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The Impact of Ownership Structure and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on  
Firm Performance, Accounting Discretions and 
Investor Perceptions: Evidence from Thailand 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
 
Abstract 
 
A weak corporate governance system and high ownership concentration with dominant family 
shareholders, in particular, were claimed by the World Bank to be the main causes of the 1997 
financial crisis in Thailand. Consequently, the Thai government embarked on a high-profile 
program of corporate governance reforms in order to regain investor confidence in the capital 
market. This thesis aims to provide systematic, empirical evidence on whether the ownership 
structure was really the key reason for the crisis and if the reforms have worked as well as they 
were intended to. Focused on the period from 1994 to 2007, the first study within this thesis 
examines the impact of ownership structure on accounting and market performance. The second 
study examines the impact of ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms 
(such as the board of directors, CEO characteristics and external auditors) on managers’ 
opportunistic accounting discretion, as measured by unsigned discretionary accruals and 
revenues. The third study examines how investors perceive the impact of these governance 
structures. All three studies take into account whether the reforms helped to improve corporate 
governance.  
The key findings of the first and second studies support the notion of an alignment effect, 
suggesting that high levels of ownership help to motivate most types of large shareholders to 
participate in the monitoring of firms. They suggest that high ownership concentration, 
especially by families, enhances firm performance and limits the use of managers’ opportunistic 
accounting discretion. Other types of large shareholders appear to have only played a significant 
role before the reforms, suggesting that the reforms might have reduced the motivation or ability 
of blockholders to participate in monitoring. There is evidence that boards of directors failed to 
enhance firm performance and to limit the use of accounting discretion before and after the 
	   iii 
reforms. The third study suggests that investors have an extremely negative perception of 
government and foreign company investors and, in turn, underestimate the performance of firms 
with high ownership by these shareholders. Investors also have negative perceptions of the size 
and independence of boards before the reforms. It appears that the reforms helped to mitigate 
their negative perception of boards, even though board efficiency did not significantly improve 
following the reforms.  
The three sets of results contribute to our understanding of the particularities of corporate 
governance systems in emerging capital markets such as Thailand, which contradicts the view of 
the World Bank. Thailand’s corporate governance reforms have been partly successful in 
remedying investors’ loss of confidence in some key corporate governance structures. However, 
further understanding of key governance structures by policy makers and more efficient 
monitoring processes by regulators are needed in order to ensure that these mechanisms are 
applicable and function as efficiently as they are intended to in practice. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and Research Questions 
Ownership concentration/Block ownership is an important source of power within a 
corporation. Nevertheless, imbalances between ownership, control and monitoring may 
provide opportunities for some parties to exploit others. For example, Berle and Means 
(1932) argue that dispersed owners of a corporation have little incentive and insufficient 
power to monitor managers and firms; without efficient monitoring, managers are able 
to gain almost complete control and reap private benefits with little cost to themselves.  
Subsequently, academics have suggested that many corporations around the world still 
have combined ownership and control (for examples, see La Porta et al, 1999; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). While this characteristic could reduce the conflict of interests 
between managers and owners, it may also lead to a conflict of interests between 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders. In an imperfect world, where 
transaction costs occur, there are likely to be agency problems, derived from conflicts of 
interest within corporations, and therefore there is a need for corporate governance in 
firms with dispersed or concentrated ownership, in order to minimise these conflicts 
(Hart, 1995a).  
Both concentrated and dispersed ownership structures can cause conflicts of interest but, 
in each case, the conflicts occur between different groups of people. Corporate 
governance mechanisms that are designed and implemented in the context of dispersed 
ownership may therefore not work efficiently in the context of concentrated ownership. 
For example, many mechanisms have been introduced in the past to solve the incentive 
problem in dispersed ownership contexts. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose the use 
of managerial ownership to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. After 
the publication of their seminal paper, many firms introduced stock-based compensation 
and bonus schemes. Subsequent research has found evidence to support the alignment of 
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interest hypothesis where managerial ownership is not too high (e.g. see Cui and Mak, 
2002; Davies et al., 2005; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Short and 
Keasey, 1999). On the other hand, where ownership is concentrated, managerial 
ownership may not efficiently align managers’ interests, as the theory suggests, because 
most owners in concentrated firms may intend to retain ownership and control. 
Other mechanisms might not work efficiently. For example boards of directors are 
introduced to supervise managers (e.g. see Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, where 
ownership is concentrated, a director might not supervise managers effectively because 
she/he is the same person or comes from the same group as the managers (such as the 
same family).  
This thesis focuses on the role of ownership structure and other corporate governance 
mechanisms in the context of Thailand. Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the 
World Bank claimed that poor corporate governance and, in particular, the existence of 
dominant shareholders who effectively controlled listed companies for their own 
interests were key contributing factors to the corporate crisis, which seriously affected 
Thailand’s economy. Partly as a consequence of the World Bank’s analysis and 
recommendations, the Thai government embarked on a high-profile program of 
corporate governance reforms from 1999 onwards in order to regain investor confidence 
in the capital market. Hence corporate governance mechanisms, especially the role of 
boards, have been underlined (through director training programmes or the requirement 
to introduce an audit committees, for instance) with the aim of increasing board 
efficiency. 
The former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun gave his view on the Thai corporate 
governance reform at the 2nd National Director Conference 2013, Thailand, on 12 June 
2013:  
“The establishment of the Thai Institute of Directors Association and the 
subsequent development of a corporate governance framework were a 
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direct response to that experience1. Thanks to the substantial efforts made 
in training thousands of company directors, and in promoting corporate 
governance awareness, many Thai companies – from banks to 
manufacturers – have made remarkable strides in enhancing their 
professionalism, and management and governance structure. 
 Yet we must acknowledge that significant gaps remain, both in the 
private and the public sectors. Improvements in corporate governance 
have been generally limited to listed companies, and even in that 
category, more can and needs to be done. 
 Amongst the listed companies, improvements are concentrated in the top 
echelon of companies that have diversified ownership or shareholder 
structures. Outside of these companies, corporate governance remains 
relatively weak, especially in the following three groups: 
 First, the large listed companies which are family-owned; 
 Second, the listed government-controlled state enterprises whose 
governance practices are becoming more and more worrisome; 
 The third – comprising the largest group of listed companies – is the 
midsize listed companies whose gaps in corporate governance are the 
greatest” (Panyarachun, 2013). 
Hence high ownership concentration in Thai listed firms has been viewed as an obstacle 
to the function of other corporate governance mechanisms. Nevertheless, there is still no 
empirical evidence to support whether the international corporate governance 
frameworks, which have been developed in dispersed ownership contexts, can work 
efficiently in contexts of highly concentrated ownership such as Thailand and an 
emerging economy. Therefore, the three empirical studies in this thesis aim to provide 
more complete evidence. 
The first empirical study (Chapter 4) examines the impact of ownership structure on firm 
performance and the second (Chapter 5) examines the impact of ownership structure and 
other corporate governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors, CEO 
characteristics and external auditors, on accounting discretion. The final study (Chapter 
6) examines whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership structure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “[t]hat experience” refers to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, which affected to Thailand, 
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and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. In addition, all three 
empirical studies take account of the Thai corporate governance reforms. 
1.2 Research Motivations 
The three empirical studies in this thesis are conducted in the context of Thailand, an 
emerging economy that suffered from the Asian financial crisis and subsequently 
attempted to recover its capital market by the introduction of high-profile corporate 
governance reforms that were adopted from international corporate governance 
frameworks.  
The first empirical study (Chapter 4) is mainly motivated by the comments of the World 
Bank, in which dominant shareholders, especially families, were cited as a key cause of 
the financial crisis even though, according to the existing literature, family ownership is 
one of the best structures in terms of reducing the agency problem within a corporation 
(for examples, see Bertrand et al., 2008; Fama and Jensen, 1983: James, 1999). Given 
that the corporate governance structures (in terms of legal shareholder protection and 
enforcement) were weak before the reforms, high ownership concentration may have 
acted as a substitute for the weak shareholder protection. 
Research from Thailand, prior to the crisis, reveals that Thai listed firms with dominant 
shareholders, especially families, performed better than those without dominant 
shareholders (Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Yammeesri, 2003; Yammeesri and Lodh, 2004). 
However, this research was conducted over short periods, before and after the 1997 
financial crisis.  
A limitation of short-term empirical study may accurately provide the impact of 
ownership structure on firm performance within a limited time frame but may not 
efficiently reflect the impact’s change since the corporate governance reforms. In fact 
the reforms that partly aim to strengthen roles of board of directors and rights of 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders may unintendedly reduce a motivation of 
large shareholders/dominant shareholders to contribute to firms. The stronger corporate 
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governance may also motivate these shareholders to seek for a leeway to protect their 
interests.  
Ownership concentration is an important governance mechanism, especially in emerging 
economies that could affect to an efficiency of other governance mechanisms. Therefore, 
an interesting question is whether the impact of ownership structure on firm 
performance changes after the significant changes in corporate governance reforms. An 
appropriate answer to this question would extend an understanding on existing literature 
about the role of ownership structure on firm performance where other corporate 
governance mechanisms are stronger. Additionally, it may potentially benefit to policy 
makers for developing appropriate governance policies in the context of emerging 
economies. 
Therefore, this study is motivated by these reasons to re-examine the impact of 
ownership structure on firm performance over a longer period, from 1994 to 2007, 
which covers two major events in Thailand: the financial crisis and the corporate 
governance reforms.  
The contradiction between the views of the World Bank and the findings of research 
also provide motivation for the second empirical study (Chapter 5) to investigate 
whether the superior performance of concentrated firms with dominant shareholders is 
partly due to the opportunistic use of managers’ accounting discretion to manipulate 
earnings, for example.  
In fact, the large corporate scandals during the last decade, even in developed capital 
markets such as the US and the UK, have revealed that accounting discretions were used 
by managers to provide misleading information on firms’ financial positions and 
performance (Giroux, 2008; Jensen, 2005). While accounting standards allow managers 
to exercise their judgment over financial reporting so that it reflects position and 
performance more accurately, the scandals have created a negative assumption that 
accounting discretions are used opportunistically (Jiraporn et al., 2008). Academics and 
policy makers have therefore focused on the role of ownership structure and other 
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corporate governance mechanisms in the prevention and detection of opportunistic 
accounting discretion, as in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US. 
In Thailand, since the financial crisis, the Thai government has been committed to 
improving the reliability and integrity of financial reporting (World Bank, 1998) and the 
corporate governance reforms have included accounting standards reform. Thai 
accounting standards have been gradually adjusted in line with international financial 
reporting standards, with the ultimate aim of fully adopting them.  
Research from the US (for example, Wang, 2006) suggests that ownership structures, 
such as family ownership, contribute positively to the quality of financial reporting. 
However, research in the context of East Asian countries including Thailand reports 
lower quality of reported earnings due to high ownership concentration. It is argued that 
this structure reduces the incentive and motivation for the preparers of financial reports 
to report high quality earnings (Ball et al., 2003) and increases opportunities for them to 
mislead the markets (Fan and Wong, 2002). Therefore, the second empirical study is 
motivated to investigate whether ownership concentration facilitates or limits managers’ 
opportunistic accounting discretion (such as discretionary accruals and revenues) and 
whether the reforms have helped to reduce it.  
The two empirical studies mentioned above focus on the role of ownership structure and 
other corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating the agency problem. However, the 
investors’ point of view on the role of these mechanisms is still missing. 
With very limited evidence from the existing literature, the third empirical study 
(Chapter 6) attempts to provide a clearer understanding about whether investors can 
correctly perceive the impact of ownership structure and the role of corporate 
governance on firm performance. The way investors think about these structures may 
affect how they value firms, regardless of whether the corporate governance system 
actually works well or not in practice. 
 	  
Chapter 1	  
7	  
The third study is also motivated by the key objective of the corporate governance 
reforms to regain investor confidence in the capital market; the success of the reforms is 
subject to how well the government can educate investors to perceive the role of 
corporate governance structures and their impact on firms more accurately. 
1.3 Contributions to Knowledge 
This thesis contributes to the literature on ownership structure and corporate governance 
reforms in several ways. 
Chapter 4 provides more complete evidence on the impact of ownership structure on 
firm performance. Although most of Thai listed firms are owned by family blockholders, 
there still is a presence of other types of blockholders in many listed firms. Therefore, 
this study investigates the impact by considering key different types of shareholders, 
which are family, government, foreign investors, banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. Theoretically, each shareholder’s type has its own motivations and 
incentives to hold substantial shares in firms. Therefore, evidence of this chapter may 
contribute to a current knowledge about the role of different types of shareholders to 
monitor firms within the same institutional environments, Thailand.   
Using a unique set of data from Thailand, this study effectively identifies the ultimate 
shareholders in listed firms and therefore benefits from an improved quality of 
ownership data. It covers periods before and after the financial crisis and the corporate 
governance reforms. This allows the study to explore whether the impact of ownership 
structure on firm performance significantly changes after the corporate governance 
reforms. Hence it impliedly adds to a growing body of literature on whether corporate 
governance reforms actually result in benefits to firms in the context of emerging 
economies.  
The evidence from Chapter 5 adds to the limited literature in the context of emerging 
markets about the impact of ownership structure and other corporate governance 
mechanisms (such as board structure, CEO characteristics and auditor reputation and 
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expertise) on managers’ opportunistic accounting discretion and provides evidence of 
whether the reforms have helped to limit opportunistic behaviour. This study applies 
accruals-based approaches (such as the cross-sectional Jones and modified Jones 
Models) and revenue-based approaches (Stubben, 2010) in order to measure managers’ 
accounting discretion and attempts to improve the measurement of accounting discretion 
by integrating both approaches. 
Evidence from this chapter may contribute to an integrated literature on accounting and 
corporate governance about the roles of the various types of ownership structure and 
corporate governance mechanisms on quality of financial reporting in the context of 
high ownership concentration. It also may provide an evidence of whether the corporate 
governance reforms have made any significant influence to the impacts in turn either 
limiting or enhancing the use of managers’ opportunistic accounting discretion. 
Chapter 6 contributes to the very limited literature on investor perceptions by providing 
evidence in more general cases on how investors perceive the impact of ownership 
structure and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. This study 
applies the naïve hypothesis (Sloan, 1996) and OLS methodology (Kraft et al., 2007) 
that is typically used in accounting research to investigate investor perceptions of 
ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms in Thailand.  
Evidence from this chapter may contribute to the knowledge of literature whether 
investors’ perception on ownership structure and other corporate governance 
mechanisms influence to the way investors use financial and non-financial information 
to predict firms’ future performance. The results may provide an indication of the 
success of the Thai corporate governance reforms by confirming whether the reforms 
that aimed to promote the role of boards of directors and the transparency of financial 
reporting and disclosure actually helped to improve the accuracy of investor perceptions. 
Finally, evidence from all three empirical studies contributes to our understanding of the 
impact of ownership concentration and other key governance mechanisms on firm 
performance, accounting discretion and investor perceptions before and after the Thai 
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corporate governance reform. They also provide evidence whether the reforms help to 
improve these impacts. These would provide a basis on which policy makers and 
regulators could design suitable corporate governance systems for the Thai capital 
market that might be applicable in other emerging economics. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis includes seven chapters. Three of them are empirical studies on the impact of 
ownership structure and other corporate governance characteristics on firm performance, 
managers’ accounting discretion and investors’ perception of corporate governance 
variables, respectively.  
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework on agency theory, which forms the basis of 
understanding of the roles of ownership structure and corporate governance, and briefly 
discusses the main differences in corporate governance between developed and 
emerging economies.  
Chapter 3 explores the corporate governance system in Thailand in order to build up a 
picture of how governance mechanisms worked and how they may be expected to have 
improved after the reforms.  
The first empirical study on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance 
before and after the reforms is discussed in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 5 presents the second empirical study, which examines the impact of ownership 
structure and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting 
discretion before and after the reforms.  
The third empirical study, reported in Chapter 6, investigates whether investors correctly 
perceive the impact of ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms 
on firm performance before and after the reforms.  
Finally, Chapter 7 provides concluding remarks, addresses some research limitations and 
provides suggestions on potential topics for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Agency Theory, Ownership Structure and 
Corporate Governance: An Overview 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews agency theory in order to frame theoretical explanations of the role 
of ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms in firm performance, 
managers’ accounting discretion and investor perception. The beginning of this chapter 
explains briefly the nature of the firm, as developed in economic theory, which is the 
basis for the development of agency theory.  
In the second section, agency theory and agency problem are explored in general and in 
the context of a modern corporation. A seminal argument of Berle and Means (1932), 
about the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations, is discussed in 
the third section. The fourth section discusses the roles of different types of ownership 
structure in the agency problem, while the fifth looks at motivation and its implication 
for the types of shareholders. The sixth and seventh sections present the roles of 
corporate governance and some corporate governance mechanisms aiming to reduce the 
agency problem. The final section provides a chapter summary and conclusion. 
2.2 Theories of the Firm: Definitions of a Firm 
Neo-Classical economists view the firm as a “black box” that is driven by its production 
functions (i.e. demand and supply) (Figure 2.1). A firm is assumed to be operated by a 
self-interested owner-manager, who chooses levels of inputs (xn) and outputs (Q) that 
maximise profit or minimise cost in a “perfect” environment, i.e. one in which all 
contracts are completed and are enforced without cost (Jensen, 1983).  
This traditional theory, however, says nothing about the technology used in production 
or the motivation of actors (i.e. employee and employer) to make decisions and initiate 
processes that maximise profit (Simon, 1997). Therefore, the theory ignores internal 
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organisation problems involving people, and the role of information within the firm – 
making the black-box firm far from a reality (i.e. Fama, 1980; Hart, 1995a; Jensen, 
1983).  
To broaden the traditional theory, a firm is viewed as “a legal entity that serves as a 
nexus for a complex set of contracts (written and unwritten) among disparate 
individuals” (Jensen, 1983: 326) (Figure 2.2). The agents in a contractual relationship 
include not only employees but also others, such as suppliers, creditors and customers. 
According to Jensen (1983:327), this definition recognises the firm as “the complex 
contractual system” in which conflicting objectives of contract parties are maximised to 
achieve equilibrium. In this view, the firm is not treated as an individual that can operate 
itself; indeed, it is likely that the behaviour of firms is affected by the behaviour of the 
contract agents. On the other hand, the contract agents’ behaviour is also influenced by 
“internal rules”1 specified in the contract (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The traditional view of a firm is still useful in developing theories to help us understand, 
for example, how a price system affects resource allocation and production output. In 
addition, to treat a firm as a nexus of contracts helps economists to think of it in a way 
that is closer to the reality of firms, which are faced with problems in the areas of motive 
and preference (Demsetz, 1983; Jensen, 1983). This definition also helps economists to 
understand how the owners of a firm interact with different agents, with different 
objectives and levels of risk-bearing, in order to achieve profit maximisation (Laffont, J., 
2002), and how contract agents respond to changes in the contract environment (Jensen, 
1983).  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In general, the “ internal rules” specified in the contract consist of at least three systems: 1) the assigned 
decision rights of each contract agents, 2) the system of performance evaluation and 3) the payoff (reward) 
system (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1983). Similarly, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the contract 
structure contains 1) rules about the distribution of “residual claims” (the rights of each contract party) and 
2) rules that govern the “decision process” (including performance criteria and payoff). 
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Figure 2.1: Firm as a black-box firm          Figure 2.2: Firm as a nexus of contracts 
2.3 Agency Theory 
Agency theory has been developed in the light of contractual frameworks, focusing 
mainly on incentive problems arising from differences in objectives and risk preferences 
among contract parties (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976: 
308), an “agency relationship” occurs under a contractual framework between two or 
more persons, when one person (the principal) engages another person (the agent) to 
perform specific work on his/her behalf. The principal delegates the tasks, together with 
decision rights over his/her assets, to the agent and offers them payment through the 
contract. The relationship is commonly found in wider society2 and expands to multiple 
principals, multiple agents and multiple actions and decisions (Hart, 1995a). 
Agency theory is built on two basic behavioural assumptions. Firstly, both principals 
and agents are assumed to be rational3, making decisions that maximise their utility. 
Secondly, given specific opportunities, both principal and agent can also engage in 
opportunism, derived from “self-interests seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1996: 6).  
Self-interest and incentives of individuals are the main sources of opportunistic 
behaviour (Jensen, 1994; Williamson, 1996). Simon (1997: 88) suggests that it is 
necessary to think about “rationality” together with “human selfishness and struggles for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For example, the relationships between doctors and patients, employees and employers, lawyers and 
clients or shareholders and managers are all principal-agent relationships. 
3 Rational behaviour is defined by Simon (1997:88) as a “human behaviour that is intendedly rational, but 
only boundedly so.” This definition suggests that an individual intends to make a “comprehensive rational 
economic decision” to maximise their utility (for example). However, they cannot always do so because of 
their cognitive limitations (for example). 
Inputs (xn) 	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power”, because selfishness and power cause individuals to “strive rationally to advance 
their own personal goals” rather than those of the organisation. Therefore, if 
opportunities are recognised, rational humans always choose options in which they are 
better off (Jensen, 1994).  
There are many forms of opportunistic behaviour recognised in existing literature (such 
as cheating, perquisites, shrinking, stealing and distorted information) in which hidden 
actions provide benefits to one party (the agent) but create expenses for other parties (the 
principals) (Clegg and Balley, 2008; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Nagin, 2002; Schipper, 
1989). 
Since an agent may not perfectly act for the best interests of the principal, it is likely that 
the principal will have a strong motivation to minimise costs incurred from the incentive 
problem (i.e. agency costs) through, for example, monitoring or bonding (Jensen, 1994; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
2.3.1 Agency Problem: A General Framework  
The agency problem arises when an agent uses delegated power over a principal’s assets 
on behalf of his/her own interests rather than those of the principal. Asymmetric 
information and transaction costs are the key factors that make the problem significant. 
Without these two constraints, the principal and the agent have the same information, in 
the sense that the actions of the agent are observable and verifiable by the principal 
without cost. In addition, the principal may solve the agency problem by writing a 
comprehensive contract that covers all possible future events and by designing 
monitoring4 to observe, verify and control the agent’s actions. The principal may also 
motivate the agent by introducing an incentive scheme that ties payment to observed 
performance. In reality, writing the comprehensive contract and implementing 
monitoring and enforcement are costly (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), monitoring includes a principal’s efforts to control the 
behaviour of its agent such through an incentive scheme, compensation or operational rules. 	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According to Hart (1995a), transaction costs incurred from uncertainty, inefficient 
negotiation and enforcement limit a principal’s scope for writing a complete contract; it 
is difficult for one to know and to plan for future contingencies. It is also difficult for 
principals to negotiate between contract parties to reach a complete contract and to make 
it enforceable by third parties such as a court5. Revising or renegotiating during a 
contract’s life may also be costly. Therefore, it is likely that a principal will write an 
incomplete contract, which “contains gaps and missing provisions” (Hart, 1995a: 23). 
This implies that a gap of information remains between the principal and the agent.  
When a contract is incomplete, divergence of interests between the principal and the 
agent becomes a problem only if there is an asymmetry of information between the 
principal and the agent (Hart, 1995a; Simon, 1997). A skilled agent, who is directly 
involved in a work process, has opportunities to access inside information, which the 
principal may not know. Information gaps make it difficult for a principal to completely 
supervise, monitor and evaluate the actual actions and performance of an agent (this is 
known as “moral hazard”) (Fama, 1980). It is also difficult for a principal to identify the 
ability of an agent to carry out delegated tasks (known as “adverse selection”). In 
addition, it is hard for a principal to make the agent understand his/her actual objectives 
(Simon, 1997). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency cost incurred from the principal-agent 
relationship is defined as the sum of three costs: 1) monitoring costs, to the principal; 2) 
bonding costs, to the agent; and 3) residual loss. Monitoring costs arise when a principal 
attempts to control an agent by implementing monitoring activities such as auditing, 
incentive plans, budget restrictions or operating provisions. Bonding expenditures are 
paid by an agent to guarantee that they will avoid activities that are harmful to the 
principal’s wealth, or to compensate for the loss from such activities. In reality, it is hard 
to believe that monitoring and bonding activities can perfectly control an agent’s actions. 
Therefore, a remaining cost incurred from a divergence of an agent’s decision is termed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  For example, the role of the courts is more costly in the US than other countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997) and legal processes take time. 
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“residual loss”. Jensen and Meckling (1976) assert that agency costs may arise in any 
activities in society that relate to “corporative effort” such as in hospitals, universities or 
corporations.  
2.3.2 The Agency Problem in an Open Corporation: The Separation of 
Ownership and Control 
It is worth noting a definition of property rights or ownership of assets because it 
determines how costs and benefits are distributed to participants in firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), particularly when a contract is incomplete (Hart, 1995a). Property 
rights (or ownership of assets) is the right to use assets, the right to receive returns from 
the assets, the right to change the assets’ form or substance or to transfer all or some 
parts of the rights to the assets (i.e. sell or rent) (Furuboton and Pejovich, 1972, 1974 
cited in Williamson, 1996: 222). When the contract is not specified, Hart (1995a) asserts 
that the owner of the assets has “residual control rights”6 to decide what to do with the 
assets. The owner also bears risks incurred from exercising property rights over the 
assets (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
A corporation is one form of organisation. It seeks external financial resources by selling 
prospective returns to those who supply capital, either in the form of debt (i.e. creditors) 
or equity (i.e. shareholders) (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). In an open corporation7, the 
property rights of the corporation (residual claims) are distributed in the form of 
common stocks, which are associated with rights to the corporation’s net cash flows to 
the shareholders who supply funds (residual claimants) (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The 
residual claims attached to common stock are unrestricted and can be “freely alienable”8. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Normally, an owner of an asset has both a “residual control right” over the asset and a “residual income” 
from the asset. For example, a shareholder has a right to vote and has a right to receive dividend or capital 
gain from a share. Nevertheless, a share may not have one-share one-vote feature.  
7 In the work of Fama and Jensen (1983), the term “open corporation” is used instead of “public 
corporation” to describe a corporation traded in the capital market, because the latter term can mean a 
state-owned organisation. An open corporation is distinguished from a closed (private) corporation in the 
sense that it is supplied capital by outsiders, who have residual claims on the corporation (i.e. it is traded 
in the capital markets) (Fama and Jensen, 1985). The open corporation is also complex in the sense that 
special knowledge is difficult to transfer among the contract agents (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
8 i.e. Shareholders can sell or transfer their common stocks to others without the approval of other 
shareholders (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
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In addition, shareholders, who own common stocks, are not required to participate in a 
corporation’s operation (Fama and Jensen, 1983).   
In practice, it is less efficient for a corporation to have all shareholders9 participating in 
every decision; it may increase bureaucratic costs (i.e. salaries and perquisites) or 
increase opportunities for small shareholders to shirk their tasks10 (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972). In addition, specific knowledge relevant to different decisions in the 
open corporation is likely to be diffused among the contract agents (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Therefore, shareholders are likely to delegate their decision making to an agent or 
group of agents who have valuable, relevant and specific knowledge and skills (i.e. 
management). Management takes a role as a coordinator of the corporation in order to 
operate and make decisions on the allocation of a firm’s resources on behalf of 
shareholders’ interests (Fama, 1980). Therefore, the relationship between shareholders 
and managers of a corporation clearly is an agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; 309). If shareholders and managers can access the same information without 
transaction costs, the agency problem and the concept of ownership is irrelevant (Fama, 
1980). 
In respect to large, modern corporations, Berle and Means (1932: 9) raise a concern over 
a separation of ownership and control, as they state in their classic book, “The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property”.  
“It has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right both to 
use his property as he sees fit and to receive the full fruits of its use, his 
desire for personal gain, for profits, can be relied upon as an effective 
incentive to his efficient use of any industrial property he may possess. 
In the quasi-public corporations, such an assumption no longer holds. As 
we have seen, it is no longer the individual himself who uses his wealth. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Alchian and Demsetz (1972) propose that shareholders of corporation are viewed as “investors” who are 
more optimistic than other investors (i.e. bondholders) about firm’s future performance, rather than being 
viewed as “joint owners” in the sense of traditional owners. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) use a term 
“financier” for referring to investors who provide funds to the corporation and expect future returns from 
their funds. 
10 This is because costs from making poor decisions are distributed not only to the shareholder who makes 
the poor decisions but also to other shareholders.	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Those in control of that wealth, and therefore in a position to secure 
industrial efficiency and produce profits, are no longer, as owners, 
entitled to the bulk of such profits. Those who control the destinies of the 
typical modern corporation own so insignificant a fraction of the 
company’s stock that the returns from running the corporation profitably 
accrue to them in only a very minor degree. The stockholders, on the 
other hand, to whom the profits of the corporation go, cannot be 
motivated by those profits to a more efficient use of the property, since 
they have surrendered all disposition of it to those in control of the 
enterprise.” 
Berle and Means (1932) claim that modern corporations, open corporations owned by 
many small shareholders, have increasingly dominated the organisational structures of 
large U.S. corporations since the 1930s. The diffused corporation leads to a divorce of 
ownership from control. According to their thesis, shareholders diversify their 
investment risks by investing a little in each corporation. High diversification reduces 
shareholders’ motivation to participate in the firm by, for example, being active in 
management or providing efficient monitoring to limit the misconduct of managers. At 
the same time, managers, who hold little or no shares in the corporation, are delegated 
power over the firm’s resources. In other words, the property rights over a corporation’s 
assets can be separated into “passive property”, which gives rights but no control to 
shareholders, and “active property”, which allows managers control with a little 
ownership. The separation of ownership and control creates opportunities for managers 
to enjoy private benefits at the expense of shareholders.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that it is likely that the large open corporation 
with diversified shareholders will face agency problems. They assert that “[i]t should be 
no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the ‘separation of ownership and 
control’ in the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately associated with the 
general problem of agency” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 309).  
Nevertheless, Berle and Means’ argument has been controversial among academics who 
contest whether the owners of modern corporations actually ignore their control over 
corporations and leave it to the managers. Demsetz (1983: 393) argues that “[i]n a world 
in which self-interest plays a significant role in economic behaviour, it is foolish to 
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believe that owners of valuable resources systematically relinquish control to managers 
who are not guided to serve their interests.” Demsetz (1983) asserts that, when 
necessary, dispersed shareholders will become sufficiently concentrated to provide 
guidance or to vote against opportunistic management. The concentration of ownership, 
particularly after incidences of poor performance, only partly solves the problem. To 
ensure against management opportunism, shareholders demand a continuous monitoring 
process, a board of directors or executive compensations, to oversee managers and 
protect their interests.  
In addition, competitive markets, in particular the market for corporate control, the 
managerial labour market and the stock market can limit managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour (for examples, see Demsetz, 1983; Fama and Jensen, 1983). For example, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the stock market can create a pressure for corporate 
managers to align with shareholders’ interests because of the demand for capital 
financing, for example. Because stock price reflects corporate current and future 
performance, it also reflects the managers’ performance. Therefore, dissatisfied 
shareholders can either sell their stocks or collect them to vote against poor managers in 
a tender offer or proxy fight. 
Similarly, Fama (1980) proposes that the managerial labour market can help to resolve 
the incentive problem by disciplining managers. Assuming that the capital market is 
efficient, managers’ wages and compensation are likely to depend on their performance. 
Shareholders can assess managers’ performance via past and current corporate 
performance and revise their contracted wages accordingly. In addition, the market 
perception of a manager’s ability is likely to be remembered and to affect his/her future 
wages if they switch to new firms. Poor managers are therefore punished for poor 
performance. The “wage revision process” can motivate managers not to deviate from 
shareholders’ interests. Nevertheless, the success of this mechanism is subject to 
sufficient weight in the wage revision process to resolve possible problems from 
managers’ incentives. 
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Later evidence on ownership concentration in many open corporations inside and 
outside the US. further weakens the argument of Berle and Means on the separation of 
ownership and control (for example, see Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Gugler et al., 2008; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988;  Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, for 
evidence in the US and see Berglöf and Perrotti; 1994, Carney and Child, 2013; 
Claessens et al. 1999, 2000; Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Gugler et al., 2008; Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Prowse, 1992; and Wiwattanakantang, 2001 for 
evidence outside the US).  
Although, Berle and Means’ argument has been controversial among academics, it has 
been widely cited and has become a primary concept of corporate governance 
development11.  
2.4 Ownership Structure, Control, and the Agency Problem: 
Theoretical Explanation 
In the context of a corporation, Grossman and Hart (1986) suggest that ownership (in the 
form of common shares) is a source of shareholders’ “residual rights of control”, giving 
shareholders the right to participate in the corporation. Therefore, the size and 
distribution of ownership has an important effect on the degrees of power and incentive 
that shareholders have to monitor in the corporation.  
Existing research normally classifies ownership structure into two main types based on 
the distribution of common shares (with voting rights) among shareholders. Ownership 
is dispersed if common shares with voting rights are distributed to many small 
shareholders and each shareholder owns a small fraction of the shares in the firm. In 
contrast, ownership is concentrated if significant fractions of shares with voting rights 
are distributed to individuals or small groups of shareholders. Both dispersed and 
concentrated ownerships can create serious agency problems if the distribution of 
ownership and control is inappropriate and monitoring is weak.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For example, in the establishment of the U.S. SEC since 1934 and the development of the OECD 
principles of corporate governance since 1999. 
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2.4.1 Dispersed Ownership and the Agency Problem 
Dispersed ownership limits shareholders’ motivation and power to participate in 
monitoring processes. Monitoring is costly and time-consuming (Diamond, 1984). It is 
no surprise that diffused shareholders may not engage in monitoring because the costs 
may exceed their residual rights to a firm’s profits. In addition, each diffused 
shareholder has a certain amount of control over a firm, relative to his/her level of 
ownership. Therefore, it is not easy for individual shareholders to successfully vote 
against managers or to collect voting rights to challenge managers. 
At the same time, control is concentrated in hands of the managers, who enjoy free 
exercise of control over a firm’s resources (La Porta et al, 1999: 471). Under these 
circumstances, the separation of ownership and control in dispersed corporations widens 
the gap of information between managers and shareholders and can lead to serious 
conflicts of interests between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals).  
For example, Gogineni et al. (2012) report that the agency problem is more severe in 
open corporations than in private firms with single owner-managers. In addition, they 
found that firms that move from being private firms to being open corporations 
experience more agency problems. This is evidence of the free-rider problem, in which 
diffused shareholders have less incentive to bear the costs of monitoring. 
This characteristic of ownership and control mostly exists in large corporations, 
particularly in developed countries such as the US (for examples, see Berle and Means, 
1932) and the UK (for example, see Goergen et al., 2005: 287).  
2.4.2 Managerial Ownership and Agency Theory 
Separation of ownership creates opportunities for self-interested managers to engage in 
opportunistic actions by, for example, increasing their wealth via excessive 
compensation, perquisites or shirking, without sharing the costs. 
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The earliest literature on ownership structure and firm performance attempts to solve the 
agency problem in dispersed firms, incurred via the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that the fractions of shares owned by managers are 
theoretically linked to managers’ incentives. In particular, they suggest that, with higher 
ownership stakes, managers have more incentive to maximise firm value with less 
consumption of executive perks, because they share wealth and loss like other 
shareholders. Therefore, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that managerial ownership 
can help to minimise agency cost by aligning the interests of shareholders and managers, 
leading to higher firm performance (an “alignment effect”).  
However, another strand of literature posits “an entrenchment effect” in firms where 
managerial ownership is too high (Stulz, 1988). Managers with more voting power can 
protect themselves from internal or external control and discipline (Morck et al., 1988; 
Denis and McConnell, 2003; Lins, 2003). It is also difficult for other shareholders to 
dismiss poorly performing managers who have significant voting rights in a firm; 
managers become entrenched if they hold too many shares in the firms.  
In contrast, Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that ownership 
structure is designed by each organisation to be at the optimal level at which profits are 
maximised. In other words, the owners of a company have always traded off between 
benefits and costs by being diffused or concentrated, due to market pressures. 
Managerial ownership levels are therefore expected to be endogenously determined and 
to reflect the existence of other corporate governance mechanisms such as managerial 
labour markets (Fama, 1980), the market for corporate control (Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
the composition of the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and the 
competitiveness of product markets (Demsetz, 1983). This suggests, for example, that, 
in order to avoid a discount on the market value of a firm (as investors expect to be at 
risk from managerial exploitation), owner-managers adjust their managerial ownership 
and introduce alternative corporate governance mechanisms to maximise a firm’s value.  
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However, this theory is based on the assumption of perfect market efficiency. In 
practice, markets are not always efficient; capital markets, in particular, often suffer 
from limited transparency and asymmetric information (Fan and Wong, 2002; Healey 
and Palepu, 2001; McConnell et al., 2008). Therefore, in practice, the imperfections of 
capital markets prevent firms from achieving their optimum investment (ownership) 
structures.  
2.4.3 Concentrated Ownership, Dominant Shareholders and the 
Agency Problem 
In corporations, the voting rights and cash-flow rights associated with common shares 
influence the behaviour of shareholders towards their firms. While cash-flow rights 
affect shareholders’ wealth (dividend or capital gains), control rights give shareholders 
the power to monitor managers and to protect themselves against being exploited by 
managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). As a result, incentives and the power of 
shareholders to monitor managers should increase when they hold substantial shares in 
firms.  
Ownership and control may not be absolutely separated in firms with concentrated 
ownership. A presence of one or more large shareholders/dominant shareholders is also 
common in firms with concentrated ownership. These shareholders are known as 
“dominant shareholders” or “controlling shareholders”. It is worth noting that the term, 
dominant shareholders, refers to shareholders who own, either directly or indirectly, 
substantial voting shares in firms and gain efficient control over the firms’ operations 
and policies. Theoretically, the number of shares owned by dominant shareholders 
should increase their ability to control and their incentive to control them. Dominant 
shareholders with significant control are more likely to participate in the operations, 
major decisions and policies of a firm. In many cases, they also take a management role 
in the firms – as chief executive officers or directors, for example. 
The number of outstanding shares with voting rights that identifies a shareholder as 
“dominant” ranges from 10% to 50% (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; 
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Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Hence no absolute proportion of shares indicating “control” 
is suggested by existing research. Nevertheless, Wiwattanakantang (2001) suggests that 
it is worthwhile for researchers to identify a threshold of control based on the economic 
and legal environment of each country. 
According to agency theory, dominant shareholders have more incentive to supervise 
managers’ performance because they would share any substantial loss of wealth incurred 
from a corporations’ performance and they have sufficient power to do so, with lower 
expenses. In terms of alignment of interests, other shareholders also benefit from 
monitoring provided by dominant shareholders (Barclay and Holderness, 1992; 
Holderness, 2003).  
However, if the dominant shareholders are concerned only with their own interests, they 
may put pressure on managers to act for their private benefit (Burkart et al., 1997; 
Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Holderness, 2003; Young et al., 2008). Such benefits may take 
many forms and might include transfer pricing (via related party transactions) or benefits 
in terms of personal satisfaction and reputation (Hart, 1995b). Therefore, this 
characteristic of ownership can create another serious agency problem, arising because 
of conflict of interests between two groups of principals (dominant and minority 
shareholders). 
Concentrated ownership with dominant shareholders is commonly found in European, in 
Asian countries and in some corporations in the US. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) 
reveal that 36% of the firms in their sample (from 27 wealthy economies) are widely 
held12 while 30% and 18% are owned by family and government, respectively. In 
addition, concentration is more obvious in emerging countries such as Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia (for example, see Claessens et al., 2000).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 La Porta et al. (1999) define “widely held” firms as firms that do not have dominant 
shareholders directly or indirectly owning in excess of 10% or 20% of shares. 	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2.4.4 Control Mechanisms 
According to Grossman and Hart, (1986) and Hart (1995a), owners of assets should 
ideally have significant residual rights and residual incomes generated from their assets. 
If the residual rights and residual incomes are not complementary, it may lead to 
inefficient use of corporate assets. For example, if A has control over “asset A” but B 
has substantial rights to income generated from it,  A would have less incentive to use 
“asset A” efficiently because most of the income will be given to B. B also has less 
incentive to operate “asset A” more profitably because he has to ask A for asset usage. 
This situation creates a “hold-up problem”. 
In practice, it is possible that a relationship between residual rights and residual incomes 
is not on a one-by-one basis (Hart, 1995a). For example, in cases of dual-class shares 
with different voting rights or joint ventures in which both parties have the same 
proportion of control over joint assets but have different proportion of shared profit. 
Evidence from literature also confirms that ownership (cash-flow rights) and control 
(voting rights) may not align perfectly in reality (Becht, 1997; Bennedsen and Nielsen, 
2010; Claessens et al. 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Lemmon and Lin, 2003; Lins, 2003). 
There are several mechanisms, such as pyramidal structures, dual-class shares and cross-
shareholding structures, that dominant shareholders can use in order to accumulate more 
control rights than cash-flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999; Bebchuk et al., 2000; 
Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010; Claessens et al., 2000). These mechanisms allow 
dominant shareholders to hold smaller fractions of shares while they still have 
substantial control over companies. As a result, they can consume private benefits 
without sharing the full cost of their exploitation. 
According to Bebchuk et al. (2000), dual-class shares are a mechanism in which firms 
issue one or more classes of stock with different voting rights, deviating from the one-
share-one-vote13 feature of shares. For example, a firm can devise to attach more voting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 One-share-one-vote refers to shares that have votes in the same proportion to their residual 
claims (Grossman and Hart, 1988). 
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rights to shares for dominant shareholders and non-voting rights to shares sold to outside 
shareholders. Nevertheless, the use of this mechanism is prohibited by the law in some 
countries, such as Thailand (Bebchuk et al., 2000; Wiwattanakantang, 2001).  
Pyramidal ownership structure is another control mechanism. This structure involves a 
process of control in which an ultimate shareholder controls firms via layers of firms 
(Wiwattanakantang, 2001). For example, if an ultimate shareholder has substantial 
control over Company A while Company A has substantial control over Company B. As 
a result, ultimate shareholder controls Company B via Company A. This mechanism is 
commonly used outside the US, especially in Asian countries (Bebchuk et al., 2000; La 
Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). However, pyramidal structure is not as popular 
in Thailand as in other Asian countries (Claessens et al., 2000; Wiwattanakantang, 
2001).  
Cross-shareholding structures are an alternative to pyramidal ownership structures 
(Bebchuk et al. 2000) and are characterised by horizontal cross-holdings of shares within 
the same group of companies. Hence control is distributed across companies in the 
group instead of being distributed only to an ultimate shareholder. This structure can 
facilitate the power of the central controller of a group.  
The use of control mechanisms creates opportunities for ultimate shareholders who are 
dominant shareholder to exploit corporate resources without directly holding a block of 
shares and fear of the market for corporate control (Burkart et al. 1997; Bebchuk et al., 
2000). For example, dominant shareholders may wish to increase their capital without 
losing their control. They could do so by issuing shares with low dividend payments but 
more voting right than common shares. Hence this mechanism is intended by dominant 
shareholders to isolate the firms from market for corporate control (Grossman and Harts, 
1988). 
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2.5 Who Owns the Firm? Shareholders’ Identities, Incentives and 
Implications 
Shareholders represented in corporations come from various groups of people. For 
example, institutional blockholders have significant influence over firms in the UK (for 
example, see Hart, 1995b) and the US (Gugler et al., 2008). In China, firms are 
dominated mostly by the state (Liu and Sun, 2005). Additionally, family shareholders 
are found mostly in Asian countries such as Thailand (Carney and Child, 2013; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999, 2000, 2001). Limited rationality and self-interested 
assumptions imply that different types of shareholders have their own motivations and 
objectives for holding shares in firms, which in turn affect their behaviour towards the 
firms (for examples, see Denis and McConnell, 2003; Gugler et al., 2008). 
2.5.1 Family 
In general, the term “family firm” is used by researchers to refer to a firm that is owned 
and/or controlled by individuals or one/more groups of family members and/or across 
generations (for examples, see Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
In addition, large family-owners normally have an influence on management decisions 
either by directly holding top management positions (such as CEO) or by indirectly 
controlling firms as board of directors (Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010). However, criteria 
to identify a family firm are not identical across research (Miller et al., 2007).  
Differences in the factors used to identify a family firm in existing research include (1) a 
difference in the minimum threshold of shares owned by family blockholders, ranging 
from at least 5% (for examples, see Allen and Panian, 1982; Claessens et al., 2000) to 
more than 50% of voting shares (for examples, see Ang et al., 2000); (2) family 
members in different board positions, such as CEO, chairman or honorary chairman (for 
examples, see Claessens et al., 2002; Bennedsen et al., 2010); and (3) the way in which 
researchers identify the founders of a firm, their descendants or family relationships (for 
examples, see Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Miller et al. 2007).  
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For example, a firm is defined as “a family firm” if a firm’s founder or members of the 
founder’s family hold positions as CEO or other positions on the board of directors 
and/or as blockholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In 
addition, family relationships may include direct relationship by blood or marriage, such 
as fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, sons, daughters and spouses, or indirect 
relationships, such as in-laws, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and cousins, regardless of 
their surname (Bertrand et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2003; Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
Across the research, family ownership is believed to reduce the agency problem in firms 
in which ownership and control are not separated (for examples, see Bertrand et al., 
2008; Fama and Jensen, 1983: James, 1999). Indeed, most family-owned firms begin as 
closed companies and are likely to use their own resources rather than external 
resources14 (i.e. debt and external equity) to run the business (James, 1999). At later 
stages, some businesses expand their sources of funding by financing with equity and 
becoming open corporations.  
Research has documented some advantages of family firms. According to James (1999), 
family firms15 dominate other business types because they have longer prospective goals 
than do non-family firms (also see Mishra et al., 2001; Martínez et al., 2007). Family 
members are tied by close relationships not only within the immediate family but also 
across generations. James (1999) posits that family ties, love and loyalty lengthen family 
managers’ perspective on their firms. Hence family managers are more likely to avoid 
any exploitable actions that may harm the family’s wealth and to use the firm’s 
resources more efficiently. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 James (1999) suggests that the heavy use of within-firm resources comes from the fact that there is no 
recorded performance history of the younger firms to reassure their creditors (banks) about their ability to 
repay loans. Mokyr (1985 cited in James, 1999) asserts that most family firms use their own resources to 
expand their business and investment at the beginning of industrial development. This is because of a lack 
of credibility with banks and incomplete capital markets (i.e. Benedict 1968 cited by James, 1999).  
15 James (1999) defines a family firm as a private-held company that is managed and controlled by 
entrepreneurs who will transfer the company to their children on their retirement. This implies that no 
other family members are directly involved in decision making on the firms’ investments. 
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Close relationships also build “feelings of co-ownership” via private communication 
among family members (James, 1999) and firms’ decision agents (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Additionally, family members are likely to have experience or special knowledge 
of their business, which is associated with their long-term relationship with managers 
and is transferred between family members (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999). Therefore, 
the gap of information between a family (the principals) and their decision-making 
agents is reduced, allowing the family to provide efficient monitoring and discipline to 
the agents (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
In contrast, some research argues that the family firm may create a different version of 
the agency problem. For example, a succession plan to transfer business to family heirs 
may obstruct a firm’s options for hiring outside professional managers, even if the heirs 
are not particularly competent (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; James, 1999; Mehrotra et al., 
2013; Mishra et al., 2001). This may create an “idiot son” problem, at the expense of 
other shareholders (Mehrotra et al., 2013).  
According to Fama and Jensen (1985), undiversified shareholders (for example, in 
family controlled firms) may make investment decisions that divert from “value 
maximising decision” rules. This may be because family firms with highly concentrated 
shares tend to benefit from enhanced firm growth, reputation, technological innovations 
and firm survival rather than from maximised shareholder value (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003). If the incentives for families to hold shares diverge from the maximisation of a 
firm’s value (because they are only concerned with benefits for the family), this may 
lead to exploitation by dominant family shareholders through, for example, dividend 
payments, underinvestment, related party transactions or tunnelling16 (DeAngelo and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  According to Johnson et al. (2000), the term “tunnelling” is used to describe situations in which 
controlling shareholders transfer corporate assets (for example, money and/or profits) out of a firm for 
their own benefits. Tunnelling may be take the form of transferring corporate assets via self-dealing 
transactions including outright theft or fraud, a transfer pricing between companies in a controlling 
shareholders’ group, excessive compensations or loan guarantees within the group. Tunnelling also 
includes situations in which controlling shareholders increase their share values through insider trading or 
dilutive share issuing, for instance.	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DeAngelo, 2000; Fama and Jensen, 1985; Mishra et al., 2001; Morck and Yeung, 2003; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Morck and Yeung (2003) also claim that exploitation by dominant shareholders may be 
severe in family business groups. They assert that managers in business groups tend to 
work for the benefit of the controlling family rather than for other shareholders. The 
family business group also provides opportunities for the controlling family to engage in 
tunnelling by transferring wealth via their firms within the group.   
More recently, Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010) assert that the net effect of using control 
mechanisms may be worse in firms with family owner-managers. Firms may be faced 
with persistent entrenchment problems because dominant family shareholders have no 
reason to provide self-monitoring. The effect may be worse if there is a larger gap 
between the voting rights and cash-flow rights associated with shares.  
2.5.2 Government 
In many countries, some private or listed firms are partially owned and controlled by the 
government. In fact, most government-controlled firms listed in the capital market have 
been partially privatised17 from state-owned firms. Governments may decide to invest in 
private firms for political, economic or social reasons (Capobianco and Christiansen, 
2011; Chen, Firth and Xu, 2009; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Le and Buck, 2011; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), in order to save them from bankruptcy, for example, to 
encourage the development of “strategic industries” or to manage unemployment, 
inflation and the provision of social services. Consequently the objective of the 
government as an investor in private or listed companies is expected to be directed less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) define “privatization” as “a sale of a state-owned firm to the private 
sector…”. There is specific line of literature that focuses on benefits and costs of a transformation of state-
owned firms to private-owned firms (also see Boycko et al., 1996; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998). This thesis focuses on incentives for government to control 
shareholders who remain in firms after (partial) privatisation and does not intend to review the literature of 
privatisation. 
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towards profit maximisation and more towards the maximisation of social welfare18 (for 
examples, see Bös, 1991, cited in Sun et al., 2002; Downs, 1957; Shen and Lin, 2009). 
Nevertheless, government-owned firms may still enjoy some competitive advantages 
from their government shareholders. For example, firms may receive some financial 
support, such as tax exemptions or lower interest rates (Capobianco and Christiansen, 
2011). In some cases, such as postal services or airport services, these firms may also 
benefit from a monopoly (Wiwattanakantang, 1999).  
However, where the objective of government shareholder is close to profit 
maximisation, they may behave just like other blockholders. For example, Le and Buck 
(2011) argue that government may concerns about extracting tax revenues, which are 
based on firms’ profit. As a result, they may put pressure on managers to make decisions 
based on firm value maximisation. Buck et al. (2008) similarly suggest that governments 
may attempt to motivate managers with compensation in order to achieve stock 
appreciation when states are in deficit.  
Different institutional environments may also influence to government’s motivation to 
participate in firms’ monitoring. In non-competitive markets, Bös (1991, cited in Sun et 
al., 2002) suggests that governments are likely to be active in monitoring roles as 
“internal regulators”, in order to achieve a balance between the maximisation of profit 
for a firm and the maximisation of social welfare for the government. 
In contrast, in a perfectly competitive capital market, Bös (1991, cited in Sun et al., 
2002) argues that governments tend to be non-active in monitoring processes, leaving 
this responsibility to other shareholders. This may happen because the monitoring costs 
(including time and effort) are higher than political payoff (Shen and Lin, 2009) and 
may create easy opportunities for management to exploit minority shareholders (Sun et 
al., 2002). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Downs (1957) argues that the role of government in maximising social welfare is still unclear as a result 
of a difficulty in defining “social welfare” finding appropriate methods to maximise it.  
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Last, the incentives and motivations of agents of the government, whether they are 
administrators or politicians, are also an important factor that can influence government 
actions. Politicians can put pressure on managers to serve their own political objectives, 
such as seeking votes, thus diverting them from the firm’s original goals. Firms’ assets 
can be exploited to provide excess employment and wages (Boycko et al., 1996; Cuervo 
and Villalonga, 2000; Downs, 1957; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In addition, some 
policies, argued by politicians to be in the public’s interests, may actually be pursued for 
a politician’s personal benefit (Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakangtang, 2006).  
2.5.3 Institutional Investors and Banks 
Research has focused on the role of institutional investors in monitoring, disciplining 
and influencing managers. Among others, Brickley et al. (1988), Chen et al. (2005), and 
Cornett et al. (2007) suggest that the incentive for institutional investors to be willing to 
act as monitors may vary according to factors such as the type of institution (whether or 
not they are independent), size of share ownership and length of time for investment 
(liquidity).  
Pound (1988) suggests that institutional investors are normally experts in business. They 
also are likely to be restricted by legal requirements of fiduciary19 responsibilities. 
Therefore, they are likely to provide efficient monitoring with lower cost than that 
associated with diffused shareholders. He proposes hypotheses regarding conflicts of 
interest and strategic alignment, suggesting that institutional blockholders tend to vote in 
favour of managers if they have a business relationship with the firm in which they 
invest, because voting against managers may affect their business benefits.  
In respect to the agency problem, recent research classifies institutional investors into 
two main categories, “pressure-sensitive” and “pressure-insensitive”, based on their 
independence from business relationships (Brickley et al., 1988; Chen et al., 2005). 
According to Cornett et al. (2007), pressure-sensitive institutional investors are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 According to O’Brien and Bhushan (1990), concept of fiduciary is based on “a prudent person 
standard”, in which prudent person makes his/her judgment with care to deal with his/her own property 
under specific circumstances at specific time. 
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institutions that do or have the potential to do business with firms (for example, 
insurance companies or banks, via their trust departments). Therefore, pressure-sensitive 
investors may want to maintain their business relationships with firms and may be less 
likely to vote against managers. On the other hand, pressure-insensitive institutional 
investors, such as investment companies, like mutual funds, or independent advisory 
firms are more independent because they directly do business with firms. As a result, 
they are likely to be more willing to provide monitoring and discipline to managers. 
Coffee (1991) argues that a trade off between “liquidity” and “control” is an important 
factor in motivating institutional investors to be active or passive in monitoring. In fact, 
“actively trading” institutional investors with short-term goals are likely to seek liquidity 
from stock trading. For example, an open-end mutual fund has to be ready to repay or 
redeem at a customer’s request. Yet some institutional investors, such as closed-end 
funds, may accept higher risks in exchange for a discount in share value if they hold 
substantial shares in the long term, and may therefore focus on short-term performance 
but ignore their role in monitoring.  
By contrast, “indexed institutional investors”20, such as pension funds, with long-term 
strategies are induced to seek adequate “control” because they may benefit from 
opposing corporate managers.  
According to Chen et al. (2005), institutional investors who prefer monitoring to trading 
are likely to take active roles in governance but to take a passive trading position. On the 
other hand, institutional investors who prefer trading to monitoring become active 
traders but take a passive role in monitoring. They suggest that institutional investors 
choose to be active monitors or active traders based on a net offset between the costs and 
benefits of monitoring and trading. They also argue that the net benefit of monitoring is 
subject to the size of the investors’ share ownership, the duration of their investment and 
their level of independence from the business.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 According to Coffee (1991: p.1290) “indexed investors” refers to investors who apply passive 
investment strategies in which their objective is to match their portfolios with the market portfolio rather 
than to beat the market. 
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Additionally, as active monitors, institutional investors may find it easier either to obtain 
financial gain or to receive inside information because they are able to influence 
managers. These benefits may be larger when they hold larger shares in the firms. 
However, they have to pay some costs incurred from monitoring (the cost of collecting 
and analysing information). The costs will be smaller when they have a large share 
holding and/or invest for longer periods of time. As active traders, institutional investors 
bear some trading costs such as direct transaction costs, price effects from having large 
shares, or the costs incurred by seeking new firms in which to invest. However, they will 
benefit if they can access superior information. If the duration of investment and the size 
of shares are greater, the cost of trading will be greater. This may imply that institutional 
investors may be willing to provide better monitoring if they hold substantial shares in 
the long term.  
Coffee (1991) suggests that the success of institutional investors in monitoring corporate 
managers is also subject to the motivation of their agents, such as professional fund 
managers, and to whether they have incentives to align with the institutions in which 
they are employed and with their investment clients.  
Conflict of interests can also arise between fund managers and their clients if their 
incentives are not fully aligned (Barber, 2007). Barber (2007) argues that this issue is 
sensitive because sometimes a client’s objective may be not only value maximisation but 
also social issues such as forcing firms to reduce pollution. Therefore, fund managers 
who ignore social activism and focus only on maximising the value of investment 
portfolios may not serve for the best interests of their clients.  
Banks are a special type of institutional investor that can be equity owners or lenders at 
the same time. Diamond (1984) argues that, although an open market provides 
opportunities for firms to directly finance among other firms, monitoring is costly 
relative to the number of lenders (if lenders firms are owned by many small 
shareholders). Hence lenders can be faced with a free-rider problem. Diamond (1984), 
however, suggests that a close relationship between banks and their client firms can help 
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the banks to be active in monitoring firms at lower costs. Thus a close relationship with 
a bank may help to reduce information asymmetry and the free-rider problem, in turn 
reducing agency costs (Cable, 1985; Coffee, 1991; Diamond; 1984). In addition, banks, 
as owner-lenders, can offer external finance resources, such as loans, with attractive 
interest rates that lower the cost of capital (Coffee, 1991). 
Nevertheless, a coalition role of owners and lenders can create a conflict of interests 
between banks and shareholders. According to Coffee (1991), bank owner-lenders can 
be motivated to provide financial resources to corporate borrowers with costs that are 
higher than normal, in order to compensate for contingency costs such as bail-outs in 
cases of insolvency. This may benefit bank owners and managers but not other 
shareholders, who may not be willing to pay such premiums.  
Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) assert that bank owners, who are more 
concerned about the insolvency of corporate borrowers, may influence companies to 
reject high positive NPV (net present value) investments. This is because high NPV 
investments are riskier and create opportunities for loans to be defaulted, even though 
they have the potential to increase shareholders’ wealth.  
Although banks as owners are likely to be restricted from holding substantial 
proportions of shares in other companies by law21, banks in some countries, such as 
Germany or Japan, can exercise “control” that exceeds their share holdings in practice. 
For example, Before 1998, German banks had the authority to collect voting proxies and 
to vote on behalf of shareholders who had deposited shares with them (Coffee, 1991; 
Stratling, 2012).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For example, under the Anti-Monopoly Act of 1977, Japanese banks are allowed to hold no more than 
5% of shares in any domestic companies. In the US, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 limits 
American bank holding companies to hold no more than 5% of the voting shares in any non-banking 
companies. In addition, German banks on average hold shares directly less than 5% of stock in 100 largest 
German corporations (Cable, 1985). It is worth noting that while Japanese banks are prohibited from 
providing an investment banking service, by the Security and Exchange Act of 1984, German banks are 
allowed to serve either commercial banks or investment banking.  
	  	  
Chapter 2	  
35	  
Since 2003, the role of banks in corporate governance in Germany has been reduced 
gradually due to many changes in the corporate governance system. According to 
Stratling (2012), many German banks have ceased to provide proxy voting services 
because they have to bear the higher costs resulting from an enactment of the new law, 
the Control and Transparency in Enterprises Act in 1998. The law intends to protect 
deposit clients’ interests by requiring the deposit banks (either equity owners or lenders) 
to ensure that they will not use the voting proposals issued to their deposit clients for 
their own interests. This also reduces the motivation of banks to be represented on 
supervisory boards.  
The role of banks as equity shareholders and monitors has tended to increase in 
emerging markets such as Thailand, after the financial crisis in 1997 (more details are 
discussed in Chapter 3). 
2.5.4 Foreign Investors 
The international capital market provides an additional source of funds to domestic 
companies. There are two main types of foreign investment: foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI). A key difference between the two types of 
investment is the level of control they allow. While investors with FDI own substantial 
shares22 and maintain substantial control over the firms they invest in, investors with FPI 
shares will not have such substantial control (Itay, 2005). This difference may affect the 
degree of monitoring and level of contribution that investors have in a firm (for example, 
in respect to transfer of knowledge or technology). 
Multinational companies (MNCs) are an obvious example of FDI investors. The general 
purposes of MNCs’ investment in other countries are to access new markets, access new 
resources and/or to save production costs through lower labour costs or cheaper 
materials, for example. The use of invested resources in the firms is expected to generate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For example, the parent company may own 100% of the shares or partly own shares in a firm. There are 
many forms of foreign direct investment such as the establishment of new companies (as either branches 
or subsidiaries), an acquisition of company outside the host country or an international joint venture 
(Tomassen, 2004). 
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income for the parent company in the host country (Tomassen, 2004). Therefore, a 
parent company is likely to maintain substantial control over the domestic company in 
which they have invested, and this may motivate it to provide efficient monitoring.  
Boardman et al. (1997) investigate whether multi-national enterprise subsidiaries 
perform better than local companies do. He suggests that the more concentrated nature 
of ownership in MNC subsidiaries may help to reduce agency costs by providing better 
monitoring and better rewards to managers because subsidiaries’ performance affects the 
performance of their parent companies. However, the success of FDI is subject to many 
factors such as a country’s economy, the size of the market, the market and accounting 
performance of companies, and trade policies such as tax deductions or special financing 
incentives, such as grants (Blomström and Kokko, 2003; Kang and Stulz, 1997; 
Wiwattanakantang, 2001). This may imply that FDI investors might not invest as much 
in monitoring costs as much as one might expect. 
Additionally, long distances between parent companies and subsidiary companies and 
different cultures and institutional environments may limit a parent company’s ability to 
provide efficient monitoring and to access information (Boardman et al., 1997; Lin and 
Shiu, 2003; Wiwattanakantang, 1999). 
Literature on FDI also suggests that to be successful in other foreign markets, MNCs 
firms need to own unique knowledge or technologies of production or management that 
allow them to compete against local companies in the markets (for examples, see 
Blomström, 1986; Blomström and Kokko, 2003; Dunning, 1980, 1988).  
In contrast to FDI investors, FPI investors may be individuals or financial institutions. 
Their main investment objectives normally involve risk diversification and return. As a 
result, they may lack incentives to control, and they therefore take a passive role in 
monitoring. Nevertheless, this type of foreign investment may provide domestic firms 
with better access to external funding and this could pressure firms to improve their 
corporate governance and performance in order to be more attractive to foreign 
investors. 
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2.5.5 Multiple Dominant Shareholders 
Most existing research attempts to explain the role of other large shareholders in limiting 
the control of dominant shareholders. Pagano and Röell (1998) suggest that other large 
blockholders are motivated by their substantial shares to strictly monitor dominant 
shareholders in order to protect themselves from others exploitation. Volpin (2002) 
suggests that a coalition23 of minority shareholders, which creates a blockholder, is an 
efficient way to limit the control of dominant shareholders.  
It is possible for firms to have more than one dominant shareholder, each having their 
own motivation to hold substantial shares in a firm. The term “multiple dominant 
shareholders” refers to all groups of dominant shareholders who hold substantial of 
shares in the same firm.  
According to Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000), there are two possible, opposed effects 
of having multiple dominant shareholders24. Firstly, the “alignment effect” suggests that 
more cash-flow rights possessed by multiple dominant shareholders leads to more costs 
being incurred from their actions. Multiple dominant shareholders are motivated to 
generate lower private benefit extractions because they also share a substantial amount 
of these costs.  
Secondly, given that each group of multiple dominant shareholders has power of control 
over a firm and that the shares associated with cash flows and control rights are 
distributed equally among the dominant shareholders, an alignment effect can be 
expected. If not, then an unequal ownership distribution creates a “coalition formation 
effect”25. Hence it is likely that smaller dominant shareholders are motivated to form a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Specifically, coalition of minority shareholders in Volpin (2002)’s study refers to “a voting syndicate”, 
in which significant groups of shareholders sign an agreement to vote together. 
24  Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) assume that each large shareholder hold substantial shares with 
voting rights equally in firms in the sense that no one has no absolute power over the others. 
25 According to Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000), the “coalition formation effect” suggests that coalition 
shareholder who holds the smallest cash-flow rights would be the one who can exploit corporate assets 
with a smallest reduction in cash-flow rights. Hence, the smallest shareholder in controlling coalition has 
both the incentives and the substantial power obtained from controlling coalition to extract corporate 
assets for their own benefits (Laeven and Levine, 2008). 
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“controlling coalition” in order to gain absolute control over a firm, resulting in a seizure 
of the control from the largest dominant shareholders.  
Maury and Pajuste (2005) suggest that multiple dominant shareholders, whose shares are 
well distributed, provide efficient check-and-balance monitoring, resulting in overall 
lower private benefit extraction. In addition, they assert that it is more difficult for each 
dominant shareholder to hide his/her exploitation from other groups of dominant 
shareholders than from dispersed shareholders. Gogineni et al. (2012) reveal that the 
second largest shareholders help to limit the agency problem in firms with concentrated 
ownership. Indeed, they found that a proportion of share ownership by these 
shareholders is associated with lower agency costs. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that groups of multiple dominant shareholders can create a 
“controlling coalition”, in which they share “a diverted profit” from an extraction. 
Hence, whether a check-and-balance system created by multiple dominant shareholders 
performs efficiently depends on the identities and motivation of each group of multiple 
dominant shareholders. 
2.6 The Role of Corporate Governance 
Hart (1995b) asserts that corporate governance has no role in a perfect world, where 
there are no agency problems and transaction costs. The absence of the agency problem 
makes a firm look like the “black box” firm according to the neoclassical theory 
discussed in Section 2.2. Without the incentive problem, there would be no need to 
motivate agents to work for the best interests of the principal because the agents would 
work based on what they are told - to maximise profits or minimise costs, for example. 
In this situation, no one is concerned with corporate governance because no incentive 
conflicts need to be solved. 
However, the presence of the agency problem alone would not cause a problem. Without 
transaction costs, all agents’ efforts would be observable and verifiable. The principal 
would be able to write a comprehensive contract, specifying all parties’ obligations for 
all possible future contingencies and losses that may be incurred by the incentive 
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problem. Thus the contract is optimised in the sense that incentives and risk sharing are 
balanced. In other words, in a perfect world there would be no need for corporate 
governance because all contract parties’ rights and obligations would be protected and 
controlled by the contract. 
However, corporate governance does matter in the real world, due to human behaviour26 
and transaction costs27, and the agency problem does exist (Hart, 1995b).  
2.6.1  Corporate Governance in a Corporation 
While firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face a conflict of interests between 
managers and small shareholders, firms with concentrated ownership are likely to face 
the conflict problem between dominant shareholders and minority shareholders. Since 
the real world is not free of transaction costs, there is a demand for corporate 
government at the corporation level. 
Generally, corporate governance can be viewed as a decision mechanism that helps 
contract parties to manage events that are not specified in the initial contract (Hart, 
1995b). At the corporation level, corporate governance involves the design of a system 
that provides appropriate mechanisms28 to check and balance management behaviour in 
order to minimise a possible conflict of interests between the management and a 
corporation’s principals (OECD, 1999, 2004). As a result, good corporate governance is 
a key factor in a company’s long-term success and helps to “improve economic 
efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor confidence” for the whole economy 
across different countries (OECD, 2004: 11). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 “Human behaviour” here refers to the bound rationality and opportunism suggested by Simon (1997) 
and Williamson (1996).  
27 Transaction cost theory was initially introduced by Corse (1937). Hart (1995b) suggests that there are at 
least three costs incurred when writing a contract. They consist of 1) the cost of predicting future events 
and planning ahead to deal with them, 2) the cost of negotiation between the contract parties and 3) the 
cost of enforcing the contract. 
28 According to Goergen et al. (2005), corporate governance mechanisms include managerial ownership 
(i.e. executive compensation), monitoring by blockholders or creditors, board of directors (i.e. non-
executive directors or independent directors), regulation (i.e. investor protection) and markets for 
corporate control (i.e. takeover). 
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Definitions of corporate governance used in existing literature vary according to 
different perspectives, who the principals are and the theory underlined in each piece of 
research (Keasey et al., 2005). For the purposes of this study, it focuses on corporate 
governance at the corporation level and from a shareholder perspective. Throughout this 
thesis, corporate governance is therefore defined as a set of mechanisms that are 
designed and implemented to minimise the conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders or between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. 
2.6.2 Corporate Governance around the World: Anglo-Saxon vs. 
Emerging Countries Models 
“There is no single model of good corporate governance.”  
       (OECD, 2004: 13) 
Academics and policy makers suggest that different institutional environments29 cause 
corporate governance systems to vary across firms and countries. Although it is difficult 
to tell which corporate governance system is the best, Charkham (2008) suggests that it 
is possible to identify which system is “good”, based on its ability to deal with the 
ineffectiveness of management incurred by the agency problem and, in turn, to make a 
corporation attractive to external financers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) also suggest that a good combination of legal protection and a degree of 
concentrated ownership is essential for a “good” corporate governance system. For 
example, the system in the US has strong shareholder protection, which helps to reduce 
the impact of exploitation by managers in widely held firms. On the other hand, 
countries such as Thailand, in emerging markets, where it is claimed that shareholder 
protection is weak, may benefit from monitoring by large shareholders 
(Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
A system of corporate governance consists of many mechanisms to help align the 
interests of managers to those of shareholders (Weir, et al. 2002). These mechanisms can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 These include history, legal systems, regulatory, business cultures and the political, economic and 
ethical environments (Charkham, 2008; Denis and McConnell, 2003; OECD, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997) 
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be categorised into “internal” and “external” mechanisms. Key internal mechanisms 
suggested by the literature include the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
incentive packages (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), debt financing (Jensen, 1986; Hart, 
1995b) and large shareholders (Demsetz, 1983; Hart, 1995b, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
External mechanisms consist of the primary and secondary capital market (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), the market for corporate control (Demsetz, 1983; Hart, 1995b), the 
managerial labour market (Fama, 1980) and legal shareholder protection (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).  
These mechanisms are selected and combined into “packages” that may be different in 
detail at both firm and country levels30. Research suggests each mechanism works 
interdependently (Rediker and Seth, 1995). Therefore, the impact of an overall system 
depends on how well its mechanisms either substitute or complement each other. 
Nevertheless, no one can guarantee that a “good” structure of governance will function 
perfectly in practice (Charkham, 2008). 
Although the common goal of corporate governance systems is to deal with the agency 
problem, it seems that root causes of the problem come from different sources in Anglo-
Saxon developed countries and emerging economies31 (Young et al., 2008). While the 
agency problem in most firms in Anglo-Saxon developed countries derives from a 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932), firms 
in emerging countries face conflicts between dominant shareholders and minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	   For example, a listed company is required to have a board of directors with a minimum threshold. 
However, shareholders can decide the number directors on the board that is suitable for their company.	  
31 An “emerging market economy” are defined as “a country that satisfies two criteria: a rapid pace of 
economic development, and government policies favouring economic liberalisation and the adoption of a 
free-market system” (Arnold and Quelch, 1998 cited in Hoskisson et al., 2000: 249). According to 
Hoskisson et al. (2000: 249), emerging market economies are characterised as countries where income is 
low and rapid growth is driven by economic liberalisation. They are categorised into 2 groups: (1) 
developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East and (2) transition economies in 
the former Soviet Union and China. 
 
	  	  
Chapter 2	  
42	  
In fact, most corporate governance mechanisms suggested in the literature have 
developed in the institutional environments of Anglo-Saxon economies (the US and the 
UK). The main objective of these mechanisms is to mitigate the traditional agency 
problem. This may imply that these mechanisms might not work as intended in the 
context of emerging economies (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008).  
For example, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest separating decision management from 
decision control functions by delegating the board of directors to oversee management. 
This mechanism might not work well in the context of emerging countries because both 
functions are normally combined in the hands of dominant shareholders. In addition, 
using stock compensation to align the interests of managers to those of a firm may not 
solve the incentive problem but rather make things worse by creating more opportunities 
for dominant shareholder managers to isolate themselves from market disciplines. 
Table 2.1: Main Characteristics of Anglo-Saxon and Emerging Countries  
Main Characteristics The Anglo-Saxon Countries 
(the United Kingdom,  
the United States) 
Emerging Countries 
Country Levels   
- Growth Stable Rapid Growth 
- Income level High Low 
- Legal Protections Strong Weak 
Firm Levels   
- Ownership Dispersed Ownership Concentrated Ownership 
- Control Management Dominant Shareholders 
- Information 
Asymmetry 
Narrow gaps, use public 
information, high quality of 
disclosure and transparency 
Wide gaps, use inside 
information, low quality of 
disclosure and transparency 
- Agency problem Management vs. Shareholders Controlling shareholders vs. 
Minority shareholders 
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2.7 Some Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Agency Problems 
2.7.1 Board of Directors 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), it is worth disaggregating the “decision 
process”32 within any organisation into two components: “decision management” and 
“decision control”. They assert that the agency problem raised by Berle and Means 
(1932) may result from decision management being separated from residual claims. 
Similar to Berle and Means (1932), the conflict of interests between decision agents 
(managers) and residual claimants (shareholders) arises because the outcomes of 
decisions made by the agents do not significantly affect the agents’ wealth. Hence 
decision management should be delegated to management, while decision control should 
remain in the hand of shareholders or their representatives, a board of directors.  
In the open corporation, shareholders appoint a board of directors to be their 
representative and delegate management and control decisions to the board. 
Nevertheless, they retain an ultimate control over significant events33 that need their 
approval. The board then selects internal decision agents who have relevant, specific 
knowledge to act as top managers34 and delegates them management and some control 
decisions to operate the corporation. The board is responsible for monitoring the top 
managers’ performance and retains ultimate control over them including mandates to 
hire, to dismiss or to set the top managers’ compensation.  
A board of directors is an effective device to control the agency problem only if it can 
prevent individual top managers, such as chief executive directors, from engaging in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that there are four steps in a decision process: initiation, ratification, 
implementation and monitoring. Initiation is a decision relevant to the plans (or proposal) to use an 
organisation’s resources and to set the contracts. Ratification is a decision to select the plans to be 
implemented. Implementation involves the execution of the selected decisions. Monitoring deals with 
measurement of the agents’ performance and the reward system. Initiation and implementation are 
included in “decision management” while implementation and monitoring are included in “decision 
control”. 
33 Significant events may include a decision to appoint and dismiss a board, a decision to auditor, a 
decision to issue, buy or sell capital or a decision to acquire or merge with another firm. 
34 “Top managers” and/or “internal managers” refer to internal managers who also are members of the 
board (i.e. executive directors) or internal managers who are not members of the board. 
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opportunistic behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Existing literature also addresses the 
fact that factors, such as the size and types of the directors, may influence the efficiency 
of a board in limiting the agency problem in a corporation. 
2.7.1.1 Board Size 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), the board in a large corporation should consist of 
several top managers who have valuable information and knowledge about the 
corporation’s business. This may imply that having many expert directors can help a 
board to develop efficient monitoring processes and to provide better advice to the chief 
executive’s office (Coles et al., 2008; Xie et al., 2003).  
Nevertheless, some research argues that oversized boards may have a reduced efficiency 
in performing their task (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). 
Indeed, a board composed of more than seven or eight directors may be less efficient 
and can easily be under control of a chief executive officer (Jensen, 1993). The bigger 
board size can also reduce the efficiency of directors in communicating or expressing 
their opinions in a board meeting – by slowing down decision making, for example 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). The efficiency of a board also depends on how well directors 
can work together. Therefore, a lack of cohesiveness between members (a coordination 
problem) may happen more easily in a large board rather than in a small board. 
2.7.1.2 Board Independence 
A board of directors include two main types of directors, in particular (1) internal 
managers who involve in management (executive directors or members of the top 
management team, for example) (2) non-executive directors35 who are not involved in 
management. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), board members should include 
many non-executive directors who are not internal managers of a corporation. The non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Most of non-executive directors are also independent directors who do not have a relationship to any 
managers, the company, its parent company, its subsidiaries or affiliated companies (for example, see 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In a few cases, companies also have non-executive directors who do not involve 
in management but are not independent directors because they fail to meet qualification of independent 
directors (for example, a relative with management).  
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executive directors are act as “arbiters”, in cases of disagreement among internal 
managers, and conduct tasks that carry a serious incentive problem, such as the setting 
of executive compensations.  
It is necessary that non-executive directors should be independent from internal 
managers, such as the CEO, so that they do not collude with internal managers to exploit 
shareholders (for examples, see Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and Weisbach et al., 
1998). Their independence enhances the efficiency of non-executive directors in 
supervising management. In addition, most non-executive directors normally take a 
management position in other corporations or complex organisations. Therefore, they 
have incentives to perform their task well in order to retain their reputation as expert 
decision control agents in business. 
In many cases, executive directors nominate non-executive directors – to help them fulfil 
their decisions in some specific areas such as market regulation, for instance (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). It is also common for a non-executive director to be a former manager of 
the corporation (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990, cited in Conyon and Peck, 1998). 
However, the benefit of receiving board seat may put non-executive directors under the 
control of executive directors (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) and compromise their 
independence. 
2.7.2 Characteristics of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
2.7.2.1 CEO Duality 
CEO duality is defined as a situation where a firm’s CEO also serves as a chairman of 
the board of directors (Boyd, 1995). According to Jensen (1993: 36) the chairman who 
has responsibility for leading board meetings and supervising the process of hiring, 
firing, evaluating and compensating the CEO.  
From an agency theory perspective, CEO duality provides opportunities for CEOs to 
dominate decision-making processes. In addition, it is difficult to prove whether a CEO-
chairman will perform his/her functions independently from his/her own interests. 
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Therefore, CEO duality not only reduces the efficient monitoring role of the board but 
also allows the board to be dominated by the CEO (Jensen, 1993). Fama and Jensen 
(1983: 314) also argue that the domination of a CEO over a board signals an incentive 
problem, incurred from the combination of management and control decisions. To 
minimise the potential agency problem, OECD (2004: 63) recommends that firms 
separate the role of CEO and chairman in order to strengthen their board independence 
and recognises this characteristic as an indicator of good corporate governance (see 
Jensen36, 1993). 
In contrast to the stewardship theory37 perspective, a “single leadership” (CEO duality) 
may provide a faster and more efficient decision-making process that responds to a 
firm’s changing environment (Boyd, 1995). Brickley et al. (1997) argue that there may 
be some costs incurred from separating CEO from chairman positions. Firstly, 
separation of the two positions may reduce the power of a CEO to perform his/her 
leadership of management efficiently. It may also confuse the public when they wish to 
identify a firm’s leader and who should be blamed when a firm performs badly (Boyd, 
1995). Secondly, a non-CEO chairman (i.e. an outside director) may not have much 
incentive to do his/her job, causing the firm to suffer from agency costs. Finally, a CEO 
may have valuable, firm-specific knowledge and experience that may help them to fulfil 
the chairman’s function. A separation may create some costs in the process of 
transferring information between a CEO and chairman. 
2.7.2.2 CEO Founders and CEO Descendants 
A CEO founder is defined as a person who takes a CEO position in firm that he/she has 
founded. In many cases, CEO founders may be motivated to hold a large proportion of 
shares in a firm they have established, in order to maintain control over the firm 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). The incentives for a CEO founder to exploit other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Similarly, Jensen (1993) suggests separating the CEO and Chairman positions to maintain the board 
efficiency. 
37 According to Davis et al. (1997: 21), stewardship theory is defined as “situations in which managers are 
not motivated by individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives 
of their principals.”  
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shareholders might be less than in a firm managed by a non-CEO founder, which, in 
turn, limits the potential for the agency problem. 
The literature also suggests that CEO founders may be a valuable asset for a firm 
because of their ability to contribute to its business. Morck et al. (1988) suggest that a 
CEO founder is normally an expert in business. In addition, firms may benefit from 
business or political networks created by a CEO founder (Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 
2004). For example, Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2004) assert that founders of Thai 
business groups have good connections with politicians or government. This may secure 
their firms in uncertain political and business environments (Polsiri and 
Wiwattanakantang, 2004). 
However, Morck et al. (1988) suggest that CEO founders may have special control over 
firm. For example, a CEO founder might be involved in selecting members of the board 
of directors. This special control therefore provides an opportunity for CEO founders to 
become entrenched, regardless his/her fraction of shares in the firm (Morck et al., 1988). 
It is also likely that the CEO position may be transferred from founders to their 
descendants. This intention may increase the incentive of a CEO founder to align with 
shareholders in long-term. However, it may later be an obstacle if the firm wishes to hire 
a professional manager. In addition, if a CEO’s descendants are not competent, this may 
lead to a decline in firm performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Bertrand et al., 2008; 
Mehrotra et al., 2013; Morck et al., 1988). 
2.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter addresses the framework of ownership structure and corporate governance 
that has developed from the agency theory. In the imperfect conditions of the market, 
agency theory suggests that principals cannot expect that agents will absolutely work on 
behalf of their interests. This conflict of interests creates “agency costs” for a firm. 
Although, agency theory provides a fine theoretical ground in respect to how a firm’s 
participants are motivated by their ownership (dispersed and concentrated ownership, for 
example) to interact with each other, it still has some missing factors that drive them to 
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act differently from the theoretical predictions. Similarly, no best corporate governance 
model is suggested in the existing literature. An ideal of corporate governance model 
might work for some countries but not others. More works need to be done in order to 
understand the role of ownership structure and corporate governance in limiting or 
enhancing the agency problem in different institutional environments. 
Following the initial argument of Berle and Means (1932), the impact of ownership 
structure on firm performance has been widely researched both inside and outside the 
US. In addition, many recent accounting scandals partly occurred because of incentive 
problems and a failure of corporate governance. As a result, more recent research has 
studied the role of ownership structure and corporate governance on the quality of 
financial reporting, but the evidence addressed in the existing literature is still unclear. 
There is also a lack of evidence to support whether investors can correctly perceive an 
outcome from the mechanisms that is reflected in firm performance or the quality of 
financial reporting. 
In addition, many capital markets have started reviewing their current model of 
corporate governance and corporate governance reforms have been implemented in 
many countries (including the US and Thai capital markets). However, there is a lack of 
evidence from existing literature to support whether the corporate governance reforms 
actually help to limit the agency problem and to increase investors’ confidence in the 
capital markets. 
In the context of the Thai capital market, this thesis attempts to fulfil the gaps in existing 
literature on the role of ownership structure and corporate governance in firm 
performance, managers’ accounting discretion and investors’ perceptions. In order to 
examine these impacts, Chapter 3 reviews the current system of Thai ownership 
structure and corporate governance and Chapters 4, 5 and 6 review related literature and 
present empirical evidence on each topic. Although each chapter may complement or 
contradict the others, looking into the role of ownership structure and corporate 
governance will contribute to the sum of academic knowledge on whether firms with 
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different ownership structures and corporate governance function as well as predicted by 
the underlying theory. 
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Chapter 3: Corporate Governance in Thailand 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the principal-agent relationship, ownership structure and 
the importance of corporate governance systems. This chapter offers an overview of 
corporate governance in Thailand. It aims to build an understanding of the history of 
Thailand’s capital market, of the key corporate governance mechanisms and how these 
mechanisms work in practice, and of corporate governance reform and its contributions 
to firms and to the capital market. 
This section is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides a history of the capital market, 
including its need for reform. Section 3.3 discusses more deeply each key corporate 
governance mechanism, including ownership structure, the board of directors, leverage, 
accounting and auditing practices, laws and legal protection. The last section provides a 
summary and conclusions. 
3.2 Thai Corporate Governance: History and Evolution 
3.2.1 The Development of the Thai Capital Market 
Thailand has liberalised its economy in order to respond to global changes.	  To promote 
growth and economic stability, the Thai government has focused its efforts on enhancing 
and strengthening the credibility of the Thai capital market. In 1963, the Bangkok Stock 
Exchange Co., Ltd. (BSE) was the first security trading market to be established by a 
private industrial group. However, the BSE was not successful, as shown by its poor 
annual turnover and low trading volume. Consequently, it ceased to operate in the early 
1970s (The SET, 2008a). 
Nevertheless, the proposal to establish “a supervised capital market” was taken forward 
by the Thai government as a part of the Second National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1967-1971). In 1974, the Securities and Exchange of Thailand Act 
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(B.E. 2517, 1974) was passed, which paved the way for the establishment of the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET). The SET traded for the first time on the 30th of April 1975. 
At that time, the SET had three regulators: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Commerce and the Bank of Thailand (BOT). The dispersed authority of the regulators 
made the supervision and development of the capital market inefficient. This problem 
was remedied when the Securities and Exchange Act (B.E. 2535, 1992) was enacted in 
1992, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand (SECT) was established 
to regulate and to supervise the SET’s primary (initial public offering) and secondary 
market.  
The SET grew slowly to begin with, partly because of limited knowledge about equity 
markets on the part of firms and investors. In addition, the capital market was not 
attracting large Thai businesses to become listed companies. One reason for this was that 
they were required by public company law1 to distribute about half of their shares to 
outside investors (Suehiro and Wailerdsak, 2004). The slow growth in the number of 
listed companies and the size of market capitalisation are shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.  
In fact, dominant shareholders in Thai firms preferred the use of either internal capital or 
debt financing over equity financing, because the latter diluted their cash-flow rights and 
control over the firms. Nevertheless, the boom of emerging markets in the 1990s 
encouraged Thai firms to seek new sources of funding for their business expansions 
(Suehiro, 2001). Therefore, when the law was revised in 1992 to allow original 
shareholders to maintain a substantial proportion2 of shares in their listed firms, the 
capital market grew dramatically and became another important source of capital for 
firms until the collapse of the financial system in 1997. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The previous Public Limited Company Act (B.E. 2521, 1978) required half of public firms’ outstanding 
shares to be distributed to small shareholders, who would hold less than 0.60% of the total shares (Suehiro 
and Wailerdsak, 2004). Hence the law limited the large shareholders to holding outstanding shares not in 
excess of 50%. 
2 See also footnote 1. 
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Sources: Fact Book from 1990 – 2007, The Stock Exchange of Thailand (2008b)  
Fact Book from 1975 – 1989, The Stock Exchange of Thailand  
(cited in Suehiro, 2001: 33) 
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3.2.2 The Financial Crisis in Thailand 
The financial crisis in Thailand began when the BOT decided to end the “pegging” 
system of the Baht against the US Dollar on the 2nd of July 1997. Consequently, the Thai 
economy suffered a sharp downturn. In addition, many companies went into financial 
difficulties and needed restructuring. In fact, these companies suffered losses incurred by 
over-borrowing in foreign short loans, resulting in the collapse of 56 financial 
institutions and many non-financial companies (Limpaphayom and Connelly, 2004). The 
crisis also affected the performance and credibility of the Thai capital market. The SET 
index dropped sharply from 832 in 1996 to 373 after the 1997 crisis, as shown in Figure 
3.3. 
The crisis revealed the weaknesses in corporate governance, especially in the financial 
sector. Many corporate governance mechanisms turned out to be inefficient both at firm 
and national level. At firm level, the World Bank (1998: 67-68) described the 
characteristics of corporate governance in East Asian countries including Thailand as 
“ineffective boards of directors, weak internal control, unreliable financial reporting, 
lack of adequate disclosures, lax enforcement to ensure compliance, and poor audits.” At 
the national level, the monitoring and supervisory process of regulators failed to detect 
these weaknesses, and in turn no appropriate action was taken to solve the problem 
(World Bank, 1998: 68).  
Concentrated ownership was identified as one of the factors that caused the weaknesses. 
Because Thai firms relied mostly on bank financing, Alba et al. (1998) characterised the 
Thai financial structure as a “bank-centred model” in which banks played the role of 
monitoring and disciplining the firms. However, block ownership by families with close 
relationships to banks led to inefficient lending by the banks (World Bank, 1998). In 
fact, a limited number of “big families”3 had significant “controlling interests” in Thai 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Thai banks before the 1997 crisis consisted of the Bangkok Bank (Sophonpanich Family), the Siam 
Commercial Bank (the Crown Property Bureau), the Thai Farmers Bank (Lamsam Family), the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Bank (Tejapaibul Family), the Bank of Ayudya (Ratanarak Family), the First Bangkok City 
Bank (Sirivadhanabhakdi Family), the Laem Thong Bank (Chonsrichawla family) and the Nakornthon 
Bank (Wang Lee Family) (Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 2004). 
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Banks before the crisis (Brooker Group, 2001). The close relationship caused the banks 
to supply loans to Thai firms without considering the firms’ performance (World Bank, 
1998). Alba et al. (1998) comment that although the signs of the crisis, such as high 
leverage and a decline in profit, were apparent before the crisis, the rapid and impressive 
economic growth in Thailand had caused investors and foreign financial institutions to 
overlook these problems. In addition, high leverage in boom periods made Thai firms 
risky and sensitive to any changes in their financial structure, in turn reducing their 
ability and willingness to adjust their behaviour and to solve these problems in time.  
In addition, the weakness of the financial system and corporate governance made many 
local and foreign investors fearful of investing in Thailand, and this contributed to the 
downturn in the Thai capital market. As in most crisis-affected Asian countries, the 
corporate governance reforms that have been recommended by the World Bank are an 
urgent mission for Thai government if it is to recover the credibility of the Thai 
economy and its capital market after the crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Summary of statistics from 1975 – 2007, The Stock Exchange of Thailand (2008b) 
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Figure 3.3: SET Index from 1975 to 2007 
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3.2.3 The Reform of Thai Corporate Governance System 
Before the crisis, few corporate governance regulations and guidelines on corporate 
governance were imposed in the Thai capital market. However, when the crisis occurred, 
it created great opportunities for the improvement of corporate governance systems in 
the capital market and many more regulations and guidelines were introduced and 
mandated successively as a result. In order to regain investors’ confidence and capital 
market performance, the Thai government, including market regulators such as the 
SECT, cooperated to strengthen their supervision and enforcement and to enhance an 
awareness of good corporate governance in listed firms.  
The year 2002 was proclaimed “the Year of Good Corporate Governance”. The National 
Corporate Governance Committee4 set national policies for corporate governance that 
were used as core guidelines for regulations to promote good corporate governance in 
the capital market (SECT, 2008). The policies suggested that good corporate governance 
should be a combination of three disciplines: regulatory discipline, self discipline and 
market discipline. In conjunction, these were expected to help protect shareholders’ 
rights, enhance the accountability of boards of directors and increase transparency and 
disclosure (Limpaphayom and Connelly, 2004; Pitiyasak, 2005).  
Responding to the national policies, the SET published the “15 Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance” for listed companies. Using a “comply or explain” approach, 
Thai listed companies were encouraged to implement all of these principles or to 
disclose their reasons for non-compliance in their Annual Registration Statements (Form 
56-1) and Annual reports. In 2006, the SET revised the principles to be in line with the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004). Listed companies were encouraged 
to comply with the revised principles and, since 2007, they have also been required to 
disclose their compliance in their annual reports. The SET assessed compliance with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4   The National Corporate Governance Committee (NCGC) was established by the Thai Cabinet in 2002 
in order to develop and implement policies to strengthen investors’ confidence in the Thai capital market. 
The NCGC is chaired by the Prime Minister and consists of representatives from government and the 
private sectors.	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these guidelines in 2008 and found that most of listed companies had implemented the 
new guidelines and disclosed their compliance in detail (SET, 2003).  
As the main market regulator, the SECT plays an important role in corporate governance 
reform. After the financial crisis, the SECT strengthened its regulations and sanctions in 
order to enhance regulatory discipline. In 2004, the World Bank conducted its 
assessment5 of Thai corporate governance practices, based on an international 
framework, and the results indicated that the system met most of the OECD principles of 
corporate governance. However, some concerns were judged as needing improvement, 
especially in the areas of the legal protection of minority shareholders, enforcement by 
regulators and the reform of accounting and auditing standards in order to facilitate high 
disclosure and transparency in financial reporting (World Bank, 2005). 
Responding to the World Bank’s comments, in 2008, the SECT proposed amendments 
to the Securities and Exchange Act (B.E. 2535, 1992) to expand minority shareholders’ 
rights so that they could jointly propose topics for the agenda of the Annual General 
Meeting and sue directors or managers for misconduct. It also included whistle-blower 
protection for auditors and employees, who report fraud. In addition, accounting and 
auditing standards have been continuously changed to be in line with international 
standards such as the IFRS and ISA.  
The amended laws are expected to raise the level of Thai corporate governance to meet 
international standards, in turn enhancing the efficiency of the capital market. In 2012, 
the World Bank conducted its assessment again and discovered significant 
improvements in the Thai corporate governance system that met most of the 
international framework requirements (the World Bank, 2013). The key areas of 
improvement included disclosure and transparency, laws and regulations to protect 
investors, and enforcement by regulators. However, there is still limited empirical 
evidence of the contributions that the reforms have made to listed firms and the overall 
capital market in practice. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The assessment is one part of the CGROSC project launched by the World Bank (Corporate Governance 
- Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes, 2005).  
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3.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Thailand 
3.3.1 The Nature of Thai Firms: The Role of Dominant Family 
Shareholders 
As in other Asian countries, concentration of ownership is an important feature of Thai 
businesses. Indeed, most Thai businesses have been founded and operated by families, 
both as private and as public companies. Most Thai business founders are Chinese in 
origin (Bertrand et al., 2008; Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 2004), and many of them 
immigrated to Thailand after the “Bowring Treaty Agreement”6 in 1855. For example, 
since the 1910s, the “big five families” 7, who started their businesses from rice trading, 
have expanded to both related and unrelated businesses such as rice milling, warehouses, 
shipping, banking and insurance (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995, cited in Polsiri and 
Wiwattanakantang, 2004). In addition, some other Chinese families8 started businesses 
in both the finance (banks or insurance) and non-finance sectors in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. Most of these Chinese businesses have remained successful because their 
members are either highly skilled or very experienced in trading, and/or have good 
connections with Thai politicians9 (Bertrand et al., 2008; Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 
2004).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Bowring Treaty Agreement was an agreement between the Kingdom of Siam and the United 
Kingdom. This agreement influenced the Thai government to reduce import and export taxes, resulting in 
an increase in international trading by foreigners in Thailand. 
7 The Bulakul, Bulasuk, Iamsuri, Lamsam and Wang Lee families have been known as the “big five 
families” (Piriyarangsan, 1983 cited in Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 2004). However, the Thai 
revolution in 1947 pressured three of them (Bulasuk, Lamsam and Wang Lee) to end their businesses in 
rice trading because the politician they supported (Mr. Predi Pranomyong) lost his control in Thai politics. 
8 For example, the Sophonpanich Family (Bangkok Bank Group), Tejapaibul Family (the Metropolitan 
Bank/World Trade Center/Sang Som Group), Chokwatana Family (Sahapathana/Sahapathanapibul 
Group), Cholvijarn Family (the Union Bank), Srifuengfung Family (THASCO Chemical Group), 
Viriyaprapaikit Family (Sahaviriya Group), Chirathivat Family (Central Group) and the Asadathorn 
Family (Thai Roong Ruang Group) (Brooker Group, 2001). 
9 Based on their experiences from the two revolutions in 1932 and 1947, Thai business groups have 
learned to create a political network to secure themselves from uncertain political and business 
environments and to expand their businesses (Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 2004). 
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It is worth noting that Chinese family businesses are different from Western businesses 
in the sense that they rely mostly on network relationships10 between families, relatives 
and friends rather than on market mechanisms (Weidenbaum, 1996). This characteristic 
has been absorbed into most Thai businesses; business groups are created and managed 
by groups of families known as “Thai business groups” (Pananond, 2007). According to 
Brooker Group (2001), the groups are likely to expand their businesses into related 
activities by establishing new companies that are controlled by the founder of the group. 
This pattern enables the group to maintain its control over subsidiary companies.	  
The Thai business groups contribute to their network companies and to other smaller 
businesses in some respects. Suehiro (1993) suggests that one factor in the continued 
existence of the Thai business groups in Thailand is the groups’ ability to adjust 
themselves in response to changes in the business environment. In addition, the groups’ 
networks and their connections with the government and banks make it easier for other 
Thai business groups to get support from the government, to finance with debt and to be 
successful when proposing investment projects to the government (Polsiri and 
Wiwattanakantang, 2004). This helps them to expand their businesses despite weak 
institutional environments and unstable political situations. Finally, business expansions 
by the big business groups also promote the inflow of foreign capital and technology 
into the Thai economy (Suehiro, 1989 cited in Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 2004). 
As mentioned, most Chinese family businesses began in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
so most of the founders are still alive. Ownership and control of the family businesses 
are not separated but concentrated within the family groups, and management positions 
are traditionally assigned to family members; even if founders retire from a group, most 
of them become honorary advisors. According to Brooker Group (2001), in cases where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Literature addresses benefits from this relationship in two aspects. The network relationship promotes 
trust among network groups, in turn reducing the transaction costs incurred in business deals, monitoring 
and enforcement (Pyatt, 1996). According to Pyatt (1996: 5), “network trust” is a type of “social 
independence”, which needs long-term assurances of benefits from the relationships developed on the 
basis of past experience. Another view suggests that the network relationship is necessary for firms in 
weak institutional environments to create competitive advantages and substitutes for inefficient financial 
market functions such as inadequate disclosure, transparency and weak corporate governance (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997, 1999, 2000; Khanna et al., 2005; Pyatt, 1996). 
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the founder passes away, control is normally distributed among family members, such as 
the founder’s sons and daughters, without significantly affecting the organisation. 
However, this tradition may limit the growth of Thai family businesses. For example, 
the fear of dilution of ownership may prevent the groups from hiring professional 
managers for senior positions or from seeking professional consultants from outside the 
business. In addition, groups may prefer to finance with debt than with equity because 
they do not want to lose their control to outsiders. 
According to the World Bank, highly concentrated ownership in the hands of families 
was one of the reasons for the 1997 financial crisis. Therefore, strengthening the 
corporate governance system is expected to limit the control of dominant family 
shareholders over listed companies. 
3.3.2 The Board of Directors: Are They Independent? 
A board of directors acts as an agent of shareholders to supervise and oversee 
management teams in listed companies. In Thailand, two main laws, the Public Limited 
Company Act (B.E. 2535, 1992) (PCA) and the Securities and Exchange Act (B.E. 
2535, 1992) (SEA), complement each other in specifying characteristics, roles and 
accountability for a board of directors in a listed company.  
Under the PCA, a Thai board of directors can be characterised as a “unitary board”. The 
board is required to be comprised of at least five directors. Half of them must hold Thai 
nationality. The board is required to arrange meetings on at least a quarterly basis. In 
addition, CEO/chair duality is permitted and there is no limit to the number of 
directorships that one person can hold. The laws set the “fiduciary duties” of directors in 
general, stating that “the directors shall perform their duty in accordance with the law, 
objective, and articles of association of the company as well as resolution of the meeting 
of shareholders in good faith and with care to maintain interests of the company” 
(Section 85, PCA, 1992). 
Although the laws and regulations about the board were generally in place before the 
reforms, they do not seem to have been clear enough for directors to apply in practice. 
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After the crisis, more details of board fiduciary duties and accountability have been 
gradually added into the amended SEA,11 aiming to strengthen and to clarify their 
substance and enforcement (Limpaphayom and Connelly, 2004). In particular, the 
regulations on directorship place great emphasis on the role of an audit committee.  
While listed companies were required by the SECT12 to have at least two independent 
directors from 1992 onwards, they were not required to set up audit committees. After 
the financial crisis, the SECT issued regulations requiring listed companies to appoint 
audit committees that must consist of at least three independent directors by the end of 
1999. The regulation partly aims to improve the quality of the boards in “financial 
oversight functions”, as recommended by the World Bank (1998), and in addition to 
boards of directors it recommends nomination and remuneration committees, although 
these are not compulsory.  
In 2005, the SECT amended its regulations such that IPO companies had to have at least 
three independent directors and an audit committee before their submission date. The 
latest SECT regulations13 were amended in 2008, requiring both IPO companies and 
listed companies for at least one third of board members to be independent and to have 
at least three independent directors and at least one of them must have sufficient 
knowledge to review financial statements. 
Apart from strengthening regulations, the SECT and the SET have attempted to promote 
the awareness of directors regarding their role. For example, in order to raise awareness 
among corporate directors, the Code of Best Practice for Directors was introduced since 
1999, clarifying directors’ duties and responsibilities. However, the Code is not 
compulsory. In the same year, the Thai Institute of Directors Association (IOD)14 was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The amendments to the SEA in respect to the board of directors were done in many ways such as 
through the issuing of new rules and the cancellation, modification or extension of existing regulations. 
12 Notification of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Re: Criteria, Conditions and Methods for 
Application of Offer for Sale of Newly Issued Shares and Approval, 18 May 1992. 
13 Notification of Capital Market Supervisory Board TorChor. 28/2008, Re: Application for and Approval 
of Offer for Sale of Newly Issued Shares (Codified), 15 December 2008. 
14 More details of the role of the IOD can be seen on the IOD website. [online] Available from 
http://www.thai-iod.com/en/main-activities.asp. [Accessed on 7 January 2012]  
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founded as an organisation with the aims of educating and improving the 
professionalism of directors. Numerous director training programmes continue to be 
launched, providing directors with knowledge and skills based on good governance 
principles.  
In 2002, the “15 Principles of Good Corporate Governance” (including guidelines for 
directors) were released, and they were revised in 2006 to comply with the OECD 
principles (2004). Although the principles are not compulsory, listed firms are required 
to disclose their compliance/non-compliance to the public. In 2008, the SEA (B.E. 2535, 
1992) was amended to include a new chapter, “Governance of Publicly Traded 
Company”, which specifies more clearly the duties, responsibilities and accountability 
of corporate directors and includes penalties if they fail to comply. 
In light of agency theory (outlined in Chapter 2), a separation of management and 
control decisions is needed in order to decrease the agency problem (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Nevertheless, this characteristic is rare in most listed firms in the Thai capital 
market. In fact, most Thai boards have dominant shareholders who normally appoint or 
become members of the board of directors (World Bank, 2005).  
In addition, a survey by Limpaphayom and Connelly (2004), based on the year 2002, 
found that most non-executive directors have close relationships with their firms. In fact, 
non-executive directors normally came from affiliate companies and represent creditors, 
suppliers or professional services. Therefore, combined ownership and control and lack 
of clarity on the independence of directors have the potential to reduce directors’ 
awareness of their responsibilities towards other shareholders. In addition, this 
characteristic may cause non-executive directors to overlook their role and lessen their 
efficiency in monitoring managers.  
Finally, in order to reduce this conflict, the SECT prohibited independent directors from 
having close relationships with listed companies15 from 2008 onwards. However, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In the case of IPO companies, they should not have had these relationships for at least two years before 
the submission date. 
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unclear whether this actually helps to reduce conflict in practice, because it is not easy to 
fully identify the relationships between directors, nominees and firms. 
3.3.3 Leverage and Thai Firms 
As in many countries, Thai commercial banks are limited by the Financial Institutions 
Business Act (B.E. 2551, 2008)16 when holding shares in other companies.17 As a result, 
the banks hold small fractions of shares when compared to other types of large 
shareholders in Thai listed companies. Nevertheless, Thai Banks play a significant role 
as the main lenders. Before the 1990s, Thai firms relied more on short-term bank debt 
rather than on equity (Brooker Group, 2001). This business practice may have resulted 
from the fact that most Thai businesses had a close connection with banks and the Thai 
capital market was undeveloped. Although the close relationship between big Thai 
business groups and banks facilitated the funding of groups for business expansions, the 
relationship caused banks to overlook their borrowers’ performance both before and 
after the lending.  
Since the 1990s, Thai firms, including small and medium-sized businesses have had 
access to alternative sources of funds from the capital market and the Bangkok 
International Banking Facilities (BIBF)18. According to Brooker Group (2001), the latter 
has caused Thai firms to turn to heavy borrowing in non-Baht currencies19 because 
foreign banks offered cheaper interest rates than domestic banks. The decision to end the 
system of pegging the Baht with the US dollar in 1997 sharply depreciated it against the 
US dollar and this seriously affected Thai firms that had taken out substantial loans in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The former Act was the Bank Business Act (B.E. 2505), which was repealed in 2008.   
17 Under the Financial Institutions Business Act (B.E. 2551), financial institutions, including banks, are 
allowed to hold shares that are (1) not in excess 10% of a company’s outstanding shares, (2) not in excess 
5% of an their capital funds for each company in which they invest or (3) not in excess of 20% of their 
capital funds for all the companies in which they invest. 
18 The BIBF was established in 1993 as an offshore banking business. It also acts as an international 
intermediate bank to facilitate domestic banks to obtain offshore funds to lend either in the domestic 
market (out-in) or international market (out-out) (Watanagase, 2001).    
19	  According to Brooker Group (2001), offshore borrowing did not need official approval from a regulator 
due to the openness of Thai financial system. It was compulsory for borrowers to register their offshore 
loans with the BOT at a stipulated date. However, this was done as a part of administrative process rather 
than for approval. 	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US dollars without hedging against Baht revenues and led to the financial crisis 
spreading throughout the Thai economy, as previously discussed. 
The 1997 financial crisis revealed a failure of the role of Thai banks as a governance 
mechanism. Banks themselves also suffered from non-performing loans incurred after 
the financial crisis. Many banks and financial institutions were closed, taken over by the 
government,20 merged or sold to other domestic or foreign banks. The BOT has since 
imposed more restrictive rules for commercial banks in order to promote good corporate 
governance within them, in turn promoting the efficient monitoring of their borrowers. 
This may imply that the role of banks as corporate governance mechanism has been 
more prominent following the crisis. However, many restrictive rules may have created 
further conflict of interests between banks and shareholders than existed before the 
crisis. 
3.3.4 Thai Accounting and Auditing Standards and the Role of 
External Auditors 
Accounting and auditing standards and practitioners (external auditors) play an 
important role in the development of corporate governance by improving the quality of 
financial reporting, which in turn reduces the gap of information between managers, 
dominant shareholders and other shareholders.  
In Thailand, Thai Accounting Standards (TASs) and Thai Standards of Auditing (TSAs) 
have been officially published since 1977 by the Federation of Accounting Professions21 
(FAP), after the establishment of the capital market. These standards aim to be the 
official guidelines to ensure a high quality of financial reporting, particularly for listed 
companies. Although TASs and TSAs were developed based on international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For example, the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (Tejapaibul Family), the Bangkok City Bank 
(Sirivadhanabhakdi Family), the Laem Thong Bank (Chansrichawla), the Nakornthon Bank (Wanglee 
Family), the Siam City Bank (Crown Property Bureau) and the Union Bank of Bangkok (Cholvijarn 
Family) were taken over by the Thai government after the crisis. 
21 Before the financial crisis, the TASs and TSAs were issued by the Institute of Certified Accountants and 
Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT). In 2005, after the crisis, the ICAAT was discontinued and the Federation 
of Accounting Professions (FAP) was established to supersede the ICAAT role. 
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standards22, both of them had been adjusted to be suitable for the Thai business 
environment before the financial crisis. In addition, listed companies have been legally 
required by the SECT to prepare quarterly and year-end financial statements, in 
accordance with the TASs, since the establishment of the SECT in 1992. The SECT23 
also allowed listed companies to apply either the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) or the United States General 
Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) for any accounting issues that were not 
specified in the TASs.  
In addition, financial statements submitted to the SECT must be certified (reviewed in 
case of quarterly reports) by external auditors who conduct their work in accordance 
with the TSAs. Listed companies also are required to submit their auditor report to the 
SECT with an “unqualified auditor’s opinion”. Since 1993, external auditors, who have 
the authority to express their opinions on the financial reporting of listed companies, 
must be on the approved lists of the SECT24. This practice unintentionally limits the 
qualified auditors who can express their opinions to the BIG425 and large local auditing 
firms. 
In 1998, the World Bank (1998) commented that the reliability and quality of financial 
reporting and disclosure in Thailand had not met international standards. In addition, 
enforcements and sanctions on violations of accounting and auditing standards by self-
regulatory agencies were claimed to be weak in practice. In order to regain investors’ 
confidence in financial reporting after the crisis, the FAP continually improved the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 At the beginning, TASs and TSAs were developed based on either the US GAAP or International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). 
23 The SECT regulations about public disclosure by listed companies have been amended several times in 
response to changes the in business environment since the first issuing on 18 May 1992. Nevertheless, the 
main contents have still remained until the present [see the latest regulation in Notification of Capital 
Market Supervisory Board TorChor. 11/2009, Re: Principles, Conditions and Approach of Information 
Disclosure about Financial Positions and Performance of Securities Issuers (Codified), 13 March 2009. 
24 The approval of each auditor was based on the opinion of the FAP (previously ICAAT). Since 2010, the 
SECT has been responsible for conducting both the verification of auditors’ qualifications and quality 
control in auditing firms and the approval of auditors. 
25 The BIG4 includes Deloitte, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst &Young. Since Thai law limits 
accounting professionals to Thai nationals, these firms have merged with large Thai auditing firms. 
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quality of accounting and auditing standards in order to meet the International 
Accounting and Auditing Standards.  
The SECT also strengthened its supervision of the quality of auditors for listed 
companies, providing training and close monitoring of their work. In addition, in order 
to promote auditor independence, since 2005, the SECT requires listed companies to 
rotate the audit partners who lead audit engagements every five years. Nevertheless, new 
auditors can come from the same audit firms. In summary, improvements in the quality 
of accounting and auditing standards and a stronger role of enforcement by both the 
SECT and the FAP are expected to have increased the reliability and transparency of 
financial reporting and accounting information after the reforms. 
3.3.5 Legal Protections and Market for Corporate Control:  
Do They Work in Practice? 
The legal system in Thailand consists of a wide set of regulations that either specify 
shareholders’ rights or limit insiders’ actions in order to protect shareholders from any 
expropriation by insiders. Most shareholders’ rights are specified in the Public Limited 
Company Act (B.E. 2535, 1992) (PCA) and the Securities and Exchange Act (B.E. 
2535, 1992) (SEA).  
Under the PCA, shareholders have right to appoint or remove directors and auditors in 
the normal course of business. To dismiss directors, it needs a 75% majority of votes 
from shareholders who attend the meeting. In addition, the sum of shares owned by 
these shareholders must not be less than 50% of the sum of shares owned by all 
attending shareholders. To appoint directors or external auditors, only 50% of the votes 
from attending shareholders are needed. In addition, major events such as mergers and 
acquisitions or the sale of significant company assets require approval at the 
shareholders’ meeting. In general, ordinary shares are based on the “one share one vote” 
rule because the law prohibits companies from issuing either shares with different voting 
rights or non-voting shares. If absent from a meeting, shareholders have to rely on a 
representative to act as a proxy in the actual meeting because voting by mail or 
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electronic mail are not allowed by law. Listed companies are also governed by the SEA, 
which provides more detail26 on shareholders’ rights.  
Although the legal protections in Thailand seem to be similar to those used in other 
countries, their enforcement has been described as weak. For example, the legally 
specified rights of shareholders are not fully enforced by shareholders in practice (Alba 
et al. 1998). Limpaphayom and Connelly (2004) show that it is difficult for shareholders 
to receive an agenda and proxy voting instruction on time. There have also been rare 
cases in which minority shareholders have taken legal action against managements 
because of time-consuming procedures and high costs. Votes against poor managers are 
also difficult to win because they normally come from the same group of dominant 
shareholders. Additionally, nominees are quite common in Thai firms (Limpaphayom 
and Connelly, 2004), partly as a result of network relationships (Brooker Group, 2001). 
Although the law prohibits shareholders from exercising their vote to benefit 
themselves, nominees may vote to support their interests, providing they do not disclose 
their relationship with specific shareholders.  
After the financial crisis, the SECT has continuously strengthened minority shareholder 
protections, including efficient enforcement. In response to the World Bank’s 
recommendations, the SEA was amended in 2008 to include more shareholder 
protection, allowing minority shareholders more opportunities to vote against poor 
managers. For example, shareholders, who jointly hold 5% of outstanding shares, can 
now sue opportunistic directors or managers to return interests that they extract back to 
the company and can propose subjects to be considered in meeting agendas.  
The SEA also allows takeover mechanisms to be used in the Thai capital market. To 
protect minority shareholder rights, anyone who initially owns a number of shares over a 
triggering threshold (more than 25% of outstanding shares) is required to make a tender 
offer for the rest of the issued shares. However, it is possible to waive the need for this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 For example, the law specifies a process for organising an annual general meeting (AGM), 
clear duties and responsibilities of directors and executives, proxy solicitation and voting rights, 
disclosure and transparency, and provisions. 
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by asking permission in a shareholders’ meeting. In 2008, the amended SEA required 
takeover defences to be approved in shareholders’ meetings. Although the law provides 
room in the market for corporate control, it is no surprise that this market is not active in 
practice. Takeovers, and hostile takeovers in particular, are quite rare in Thailand. As 
suggested in the literature, high concentrated ownership in Thai firms reduces the 
number of opportunities for successful takeovers.27 
3.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The Thai capital market was established nearly 40 years ago and is still young compared 
to capital markets in the US or the UK. The capital market was initially established 
under an international framework that was guided by the World Bank (The SET, 2008a). 
However, it appeared that market mechanisms did not function as well as could be 
expected. In fact, the capital market was accused of being inefficient in terms of the low 
quality of disclosure and transparency, the legal framework, the monitoring process and 
enforcement (Fan and Wong, 2002; World Bank, 1998, 2005). However, this issue was 
not significantly addressed until the collapse of financial systems in East Asia in mid-
1997.  
Although the need to improve corporate governance in Thailand had already been 
discussed to some degree prior to 1997, at that time both the awareness of corporate 
governance problems and the effectiveness of existing corporate governance 
mechanisms was very limited. The financial crisis revealed weaknesses in the existing 
corporate governance system, and a high concentration of family ownership was 
partially blamed for the problem (World Bank, 1998). Close relationships between 
dominant shareholders and banks was suggested to be a cause of over borrowing by 
most listed firms (Limpaphayom and Connelly, 2004). Additionally, this feature may 
have limited the demand for high quality financial reporting because dominant 
shareholders could easily access inside information (Wang, 2006). Consequently, the 
crisis discredited the capital market and reduced investors’ confidence in it. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Becht (1997) and Goergen (2005).  
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Following the 1997 financial crisis, the need for corporate governance reforms was 
recognised as much more pressing. Such reforms aimed to increase the capital market’s 
efficiency in terms of more transparency in disclosures, a higher quality of financial 
reporting and stronger legal protections. The reform was also expected to improve 
investors’ confidence after the financial crisis and to enhance the performance of listed 
companies, in turn making the Thai capital market more attractive to investors. Many 
corporate governance mechanisms and frameworks have been introduced and 
implemented, such as the adoption of an international corporate governance framework, 
the introduction of training for directors, a reform of accounting and auditing standards, 
new laws and legal protection. The recent assessment by the World Bank shows that 
there has been significant improvement in corporate governance practices (the World 
Bank, 2013).  
However, there is still little known about whether firms still gain net benefits from 
concentrated ownership following the reforms, and whether other corporate governance 
mechanisms implemented after the reforms work as intended at firm level. Therefore, to 
enlighten these questions it is important for market regulators and policy makers to 
continuously develop a system of corporate governance that is suitable for Thailand.  
The subsequent chapters of this thesis aim to reinvestigate on an empirical basis whether 
concentration of ownership might have been detrimental or beneficial to listed firms in 
Thailand before the crisis and the reforms. It also contributes to the existing literature by 
investigating whether the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance and 
managerial behaviour in respect to accounting discretion has changed after the 
introduction of corporate governance reforms. In addition, it aims to provide evidence of 
whether investors have been able to perceive these impacts correctly before and after the 
reforms. 
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Ownership Structure on 
Firm Performance 
4.1 Introduction: Motivations and Research Questions 
In their seminal work, Berle and Mean (1932) point out that the separation of ownership 
and control can potentially create a problem in modern corporations, rooted in the 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Common shares are a source of cash-flow rights and control rights for owners of 
corporations (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Concerns that some managers in large, listed 
companies held few or no cash-flow rights in the companies they managed (and that 
their interests could therefore significantly deviate from those of the shareholders) has 
led to a substantial rise in research on the influence of ownership structure on firm 
performance in the UK and the US (for examples, see Morck et al. 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999) and, later, in Continental Europe and the East 
Asia (for examples, see Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010; La Porta et al. 1999). While, 
initially, large shareholders who were either directly involved in the management, or at 
least the supervision of the management, of a firm were expected to reduce agency 
problems, later research has started to acknowledge another agency problem: large 
shareholders may use their control rights to exploit a firm and its minority shareholders.  
Findings of previous research into the relationship between ownership structures and 
firm performance are relatively inconsistent. The variation in the findings is partially due 
to methodological differences in the research (ranging from divergent definitions of 
block ownership to the use of different statistical methods) but is also a result of 
different institutional environments at firm and national levels (such as regulation, 
culture, corporate governance and data limitation). 
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This chapter aims to provide evidence on the potential impact of ownership structure on 
firm performance in the context of an emerging economy, Thailand. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, high ownership concentration leads to the combination of ownership and 
control in the hands of dominant family shareholders, which leads to a different scenario 
from that expected by Berle and Mean (1932). This was claimed to be a key cause of the 
1997 financial crisis in Thailand, and consequently, corporate governance reform has 
been introduced in order to regain creditability and to increase investors’ confidence in 
the capital market. 
Research into the potential impact of ownership structure and firm performance in 
Thailand is still limited. Following the corporate governance reforms, research 
investigated the impact of blockholders on corporate performance in Thai listed 
companies, but only Suehiro (2001) actually took account of the potential impact of 
family block ownership. In addition, previous research tends to have focused exclusively 
on the periods prior to or after the reforms (Limpaphayom and Connelly, 2004).  
Recently, Carney and Child (2012) examined the change of ownership structure in East 
Asian corporations from 1996 to 2008, including Thailand. However, they also failed to 
consider whether the corporate governance reforms had enhanced firm performance. 
There is therefore a lack of clarity on the effect of Thai ownership structure in long term. 
Furthermore, there is still a question over whether the corporate governance reforms 
have actually contributed to the capital market as intended. Clearer answers to these 
questions are very important to policy makers in developing appropriate corporate 
governance systems that are optimised for Thai listed companies.  
Therefore, this chapter addresses three main questions: 
Q4.1: Whether there has been a change of ownership structure in Thailand over the 
periods of study 
Q4.2: Whether ownership structure has had a beneficial or detrimental impact on the 
performance of listed companies 
Q4.3:  If ownership structure has had some influence on firm performance, whether the 
influence has improved after corporate governance reforms.  
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This study has extended the previous research in Thailand in several ways.  
Firstly, ownership and accounting data has been carefully collected from a unique set of 
databases in Thailand, which have allowed the identification of an ultimate shareholder 
and its group for each listed company. This has improved the quality of variables used in 
this study.  
Secondly, this study uses data from the 14 years from 1994 to 20071, which cover two 
major events: the 1997 financial crisis and the corporate governance reforms. The 
limitation of the available data on ownership has restricted researchers to conducting 
their tests on short periods. Additionally, there is a lack of evidence on the outcomes of 
the reforms in respect to listed firms. This study is therefore one of the first to examine 
the potential impact of ownership structure on firm performance before and after the 
corporate governance reforms in Thailand. This study also adds to a growing body of 
literature regarding an on-going debate about whether corporate governance reforms 
actually result in benefits rather than costs to firms in the context of emerging 
economies. 
Thirdly, unlike previous research in Thailand, the long-term panel data used in this study 
allows a fixed-effects model to be applied to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, 
improving the validity of the results. 
Fourthly, while family is likely to own substantial shares in most of Thai listed firms, 
there still is a presence of other types of blockholders in many listed firms. Existing 
literature suggests that different types of shareholders have different motivations and 
incentives to hold shares in firms and this could affect to their degrees of alignment of 
interests. Therefore, this study investigates the impacts of various types of shareholders 
(i.e. family, government, foreign company, bank and non-bank financial institution) on 
firm performance in the context of emerging economies.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Emerging economies including Thailand have been affected by the global financial crisis which began 
late 2007/early 2008. Therefore, this study does not use samples from after the year 2007, since the effect 
of the global crisis might distort the impact upon firm performance of ownership structure and other 
aspects of corporate governance. 
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Finally, because ownership structure may affect the efficiency of other governance 
mechanisms in the Thai capital market, a better understanding of its role in firm 
performance could benefit policy makers who are developing appropriate policies and 
guidelines to improve the efficiency of the corporate governance system. It could also 
help with the creation of guidelines for other capital markets in emerging economies. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents a literature 
review and the development of the hypothesis. The research methodology, the variable 
definitions and the sampling and data collection are shown in Sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 
respectively. Empirical evidence and sensitivity tests are discussed in Sections 4.6 and 
4.7 respectively, and the last section provides the conclusion to the chapter.  
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
As discussed in Chapter 3, most Thai listed companies have highly concentrated 
ownership and most of them are controlled by dominant shareholders. In addition, most 
dominant shareholders are involved in the management of firms. Therefore, the 
following sections review the literature covering (1) the impact of ownership 
concentration and the presence of dominant shareholders on firm performance, (2) the 
impact upon firm performance of ownership concentration from different types of 
shareholder and from dominant shareholders according to their identities, (3) the impact 
of managerial ownership on firm performance and (4) the corporate governance reforms 
and their implications.  
4.2.1 The Impact of Ownership Concentration and the Presence of 
Dominant Shareholders on Firm Performance 
In respect to the theory discussed in Chapter 2, the hypothesis of the alignment of 
interests suggests that large shareholders with substantial shares should have more 
incentive and power to provide efficient monitoring and closely supervise managers 
because their wealth from cash-flow rights is substantially affected by firm performance. 
Holderness (2003) asserts that the benefits of the efficient monitoring provided by 
blockholders are also shared to minority shareholders and firms. Therefore, this 
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hypothesis predicts a positive impact of ownership concentration on firm performance: a 
firm’s performance increases as share ownership increases. 
However, if the interests of large shareholders diverge from firm value maximisation, 
these shareholders may exercise their power to influence managers to act for their own 
benefit rather than that of minority shareholders and firms (Burkart et al., 1997; 
Holderness, 2003; Young et al., 2008; Zerni et al. 2010). This notion therefore predicts a 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance: a firm’s 
performance decreases as share ownership increases. 
In addition, one of distinct characteristics of firms with concentrated ownership is that 
they have one or more blockholders or dominant shareholders. Earlier research in the US 
or the UK has viewed the presence of large shareholders as a mechanism that enables 
outside shareholders to cooperate in order to hold managers to account, usually without 
being able to individually dictate a firm’s business policies. Research in the US normally 
uses the term “blockholders”, “large shareholders” or “majority shareholders” to 
represent shareholders who own block of firm’s shares. The identification of block 
ownership depends on thresholds that are often based on legislative reporting 
requirements, ranging from the ownership of 10-20% to 3-5% of shares. Large 
shareholders are expected to have sufficient cash-flow rights tied up in the firm to give 
them an incentive to monitor the firm and, if necessary, instigate cooperation with other 
shareholders to sanction poorly performing managers. 
Later research, especially in the Asian context, normally uses the term “dominant 
shareholder” or “controlling shareholder” rather than “blockholder” to identify large 
shareholders who individually own or control sufficient shares or voting rights to enable 
them to control the firm. In the context of the Thai capital market, this thesis uses the 
term “dominant shareholders”, emphasising their willingness to control a firm rather 
than merely to gain voting rights in order to protect themselves from poor management. 
Dominant shareholders can use either pyramidal or cross-sectional structures to separate 
voting rights (control) and cash-flow rights (ownership) and thereby create other 
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channels for dominant shareholders to exploit minority shareholders (Bebchuk et al, 
2000; Grossman and Hart, 1988). Therefore, while dominant shareholders may be self- 
constrained by their block ownership, the presence of pyramidal or cross-sectional 
structures may facilitate their exploitation of corporate assets without them having to 
bear the costs from the exploitation. Research that found evidence of exploitation by 
dominant shareholders in firms where control rights are higher than cash-flow rights 
includes Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010); Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004), in 
Germany; Lemmon and Lins (2003), in eight East Asian countries; and Lins (2003), in 
18 emerging markets2.  
4.2.1.1 Prior Research on US Firms 
Having identified the presence of blockholders in US listed firms, research in the US 
context turns focuses on the impact of blockholder ownership on firm performance.  
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) compared the performance of firms with and without 
blockholders. They found no significant difference between the two groups, measured 
by Tobin’s q, and the accounting rate of return. They also found that blockholders were 
likely to be involved in management. They therefore suggest that shareholders are 
motivated to become concentrated in order to be managers rather than to provide 
efficient monitoring.  
McConnell and Servaes (1990) found no evidence to support that ownership by 
blockholders3 influences firm performance in terms of efficient monitoring. Mehran 
(1995) also found no relationship between outside blockholders who do not involve in 
management and firm performance, in the manufacturing industry. By regressing firm 
performance on different identities of blockholders4, he also found no significant 
relationship between them. Seifert et al. (2005) studied four countries (the US, England, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The 18 emerging markets in Lin (2003) consist of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. 
3 “Blockholder”, as used in McConnell and Servaes (1990), is defined as a shareholder who owns 5% or 
more shares in a firm. 
4 The identities of blockholders used in Mehran (1995) include institutional investors, individual investors 
and corporations. 
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Germany and Japan). Regarding the US sample, they suggest that OLS regression and 
2SLS provides opposite results; while they found a positive effect of blockholders on 
Tobin’s q using OLS, they found a negative effect under 2SLS. 
Therefore, a failure to identify types of shareholder may lead to an insignificant impact 
of blockholder ownership on firm performance being detected, partly because different 
types of blockholder have different motivations and abilities to provide efficient 
monitoring (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). For example, long-term investors are 
normally more active than short-term investors are, when it comes to monitoring 
managers (Mehran, 1995). Roe (1990) suggests that institutional investors and banks 
may be restricted by law from holding significant shares in a company. Hence they may 
not have sufficient power to provide efficient monitoring. In addition, Barclay and 
Holderness (1991) assert that firm performance is affected by the experience and special 
skill of blockholders. This may imply that the efficiency of monitoring depends on these 
factors rather than on who owns shares in a firm.   
In conclusion, existing literature on the US does not provide strong evidence to support 
either the beneficial or the detrimental effects of blockholder ownership and may imply 
that the US corporate governance system relies on other corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as the board of directors and strong shareholder protection. These 
mechanisms could negate the need for large shareholders to monitor managers’ 
behaviour. 
4.2.1.2 Research outside the US  
Research on the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance is more 
widespread in countries outside the US, such as those in Continental Europe or Asia. In 
addition, much of this research focuses on whether firms with dominant shareholders 
have superior performance to that of firms without dominant shareholders. 
Among others, Claessens and Djankov (1999) report a positive relationship between 
concentrated ownership and firm performance, measured by firm profitability and labour 
productivity in the Czech Republic. Seifert et al. (2005) found both a positive and a 
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negative effect of blockholders on firm performance using OLS and 2SLS in German 
firms and the UK, respectively. Applying a generalised method of moments (GMM), 
Miguel et al. (2004) found evidence to support a non-linear relationship between 
concentrated ownership and market performance. They found that concentrated 
ownership in Spanish listed firms was associated with higher firm performance when 
ownership ranged from 0% to 87%. However, the relationship was negative beyond 
87%. 
Taking into account the imbalance between cash-flow and control rights, in Germany, 
Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004) found evidence of exploitation by dominant 
shareholders with higher control rights than cash-flow rights, which in turn reduced firm 
performance. In fact, dominant shareholders with higher cash-flow rights than control 
rights had a positive effect on firm performance. Additionally, their study posits that an 
increase in control rights by the second largest shareholders benefits minority 
shareholders in German firms, leading to higher firm performance. Their results are 
robust to all types of dominant shareholder5, except for those from public sector. Lins 
(2003) reports a significant positive relationship between outside blockholders with 
control rights and firm performance, measured by Tobin’s q in 18 emerging countries. 
The results were stronger in countries with poor minority shareholder protection6. 
Nevertheless, the results from 2SLS showed some evidence that outside blockholders 
were likely to have control rights in firms with high firm performance. 
In the context of Asian countries, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) document that ownership 
by the top five blockholders was positively related to firm performance, measured on the 
basis of accounting, in Malaysia. Morck et al. (2000) also report a positive effect of 
corporate blockholders on firm performance in Japan, suggesting efficient monitoring by 
blockholders. However, Seifert et al. (2005) could not find any significant effect of 
blockholders on firm performance in Japanese listed firms, using OLS and 2SLS. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004), dominant shareholders were also classified by their identities as 
individuals or families, non-bank corporations, banks, public sector bodies and foreign companies. 
6 In Lin (2003), poor minority shareholder protection is categorised by the degree of antidirector rights 
measure (< 4) and the Rule of Law measure (< 7) suggested by La Porta et al. (1998). 
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In summary, the principal-agent theory and evidence from existing literature suggest that 
increasing levels of ownership could either align or divert the interests of large 
shareholders to/from those of firms or other shareholders. In Thailand, 
Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Yammeesri (2003) found that firms with the presence of 
dominant shareholders have superior performance than firms without the presence of 
dominant shareholders before the financial crisis. Yammeesri (2003) also reports that 
controlling ownership (>25%) was significantly related to both accounting and market 
performance before the financial crisis (1993 – 1996) but was significantly related to 
accounting performance after the financial crisis (1998 – 2000). Nevertheless, 
Limpaphayom (2001) found no significant evidence for this relationship. The difference 
in results may be caused by differences in ownership data. While the definition of share 
ownership used in Limpaphayom (2001) included shares held by the top-five 
shareholders, the first two studies focused on the effects of the presence of dominant 
shareholders who held more than 25% of shares outstanding.  
The previous research discussed above provides some clues that the high concentrated 
ownership and/or the presence of a dominant shareholder may play a substitutive role for 
a weak governance system in the Thai capital market before the corporate governance 
reforms. As discussed in Chapter 3, many large listed firms normally have high 
concentrated ownership and many of them have a good network relationship with their 
network companies, government or banks that potentially contribute to the firms in 
terms of such as an ability to response to a change in business environment (Suehiro, 
1993) or financial supports (Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 2004).  
However, the existing evidence based on the Thai context on the impact of ownership 
concentration and the role of a dominant shareholder on firm performance is still limited 
to short period either before or after the financial crisis. To provide more clear evidence, 
this study propose the first two hypotheses based on the alignment of interests as follow:  
Ha1: Ownership concentration has a positive impact on firm performance. 
Ha2: The presence of a dominant shareholder has a positive impact on firm 
performance. 
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4.2.2 The Impact of Ownership Concentration by Shareholders’ Types 
and the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types on Firm 
Performance 
As discussed in Chapter 2, different types of shareholder may have different motivations 
for holding shares in firms. In addition, evidence from existing literature suggests that, 
with different motivations and incentives, ownership of different types of shareholder 
may affect firm performance in either positive or negative directions. This study focuses 
on five types of shareholder: families, governments, foreign company investors, banks 
and financial institutions. 
4.2.2.1 Family 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1, existing research views family ownership as a 
structure that helps to reduce the agency problem, because the interests of family 
members are likely to align with those of the firm they own (for example family ties, 
efficient monitoring and communication among family members, long-term objective 
with firms). 
Among others, Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that firms with continued founding-
family ownership7 performed at least as well as non-family firms in the US S&P 500, 
after taking account of firm age, family-CEO position, separation of control and cash-
flow rights and the endogeneity problem. They also document that family firms with 
family CEOs had better firm performance than those with non-family CEOs. However, 
their study suggests that the relationship is nonlinear. Hence firm performance decreases 
as the proportion of shares owned by family increases. This may imply that family 
owners can become entrenched if their control increases. Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
found that only firms with a founding family member serving as CEO or as a chairman 
with a non-family CEO had enhanced performance in the US.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Anderson and Reeb (2003) also report that controlling families, on average, hold 18% of shares in their 
sample firms.  
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Maury (2006) reveals that firm performance is higher in firms with active dominant 
family shareholders than in firms with passive or no dominant family shareholders, as is 
more often the case in Western European countries. Mishra et al. (2001) report that firms 
with older founding family owners are associated with higher firm performance in 
Norway, and Martínez et al. (2007) and Bonilla et al. (2010) also find superior 
performance among firms with dominant family shareholders in Chile, in their study 
based on market (Tobin’s q) and accounting performance (ROA, ROE). Improved 
performance in family-controlled firms has also been found in Japan (Asaba and 
Kunugita, 2007) and Thailand (Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Yammeesri et al., 2006), while 
in Canada, King and Santor (2008) report that only family-controlled firms with a single 
class of shares have better accounting performance than non-family controlled firms. 
By contrast, family owners may destroy firm performance if their objectives in holding 
shares diverge from the firm value maximisation. For instance, DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(2000) document the poor performance of the Times Mirror Company, a Fortune 500 
company with a controlling family. They also report cases of the exploitation of 
minority shareholders by dominant family shareholders, in the form of special dividend 
payments only for family shareholders. Similarly, Faccio et al. (2002) argue that 
dominant shareholders, especially family shareholders, exploit minority shareholders in 
Western Europe by means of lower dividend payments. From Finland, Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) document evidence of minority shareholder exploitation by dominant 
family shareholders, resulting from a lack of efficient monitoring by other dominant 
shareholders. Villalonga and Amit (2006) found some evidence of exploitation by 
controlling families when mechanisms such as pyramidal structures were used. 
Similarly, King and Santor (2008) document that family firms with dual-class shares 
perform worse than those with dispersed ownership. Anderson and Reeb (2003) report 
some evidence of entrenchment by dominant family shareholders, and suggest that 
families might exit sooner than other shareholders from firms with poor (or foreseeable 
poor) performance. 
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Additionally, firm founders are likely to transfer a business to their heirs, even if their 
heirs are not particularly competent. This may therefore lead to poorer firm performance 
at the expense of other shareholders (for example, see Bertrand et al., 2008; Mehrotra et 
al., 2013).  
In summary, evidence from existing literature provides mixed results, which either 
support the alignment or divergence of interests hypotheses. Research in Thailand before 
the financial crisis found evidence that firms with a dominant family shareholder had 
superior performance than firms without them (e.g. Wiwattanakantang, 2001; 
Yammeesri, 2003). Yammeesri (2003) and Yammeesri et al. (2004) report that family-
controlled ownership and the presence of a dominant family shareholder were positively 
significant only to accounting performance after the financial crisis (1998 – 2000). 
Similarly, Connelly et al. (2012) found no relationship between family ownership and 
market performance (Tobin’s q) for the listed firms in 2005.  
In fact, most of listed firms were founded by founding family, which are normally a 
well-known family in the Thai society. Like many Asian countries, a relationship among 
family members is very close in the Thai family and it may enhance family ties e.g. love, 
trust and loyalty among them. These characteristics could better align interests of family 
shareholders with their firms. Additionally, while the previous research in Thailand does 
not provide strong empirical evidence of exploitation by family firms, the research has 
limited its study to the short-term period. Therefore, this study re-examines the impact of 
family ownership and the presence of a dominant family shareholder on firm 
performance in longer period and proposes the hypotheses based on the alignment of 
interests as follow: 
Ha3: Family block ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. 
Ha4: The presence of a dominant family shareholder has a positive impact on 
firm performance. 
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4.2.2.2 Government 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2, governments may invest in private and/or 
listed firms for many reasons, political, economic or social. Their differing objectives 
may lead to different effects on firm performance (Chen, Firth and Xu, 2009).  
Intensive research on government ownership and firm performance has been carried out 
in China. Sun et al. (2002) examined the relationship between the privatisation of firms, 
which were still owned partly by the state, and firm performance. They report a positive, 
non-linear relationship. However, at higher levels of ownership, the interests of 
dominant government shareholders were shown to diverge from the firm value 
maximisation.  
Chen, Firth and Xu (2009) classified state-owned firms into three main categories8 based 
on the government’s political and economic objectives. They suggest that the degree of 
government involvement in supervision and monitoring and the level of experience of 
CEOs are the main factors influencing a firm’s performance. In particular, they found 
that state-owned firms that were controlled by the central government performed better 
than other types of state-owned firm. In fact, these firms were closely supervised and 
monitored by several departments under central government control (such as the 
National Audit Office, NAO). In addition, it was more likely for the CEOs of these firms 
to be highly competent.  
Le and Buck (2011) found that a government might use political power to pursue its 
goals, creating some costs for the firms; however, the net effect is not harmful to overall 
firm performance.  
In summary, the evidence from existing literature is mixed. In Thailand, government 
owned firms are either a pure monopoly business (e.g. Airports service) or the biggest 
firms in the same sectors (e.g. Energy and Utilities). This could motivate the government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Chen, Firth and Xu (2009: 172) classify state-owned firms into SAMBs (state asset management 
bureaus), SOECGs (SOEs affiliated to the central government), and SOELGs (SOEs affiliated to the local 
government). 
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blockholder or a dominant government shareholder to provide efficient monitoring to its 
firms. Previous research in Thailand such as Wiwattanakantang (2001) found that firms 
with dominant government shareholders perform better than firms without dominant 
shareholders do before the financial crisis. Because no strong evidence on the 
exploitation by Thai government was addressed by the previous studies, this study re-
examines the impact of government ownership and the presence of a dominant 
government shareholder on firm performance in longer period and proposes the 
hypotheses based on the alignment of interests as follow: 
Ha5: Government block ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. 
Ha6: The presence of a dominant government shareholder has a positive impact 
on firm performance. 
4.2.2.3 Foreign Investors 
Foreign investors are investors who do not hold the same nationality as the countries in 
which they have invested.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4, they can come from two main groups: multi-
national companies (MNCs) and foreign institutions (such as banks and financial 
institutions). The key benefit from MNC investment is in the form of specific knowledge 
or technology that can be transferred from foreign companies to domestic companies. 
Nevertheless, an MNC may be more interested in increasing its performance (expanding 
its market or reducing the cost of production) than in providing better monitoring.  
Foreign institutional investors may benefit domestic companies as another source of 
funding and may exert some pressure to improve corporate governance. However, if 
their investment objective is simply to diversify their portfolio, they might lack 
incentives to monitor and control a firm. In addition, their degree of monitoring may be 
limited by distance and differences in culture.   
Existing research reveals that the proportion of foreign investors’ ownership may help to 
increase their power and incentive to be involved in monitoring processes. For example, 
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in Japan, Ghahroudi (2011) found that high levels of foreign ownership led to situations 
in which firms were managed by foreign representatives and operated by many foreign 
employees. He suggests that this characteristic enhances the transfer of knowledge and, 
in turn, partly contributes to firm performance. He also addresses other factors that lead 
to different effects from foreign ownership: in particular, the size of MNCs and 
managerial control costs. Seifert et al. (2005) also found a significant positive 
relationship between ownership by foreign investors and firm performance in Japan.  
In summary, the evidence from existing literature is mixed. In Thailand, foreign 
investors who hold substantial shares in Thai listed firms are normally MNCs9. This 
could provide benefit to local firms in terms of a transfer technology and enhance a 
motivation to provide better monitoring to the firms. Additionally, government attempts 
at promoting foreign investment after the crisis could motivate many foreign institutions 
to increase their investment in the Thai capital markets. Therefore, this may increase 
their motivation to invest in firms’ monitoring process.  
Research in Thailand such as Wiwattanakantang (2001) reveals that firms with a 
presence of dominant foreign investors perform better than firms without them before 
the financial crisis. However, Yammeesri (2003) could not find a relationship between 
foreign controlled ownership and firm performance before and after the reform. 
Nevertheless, he found the significantly positive effect of the presence of a dominant 
foreign company shareholder on accounting performance measured by sales-to-assets 
ratio after the financial crisis. Because no strong evidence on the exploitation by foreign 
company shareholder was addressed by the previous studies, this study re-examines the 
impact of foreign company ownership and the presence of a dominant foreign company 
shareholder on firm performance in longer period and proposes the hypotheses based on 
the alignment of interests as follow:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The MNCs are limited by the Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999) not to hold more than 50% of 
shares outstanding with voting rights. Therefore, they are likely to jointly invest with local companies. For 
example, Thai Wacoal Public Company Limited, which produces ladies’ lingerie products in Thailand, is 
a joint venture between the Wacoal Corporation of Japan and the Sahapathana Group, the latter of which 
is controlled by the Chokwatana family. 
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Ha7: Foreign company block ownership has a positive impact on firm 
performance. 
Ha8: The presence of a dominant foreign company shareholder has a positive 
impact on firm performance. 
4.2.2.4 Banks and Non-Bank Financial Institutional Investors 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3, the incentives for banks and non-bank financial 
institutional investors to hold shares in firms may either provide benefits or create costs. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) report a positive association between ownership of 
institutional investors and firm performance in the US. A study in the US by Seifert et 
al. (2005) also found a positive relationship between institutional investors and firm 
performance when OLS was applied, but the relationship became negative when 2SLS 
was applied. The contradictory result may be caused by a failure to classify the types of 
institutional investor (Bhattacharya and Graham, 2007).  
In Finland, Bhattacharya and Graham (2007) classified different types of institutional 
investor10 as either “pressure-sensitive institutional owners” or “pressure-resistant 
institutional owners” and found that both groups were positively related to firm 
performance.  
Gorton and Schmid (2000) reveal a positive relationship between banks with higher 
control rights and firm performance in Germany. They also did not find evidence of 
banks in Germany exploiting minority shareholders by means of proxy voting or equity 
shareholders. By assumed a non-linear relationship, Morck et al. (2000) report a positive 
relationship between bank ownership and firm performance at high levels of bank 
ownership. They suggest that Japanese banks with high levels of ownership are likely to 
relax criteria for investment, allowing firms to invest in more profitable projects. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Bhattacharya and Graham (2007) classified insurance companies, banks, and non-bank trusts as 
“pressure-sensitive institutional owners”, while public pension funds, mutual funds, endowments and 
foundations were classified as “pressure-resistant institutional owners” 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, banks play an important role as lenders in Thailand before 
the financial crisis but the role of bank as equity owners become more important after 
the financial crisis. Limpaphayom and Polwitoon (2004) reveal that banks, as equity 
owners, had a positive effect on firm performance, measured by Tobin’s q before the 
financial crisis. However, the relationship was non-linear, indicating entrenchment at 
high levels of ownership. Yammeesri (2003) found that firms with a presence of bank 
equity ownership in the top-ten shareholders did not perform better than those without 
bank equity ownership in term of market performance. He also found that the former 
performed worse than the latter in term of sale-to-asset ratio. The evidence was 
consistent between periods before and after the financial crisis. 
In summary, the previous evidence in Thailand is still mixed. Additionally, the 
increasing in bank ownership, especially after the financial crisis and the more efficiency 
of bank regulator after the corporate governance reforms could motivate bank owners to 
participate more in firms’ monitoring. Therefore, this study re-examines the impact of 
bank ownership and the presence of a dominant bank shareholder on firm performance 
in longer period and proposes the hypotheses based on the alignment of interests as 
follow:  
Ha9: Bank block ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. 
Ha10: The presence of a dominant bank shareholder has a positive impact on firm 
performance. 
As suggested by existing literature about the different motivations between bank and 
non-bank financial institutions, this study separately proposes the hypotheses for non-
bank financial institutions based on the alignment of interests as follow:  
Ha11: Non-bank financial institution block ownership has a positive impact on 
firm performance. 
Ha12: The presence of a dominant non-bank financial institution shareholder has 
a positive impact on firm performance. 
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4.2.3 The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance 
As discussed previously in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2, Berle and Mean (1932) argue that 
the agency problem in firms owned by diversified investors arises because of the 
separation of ownership and control. In response, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose 
the use of managerial ownership in order to align the interests of managers to those of 
firms, since an increase in the proportion of shares owned by managers should motivate 
managers to work for the interests of the firm. Therefore, an alignment of interest 
hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance.  
However, high managerial ownership not only increases managers’ incentives but also 
increases their power of control. As a result, managers can become entrenched at higher 
levels of ownership because they can protect themselves from market disciplines such as 
the market for corporate control or the managerial labour market (for example, see Denis 
and McConnell, 2003). Therefore, the entrenchment hypothesis predicts a negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance at high levels of 
ownership. 
Some research argues that the level of managerial ownership is endogenously 
determined by other corporate governance mechanisms, such as the labour market 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983) or competitive product and capital markets (Demsetz, 1983). 
Hence each firm’s ownership structure is expected to be at its optimal level, reflecting a 
mix of corporate governance mechanisms (Demsetz, 1983) and there should be no 
relationship between ownership and firm performance (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Nevertheless, this notion is based on the 
assumption of perfect market efficiency, which might not always exist in reality. In fact, 
the market may suffer from limited transparency and asymmetric information. In 
addition, it is likely that the institutional environments of markets can change over time. 
Therefore, firms cannot always reach an optimum level of ownership in practice (see, for 
example McConnell et al., 2008).  
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Initially, studies into the potential impact of managerial ownership on firm performance 
were focused on the US. Later research expanded to European and Asian countries yet 
consistently found mixed evidence. This may have been caused by differences in the 
quality of ownership data, performance measurements (accounting or market based), 
sample sizes, methodologies and institutional environments such as corporate 
governance systems and regulations.  
4.2.3.1 Prior Research on US Firms 
In the US, managerial ownership is used as a mechanism to increase managers’ 
incentives (for example, through stock compensations), as suggested by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Therefore, earlier research from the US focused its attention on the 
potential impact of managerial ownership on firm performance.  
Research normally measures firm performance based on either accounting performance 
(for example, return on assets) or market performance (Tobin’s q or Quasi Tobin’s q). 
Evidence from the studies supports the notions of either the alignment or the 
entrenchment effects of managerial ownership on firm performance. In fact, much 
research found a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance, with different turning points. A few researchers also found evidence in 
support of the notion of market efficiency, showing no relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. 
For example, using large industrial firms in the Fortune 500 as a sample, Morck et al. 
(1988) applied a piecewise, linear regression and report evidence for an alignment effect 
with 0% to 5% managerial ownership. They find that when managerial ownership 
exceeds 5%, the effect becomes negative, indicating the presence of an entrenchment 
effect. The effect becomes positive again when the ownership exceeds 25%.  
McConnell and Servaes (1990) extend the scope of the sample used in Morck et al. 
(1988) by including smaller firms and using a variety of sources of ownership data. They 
used a quadratic form regression to show that the alignment effect is present until 
managerial ownership reaches the turning point at 37.6% and remains in place up to 
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60.9%. However, by replicating the methodology of Morck et al. (1988), they found a 
significant positive relationship only when managerial ownership is between 5% and 
25%. Koles (1995) suggests that the different results in these two studies may be caused 
by the difference in sample size rather than in the source of the data.  
Cui and Mak (2002) found a “W-shape relationship”11 between managerial ownership 
and Tobin’s q. However, their sample was limited to firms in high research and 
development (R&D) industries, and their study may imply that the different pattern of 
the relationship is due to industry effects. 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance may suffer from 
reverse causality and endogeneity problems (for example, see Jensen and Warner, 1988). 
Hence ownership may be increased as firm performance increases, but not vice versa. 
For example, managers are likely to buy stocks or exercise stock options in firms with 
high performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Jensen and Warner, 1988; McConnell 
and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al. 1988). In addition, ownership may also be endogenous, 
determined by observed or unobserved firm heterogeneity and resulting in biased OLS 
estimators.12  
Therefore, recent studies have attempted to test for the existence of these problems by 
applying different methodologies alongside OLS. However, results have still been 
inconclusive. Among others, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) used panel data and 
instrument variables (IV-lagged ownership variables) to control for endogeneity 
problems. They report that managerial ownership (by CEO and CEO tenure) was 
associated with high market performance (Tobin’s q) at the 1% turning point. Their 
results from OLS and IV are consistent.   
Cho (1998) used OLS and simultaneous equations (two-stage least squares, 2SLS, and 
three-stage least squares, 3SLS) to examine the links between managerial ownership, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The W-shape relationship in their study indicates a negative relationship between managerial ownership 
from 0% to10%, a positive relationship from 10% 30%, a negative relationship from 30% to 50% and a 
positive relationship from 50% upwards.	  12	  Among others, Cho, 1998; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Seifert et al., 2005.	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investment and firm performance. However, he found inconsistent results from different 
methodologies. While results from the OLS showed a non-linear relationship with 
different turning points compared to those found in previous studies (such as Morck et 
al. 1988), the results from simultaneous equations suggested that managerial ownership 
is determined by market performance (Tobin’s q), but not vice versa. His study suggests 
that the markets to equity and industry are other factors that could determine managerial 
ownership.  
Cui and Mark (2002) used OLS and 2SLS to investigate the relationship between 
managerial ownership and market performance (Tobin’s q). They found a non-linear 
relationship and consistent results from both methodologies. Seifert et al. (2005) applied 
both OLS and 2SLS to regress firm performance (Tobin’s q) on managerial ownership. 
However, the results from the two methods are inconsistent. Regarding OLS, Seifert et 
al. (2005) found the entrenchment effect at lower levels of managerial ownership (less 
than 10%), but no significant relationship was found with regard to higher levels of 
managerial ownership. Nevertheless, when 2SLS was applied, only the entrenchment 
effect was found.  
By contrast, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) reveal that ownership structure is endogenously 
determined by the firm-specific characteristics (firm size and volatility of profit rate) 
that are chosen to maximise firm profitability. Using OLS regression, they did not find a 
significant relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance, 
measured by accounting profit rate. Ownership data used in their study included the 
percentage of shares owned by the top 5 and 20 shareholders, but they did not classify 
the types of managerial ownership. Their findings are consistent with the later study by 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
Himmelberg et al. (1999: 357) argue that managerial ownership may be determined by 
factors of unobserved firm heterogeneity such as intangible assets, effective monitoring 
processes and the degree of monopoly in business. Hence the exclusion of these factors 
from a regression of firm performance on managerial ownership may lead to false 
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results. They used unbalanced panel data with a fixed-effects model to control for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. They found no significant relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance (Tobin’s q).  
Zhou (2001), however, maintains that fixed-effects models have their own limitations if 
there is little cross-sectional variation of levels of share ownership within individual 
firms. In this case, it is difficult for the model to detect any significant relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance, even if one does exist. Zhou 
(2001) shows that changes in year-to-year managerial ownership within sampled firms 
tended to be slow, while cross-sectional variation of managerial ownership across 
sampled firms differed. Therefore, it is not surprising that the results of using fixed-
effects approaches are insignificant in the study of Himmelberg et al. (1999), because 
the fixed-effects approach removes all possible within variations.  
According to McConnell et al. (2008), the comments of Zhou (2001) do not mean that 
the fixed effects model has no merit. They believe that the model does control for the 
endogeneity problems arising from unobserved, firm-specific heterogeneity. McConnell 
et al. (2008: 93) assert, “[t] he fixed effects model accomplishes this by, in essence, 
considering changes in ownership and changes in value rather than levels. When 
changes are considered, any firm fixed effect cancels and, therefore, any relation that 
remains cannot be due to endogeneity that arises from such an effect.”  
They investigated the impact of changes in managerial ownership on a firm’s market 
values six days after the announcement of insider purchasing. They found that a change 
in managerial ownership affected firm performance in a non-linear form (a curvilinear 
relationship). In particular, changes in the firm’s market value first increased and then 
decreased as the managerial ownership increased. Their findings also oppose the notion 
of market efficiency. McConnell et al. (2008: 105) comment,  
 “[M]anagers, the board and other shareholders do not jointly maximise 
the value of the firm with respect to ownership structure. In some cases, 
insiders own “too much” stock and in other cases, they do not own 
	  	  
Chapter 4 
91	  
enough. In those cases where managers own too much stock, they may be 
doing so to enhance their entrenched positions.” 
This suggests that firms need to adjust their share distribution to managers in order to 
respond to changes in their specific circumstances over time.  
Later, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) applied the fixed effects model and found that an 
increase in managerial ownership led to an increase in Tobin’s q after being controlled 
for previous stock returns. They also found no evidence that managerial ownership was 
detrimental to firm performance. 
4.2.3.2 Prior Research outside the US 
Research done outside the US also reveals mixed results regarding the alignment and 
entrenchment effects of managerial ownership on firm performance and confirms the 
presence of a non-linear relationship, with different turning points and patterns, 
revealing that the degree of incentive effects may be influenced by institutional 
environments. Additionally, as in the research from the US, later international studies 
have taken endogeneity into consideration. 
For example, in research based in the UK, Short and Keasey (1999) applied a cubic form 
regression and confirmed that the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance is non-linear. They used accounting and market performance measurements 
and found a pattern of alignment and entrenchment effects that was similar to that found 
by Morck et al. (1988). However, they report the presence of an entrenchment effect at 
higher levels of managerial ownership: between 15.58% and 41.84% from accounting 
measurements, and between 12.99% and 41.99% from market value measurements. 
Compared to the US, their findings imply that it is more difficult for managers in the UK 
to abuse other shareholders, because of the more active role of institutional investors and 
the market for corporate control in the UK capital market. In fact, it is more difficult for 
takeover defences by managers be successful in the UK than it is in the US. In addition, 
the allowance for CEO duality may create opportunities for management to become 
more easily entrenched in the US than in the UK, where CEO duality is rare.  
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Davies et al. (2005) argue that external market controls (hostile takeovers) may not work 
efficiently at higher levels of managerial ownership, as reported in previous studies 
(both in and outside the US). Therefore, an entrenchment effect may occur again, when 
the power of management is stronger than the control from the external market (when 
management stakes are higher than 50%). Accordingly, they applied a “quintic 
structure” as a functional model and found entrenchment effects at more than 50% 
managerial ownership in the UK. They also found the alignment effect again at higher 
levels of managerial ownership. After controlling for endogeneity, they confirmed that 
firm performance is partially determined by managerial ownership and vice versa.	   It is 
worth noting that their findings reveal that the choice of model used to explain the 
structure of a relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance has 
some influence on the results. 
In Spain, Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz (2001) found a non-linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance, but not vice versa, using one-
equation models (OLS) with two break points (at 20% and 50%). The alignment effect 
was found when managerial ownership was between 0% and 20%, and again at more 
than 50%. Entrenchment effects appeared between 20% and 50% managerial ownership. 
However, when simultaneous equations were applied, managerial ownership seemed to 
be determined both by firm performance and by investment.  
In New Zealand, Bhabra (2007) applied cubic form regressions and found a relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance. However, the entrenchment range 
was higher and longer than that found in the US research (between 14% and 40%). The 
result was still robust after controlling for endogeneity. The difference could be 
explained by the smaller size of the capital market and the potential for greater 
transparency in New Zealand, which seem to be obstacles to management entrenchment. 
However, the difficulty in a success of takeover defences and the weak role of 
institutional investors in New Zealand may have caused an entrenchment effect to occur 
for longer than it does in the US.  
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Similar research has been carried out in Asian countries. Hu and Zhou (2008) applied a 
quadratic form regression to a sample that was limited to non-listed companies in China 
and found that the relationship was non-linear, with a negative turning point above 50% 
managerial ownership. They also compared the accounting performance (ROA) of firms 
with managerial ownership to that of firms without managerial ownership and found that 
the former outperformed the latter.  
In Japan, Chen et al. (2003) found a “U-shaped relationship” between managerial 
ownership and firm performance; the entrenchment effect was found at low levels and 
the alignment effect at high levels of managerial ownership. After controlling for 
endogeneity, however, they found an alignment effect that appeared as a linear 
relationship between the two variables.  
In summary, the evidence from existing literature reveals mixed results either supports 
alignment or entrenchment of managerial ownership and suggests that the relationship 
might not be linear in form. In Thailand, Yammeesri (2003) reports the positive and 
significant relationship between managerial ownership (all directors) and both market 
and accounting performance only before the financial crisis. However, he found no 
significant difference in both firm performances between firms with the presence of 
managerial ownership and firms without the presence of managerial ownership before 
and after the financial crisis. 
Additionally, it is quite common characteristics that listed firms have dominant family 
shareholders who also take a role of management. The combination of ownership and 
control may help to align interests of manager-owners to firms. However, evidence from 
the previous literature in Thailand reports mixed results. For example, 
Wiwattanakantang (2001) found that dominant shareholders who involve in 
management become entrenched when they hold 25% to 50% of share ownership in 
term of market performance. Nevertheless, their interests seem to more align to other 
shareholders when they hold more than 75% of share ownership. Finally, by replicating 
a cubic-form regression, as suggested by Short and Keasey (1999), Yammeesri (2003) 
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could not find significant evidence of a non-linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance before and after the financial crisis. 
In light of the findings of existing literature with the mixed results, this study therefore 
proposes the hypotheses based on alignment of interests, stated as follows: 
Ha13: Managerial ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. 
4.2.4 The Corporate Governance Reforms and their Implications  
Corporate governance reforms are often triggered by high-profile corporate scandals in 
individual companies (such as ENRON) or financial crises (such as the Asian financial 
crisis or the global credit crunch). As discussed in Chapter 2, the key objective of 
corporate governance systems is to reduce the conflict of interests between managers 
and shareholders or between dominant shareholders and minority shareholders. The 
strengthening of the systems is ideally expected to reduce agency costs and, in turn, to 
enhance firm performance.  
However, there is no guarantee that corporate governance reforms will achieve their 
proposed aims without creating additional problems13 or that they will not cause the cost 
of compliance to outweigh the reduction in residual losses.14 Research into the impact of 
corporate governance reforms on corporate performance is important to an 
understanding of their contribution to firms and capital markets in practice, and to the 
future development of global corporate governance systems, but evidence from existing 
literature is still limited and contradictory. 
For example, the UK corporate scandals (ENRON and WorldCom) in 2002 led to the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200215 (SOX, 2002), which mainly focused 
on the independence of board directors and auditors. Nevertheless, subsequent evidence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For instance, the introduction of remuneration committees and consultants in the US and the UK 
appears to have contributed to a ratcheting up of the process of executive remuneration.  
14 Such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which imposed large compliance costs, on smaller firms in particular, 
and failed to prevent the use of REPO 105 provisions by Lehman Brothers and other financial institutions 
in the run-up to and during the 2007/08 credit crunch.	  
15 For example, a requirement that an audit committee must be entirely composed of independent 
directors, or a prohibition of non-auditor services. 
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has shown that attempts to improve individual corporate governance mechanisms (for 
example, through director independence) following the SOX, 2002, may not have 
successfully contributed to firm performance. For example, Bolton (2012) examined 
whether firms benefitted, in terms of performance, from complying with the 
requirements for audit committee independence but found no significant improvements.  
Focusing on evidence from Russia Kuznecovs and Pal (2012) examined whether 
corporate governance reforms, in term of disclosure and transparency, enhanced firm 
performance in Russian listed firms. They found that the corporate governance index 
(T&D index) was positively associated with Tobin’s q for the full sample of Russian 
listed firms. However, focusing on industry sectors, they found that the significant 
positive results were absent from firms in the utilities sectors that were not oil and gas 
producers. They suggest that, while better corporate governance improves firms’ 
transparency, it could also force them to pay higher taxes. They therefore argue that the 
success of corporate governance reforms in improving firm performance in Russia 
depends on how the system solves the conflict of interests between the central 
government and dominant shareholders. Overall, they found no evidence of a link 
between Russian corporate governance reforms and improvements in firm performance, 
as measured by Tobin’s q and earnings before interest and taxes as a share of total 
assets. 
Gao et al. (2008) investigated the effectiveness of corporate governance reforms in 
2005. They also focused on whether changes in ownership by the state and the largest 
shareholders enhanced firm performance. Based on their findings, the reforms appear to 
have led to a decrease in state ownership and the ownership of the largest shareholders 
in Chinese listed firms. They also found that change in state ownership had a positive 
effect on firm performance (change in the ROE) after reforms.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the need for corporate governance reforms in Thailand was 
primarily driven by the 1997 financial crisis. The reforms aimed to regain investors’ 
confidence and to promote the creditability of the Thai capital market, making it more 
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competitive and attractive to international investors. The reforms adopted the 
international corporate governance framework (OECD, 2004), which is mostly based on 
dispersed ownership model and includes mechanisms such as director independence. 
However, while ownership is more widely held in most US or UK firms, it is highly 
concentrated in most Thai firms, and it has still been a debate whether the adoption of 
international corporate governance mechanisms actually works well in such a different 
institutional environment (Enriques and Volpin, 2007; Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008).  
If the corporate governance mechanisms, imposed since 1999, had worked as well as 
they were intended to, they would have prevented large shareholders/dominant 
shareholders from consuming private benefits and either the positive or negative impact 
of ownership concentration and the presence of dominant shareholder ownership on firm 
performance should have improved. Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses as 
follows: 
Ha14: The impact of ownership concentration on firm performance differs in pre-
reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-reform ownership 
will be more positively effect to firm performance. 
Ha15: The impact of the presence of a dominant shareholder on firm performance 
differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the presence 
of a dominant shareholder in post-reform period will be more positively 
related to firm performance. 
Ha16: The impact of family block ownership on firm performance differs in pre-
reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-reform ownership 
will be more positively effect to firm performance. 
Ha17: The impact of government block ownership on firm performance differs in 
pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-reform 
ownership will be more positively effect to firm performance. 
Ha18: The impact of foreign company block ownership on firm performance 
differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-
reform ownership will be more positively effect to firm performance. 
Ha19: The impact of bank block ownership on firm performance differs in pre-
reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-reform ownership 
will be more positively effect to firm performance. 
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Ha20: The impact of non-bank financial institutions block ownership on firm 
performance differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that 
the post-reform ownership will be more positively effect to firm performance. 
Ha21: The impact of the presence of a dominant family shareholder on firm 
performance differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that 
the presence of this type of dominant shareholder in post-reform period will 
be more positively related to firm performance. 
Ha22: The impact of the presence of a dominant foreign company shareholder on 
firm performance differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense 
that the presence of this type of dominant shareholder in post-reform period 
will be more positively related to firm performance. 
Ha23: The impact of the presence of a dominant non-bank financial institution 
shareholder on firm performance differs in pre-reform and post-reform 
periods in the sense that the presence of this type of dominant shareholder in 
post-reform period will be more positively related to firm performance. 
Ha24: The impact of managerial ownership on firm performance differs in pre-
reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-reform ownership 
will be more positively related to firm performance. 
4.3 Research Methodology 
Some theoretical and methodological issues have been addressed by research on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. They mainly involve 
endogeneity of ownership (for examples, see Jensen and Warner, 1988; Morck et al., 
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Two possible sources of the endogeneity problem 
of ownership have been addressed in the research. One is caused by reverse causality16 
and another arises from omitted variables.  
Regarding reverse causality, academics argue that managers are willing to increase their 
fractions of shares in the firms they manage (to buy shares in the capital market or to 
exercise their share options) if the firm has good performance (Morck et al., 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). Ownership may 
therefore be determined by firm performance, but not vice versa.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) also raise a concern about the causality 
problem. However, their study did not test or detect this problem. 
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The problem of omitted variables arises when a researcher cannot add additional control 
variables to a regression model because data are unavailable (Wooldridge, 2010). If the 
omitted variables are correlated with explanatory variables (such as ownership), then the 
explanatory variables would be endogenous. Himmelberg et al. (1999) argue that 
managerial ownership is an endogenous variable, determined by observed or unobserved 
firm heterogeneity (see also Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
If an explanatory variable is somehow correlated with observed or unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, an ordinary least square estimation (OLS) will be biased and inconsistent 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Himmelberg et al. (1999: 257) argue that when regressing firm 
performance on ownership variables, research using cross-sectional data is likely to 
suffer from “unobserved heterogeneity” that has been omitted from the model. A 
problem may arise if unobserved determinants of firm performance also determine 
ownership and ownership may therefore be a false determinant of firm performance. For 
example, unobserved heterogeneity may be related to a firms’ monitoring technology, 
the degree of its market power or the level of intangible assets such as the talents of 
managers. 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) suggest that, under optimal contracts, the need for managerial 
ownership, in order to align the interests of managers to those of shareholders, is 
reduced if a firm’s owners can access superior monitoring technology. The superior 
monitoring will enhance firm performance because it helps to reduce managers’ 
opportunities to abuse the firms’ assets. However, if the quality of this monitoring is not 
included in the model specification, managerial ownership may be falsely related to firm 
performance that actually results from a negative relationship between monitoring 
technology and managerial ownership. If this issue is ignored it may cause OLS 
estimators to be biased and inconsistent. 
One solution that mitigates for the endogeneity problem is to find an “instrument 
variable”, which is not correlated with any other observed or unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, as a proxy for ownership and to use IV methods such as 2SLS regressions 
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(for examples, see Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Wooldridge, 
2010). When potential observed heterogeneity, that could determine firm performance, 
is already added into the specification model, it is difficult to find an instrument variable 
that is correlated to ownership but not correlated to firm performance in practice. As a 
result, the use of instrument variables provides unclear results and continues to be 
debated among researchers. 
Using panel data,17 in which the same cross-sectional units are collected at different 
points in time, provides another solution for this problem (Himmelberg et al., 1999; 
Wooldridge, 2010). Where there is an endogeneity problem of ownership, Himmelberg 
et al. (1999) suggest that using panel data allows research to apply a fixed effects 
estimator by assuming that any unobserved heterogeneity18 is constant over time. In 
particular, unobserved heterogeneity includes unobserved firm characteristics such as 
the use of monitoring technology or the level of managers’ talent. 
A fixed-effects model arises from “a basic unobserved effects model” (Greene, 2008: 
193; Wooldridge, 2010: 285), 
yit = xitβ + ci + uit ,             t= 1, 2…,T    
Where subscripts i and t denote the individual and the time period, respectively, xit are 
observable variables, uit denotes “idiosyncratic errors” and ci are unobserved effects, 
which are assumed to be arbitrarily correlated with xit.  
Following Greene (2008: 193 – 194), the general form of ci is  
E[ci | Xi] = h(Xi)      
Given that the conditional mean is the same in every period, one can write the model as 
yit = xitβ + h(Xi) + uit + [ci - h(Xi)] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	   	  In general, panel data allows one “to obtain consistent estimators in a presence of omitted variables” 
under certain assumptions (Wooldridge, 2010: 281).	  
18	  	  According to Wooldridge (2010), the unobserved heterogeneity can be called in many name such as an 
unobserved time-invariant variable, unobserved component and latent variable. 	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yit = xitβ + αi      + uit + [ci - h(Xi)] 
By assuming that [ci – h(Xi)] is uncorrelated with Xi, one can absorb it into the 
idiosyncratic errors and write the model as, 
yit = xitβ + αi + uit      
Note that the fixed-effects model assumes a strict exogeneity of the explanatory 
variables, conditional on the unobserved effect (ci) (Greene, 2008: 194; Wooldridge, 
2010: 301). This suggests  
E(uit | xit, ci] = 0, t = 1,2,…, T and Var[ci | Xi] = 0. 
This method therefore partly mitigates for the endogeneity problem regarding omitted 
variables. However, it is possible for explanatory variables to be correlated with 
unobserved heterogeneity that varies over time. In this case, either OLS or fixed-effect 
estimators would be biased. In addition, one cannot include observable “time-constant 
variables”, such as gender or industry,19 in xit because it is impossible to distinguish 
between observable time-constant variables in xit and unobservable time-constant 
variables in ci (Greene, 2008: 194; Wooldridge, 2010: 301).  
This study uses unbalanced panel data and applies a two-way fixed effects model (firm-
year) to investigate the impact of ownership structure on firm performance. The general 
models take the forms below:  
 FMit = β0 + β1Concentrated Ownit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit  
  + αi1Firm fixed effect + αi2Year fixed effect + εit    (4.1) 
 
 FMit = β0 + β1D_Dominantit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect  
  + αi2Year fixed effect + εit       (4.2) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  It is possible to include industry in the fixed-effect model if it appears to change over time for at least 
some firms (Wooldridge, 2010: 301). 
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 FMit = β0 + β1Family Ownit + β2Government Ownit + β3Domestic Ownit20  
  + β4Foreign Ownit + β4Non-Bank Financial Institution Ownit  
  + β5Bankit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect 
  + αi2Year fixed effect + εit       (4.3) 
 FMit = β0 + β1D_Familyit + β2D_Governmentit + β3D_Domesticit  
  + β4D_Foreignit + β4D_Non-Bank Financial Institutionit  
  + β5D_Bankit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect  
  + αi2Year fixed effect + εit       (4.4) 
 FMit = β0 + β1Manager Ownit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect  
  + αi2Year fixed effect + εit         (4.5) 
  
Where FM stands for firm performance, measured by accounting and market value 
approaches, subscripts i and t denote firms and years. Own is the percentage of shares 
owned by the largest shareholders, by their types. D_ indicates a dummy variable, which 
is equal to 1 if there is a presence of dominant shareholders, by their types. The 
definitions of all variables are described in Table 4.1. This study also used a cluster-
robust standard error estimator21 so that the fixed-effects (FE) standard error is more 
valid and robust in the presence of any heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in error 
terms (εit). 
4.3.1 Test for Equality between Coefficients before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms 
This study separates the full sample into pre-period (1994 – 1998) and post-period of the 
corporate governance reform (2000 – 2007) and run each specification models22 for each 
sample (Model 4.1 to 4.5) in order to examine the impact of ownership structure on firm 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This study also added domestic company ownership as a variable, in order to control for (1) any firms 
that are owned by dominant shareholders but do not publicly disclose it or (2) cases in which data is 
unavailable to trace the ultimate shareholder. 
21 Stock and Watson (2008:155) assert that a heteroskedasticity-robust variance matrix estimator used for 
fixed effect panel data is inconsistent if the number of time periods (T) is fixed but the number of firms (n) 
increases to infinity. In particular, they suggest that if T>3 and the error term is believed to be 
“unconditionally serially uncorrelated”, the heteroskedasticity-robust variance matrix estimator is more 
efficient than the cluster-robust standard error estimator is. However, if one cannot place a restriction on 
the structure of the error term, then the cluster-robust standard error estimator should be used. 
22 The year-fixed effects were excluded from pre and post regressions for each specification model to 
avoid a redundancy to the time-indicator (Post). 
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performance before and after the reform. In order to reduce any effects from the 
transitory period, the year 1999 was excluded because the first governance mechanism, 
audit committees, was introduced in this year. 
In order to compare the pre and post impacts, this study uses a dummy variable approach 
suggested by Gujarati (1970a, 1970b) to test equality between sets of coefficients in the 
pre-reform and post-reform regressions. Under this approach, observations from pre-
period and post-period samples for each model (Model 4.1 to 4.5) are pooled together 
and are estimated in form of single regressions as following: 
 FMit = β0 + β1Concentrated Ownit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit  
  + αi1Firm fixed effect + Post × [β0 + β1Concentrated Ownit  
  + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect] + εit  (4.6) 
 FMit = β0 + β1D_Dominantit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect  
  + Post × [β0 + β1D_Dominantit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit  
  + αi1Firm fixed effect] + εit      (4.7) 
 FMit = β0 + β1Family Ownit + β2Government Ownit + β3Domestic Ownit 
  + β4Foreign Ownit + β4Non-Bank Financial Institution Ownit  
  + β5Bankit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect 
  + Post × [β0 + β1Family Ownit + β2Government Ownit  
  + β3Domestic Ownit + β4Foreign Ownit  
  + β4Non-Bank Financial Institution Ownit + β5Bankit 
  + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect] + εit   (4.8) 
 FMit = β0 + β1D_Familyit + β2D_Governmentit + β3D_Domesticit  
  + β4D_Foreignit + β4D_Non-Bank Financial Institutionit  
  + β5D_Bankit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect  
  + Post × [β0 + β1D_Familyit + β2D_Governmentit + β3D_Domesticit  
  + β4D_Foreignit + β4D_Non-Bank Financial Institutionit  
  + β5D_Bankit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect] + εit  (4.9) 
 FMit = β0 + β1Manager Ownit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit + αi1Firm fixed effect 
  + Post × [β0 + β1Manager Ownit + γ1-13 Control Variablesit  
  + αi1Firm fixed effect] + εit        (4.10) 
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Where Post is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 for periods after the reform 
(2000 - 2007) and is equal to 0 for periods before the reform (1994 - 1998).  
Under an assumption that all variables (i.e. ownership and control variables) are changed 
over time, Post is interacted with each variable in each specification model (a 
“multiplicative form”, Post × variable). The coefficient of each variable (e.g. βPre) is the 
coefficient before the corporate governance reform. The coefficient of (Post × variable) 
indicates an incremental effect from the post-reform period. Therefore, the coefficient of 
each variable after the reform (βPost) is equal to the sum of each coefficient and its 
incremental effect (i.e. βPre + coefficient of (Post × variable)).  
The significantly positive sign of the coefficient of (Post × variable) indicates the 
positive incremental effect in post-reform period. In other words, the ownership variable 
has more positive (less negative) impact on firm performance in the post-reform period 
than in the pre-reform period.  
This could imply that the ownership structure works more efficient either in aligning the 
largest shareholders’ interests to other shareholders’ interests or limiting their 
opportunistic behaviour in firms in the post-reform period. In the context of the Thai 
capital market, this could imply some degree of success of the corporate governance 
reform in controlling the agency problem arisen from the conflict of interests between 
large (dominant) shareholders and other shareholders in the listed firms. 
On the other hand, the significantly negative sign of coefficient of (Post × variable) 
indicates the negative incremental effect in post-reform period. In other words, the 
ownership variable has more negative (less positive) impact on firm performance in the 
post-reform period than in the pre-reform period.  
This could imply the less efficiency of the ownership structure either in aligning the 
largest shareholders’ interests to other shareholders’ interests or limiting their 
opportunistic behaviour in firms in the post-reform period. In the context of the Thai 
capital market, this could indicate that the reforms might possibly reduce the motivation 
	  	  
Chapter 4 
104	  
of the largest shareholders (dominant shareholders) in participating in firms’ monitoring 
or increase their motivation to exploit other shareholders. 
The Wald test23 is also performed in order to test whether the coefficients of variables in 
the post-reform period (βPost = βPre + incremental effect) significantly differ from those 
in the pre-reform period (βPre). Previous research that uses the Wald test to test the 
equality of two variables in a single regression is such as Aggarwal et al., (2011). In this 
study, the Wald tests are computed by using “test” command in Stata. The null 
hypothesis is that βpost = βPre, which is equivalent to βPost – βPre = 0. The rejection of the 
null hypothesis indicates that βpost is significantly different from βPre. 
4.4 Definitions of Variables 
4.4.1 Firm Performance 
This study used both an accounting and a market-value approach to measure firm 
performance, because both of them have their strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, a 
comparison of the results from the two measurements may contribute to an 
understanding of whether ownership structure is beneficial to firm performance or 
investor perceptions in Thailand. 
4.4.1.1 Market Performance 
Regarding the market value approach, Tobin’s q (q) is a popular proxy in research24 to 
measure market performance. The q ratio is traditionally the ratio of the market value of 
the firm to the replacement value of assets (Tobin, 1978). In the short run, the q ratio 
reflects the value of intangible assets such as goodwill, management talents, a firms’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 According to Judge et al. (1985: 20–28), the Wald test is computed by using the estimated coefficient 
vector (b) and the estimate-variance-covariance matrix (V) of the estimated coefficients from the 
unconstrained model.  
    Given that Rb = Rβ +v1 and Rβ = r, where R is a (1×K) row vector, v1 ∼ N(0, σ2R(Xʹ′X)-1Rʹ′), the null 
hypothesis is Rb = r, which denotes the q linear hypothesis to be tested, The Wald statistics (W) is W = 
(Rb – r)ʹ′(RVRʹ′)-1(Rb – r) and the F statistic is computed as F = 1/q × W. 
24 For examples, see Cho, 1998; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2009; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Holderness and 
Sheehan, 1988; Lins, 2003; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Mehran, 1995; 
Morck et al, 1988; Seifert et al., 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; and Wiwattanakantang, 2001. 
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growth rate, market power, and investor expectations (Tobin, 1978; Perfect and Wiles, 
1994). However, because the q ratio is likely to be affected by investor expectations, it is 
likely to overlook what has been actually achieved by managers (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001). In addition, finding market data in order to calculate an accurate q 
ratio is sometimes complicated and time consuming in practice (Chung and Pruitt, 1994; 
Perfect and Wiles, 1994). In addition, the market data (such as the replacement cost of 
assets) is either not available or accurate in some countries (Chung and Pruitt, 1994; 
Perfect and Wiles, 1994; Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
In order to solve this problem, much of the research25 normally simplifies the q ratio by 
using some information extracted from financial statements (balance sheets). In 
particular, research is likely to use the book value of total assets, rather than replacement 
costs, as a denominator of the q ratio. Although, the simplified q is likely to differ from 
the traditional q ratio (with market data), the variation between the two is acceptable 
when their accuracy and availability are compared (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). Chung and 
Pruitt (1994) assert that the simplified q, applied accounting information, theoretically 
provides an accurate q, which can explain at least 96.6% of the variability of the 
traditional q. 
Following the literature, this study used a simplified Tobin’s q (Quasi-q) as a proxy for 
firm performance based on the market value. The Quasi-q ratio is a sum of the market 
value of equity and the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total 
assets. The book value of total assets is used instead of the replacement cost of assets 
because it is difficult to access the appropriate replacement costs for many of listed firms 
in Thailand. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 A simplified Tobin’s q is also used in corporate governance research such as Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996; Adams and Mehran, 2011; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Caprio et al., 2007; De Andres and Vallelado, 
2008; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Himmelberg et al., 1999; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Yeh et al., 2003; and Yermack, 1996. 
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4.4.1.2 Accounting Performance 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) posit that accounting performance, rather than market 
performance, can be the more appropriate proxy for firm performance, because the 
results of performance reflect management actions in the current period and do not 
depend much on investor expectations. The information used to calculate accounting 
performance might also be more reliable, as it is normally governed by accounting 
standards. However, there is a chance that some managers will distort accounting data, 
leading to an overstatement of firm performance. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a dominant shareholder can extract corporate assets in many 
ways, including excessively compensating management, selling assets among companies 
in the group, claiming executive perks or investing inefficiently. The exploitation would 
affect either the statement of financial position or the statement of profit or loss. 
Therefore, it would be more meaningful to measure accounting performance in a way 
that incorporates the exploitation from the two statements (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
Hence research commonly uses the return on assets ratio (ROA) as a proxy for 
accounting performance, because the ratio reflects the efficiency of the ways in which a 
firms’ assets are allocated and managed. 
This study used ROA as the main proxy for firm performance based on accounting 
performance. The ROA was calculated as earnings before interests and taxes, divided by 
the book value of total assets. All accounting data came from consolidated financial 
statements for the year ended 31 December. Alternative measurements of accounting 
performance (industry-adjusted performance26 and sales-to-assets ratio) were applied in 
the sensitivity test in Section 4.7. 
4.4.2 Ownership Variables 
This study measured ownership concentration by the percentage of shares owned 
directly or indirectly by the firm’s largest shareholders.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Industry-adjusted performance is the difference between individual firm performance and industry 
median firm performance (for example, see Saito, 2008).  
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Ownership concentration by shareholder type was measured as the percentage of shares 
owned directly or indirectly by the largest shareholders within each type (family, 
government, foreign company investor, domestic company, bank or non-bank financial 
institutional investor). This study use ownership of the largest shareholders and did not 
aggregate the share ownership by types or across types because it is unlikely that 
shareholders within each type or across types would cooperate in their control efforts 
with each other. This could be caused by the fact that they normally are competitors in 
other markets (for example banks and non-bank financial investors). They also might 
have different cultural backgrounds (for example among different foreign company 
investors) or gave different investment interests in terms of stake or investment horizon, 
dividend preferences or perceptions of the effectiveness of different corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
This study measured managerial ownership as the percentage of shares held by the all 
directors (the number of shares owned by members of the board, divided by the number 
of the firm’s shares outstanding at the time, t). If the directors were members of a family 
group, then managerial ownership also includes all the shares held by the group.  
This study defined a dominant shareholder as the firm’s largest shareholder, who 
directly and/or indirectly owns shares equal to or more than 25% of the voting shares. 
This definition is in line with the SEA (B.E. 2535; 1992), which states that shareholders 
who own more than 25% of shares outstanding have a significant influence on firms’ 
operation, management and policies27. 
It is, however, important to note that the 25% threshold does not give dominant 
shareholders limitless power, as Section 107 of the PCA (B.E. 2535; 1992) specifies that 
a resolution at shareholder meetings requires at least 3/4 (75%) of the total number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  The definition of dominant shareholders was amended by the amendment of the SEA (B.E. 2535; 1992) 
since 2008. Under the new definition, shareholders will have control over firms if he/she holds more than 
50% of shares outstanding in the firm. Nevertheless, the threshold used in this chapter is in line with the 
old definition because there is evidence from existing literature in Thailand (for example, see 
Wiwattanakantang, 2001), dominant shareholders have control over firms when they owned at least 25% 
of shares outstanding.	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votes of shareholders who attend the meeting and have the right to vote for significant 
events including the following:  
 “ (1) the sale or transfer of the whole or partly of business to other person  
 (2) the purchase or acceptance of transfer of the business of other 
companies or private company by the company  
 (3) the make, amending or terminating of contracts with respect to the 
granting of a hire of the whole or important parts of the business with 
other person with the purpose of profit or loss sharing…”.  
Despite the fact that the PCA (B.E. 2535; 1992) restricts public limited firms to issuing 
common shares on a one-share-one-vote basis, existing literature reveals that, in reality, 
dominant shareholders can still divert their cash-flow rights from control rights by 
holding shares in listed firms via firms under their control (for examples, see Carney and 
Child, 2012; Fan and Wong, 2002; Wiwattanakantang, 2001). In other words, in 
Thailand, a dominant shareholder can hold shares indirectly either via a pyramidal 
structure or a cross-shareholding structure28.  
In this study, a pyramidal structure is a structure in which a dominant shareholder 
controls firms via either private or listed companies. For example, assuming that Firm A 
is a listed company in the sample, Figure 4.1(A) shows that Firm A is owned by Firm B 
(x%), which is controlled by Family X (y%>=25). Hence Family X owns Firm A (x%) 
via the pyramidal structure. Family X is a dominant shareholder of Firm A only if it is 
the largest shareholder of Firm A (via Firm B) and owns shares (via Firm B) equal to or 
more than 25% (x% >=25). 
In Figure 4.1(B), if Firm A also owns shares in Firm B (z%), this is a cross-shareholding 
structure between Firm A and Firm B. In this case, Family X could have control in Firm 
A only if the shares of Firm A owned by Firm B are more than the shares of Firm B 
owned by Firm A (x% - z% > 0). Family X is a dominant shareholder of Firm A only if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the PCA (B.E. 2535; 1992) does not allow listed companies to issue dual-
class shares with different voting rights. Therefore, sources of the divergence between both rights are 
pyramidal structures, cross-shareholding structures or both. 	  
	  	  
Chapter 4 
109	  
it is the largest shareholder of Firm A (via Firm B) and owns shares (via Firm B) equal 
to or more than 25% (x% > z% and x% >=25). 
Figure 4.1(C) shows a combination of all shareholding types: direct and indirect 
shareholding through pyramidal and cross-shareholding structures. It shows that, in total, 
the control of Family X in Firm A is equal to the sum of their control from each 
shareholding type (x% + w%, where x% > z% or w%, where x% < z%). Family X is a 
dominant shareholder of Firm A only if it is the largest shareholder of Firm A and owns 
total shares in Firm A (both direct and indirect) equal or more than 25% (x% + w% 
>=25). 
 
 
This study classified dominant shareholders into six types: (1) a family or an individual, 
(2) the government, (3) a foreign company, (4) a domestic company29, (5) a financial 
institution and (6) a bank. If a listed firm is owned by other private or listed firms, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  See footnote 20. 
!
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Figure 4.1: Example for Direct shareholding and Indirect Shareholding via Pyramidal 
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study searched for its ultimate shareholders30 along with their control chain. The 
dominant shareholder therefore is also the ultimate shareholder who controls the largest 
voting rights in a listed firm. 
For families or individuals (both Thai and foreign), this study first identified the family 
group by its surname, so shareholders who have the same surname were treated as a 
single group. It is worth noting that Thai family names have a special characteristic, 
which is not found in some other countries; Thai surnames are unique to each family and 
belong to the family lineage31. Second, this study applied “the Rules of Connected 
Transaction” (2008)32 as a guideline to identify family relationships. This rule, issued by 
the SECT, allowed this study to include direct family (by blood and in-law relationships) 
and indirect family (their relatives), who may use a different surname, in the same 
family group. This study used several sources to identify family relationships, including 
(1) Annual Registration Statements (Form 56-1), (2) Books related to the Thai Business 
Group33 and (3) Thai articles and newspapers. If a firm was owned by limited 
companies, this study traced the ultimate shareholders of the limited companies. 
Government refers to state agencies, as defined by “the Rules of Connected Transaction” 
(2008) and includes (1) government units, such as the Ministry of Finance, and (2) 
government organisations or business units owned by the State.  
Domestic company refers to companies that are registered in Thailand and have more 
than half of their capital shares (51%) held by Thai people or other domestic companies. 
Foreign company refers to (1) companies that are not registered in Thailand or (2) that 
are registered in Thailand but have at least half of their capital shares held by foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This study defined an ultimate shareholder as a shareholder at the top of the firm’s control chain of 
firms. The 25% threshold is applied to all layers of each firms’ control chain.	  31	  In fact, the Individual Name Act B.E. 2505 (1962) does not allow individuals to use the same surname 
if it has already been registered by another person (Section 8 (3)).	  32	  	  The Notification of Capital Market Supervisory Board TorChor.21/2008 Rules of Connected 
Transaction (Codified), effective on 31/08/2008	  33	  This study used two main books: (1) Thai Business Groups 2001: A unique Guide to Who Owns What 
(Brooker Group, 2001) and (2) Super Families in Thailand (Sonsuwan, 1995) 
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persons or a company that is not registered in Thailand34. This study identified a 
company’s nationality based on the SETSMART. Foreign companies therefore include 
many types of owner such as trading companies, banks or institutional investors. 
However, because of data limitations, this study could not track the ultimate 
shareholders of foreign companies. Therefore, it is possible for a foreign company to be 
part of a family’s control chain. Foreign investors who are people were classified as 
individual/family. 
Except for banks and insurance companies, financial institution includes all types of 
financial institution, such as finance companies, securities companies, funds, mutual 
funds and public mutual funds. Banks were classified separately. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the incentives for banks to hold shares in firms may differ from those of other 
financial institutions. This study could not track the ultimate shareholders of financial 
institutions and banks because of data limitations. 
Additionally, this study measured the presence of dominant shareholders as a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 if a firm has a largest shareholder who is also a dominant 
shareholder, otherwise it is equal to 0. This study also categorised dominant 
shareholders into six types: family, government, foreign company investor, domestic 
company, bank and non-bank financial institutional investor. 
4.4.3 Ratio of Cash-flow Rights Over Voting Rights 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, existing literature claims that the separation of cash-flow 
rights and voting rights is potentially an incentive for the largest shareholders or 
dominant shareholders to exploit other shareholders, particularly when voting rights 
exceed cash-flow rights. Among others, Claessens et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins 
(2003), Lins (2003) and Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010) generally found that low cash-
flow rights, compared to voting rights, led to a low firm value. Nevertheless, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Under, the Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999), “foreigner” means (1) a natural person who is not of 
Thai nationality, (2) a company not registered in Thailand, (3) a company registered in Thailand, of which 
at least half the capital shares are held by (1) or (2), or (3) a company registered in Thailand, in which 
investment has been placed by (1) or (2) (Section 4).	  
	  	  
Chapter 4 
112	  
separation could also increase incentive of these shareholders to monitor managers 
because of lower costs (such as time and effort) on negotiation with other shareholders 
(Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010). 
In Thailand, the separation of rights arises from the use of various control mechanisms, 
such as pyramidal or cross-shareholding structures, because non-voting shares or shares 
with multiple voting rights are not permitted. Existing research suggests that Thai listed 
firms use fewer pyramidal and cross-shareholding structures than firms in other 
countries in East Asia (for example, see Claessens et al., 2000). However, Connelly et 
al. (2012) reports a higher use of pyramidal structure in family firms after the financial 
crisis and this structure may be used by the family firms for their private benefits. 
In order to control for any effects from a difference between cash-flow rights and control 
rights of the largest shareholder, this study adopted Fan and Wong’s (2002) method of 
calculating the ratio of cash-flow rights over voting rights (CV). The CV is close to 0 if 
the difference is large and equal to 1 if the largest shareholder directly holds shares in a 
firm. Because this ratio has an inverse relationship with cash-flow rights, it is expected 
to have a positive sign of coefficient. Hence a decrease (increase) in CV from its mean is 
associated with a decrease (an increase) in firm performance. 
To calculate cash-flow rights, this study first identified an ultimate shareholder for each 
listed firm. The cash-flow rights are equal to the product of the percentage of shares 
owned by the ultimate shareholder along with its control chain. As shown in Figure 
4.1(A) in Section 4.4.2, the cash-flow rights of Family X in Firm A is equal to x% × y%, 
which is a product of Firm A’s shares owned by Firm B (x%) and Firm B’s shares 
owned by Family X (y%).    
In Thailand, a cross-shareholding structure is normally present in firms within the same 
business group. This may imply that the cash-flow rights that run between firms via a 
cross-shareholding structure are circulated in the same group. This study therefore used 
the net of voting shares to calculate the cash-flow rights. As shown in Figure 4.1(B), if 
Firm B owns x% of Firm A and Firm A owns z% of Firm B, assuming that x% is more 
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than z%, the cash-flow rights of Family X in Firm A are equal to (x% - z%) × y%. In 
Figure 4.1(C), the cash-flow rights of Family X in Firm A are equal to w% + [(x% - z%) 
× y%]. 
4.4.4 Examples of Ownership Structure 
This section provides some examples of ownership structure in Thai listed firms. Figure 
4.2 shows the ownership structure of Thai Rung Union Car Plc. for the years 1996, 1998 
and 2003. The company is the largest Thai assembler of modified motor/pickup track 
and was founded by the Phaoenchoke family in 1967. Its ownership has a simple 
structure, in which the ultimate shareholder directly holds shares in the firm. The 
Phaoenchoke family directly held 68%, 68% and 68.7% of shares in the company in 
1996, 1998 and 2003, respectively. Hence the family is seen as the dominant shareholder 
of the company. 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the ownership structure of Central Pattana Plc. for the years 1996, 
1998 and 2003. The company is the largest Thai retail developer and was founded in 
1980 with joint investment from the Chirathivat family (Central Group), the Tejapaibul 
family (World Trade Center/Sangsom Group) and the Darakananda family (Saha-Union 
Group). Nevertheless, only the Chirathivat family substantially holds shares in the 
company.  
! Thai Rung Union Car Plc. 
Phaoenchoke Family 
68%, 68%, 68.7% 
 
Business: Industrial/Automotive 
Market Capitalisation: 
5,000 MB in 1996 
1,170 MB in 1998 
7,400 MB in 2003 
 
Year established: 1973 
Founder: Phaoenchole Family  
Figure 4.2:  A direct shareholding: Thai Rung Union Car Plc. 
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The ownership structure of Central Pattana Plc. is a good example of both direct and 
indirect shareholding by a dominant shareholder. The Chirathivat family directly held 
35.92%, 39.61% and 30.26% of the company’s shares in 1996, 1998 and 2003, 
respectively. It also held 29.25%, 29.25% and 29.40% of the shares in 1996, 1998 and 
2003, respectively, via Central Holding Co., Ltd., which was 100% owned by the family 
in all three years. Only in 1996 did the family also own 0.60% of the company’s shares 
via Central Garment Factory Co., Ltd, of which 42% of the shares were held by the 
family and indirectly by companies in the family’s control chain (29% via Central 
Holding Co., Ltd.  and 29% via Central Department Store Co., Ltd). Therefore, the total 
voting rights are the sum of direct and indirect voting shares: 65.77% 
(35.92+29.25%+0.60%) in 1996, 68.25% (39.00+29.25%) in 1998 and 59.66% 
(30.26%+29.40%) in 2003. Total cash-flow rights are equal to the percentage of direct 
voting shares, plus the sum of the product of the indirect voting shares. In this case, the 
cash-flow rights were equal to the voting rights for all three years35. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  For example, in 1996, cash-flow rights were {35.92% + [29.5%×100%] 
+[(0.60%×42%)+(0.60%×29%×100%) +(0.60%×29%×100%)]} = 65.77% 
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Figures 4.4 (A), 4.4(B) and 4.4(C) show a simplified ownership structure36 for Charoen 
Pokphand Foods Plc. for the years 1996, 1998 and 2003, respectively. Charoen 
Pokphand Foods Plc. (CPF) was founded by the Chearavanont family. Having started as 
an animal feed producer in 1978, it has expanded into a fully integrated agro-business 
(covering livestock and aquaculture) and become the top Thai business group and the 
largest Thai multinational company, expanding its businesses into many countries in 
Asia and Europe, such as China, Taiwan and the United Kingdom. The Chearavanont 
family uses either direct or indirect shareholding, via pyramidal structures and cross-
shareholding, to control CPF. As discussed in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, if a dominant 
shareholder uses both direct and indirect shareholding, control rights are the sum of the 
rights from each type of shareholding. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 In fact, the Chearavanont family also controls CPF via many small private companies in its business 
group. This study shows only the main companies in the family control chain in order to make the 
example easier to understand. 
!
Figure 4.3: A direct shareholding and indirect shareholding via 
pyramidal structure: Central Pattana Plc. for the years 1996, 1998 
and 2003, respectively 
Central Holding Co. Ltd. 
29.25%, 29.25%, 29.40% 
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35.92%, 39.00%, 
30.26% 
 
 !
100%, 100%, 100% 
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Family and Darakananda Family 
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Central Pattana Plc. 
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Figures 4.4A and 4.4B show that the Chearavanont family did not directly own shares in 
CPF in the years 1996 and 1998. However, in 2003, the family directly owned 1.26% of 
the shares in CPF, as shown in Figure 4.4C. In all three years, the family indirectly 
controlled CPF via private or listed companies in its business group. In fact, the family 
owned 33.33%, 33.33% and 23.03% of the company’s shares (in each year, respectively) 
via Charoen Pokphand Co., Ltd, a private company in which they held 87.87% of the 
shares. This represents the use of a pyramidal structure.  
The family also owned shares via other private or listed companies in its business group. 
For example, Figure 4.4A shows that, in 1996, 5.18% of CPF was owned by Bangkok 
Agro-Industrial Products Plc. (BAP) and 59.82% of BAP’s shares were owned by CPF. 
This represents a cross-shareholding structure and indicates that BAP was controlled by 
CPF37 and therefore by the Chearavanont family. In total, the family controlled CPF 
with about 43.15%38, 43.63% and 48.83% of the shares in 1996, 1998 and 2003, 
respectively, and they received cash-flow rights, via direct shareholding and indirect 
sources, equal to 29.29%39, 31.70% and 20.24% in 1996, 1998 and 2003, respectively. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	   In this case, BAP was also a subsidiary of CPF because more than 50% of its shares were owned by 
CPF.	  
38 For the simplified ownership structure of CPF, the voting rights of Chearavanont family in CPF were 
43.15% (33.33% +5.18% + 2.97% +1.67%) in 1996, 43.63% (33.33% +5.02% + 2.85% + 2.43%) in 1998 
and 48.83% (23.03% + 2.55% + 1.45% + 20.54% +1.26%) in 2003. 
39 For the simplified ownership structure of CPF, the cash-flow rights of the Chearavanont family in CPF 
were (33.33% × 87.87%) = 29.29% in 1996, {(33.33% × 87.87%) + [(100% - 0.80%) × 2.43%]} = 31.70% 
in 1998 and (23.03% × 87.87%) = 20.24% in 2003. 
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Business: Agro & Food Industry 
Market Capitalisation: 
9,600 MB in 1996 
 
Year established: 1978 
Founder: Chearavanont Family 
Figure 4.4A: Indirect shareholding via pyramidal structure and cross-shareholding 
structure: Charoen Pokphand Foods Plc. for the year 1996.!
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Figure 4.4B: Indirect shareholding via pyramidal structure and cross-shareholding 
structure: Charoen Pokphand Foods Plc. for the year 1998.!
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Figure 4.4C: Indirect shareholding via pyramidal structure and cross-shareholding 
structure: Charoen Pokphand Foods Plc. for the year 2003.!
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4.4.5 Other Corporate Governance Variables 
4.4.5.1 A Role of the Second Largest Shareholder 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.5, existing literature suggests that the role of the 
second largest shareholder is another mechanism that checks and balances the control of 
a dominant shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999; Pagano and Röell, 1998). The alignment 
of interest hypothesis suggests that the incentive of shareholders to participate in 
monitoring processes may increase in proportion to the number of shares they own 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence the second largest shareholder, who owns a 
substantial proportion of a firm’s shares, has more incentive and power to monitor the 
largest shareholder and to prevent them from diverting profits for their own benefit 
(Maury and Pajuste, 2005).    
In addition, a firm may have multiple large shareholders, none of whom has absolute 
control. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) suggest that it is difficult for individual large 
shareholders to extract private benefits from firms with multiple large shareholders 
because they would need a coalition of other large shareholders in order to do so. They 
also posit that the degree of coalition among multiple large shareholders depends on the 
extent of their control and cash-flow rights. More cash-flow rights may restrain multiple 
large shareholders from extracting private benefits, because they would also bear more 
of the costs of such actions.  
However, it is possible for large multiple shareholders to create a controlling coalition, 
in which they share some benefits from extracting corporate assets (Maury and Pajuste, 
2005), thereby reducing firm performance. If there is a conflict of interest among the 
multiple shareholders, this may harm firms as well.  
Among others, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) found that the second largest shareholder 
helped to improve firm performance (Tobin’s q) in German listed companies. Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) found that an increase in the contestability40 of the largest shareholder’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Maury and Pajuste (2005: 1816) define the contestability of the largest shareholder as the probability of 
diverted profit being recovered from other large shareholders. The contestability increases as the amount 
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control increased firm performance in Finnish listed firms. Their evidence also suggests 
that a balance (more equality) of voting shares among multiple large shareholders 
positively influences firm performance. Nevertheless, the role of multiple large 
shareholders depends on their identities. Maury and Pajuste (2005) report that the effect 
of ownership by the second largest shareholders on firm performance in family-
controlled firms was negative when the second largest shareholder was another family. 
This evidence indicates the presence of collusion among families. However, the effect 
on firm performance was positive when the second largest shareholder was a financial 
institution. This evidence indicates that better monitoring was provided by the second 
largest shareholder. 
In order to capture any effect from the second largest shareholders, this study calculated 
the ratio of the share difference, which is the difference between the proportions of 
shares owned by the largest and the second largest shareholders, divided by the 
proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholder. The ratio therefore ranges from 0 
to 1. A high ratio (close to 1) indicates a large difference between the proportions of 
voting shares held by the largest and second largest shareholders and implies that the 
largest shareholders have close to absolute control in firms. On the other hand, a low 
ratio (close to 0) indicates a small difference and implies that the two largest 
shareholders have similar levels of control. Therefore, if the increase of shares held by 
the second largest shareholder increases their incentive to check and control the largest 
shareholder, this study expects a negative relationship between the ratio of share 
difference and firm performance. However, if a controlling coalition is present, a 
positive relationship between the ratio of share difference and firm performance is 
expected. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of voting shares owned by other large shareholders, outside a coalition, increases. The contestability of the 
largest shareholder’s power in Maury and Pajuste’s (2005: 1820) study is measured by the sum of the 
squares of the difference between the voting share of the largest shareholders and the second largest 
shareholders and between the second and the third largest shareholders. This variable is expected to be 
negatively related to firm performance. 
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4.4.5.2 Board of Directors Characteristics 
As outlined in Chapter 2, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that a board of directors is a 
mechanism that is designed to separate “decision management” from “decision control”. 
Hence it helps to reduce the agency problem between managers and shareholders. 
Decision control is delegated to the board by shareholders, and it acts as their 
representative in ensuring that managers act in the best interests of shareholders. 
Existing literature suggests that characteristics of boards, particularly size, board 
composition and board experience, are the important factors by which to measure the 
quality of boards (Coles et al. 2008; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
Firstly, existing research reveals that boards that are too big may lead to inefficient 
supervision because of the free-rider problem (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Yermack, 1996; Pathan et al., 2007). Some research confirms that firms benefit from 
having smaller boards, measured in terms of market performance (Tobin’s q) (Eisenberg 
et al. 1998; Yermack, 1996). By contrast, Coles et al. (2008) found that large boards 
benefit large, diversified or high-debt firms. In Thailand, Connelly and Limpaphayom 
(2004), which focused their research on Life Insurance Industry in the year 2000 to 
2001, could not find any relationship between board size and firm performance. 
Secondly, board independence becomes an important characteristic, particularly where a 
dominant shareholder manages a firm. Existing literature suggests that independent 
directors are less likely to be under the control of management and, in turn, may be more 
willing to monitor managers (for examples, see Hermalin and Weisbach et al., 1998). 
Independent directors (outside directors) could therefore enhance firm performance by 
providing more efficient supervision over management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hillier 
and McColgan, 2006). However, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990, cited in Conyon and 
Peck, 1998) argue that outside directors may not be truly independent because they are 
normally selected by boards and are often former managers. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(2001) found that the presence of more outside directors decreased firm performance. 
They suggest that outside directors may receive some benefits, such as board seats; 
therefore, it may be difficult for them to maintain their independence. Bhagat and Black 
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(2002) also found that firms with high proportions of outside directors did not perform 
better than other firms did, in long term. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that firms may need specific information to deal with 
specialised decisions and are therefore likely to appoint outside directors who are 
experts in relevant areas such as capital markets, corporate law or relevant technology. 
Fich (2005) posits that expert or well-known outside directors provide benefits to firm 
performance. He found that new appointments of outside directors, who were CEOs of 
other companies, particularly from banks, were more favoured by market participants, 
which in turn improved market performance (measured by cumulative abnormal 
returns). Recently, Fields et al. (2012) found that more independence and expertise in 
boards reduced the cost of debt for firms in terms of lower interest rates and better credit 
terms.  
Raheja (2005) suggests that an optimal board size and board composition (in terms of 
the proportions of outside and inside board members) depends on the characteristics of a 
firm and its directors and proposes a model suggesting that high-tech firms require a 
higher proportion of inside directors because it is costly and difficult for outside 
directors to verify projects. Coles et al. (2008) assert that firms with high R&D are likely 
to benefit from having inside directors who have firm-specific knowledge and therefore 
cast doubt on whether board characteristics, in particular smaller boards and higher 
numbers of outside shareholders, lead to better firm performance.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the board structure of Thai listed firms has been changed as 
a result of corporate governance reform. Since 1999, listed firms have been required to 
set up an audit committee that is composed of at least three independent directors.41 This 
requirement affects both board size and the proportion of independent directors in listed 
firms. In fact, independent directors should not have any relationship to a company apart 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Since 2008, listed firms are required to have at least one-third independent directors on their boards. 
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from being directors. The definition of independent directors in this chapter is based on 
the qualifications42 set by the SECT. 
In line with the SEA (B.E. 2535: 1992), this study defined a board of directors as the 
board of directors of a company: a director is the director of a company, and an 
executive or manager is defined as a manager or person who is responsible for the 
management of the company.  
In order to control for board characteristics, this study included board size, board 
independence and board experience and captured their impact on firm performance. 
Board size was measured using a natural log of the total number of directors on a board. 
Board independence is the proportion of independent directors to the total number of 
directors. Director experience43 was measured as the ratio of the number of directors 
who are also appointed as directors of other listed firms to the total number of directors 
of a listed firm (for an example of this, see Field et al., 2012).  
4.4.5.3 Chief Executive Director Characteristics 
4.4.5.3.1 CEO duality 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.2.1, CEO duality refers to a situation in which the 
CEO and chairman is the same person (Boyd, 1995). Agency theory suggests that CEO 
duality may reduce the efficiency of a board of directors when it comes to supervising 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  According to the Notification of the Securities and Exchange Commission No. KorChor. 12/2000: 12 
(superseded by TorChor. 28/2008: 8-9), “independent directors are directors whose qualifications comply 
with e.g. criteria as following: 
 1) Holding shares not exceeding 1% of total shares with voting right of the company, its parent 
company, subsidiary, affiliate or juristic person who may have conflict of interest; 
 2) Not being an employee, staff, advisor, who receives salary, or controlling person of the 
company, its parent company, subsidiary, affiliate or juristic person who may have conflict of interest; 
 3) Not being a person related by blood or registration under laws, such as father, mother, spouse, 
brothers, sisters and children, including spouses of the children, of its executives, major shareholders, 
controlling person, or nominees as executive or controlling person of the company or its subsidiary;  
 4) Having no business relationship with the company, its parent company, subsidiary, affiliate or 
juristic person who may have conflict of interest, in the manner which may interfere with his/her 
independent judgment, and not possessing any qualification which makes him/her incapable of expressing 
independent opinion with regard to the company’s business operation” 
 
43 To identify directly an education background for each board member may be a better proxy to measure 
board experience if data was available. 
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management, because of a lack of board independence (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In 
contrast, stewardship theory suggests that the combination of the two positions may 
contribute to firms in terms of (1) the specific knowledge possessed by the CEO-
chairman, (2)	  a clearly identifiable leadership role within a firm	  and (3) quicker decision 
making in a changing business environment (Boyd, 1995; Brickley et al., 1997). 
Evidence from existing research is unclear on whether CEO duality benefits firm 
performance or not. In the US, Rechner and Dalton (1991) found that firms with 
independent CEOs performed better than those with CEO duality. By contrast, Boyd 
(1995) found that CEO duality helped to enhance firm performance under some 
conditions (resource scarcity or high complexity). Brickley et al. (1997) found no 
evidence to support the expectation of poor accounting and market performance in firms 
with CEO duality.  
Recently, Dey et al. (2011) focus on firms, which switched away from CEO duality to 
non-CEO duality. They have reported that these firms perform more poorly in terms of 
lower announcement return from a negative markets reaction to an announcement of the 
change, lower subsequent performance and lower return on investment. Peng et al. 
(2007), in China, found a positive impact of CEO duality on firm performance in 
specific environments, where there was a scarcity of resources scarcity or environmental 
dynamism (unpredictability of change). Tan et al. (2001), in Singapore, report similar 
results during the Asian economic crisis. 
To capture any possible effects of CEO duality on firm performance, this study defined a 
dummy variable, CEO-Chair as 1 if a firm had a CEO who also served as chairman and 
as 0 in all other cases. In the sample, this characteristic is found in family-controlled 
firms. Since corporate governance reform has recommended the separation of CEO and 
chairman positions, many Thai listed firms tend to separate them. However, it seems that 
the relationship between CEO and chairman often remains very close (for example, 
father and son) in many listed firms. Hence their independence is unclear. Villalonga 
and Amit (2006) also suggest that this feature leads to poorer firm performance. To 
	  	  
Chapter 4 
126	  
capture this feature, this study therefore defined another dummy variable, CEO-Group, 
as 1 if a firm has a CEO and chairman who came from the same family but are not the 
same person, and as 0 in all other cases.  
4.4.5.3.2 CEO Founders and CEO Descendants 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.2.2, this study defined a CEO founder as a CEO 
who is also the founder of a firm. There are two opposing aspects to a CEO founder’s 
interests, which either align with or diverge from a firm’s interests. From one point of 
view, a CEO founder has power of control over a firm, leading to an entrenchment 
effect, regardless of the proportion of their shareholding (Morck et al., 1988). In 
addition, family ties may motivate CEO founders to transfer a business to their 
descendants without considering their descendants’ competency (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Bertrand et al., 2008; Mehrotra et al., 2013; Morck et al., 1988). 
From another point of view, CEO founders may contribute to firms in terms of their 
competence, expertise in business (Morck et al., 1988) or political network (Polsiri and 
Wiwattanakantang, 2004). In addition, a plan for succession may motivate CEO 
founders to manage firms more efficiently (Adams et al., 2009). 
Existing literature reveals mixed results. For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) report 
a positive relationship between CEO founders or descendants and firm performance in 
old and young firms. Morck et al. (1988), however, found that CEO founders only 
enhanced market performance in younger firms. They suggest that when firms become 
older it is easier for either CEO founders or their descendants to become entrenched. 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) report that, on average, the firms they studied gained the 
most benefit from having CEO founders, but firms with CEO descendants gained the 
least benefit. In France, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) found that firms with CEO founders 
and CEO descendants outperformed more widely held firms in terms of management 
styles (for example, hiring skilled workers with lower wages). In Thailand, Bertrand et 
al. (2008) also found that firms with many founder’s sons in their management teams 
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were associated with lower firm performance, and the negative effect increased when the 
founder was dead.  
To control for any possible effects of CEO founders or CEO descendants on firm 
performance, this study defined two dummy variables. Firstly, CEO founder is a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 if firm has a CEO founder, otherwise it is equal to 0. Second, CEO 
descendant is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if firm has a CEO descendant, otherwise it is 
equal to 0. 
4.4.5.4 Leverage 
 This study defined leverage as a ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the year ending 
31 December. Leverage was used as a control variable in order to capture the possibility 
of management decisions being controlled by lenders. For example, lenders may 
influence managers not to invest in higher risk projects, even if they will have a positive 
net present value (NPV), because the higher risk may affect a firm’s ability to pay for a 
fixed stream of loans. Therefore, if the interests of lenders diverge from those of 
shareholders, leverage has negative effect on firm performance (Short and Keasey, 
1999). 
Regarding corporate governance, Jensen (1986) suggests that leverage may be a 
mechanism that helps to reduce a conflict of interests between managers and 
shareholders, because managers commit to repay loans. This study expects to see either 
a positive or a negative relationship between leverage and firm performance. 
4.4.6 Firm Characteristics 
This study included control variables for firm characteristics that may influence firm 
performance, as defined in Table 4.1.  
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4.4.6.1 Firm Size 
Firm size was measured by log of total assets at the year ending 31 December. Existing 
literature suggests either positive or negative relationships between firm size and firm 
performance.  
Larger firms may benefit from economies of scale and they are likely to have easy 
access to internal or external funds (Baumol, 1959 cited in Lehmann and Weigand, 
2000; Short and Keasey, 1999). In addition, they may be faced with higher agency costs, 
implying a higher demand for better monitoring processes, and this may mean that more 
competent managers are hired, for example (Core et al., 1999; Himmelberg et al., 1999). 
Larger firms are also more likely to be monitored closely by institutional investors, 
market regulators and the press (Helwege et al., 2007). These arguments suggest that 
there will be a positive relationship between firm size and performance.  
Nevertheless, larger firms tend to diversify their businesses more than smaller firms do, 
in turn lowering their Tobin’s q. In fact, Lang and Stulz (1994) found that a negative 
relationship between size and Tobin’s q remained after they had controlled for 
diversification. 
4.4.6.2 Firm Growth 
Existing literature also suggests that firm growth may either influence firm performance 
positively or negatively. Firm growth may be a reflection of increased investment 
opportunities for firms and, therefore, firm performance may increase as firm growth 
increases (Lehmann and Weigand, 2000; Morck et al., 1988).  
However, high firm growth may be the result of managers using discretion to increase 
their control over a firm’s resources (when compensation is tied to sales growth, for 
instance) (Jensen, 1986; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000). In addition, investors may be 
too optimistic about firms that have good performance records (Lakonishok et al., 1994), 
leading to stock overpricing. If these firms cannot meet this expectation, firm market 
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performance is likely to decrease in subsequent periods (Lakonishok et al., 1994; 
Skinner and Sloan, 2002). 
This study used sales growth as a proxy for the value of firm growth. The variable is 
measured by an average of annual change in sales (current sales (t) to previous sales (t-
1)), averaged over three years, for which data is available, prior to the current year  (for 
an example of this, see Maury, 2006: 236). 
4.4.6.3 Firm Age 
Firm age was natural log of the number of years since the establishment of a firm. Two 
opposing views suggest either positive or negative effects from firm age on firm 
performance.  
Older firms tend to have more experience in business (Stinchcombe, 1965 cited in 
Majumdar, 1997). As firms grow, they may develop business strategies to compete in 
the market. For instance, they may invest in research and development or learn from 
their competitors in the same or other industries (for example, see Loderer and Waelchli, 
2010). This suggests that there is a positive relationship between firm age and firm 
performance.  
Nevertheless, older firms may be less flexible than younger firms are, making it difficult 
for them to adjust their organisational structure in order to respond to rapid 
environmental change (Marshall, 1920, cited in Majumdar, 1997). In the literature on 
finance, Pástor and Veronesi (2003) posit that the uncertainty over average profitability 
declines over a firm’s lifetime because investors learn how it performs. Hence investors 
tend to overprice younger firms because they are unsure about their future profitability. 
They found that younger firms have a higher market performance (market-to-book 
ratio), which declines over time. These arguments predict a negative relationship 
between firm age and firm performance. 
	  	  
Chapter 4 
130	  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of All Dependent and Explanatory Variables used in Chapter 4 
Dependent Variables: Firm Performance Measurement 
Variables Description  
Accounting Measurement 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Earnings before interests and income taxes, scaled by book value of total assets (at 
the end of 31 December) 
   Market Value Measurement 
Quasi Tobin’s q 
(Quasi-q) 
(Market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities), scaled by book value 
of total assets 
 Explanatory Variables: Ownership Variables 
Variables Description Expected effect to 
Firm 
Performance Concentrated Own Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder  ositive or 
Negative 
  Family Own Percentage of shares owned by family who is the largest 
shareholder in family shareholder’s category 
Positive or 
Negative 
  Government Own Percentage of shares owned by government who is the 
largest shareholder in government shareholder’s category 
Positive or 
Negative 
  Foreign Company Own Percentage of shares owned by foreign company who is 
the largest shareholder in foreign company shareholder’s 
category 
Positive or 
Negative 
  Domestic Company 
Own 
Percentage of shares owned by domestic company who 
is the largest shareholder in domestic company 
shareholder’s category 
Positive or 
Negative 
  Bank Own Percentage of shares owned by bank who is the largest 
shareholder in bank shareholder’s category 
Positive or 
Negative 
  Non-Bank Financial 
institutions Own 
Percentage of shares owned by non-bank financial 
institutional investor who is the largest shareholder in 
non-bank financial institutional investor shareholder’s 
category (excluded insurance companies) 
Positive or 
Negative 
  Manager Own Percentage of shares owned by all directors Positive or 
Negative 
   
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 4.1: Summary of All Dependent and Explanatory Variables used in Chapter 4 (Cont’) 
Explanatory Variables: Ownership Variables (Cont’) 
Variables Description Expected effect to 
Firm 
Performance D_Dominant Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the largest shareholder and 
own equal or more than 25 percent of voting shares, 
otherwise equal to zero 
ositive or 
Negative 
D_Family Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the family largest 
shareholder and own equal or more than 25 percent of 
voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Government Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the government largest 
shareholder and own equal or more than 25 percent of 
voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Foreign Investors Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the foreign company 
largest shareholder and own equal or more than 25 
percent of voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Domestic Company Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the domestic company 
largest shareholder and own equal or more than 25 
percent of voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Bank Own Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the bank largest 
shareholder and own equal or more than 25 percent of 
voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Non-Bank Financial 
institutions 
Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the non-bank financial 
institutions largest shareholder and own equal or more 
than 25 percent of voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
Control Variables: Control Mechanisms 
Ratio of Share 
Difference 
Shares difference between the largest and the second 
largest shareholders divided by shares owned by the 
largest shareholder 
Positive or 
Negative 
CV Ratio of cash-flow rights to voting rights Positive or 
Negative 
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 4.1: Summary of All Dependent and Explanatory Variables used in Chapter 4 (Cont’) 
Control Variables: Firm Governance 
Variables Description Expected effect to Firm 
Performance 
 
Control Variables: Board Structure 
Board Size Natural Log of number of directors in the board Positive or Negative 
   Board 
Independence 
Number of independent directors divided by total 
number of directors in the board 
Positive or Negative 
   Board Experience Number of directors who are directors of other 
companies divided by total number of directors in the 
board 
Positive or Negative  
Control Variables: CEO Characteristics 
CEO Founder Dummy variable, which equal to one if CEO is also a 
founder of the firm, otherwise as zero 
Positive or Negative 
   CEO Descendant Dummy variable, which equal to one if CEO is 
founder’s descendants, otherwise as zero 
Positive or Negative 
   CEO-Chair Dummy variable, which equal to one if firm has CEO 
who also serves as chairman, otherwise as zero 
Positive or Negative 
   CEO-Chair 
Group 
Dummy variable, which equal to one if CEO and 
chairman come from the same family, otherwise as 
zero 
Positive or Negative 
 
Explanatory Variables: Ownership Variables (Cont) Control Variables: Firm Characteristics  
Firm Size Natural log of total assets at the year ended 31 
December 
Positive or Negative 
   Firm Age Natural log of number of year since established Positive or Negative 
 
   Firm Growth An average of annual change in sales, average over 
three years, or available years, prior to the current year 
Positive or Negative 
   Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets (at the year ended 31 
December) 
Positive or Negative 
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4.5 Sampling and Data Collection 
The sample in this study consists of firms that were listed in the SET from 1994 to 2007. 
This study has focused the sample on the end of the year 2007 in order to avoid any 
effects from the global financial crisis, which might distort the analysis of corporate 
governance reforms. This study has excluded firms in the financial sector because banks, 
financial institutions and insurance companies are governed under specific laws and 
have different regulators44. This study has also excluded firms under rehabilitation45 
(REHABCO) when they have been moved from their normal sector, because they are 
prohibited from trading and are exempted from normal practice (for example, they are 
not required to submit financial statements on a quarterly basis).  
The sample period in this study is designed to cover major events in the Thai capital 
market: in particular, the financial crisis of 1997 and the reform of Thai corporate 
governance since 1999. The 14-year horizon data46 provide for the investigation of the 
impact of ownership structure, observed corporate governance and firm performance 
over a long period; previous research in Thailand has normally focused on shorter 
periods, such as one year (Wiwattanakantang, 2001).  
For listed companies, the database of ownership, board of directors and accounting data 
is officially provided by the SET. This study used two main sources of databases 
provided by the SET to construct datasets.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Firms in the financial sector (including bank and insurance companies) are regulated by the BOT. Firms 
in other sectors are regulated by the SECT. The two groups are also governed under different laws. 
45 Examples of the SET criteria for moving a firm to the “Companies under Rehabilitation” (REHABCO) 
sector include (1) if its shareholders’ equity is less than zero and (2) if its shareholders’ equity is less than 
zero if the firm has adjusted its financial statements following an auditor’s opinion. When listed firms 
meet the criteria, the SECT will post an “SP” sign (suspense) to prohibit the trading of their securities. If 
the firm cannot solve its problem (by raising additional equity), its securities will be suspended until it 
meets the criteria to be excluded from this sector (source: The SET, Procedure and Guidelines for Listed 
Companies Facing Possible Delisting and Being Subject to Preparing Rehabilitation Plans, amended 10 
May 2005). 
46 Because the SECT was founded in 1992, data about each listed firm, such as ownership and boards of 
directors, before 1992 was incompletely recorded in the SET and the SECT databases; in turn, it is hard to 
track backdated data. The sample period in this study therefore starts in 1994, which is the earliest year 
from which the database provides data that is more complete.  
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Firstly, ownership, board of directors and accounting data from 1994 to 1996 were 
obtained from the Integrated-SET Information Management System (I-SIM) CD-ROM. 
The data from 1997 to 2007 came from the SET Market Analysis and Reporting Tool 
(SETSMART). This study also randomly checked the accuracy of the database with 
audited financial statements and the Annual Registration Statements (Form 56-1) that 
are annually submitted by listed firms. 
The ownership data provided in I-SIM and SETSMART includes the names of 
shareholders, their nationality and the number and percentage of shares owned (if it is at 
least 0.05%) at the closing date of the registered shareholder book. Normally, the closing 
date occurs more than once a year and, in these cases, this study chose the ownership 
information from the first closing date of each sample year in order to identify the 
ultimate shareholders for each firm. Firm performance was measured at the year ended 
31 December. This method may reduce the problem of reverse causality between 
ownership and firm performance. In cases where the shareholders of listed firms were 
private firms (limited companies)47, this study used a Copy of the Shareholders’ Name 
List (Bor. Aor. Jor. 5 Form)48 to identify their ultimate shareholders and this applied for 
all layers of firms (subject to data availability49). 
For data on directors and executives, this study used both I-SIM and SETSMART, 
which provide lists of registered directors and executives50 for all listed companies. They 
include the names, positions, types (regular, executive, independent or audit committee) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Private or limited companies are companies not listed in the SET. 
48 “A Copy of Shareholders’ Name List” gives information on shareholders’ names, number of shares and 
percentage of shares owned. Limited companies are required to submit the document to the Department of 
Business development (DBD), Ministry of Finance when there is any change in shareholders and their 
shares. If no details change, the companies still have to submit the document annually with their annual 
financial statements. This study therefore used the first date of the sample year on which this document 
was submitted, in order to match with the closing date of the registration book of the listed company. The 
List is kept in the form of scanned documents and the data therefore had to be carefully collected by hand. 
49 Many limited companies that used to own listed firms had already terminated their business, so 
ownership data was unavailable. In these cases, this study classified their ultimate shareholders as a 
domestic company.	  
50 Listed companies are required by the SECT to file the names of their directors and executives on the 
database of directors and executives of securities issuing companies (The Notification of the Capital 
Market Supervisory Board No. TorCor. 19/2010 Re: rules for listing the name of persons on the database 
of directors and executives of securities issuing companies). 
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for each director and executive as well as the start and end date of their positions. This 
study also used Form 56-1 to identify CEOs, chairmen and their founders and 
descendants. 
For accounting data, this study used both I-SIM and SETSMART, which provide 
consolidated financial statements and companies’ financial statements on an annual and 
quarterly basis. However, they do not provide a gross property, plant and equipment 
account (PPE) and depreciation account separately. Therefore, PPE and depreciation 
accounts were collected from DataStream (Code#WC02301 and Code#WC01148, 
respectively). Finally, this study used accounting data at the end of calendar years (31 
December). Therefore, firms with accounting periods that do not end on 31 December 
are excluded from the sample.  
To construct the data, this study first gathered ownership data (only common stocks) of 
all listed companies (1994 to 2007), excluding firms in financial and REHABCO 
sectors, and identified their largest shareholders. Then, where available, this study 
merged the ownership data with the accounting data, board of directors and firm 
characteristics. Firms with one-year observations (singletons) were dropped from the 
sample. Apart from these data restrictions, this study did not have any other criteria for 
selecting firms. This study also did not require a balanced panel in order to avoid 
selection bias. An initial data therefore consisted of unbalanced panel data on 3,998 and 
3,997 firm-year observations (from 1994 to 2007) for the ROA and q samples, 
respectively.  
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Descriptive Analysis – Full Sample 
Table 4.2 shows numbers of non-financial listed firms in the sample from 1994 to 2007. 
The whole sample consists of unbalanced panel data, covering 3,998 firm-year 
observations from 1994 to 2007 in total for ROA, and 3,997 for Quasi-q. All continuous 
variables are winsorised by the 1st and 99th percentiles. Table 4.2 reveals that the 
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sample in this study represents, on average, 88.30% of the total number of non-listed 
companies in the SET. 
Table 4.2 Numbers of Non-Financial Listed Firms listed in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand in Full Sample from 1994 to 2007 
    
Fiscal 
Year 
Number of 
Sample Firms 
Number of Total Non- 
Financial Listed Firms 
(excl. REHABCO) 
% of Sample Firms to Total 
Non- Financial Listed Firms 
(excl. REHABCO) 
    
1994 247 311 79.42% 
1995 292 333 87.69% 
1996 315 363 86.78% 
1997 325 340 95.59% 
1998 289 321 90.03% 
1999 263 275 95.64% 
2000 255 272 93.75% 
2001 244 268 91.04% 
2002 240 272 88.24% 
2003 255 297 85.86% 
2004 277 331 83.69% 
2005 303 359 84.40% 
2006 348 392 88.78% 
2007 345 394 87.56% 
    
Total 3,998 4,528 88.30% 
  
Table 4.3 provides a summary of descriptive data for the full sample. In general, it 
shows that listed firms in the sample consist of large and smaller firms in terms of the 
book value of their total assets, which ranges from 892,000 million Baht to 64 million 
Baht. The sample firms have been established, on average, for 24 years. Regarding firm 
performance, it shows that the average means of the ROA and Quasi-q are 6.54% and 
1.162, respectively. 
Regarding ownership variables, Table 4.3 shows that, on average, the largest 
shareholders held 41.73% of shares, indicating that share distribution in most of the 
sample firms was highly concentrated. Family, government, foreign companies, 
domestic companies, bank and financial institutions held, on average, 35.37%, 1.32%, 
9.67%, 2.23%, 1.04% and 2.50% of shares, respectively. This indicates that, on average, 
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most of the firms were held by dominant family shareholders. Managerial ownership 
averages 38.24%, which includes the percentage of shares owned by all directors. 
Executive directors owned 6.34% of shares on average. 
The ratio of cash-flow rights to voting rights (CV) indicates the separation of cash-flow 
rights from control rights, ranging from 0 to 1, with ratios closer to 0 implying higher 
separation. Panel A shows that the mean of the ratio of cash-flow rights to CV is 0.85, 
which is close to 1. This is consistent with existing research that reports the CV at about 
0.95 in 1996 (Fan and Wong, 2002) and 0.82 in 2008 (Carney and Child, 2012) and 
supports the findings of Claessens et al. (2000) and Wiwattanakantang (2001), who 
report that pyramidal and cross-shareholding structures are not widely used in Thai 
listed firms. 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample during 1994 to 2007	  
	   No.  Mean Median SD Maximum Minimum 
 
Firm Characteristics (Million Baht) 
Total Asset  3,998 8,923 2,310 31,300 892,000 64 
Total Liability 3,998 5,353 1,162 19,200 494,000 0.474 
Total Equity 3,998 3,362 1,005 11,800 361,000 -23,600 
Total Sales 3,998 6,866 1,696 40,000 1,500,000 -646 
EBIT 3,998 842 149 5,491 165,000 -25,800 
Market Capitalisation 3,997 6,786 980 33,400 1,060,000 2 
       
       
Firm Performance       
Return on Assets (ROA) 3,998 6.54% 7.58% 0.109 31.17% -42.93% 
Simplified Tobin’s q (Quasi-q) 3,997 1.162 1.002 0.590 3.957 0.400 
       
Ownership Variables       
       Ownership Concentration by the Largest Shareholders 
Concentrated Own  3,998 41.73% 41.00% 18.19% 83.80% 7.50% 
       Ownership Concentration by the Largest Shareholders within each Type 
- Family 3,998 35.37% 35.40% 21.71% 83.30% 0.00% 
- Government 3,998 1.32% 0.00% 6.72% 47.90% 0.00% 
- Foreign company investors 3,998 9.67% 3.50% 14.51% 66.80% 0.00% 
- Domestic company 3,998 2.23% 0.00% 7.44% 51.60% 0.00% 
- Bank 3,998 1.04% 0.00% 2.47% 12.20% 0.00% 
- Non-Bank Financial Institutions 3,998 2.50% 1.20% 3.59% 19.80% 0.00% 
       Managerial Ownership       
All Directors Ownership 3,998 38.24% 41.69% 24.67% 83.90% 0.00% 
Executive Directors Ownership 3,998 6.34% 0.00% 14.97% 63.90% 0.00% 
       
Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
       
Control Mechanisms       
Ratio of Cash Flow Rights to Voting 
Rights (CV) 3,998 0.851 1.000 0.246 1.000 0.085 
Ratio of Share Difference 3,998 0.632 0.714 0.283 0.982 0.010 
       
       
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
(This table is continued on the next pages) 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample during 1994 to 2007 (Cont’)	  
	   No.  Mean Median SD Maximum Minimum 
	         
Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms (Cont’) 
       
Board Structure       
Number of Total Directors 3,998 12.256 12 3.961 32.000 1.000 
Number of Independent Directors 3,998 4.954 5 2.488 18 0 
Number of Directors who are 
appointed in Multiple Companies 3,998 4.992 4 3.804 26 0 
Board Size 3,998 2.459 2.485 0.303 3.219 1.792 
Board independence 3,998 0.426 0.412 0.220 1.000 0.080 
Board Experience 3,998 0.390 0.364 0.242 0.933 0.000 
       
Other Control Variables       
Number of Year Since Established 3,998 24 21 15 131 1 
Firm Age (ln Age) 3,998 3.009 3.045 0.532 4.466 1.609 
Leverage 3,998 0.519 0.518 0.259 1.322 0.040 
Sales Growth 3,998 0.178 0.103 0.392 2.778 -0.408 
Firm Size 3,998 14.856 14.653 1.295 18.610 12.632 
       
       
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
 
4.6.2 Univariate Analysis 
4.6.2.1 Firm Characteristics and Firm Performance in Firms with and 
without Dominant Shareholders 
Table 4.4 reports a mean comparison of all continuous variables between firms with and 
without dominant shareholders. Panel A, in Table 4.4, shows that about 79.81% of the 
sampled firms had dominant shareholders. In addition, firms with dominant shareholders 
appear to have been larger than firms without dominant shareholders in terms of total 
assets, total liability, total equity, total sales and market capitalisation. Nevertheless, the 
growth opportunities (sales growth) of the former were lower than those of the latter by 
5%. This is consistent with some previous research, which found a negative effect of 
firm age and firm size on firm growth (Evans, 1987; Yasuda, 2005).  
The findings for larger firms with dominant shareholders, however, are different from 
those of research from the US, which has generally found that firms with dominant 
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shareholders tend to be smaller than more widely held firms (for example, see Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003). This may be caused by the nature of Thai listed firms, since most of 
them come from large family businesses. In fact, since the 1990s, it seems to have been 
popular among Thai big business groups for them to have firms in their groups listed in 
the Thai capital market (Suehiro, 2001).  
Regarding firm performance, Panel B, in Table 4.4, shows that the ROA (7.33%) and 
Quasi-q (1.172) for firms with dominant shareholders are significantly higher than for 
those without dominant shareholders (ROA 3.39%, Quasi-q 1.121). This indicates that 
firms with dominant shareholders had superior performance to that of firms without 
dominant shareholders, according to accounting and market performance.  
4.6.2.2 Managerial Ownership and Other Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms in Firms with and without Dominant Shareholders 
Panel C, in Table 4.4, shows that managerial ownership in firms with dominant 
shareholders (42.53%) was higher than in firms without dominant shareholders 
(21.26%). This suggests that dominant family shareholders are likely to take 
management roles in firms they own rather than to act as outside investors (for example, 
see Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). Nevertheless, ownership of executive directors in 
firm without dominant shareholders (9.64%) was higher than those with dominant 
shareholders (5.79%). This suggests that firms without dominant shareholders are likely 
to use share ownership as mechanisms to align executive directors’ interests more than 
firms with dominant shareholders. 
In addition, the CVs of firms with and without dominant shareholders are about 0.84 and 
0.90, respectively. This may imply that the use of pyramidal and cross-shareholding 
structures was high in the case of firms with dominant shareholders. In addition, the 
ratio of ownership difference between the largest and the second largest shareholders 
seems to be larger in firms with dominant shareholders (0.70) than in those without 
dominant shareholders (0.35). This indicates that there was a significant difference 
between the proportion of shares held by the largest and by the second largest 
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shareholders in firms with dominant shareholders. Hence the large difference shares may 
limit the motivation and power of second largest shareholders to monitor the largest 
shareholders. 
Regarding board structure, Table 4.4, Panel C, suggests that the sample firms had an 
average of 12 members on their boards of directors. The average board size was about 
the same in firms with and without dominant shareholders, as shown in Panel A. 
Nevertheless, firms with dominant shareholders had a higher proportion of independent 
directors (0.43) than firms without dominant shareholders did (0.39). Additionally, it 
shows that firms with dominant shareholders tended to have larger proportions of 
directors who were also directors of other listed firms. Although this may imply that 
directors of firms with dominant shareholders may have more experience in business, it 
may also indicate the presence of cross-directorship among firms in the same business 
group. 
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Table 4.4: Univariate Analysis – Full Sample 
Panel A: A Mean Comparison of Firms Characteristics between Firms with and without 
Dominant Shareholders  
 
Firm without 
Dominant 
Shareholder 
(< 25%) 
Firm with 
Dominant 
Shareholder 
(>= 25%) 
Mean 
Diff. t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 (1) (2) (2) - (1)     
          
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
 
Firm Characteristics  (Million Baht) 
Total Asset  807 5,161 3,191 9,874 4,713 3.83 0.000 3.14 0.002 
Total Liability 807 3,276 3,191 5,879 2,603 3.44 0.001 2.85 0.004 
Total Equity 807 1,836 3,191 3,748 1,912 4.11 0.000 2.82 0.005 
Total Sales 807 2,411 3,191 7,992 5,581 3.55 0.000 8.02 0.000 
EBIT 807 208 3,191 1,002 794 3.68 0.000 7.99 0.000 
Market 
Capitalisation 807 2,566 3,190 7,854 5,288 4.03 0.000 3.69 0.000 
          
Panel B: A Mean Comparison of Firm Performance between Firms with and without Dominant 
Shareholders  
          
Firm Performance          
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 807 3.39% 3,191 7.33% 3.94% 9.30 0.000 7.65 0.000 
Simplified Tobin’s 
q (Quasi-q) 807 1.121 3,190 1.172 0.052 2.23 0.026 2.42 0.016 
          
Panel C: A Mean Comparison of Managerial Ownership and Other Corporate Governance 
Variables between Firms with and without Dominant Shareholders  
Managerial Ownership 
All Director 
Ownership 807 21.26% 3,191 42.53% 21.27% 23.3 0.000 21.6 0.000 
Executive Directors 
Ownership 807 9.64% 3,191 5.79% -3.84% -10.2 0.000 -10.7 0.000 
          
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
(This table is continued on the next pages) 
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Table 4.4: Univariate Analysis – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel C: A Mean Comparison of Managerial Ownership and Other Corporate Governance 
Variables between Firms with and without Dominant Shareholders (Cont’) 
 
Firm without 
Dominant 
Shareholder 
(< 25%) 
Firm with 
Dominant 
Shareholder 
(>= 25%) 
Mean 
Diff. t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 (1) (2) (2) - (1)     
          
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
 
Control Mechanisms 
CV 807 0.904 3,191 0.837 -0.067 -6.95 0.000 -9.61 0.000 
Ratio of Share 
Difference 807 0.349 3,191 0.704 0.355 36.8 0.000 30.8 0.000 
          
Board Structure          
Number of Total 
Directors 807 12.374 3,191 12.226 -0.148 -0.95 0.342 -1.82 0.069 
Number of 
Independence 
Directors 807 4.75 3,191 5 0.256 2.62 0.010 3.05 0.002 
Number of 
Directors who are 
appointed in 
Multiple Companies 807 4.538 3,191 5.107 0.569 3.80 0.000 3.13 0.002 
Board Size 807 2.475 3,191 2.454 -0.021 -1.75 0.081 -1.83 0.068 
Board 
Independence 807 0.399 3,191 0.433 0.426 3.89 0.000 3.77 0.000 
Board Experience 807 0.353 3,191 0.399 0.046 4.84 0.000 4.36 0.000 
          
Other Control Variables 
Number of Year 
Since Established 807 22 3,191 24 2 3.75 0.000 3.50 0.001 
Age (ln Age) 807 2.952 3,191 3.024 0.072 3.45 0.000 3.50 0.001 
Leverage 807 0.523 3,191 0.518 -0.005 -0.48 0.630 -0.02 0.983 
Sales Growth 807 0.218 3,191 0.168 -0.050 -3.27 0.001 -2.26 0.024 
Firm Size 807 14.698 3,191 14.897 0.199 3.91 0.000 3.14 0.002 
          
          
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
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Table 4.5: Percentage of Share Ownership Classified by Types of Shareholders from 1994 to 2007 
Panel A: Firms with Dominant Shareholders 
               Types of the Largest Shareholder who are Dominant Shareholders 
Year 
Largest Dominant 
Shareholder Family Government Foreign Domestic Bank Financial 
institutions 
 No.  % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1994 186 45.45 158 46.18 4 46.78 19 40.84 3 39.50 0 0.00 2 37.65 
1995 223 47.09 187 47.96 5 46.88 23 40.45 7 47.69 0 0.00 1 34.00 
1996 249 47.19 208 47.77 5 46.90 28 42.04 7 52.69 0 0.00 1 33.90 
1997 259 48.12 211 49.21 5 45.42 32 41.67 9 50.70 0 0.00 2 32.10 
1998 234 47.89 191 49.12 6 45.17 30 41.34 6 46.30 0 0.00 1 34.40 
1999 212 47.40 168 48.82 7 38.71 32 42.32 4 46.80 0 0.00 1 34.40 
2000 207 47.34 158 48.52 6 40.98 37 43.06 3 54.67 2 47.80 1 34.90 
2001 200 47.83 150 49.04 6 43.55 37 43.88 4 47.25 2 50.55 1 34.90 
2002 193 48.08 142 48.62 8 45.76 38 45.90 3 54.67 2 51.25 0 0.00 
2003 207 47.74 159 48.16 8 45.58 33 47.08 4 40.35 3 48.50 0 0.00 
2004 226 47.44 172 47.54 7 42.17 34 47.89 7 47.93 4 41.70 2 59.60 
2005 247 48.96 197 49.21 8 49.86 35 46.93 3 52.50 2 47.10 2 52.80 
2006 280 49.98 217 50.75 10 48.43 39 48.10 10 44.53 2 36.00 2 51.15 
2007 268 50.21 210 50.95 9 47.16 37 48.59 10 46.24 2 35.30 0 0.00 
Total 3,191 48.01 2,528 48.70 94 45.38 454 44.65 80 47.77 19 44.65 16 42.07 
               Mean of Share Ownership and Comparison of Pre (1994-1998) and Post (2000 – 2007) the Corporate Governance Reform 
               
 
Largest 
Dominant 
Shareholder 
Family Government Foreign Domestic Bank 
Financial 
institutions 
               Pre-CG 1,151 47.24 955 48.13 25 46.16 132 41.34 32 48.60 0 0.00 7 34.54
% Post -CG 1,828 48.57 1,405 49.23 62 45.82 290 46.41 44 47.25 19 44.65 8 49.61
% Mean Diff.  1.33  1.10  -0.034  5.07  -1.35  -
44.65% 
 1.51 
t  2.38  1.76  -0.10  3.24  -0.55  n/a  1.40 
p_value  0.018  0.079  0.920  0.001  0.587  n/a  0.186 
               
Note: Percentages of share ownership shown here are before winsorising.  
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Table 4.5: Percentage of Share Ownership Classified by Types of Shareholders from 1994 to 2007 (Cont’) 
Panel B: Firms without Dominant Shareholders 
               Types of the Largest Shareholder who are not Dominant Shareholders 
Year 
Non-Dominant 
Largest Shareholder Family Government Foreign Domestic Bank Financial 
institutions 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1994 61 15.96 61 13.64% 61 0.51 61 6.11 61 2.00 61 1.49 61 4.20 
1995 69 17.57 69 14.38% 69 0.62 69 5.59 69 2.98 69 1.67 69 4.69 
1996 66 17.26 66 14.15% 66 0.53 66 5.85 66 2.98 66 1.61 66 4.52 
1997 66 17.87 66 14.99% 66 1.26 66 5.66 66 2.25 66 2.21 66 5.04 
1998 55 17.92 55 15.09% 55 1.35 55 6.19 55 2.65 55 2.12 55 4.34 
1999 51 17.95 51 15.01% 51 0.94 51 6.82 51 3.85 51 2.33 51 4.09 
2000 48 17.24 48 14.19% 48 1.43 48 6.73 48 3.43 48 2.50 48 4.17 
2001 44 17.32 44 13.45% 44 0.54 44 8.32 44 3.43 44 2.57 44 3.34 
2002 47 16.58 47 13.88% 47 0.97 47 8.23 47 2.79 47 2.19 47 3.18 
2003 48 16.31 48 13.84% 48 1.29 48 7.30 48 2.95 48 1.44 48 2.93 
2004 51 16.63 51 13.49% 51 1.12 51 7.44 51 2.41 51 0.91 51 1.61 
2005 56 16.39 56 13.11% 56 1.41 56 7.02 56 1.73 56 0.88 56 2.96 
2006 68 17.09 68 14.48% 68 1.31 68 6.10 68 1.05 68 1.33 68 2.01 
2007 77 16.77 77 14.17% 77 1.19 77 5.67 77 1.79 77 0.74 77 1.92 
Total 807 17.07 807 14.16% 807 1.03 807 6.51 807 2.52 807 1.66 807 3.50 
               Mean of Share Ownership and Comparison of Pre (1994-1998) and Post (2000 – 2007) the Corporate Governance Reform 
               
 
Non-Dominant 
Largest 
Shareholder 
Shareholder 
Family Government Foreign Domestic Bank 
Financial 
institutions 
               Pre-CG 317 17.32 317 14.44 317 0.84 317 5.86 317 2.58 317 1.81 317 4.57 
Post -CG 439 16.79 439 13.87 439 1.18 439 6.95 439 2.32 439 1.48 439 2.66 
Mean Diff.  -0.53  -0.58  0.33  1.09  -0.27  -0.34  -1.91 
t  -1.31  -1.12  1.06  2.10  -0.77  -1.44  -6.13 
p_value  0.189  0.262  0.288  0.036  0.441  0.151  0.000 
 Note: Percentages of share ownership shown here are before winsorising. 
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4.6.2.3 The Pattern of Ownership Structure 
Panels A and B, in Table 4.5, present the means of the numbers of voting shares, 
classified by the type of shareholder, for firms with and without dominant shareholders 
from 1994 to 2007.  
Regarding firms with dominant shareholders, Panel A, in Table 4.5, shows that, on 
average, dominant family shareholders owned about 48.7% of voting shares during the 
periods studied.  
The mean proportion of shares held by dominant government owners was about 45.38%. 
In addition, the proportion of shares held by dominant government shareholders tended 
to gradually increase overall, with a slight drop in some years.  
Dominant shareholders that are foreign companies held an average of 44.65% of shares 
and their ownership tended to gradually increase every year. Ownership by dominant 
shareholders that are domestic companies was about 47.77%, with a slight drop in some 
years. 
Banks acting as dominant shareholders owned about 44.65% of shares, on average. A 
few dominant bank shareholders were present from 1999 onwards. This might have been 
due to the 1997 financial crisis, which may have forced some firms to be owned by their 
lenders. On average, a few non-bank financial institutional investors acting as dominant 
shareholders owned about 42.07% of shares. Small number of bank and non-bank 
financial institutional investors acted as dominant shareholders suggests that these 
shareholders prefer to invest in firms as outside blockholders rather than to control the 
firms in which they invest.  
For firms without dominant shareholders, Panel B, in Table 4.5, shows that, while the 
largest family shareholders who are not dominant shareholders held an average of 
14.16% of shares, other types of the largest shareholders owned less than 10% of the 
shares. 
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Overall, evidence from this section suggests that the pattern of ownership structure in 
Thailand has not significantly changed through the periods studied. The evidence also 
suggests that, in the periods studied, ownership distributions in most listed firms were 
still highly concentrated in the hands of dominant shareholders who are family. 
4.6.2.4 Before and After the Corporate Governance Reforms 
4.6.2.4.1 Firm Characteristics and Firm Performance 
Panels A, B and C, in Table 4.6, provide mean comparisons of firm characteristics and 
other corporate governance variables before (1994 to 1998) and after (2000 to 2007) the 
corporate governance reforms. After the exclusion of single-year observations, the sub-
samples remain 1,468 in pre-reform periods and 2,267 in post-reform periods for ROA, 
and 1,467 and 2,267 for the Quasi-q sample.  
Overall, Panel A, in Table 4.6, suggests that the sample firms were larger after the 
reforms, in terms of the book value of their assets, market capitalisation, equity and 
sales. Nevertheless, the leverage ratio statistically reduces on average from 59.5% to 
46.3%. Although, this ratio is still high, its decline may partly have resulted from firms 
being limited to funding with further debt due to the financial crisis. 
Regarding firm performance, while the ROA appears to have improved after the reform, 
there is no significant improvement in Quasi-q after the reform, as shown in Panel B, in 
Table 4.6. 
 4.6.2.4.2 Other Corporate Governance Variables 
Regarding the structures of ownership and control, Panel C, in Table 4.6, shows that 
there has been no significant change in managerial ownership, CV ratio and the ratio of 
difference between the largest shareholders and the second largest shareholders after the 
reforms. 
Regarding board structure, firms seem to have had bigger boards and higher proportions 
of independent directors after the reforms. This may be a result of the requirement for 
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listed firms to have at least three independent directors. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
proportion of directors who are directors of other boards has been significantly reduced 
after the reforms. 
4.6.2.4.3 The Pattern of Ownership Structure 
In consideration of corporate governance reform, Panel A, in Table 4.5, suggests that the 
average proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholders has significantly 
increased after the reforms. Indeed, more concentration of ownership appears to have 
taken place in firms where the largest shareholders were dominant family, foreign or 
bank shareholders. Panel B, in Table 4.5, suggests that, on average, while the largest 
shareholders who are foreign companies significantly increased their proportion of 
investment, those who are non-bank financial institutional investors significantly 
decreased their investment. Hence, on average, there has been no significant change of 
ownership structure in firms without dominant shareholders. 
Overall, the evidence contradicts the expectation that the reforms would reduce the 
motivation of shareholders to have concentrated ownership, because they were already 
protected by the better system. 
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Table 4.6: Univariate Analysis – A Mean Comparison of Variables between Pre-Reform and Post-
Reform of the Corporate Governance System 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
 
Pre-Reform 
1994 to 1998 
(1) 
Post- Reform 
2000 to 2007 
(2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
Sum Test 
          
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
Firm 
Characteristics  
(‘000 Baht) 
         
Total Asset  1,468 6,852 2,267 10,400 3,498 3.29 0.001 1.90 0.057 
Total Liability 1,468 4,730 2,267 5,718 9,876 1.53 0.127 -4.39 0.000 
Total Equity 1,468 1,969 2,267 4,383 2,415 5.97 0.000 9.94 0.000 
Total Sales 1,468 3,219 2,267 9,557 6,338 4.59 0.000 10.73 0.000 
EBIT 1,468 430 2,267 1,176 746 3.94 0.000 3.48 0.001 
Market 
Capitalisation 1,467 3,968 2,267 8,882 4,914 4.28 0.000 10.16 0.000 
          Panel B: Firm Performance 
Firm Performance 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 1,468 6.28% 2,267 7.11% 0.008 2.35 0.019 2.03 0.043 
Simplified 
Tobin’s q  
(Quasi-q) 1,467 1.173 2,267 1.170 -0.004 -0.19 0.847 -0.46 0.645 
          Panel C: Ownership Variables  
Ownership Concentration 
Ownership 
Concentration by 
the Largest 
Shareholder 1,468 40.73% 2,267 42.38% 1.64% 2.69 0.007 2.43 0.015 
- Family 1,468 35.76% 2,267 35.03% -0.72% -0.99 0.322 -1.24 0.214 
- Government 1,468 0.93% 2,267 1.58% 0.65% 2.90 0.004 3.26 0.001 
- Foreign 
company investors 1,468 7.98% 2,267 10.68% 2.70% 5.58 0.000 3.70 0.000 
- Domestic 
company 1,468 2.11% 2,267 2.41% -0.30% -1.19 0.236 -4.86 0.000 
- Bank 1,468 1.03% 2,267 1.01% -0.01% -0.14 0.888 -0.81 0.419 
- Non-Bank 
Financial 
Institutions 1,468 3.35% 2,267 1.87% -1.48% -12.75 0.000 -18.65 0.000 
          
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 4.6: Univariate Analysis – A Mean Comparison of Variables between Pre-Reform and Post-
Reform of the Corporate Governance System (Cont’) 
Panel C: Ownership Variables (Cont’) 
 
Pre-Reform 
1994 to 1998 
(1) 
Post- Reform 
2000 to 2007 
(2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
Sum Test 
          
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
Managerial Ownership 
(‘000 Baht) Director 
Ownership 1,468 38.37% 2,267 37.93% -0.44% -0.54 0.592 -0.36 0.717 
Executive 
Director 
Ownership 1,468 6.35% 2,267 6.35% -0.00% -0.00 0.998 -0.37 0.715 
          Panel D: Other Control Variables 
Control Mechanisms 
CV 1,468 0.851 2,267 0.850 -0.000 -0.02 0.987 1.28 0.201 
Ratio of Share 
Difference 1,468 0.641 2,267 0.629 -0.012 -1.25 0.211 -1.58 0.114 
          
Board Structure 
Number of Total 
Directors 1,468 11.714 2,267 12.448 0.734 5.65 0.000 7.54 0.000 
Number of 
Independent 
Directors 1,468 2.334 2,267 6.534 4.200 85.58 0.000 50.83 0.000 
Number of 
Directors who are 
appointed in 
Multiple 
Companies 1,468 4.990 2,267 4.391 -0.592 -0.47 0.638 0.17 0.866 
Board Size 1,468 2.406 2,267 2.481 0.075 7.48 0.000 7.53 0.000 
Board 
Independence 
1,468 0.218 2,267 0.556 0.337 67.46 0.000 47.86 0.000 
Board Experience 1,468 0.405 2,267 0.381 -0.024 -2.94 0.003 -2.37 0.018 
          
Other Control Variables 
Number of Year 
Since Established 1,468 20.734 2,267 25.542 4.807 9.66 0.000 15.28 0.000 
Age (ln_Age) 1,468 2.848 2,267 3.115 0.267 15.37 0.000 15.29 0.000 
Leverage 1,468 0.594 2,267 0.463 -0.132 -15.90 0.000 -15.65 0.000 
Sales Growth 1,468 0.215 2,267 0.170 -0.045 -3.37 0.001 -5.19 0.000 
Firm Size 1,468 14.793 2,267 14.907 0.114 2.63 0.009 1.90 0.057 
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Table 4.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables used in this study. The total sample includes 3,998 (3,997) firm-year observations of non-financial listed 
companies in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is shown in Panel B. 
Asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at 1% level. 
  Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 ROAt 1.000            
2 Quasi-qt 0.275* 1.000           
3 Concentrated Own 0.115* 0.014 1.000          
4 Family Own 0.056* -0.017 0.715* 1.000         
5 Government Own 0.079* 0.104* 0.012 -0.240* 1.000        
6 Foreign Com. Own 0.069* -0.004 0.028 -0.439* -0.041* 1.000       
7 Domestic Com. Own -0.050* 0.043* -0.039 -0.285* -0.004 -0.006 1.000      
8 Bank Own -0.060* -0.039 -0.129* -0.158* 0.058* -0.069* 0.097* 1.000     
9 Non- Bank Fin. Own -0.067* -0.046* -0.155* -0.156* -0.026 -0.057* 0.063* 0.041* 1.000    
10 Director Ownership 0.057* -0.052* 0.479* 0.796* -0.274* -0.452* -0.277* -0.180* -0.138* 1.000   
11 Executive Director 
Ownership 
-0.013 -0.016 0.069* 0.171* -0.080* -0.120* -0.084* -0.092* -0.005 0.254* 1.000  
12 Ratio of Share 
Difference 0.091* -0.013 0.732* 0.545* -0.014 -0.168* -0.058* -0.091* -0.126* 0.329* 0.071* 1.000 
13 CV -0.023 0.044* -0.129* -0.177* 0.026 0.101* -0.066* -0.091* 0.091* -0.039 0.089* -0.098* 
14 Board Size -0.068* -0.061* -0.114* -0.104* 0.168* 0.038 0.066* 0.142* -0.051* -0.094* -0.035 -0.120* 
15 Board Independence 0.027 0.034 0.103* 0.021 0.004 0.068* -0.047* -0.071* -0.155* 0.013 0.021 0.061* 
16 Board Experience 0.022 0.046* 0.090* 0.083* 0.139* -0.038 0.010 0.152* -0.064* -0.067* -0.088* 0.108* 
17 CEO Founder 0.023 -0.064* -0.060* 0.079* -0.101* -0.146* -0.077* -0.104* -0.043* 0.223* 0.234* -0.017 
18 CEO Descendant 0.011 -0.012 0.172* 0.243* -0.064* -0.080* -0.080* -0.019 -0.028 0.210* 0.115* 0.153* 
19 CEO-Chair 0.005 -0.017 0.014 0.125* -0.072* -0.112* -0.085* -0.085* -0.033 0.176* 0.086* 0.055* 
20 CEO-Group 0.037 -0.037 0.187* 0.239* -0.072* -0.073* -0.035 -0.012 -0.076* 0.209* 0.048* 0.165* 
21 Firm Size 0.081* 0.148* -0.008 -0.107* 0.273* 0.102* 0.005 0.030 -0.139* -0.210* -0.039 0.067* 
22 Firm Age 0.030 -0.132* 0.084* 0.033 -0.109* 0.143* 0.014 0.001 -0.119* -0.002 -0.033 0.031 
23 Sales Growth 0.156* 0.146* -0.054* -0.080* 0.118* -0.011 -0.015 0.020 -0.013 -0.103* -0.022 0.003 
24 Leverage -0.397* 0.058* -0.036 0.020 -0.006 -0.108* 0.020 0.052* 0.079* 0.004 0.045* 0.002 
              
(This table is continued on the next pages) 
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Table 4.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables used in this study. The total sample includes 3,998 (3,997) firm-year observations of non-financial listed 
companies in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is shown in Panel 
B. Asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at 1%  level. 
 
  Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
 Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
              
13 CV 1.000            
14 Board Size -0.295* 1.000           
15 Board Independence 0.155* -0.310* 1.000          
16 Board Experience -0.322* 0.211* -0.087* 1.000         
17 CEO Founder 0.168* -0.118* 0.102* -0.160* 1.000        
18 CEO Descendant -0.032 0.076* 0.034 0.038 -0.197* 1.000       
19 CEO-Chair 0.083* -0.093* 0.108* -0.046* 0.472* 0.075* 1.000      
20 CEO-Group 0.043* -0.010 0.054* -0.025 -0.090* 0.514* -0.158* 1.000     
21 Firm Size -0.063* 0.254* -0.003 0.358* -0.079* 0.064* -0.019 0.005 1.000    
22 Firm Age -0.025 0.108* 0.139* 0.097* -0.072* 0.053* -0.011 0.094* -0.097* 1.000   
23 Sales Growth 0.009 -0.016 -0.042* 0.073* -0.004 -0.021 -0.018 -0.023 0.203* -0.231* 1.000  
24 Leverage 0.022 -0.007 -0.145* 0.064* 0.017 -0.007 0.001 0.011 0.253* -0.157* 0.003  
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Table 4.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables used in this study. The total sample includes 3,998 (3,997) firm-year observations of non-financial listed 
companies in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is shown in Panel 
B. Asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at 1% level. 
  Panel B: Spearman Correlation Matrix 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 ROAt 1.000            
2 Quasi-qt 0.319* 1.000           
3 Concentrated Own 0.096* 0.000 1.000          
4 Family Own 0.035 -0.033 0.709* 1.000         
5 Government Own 0.058* 0.100* -0.035 -0.181* 1.000        
6 Foreign Com. Own 0.126* 0.059* -0.163* -0.391* 0.032 1.000       
7 Domestic Com. Own -0.086* 0.022 -0.197* -0.275* 0.031 0.024 1.000      
8 Bank Own -0.065* -0.044* -0.155* -0.166* 0.105* -0.016 0.159* 1.000     
9 Non- Bank Fin. Own -0.047* -0.047* -0.208* -0.158* -0.023 -0.056* 0.056* 0.054* 1.000    
10 Director Ownership 0.037 -0.068* 0.496* 0.799* -0.266* -0.428* -0.259* -0.187* -0.142* 1.000   
11 Executive Director 
Ownership 0.004 -0.044* -0.127* 0.018 -0.142* -0.112* -0.019 -0.047* 0.018 0.178* 1.000  
12 Ratio of Share Difference 0.080* -0.016 0.787* 0.588* -0.011 -0.277* -0.173* -0.107* -0.095* 0.378* -0.083* 1.000 
13 CV 0.006 0.048* -0.191* -0.273* 0.018 0.102* -0.010 -0.047* 0.066* -0.136* 0.079* -0.160* 
14 Board Size -0.063* -0.053* -0.115* -0.113* 0.177* 0.124* 0.094* 0.151* -0.075* -0.102* -0.033 -0.135* 
15 Board Independence 0.029 0.039 0.088* 0.011 0.000 0.020 -0.091* -0.077* -0.225* 0.016 0.003 0.053* 
16 Board Experience 0.023 0.072* 0.075* 0.065* 0.186* 0.071* 0.039 0.140* -0.078* -0.079* -0.133* 0.087* 
17 CEO Founder 0.025 -0.048* -0.068* 0.075* -0.091* -0.096* -0.050* -0.107* 0.012 0.213* 0.241* -0.021 
18 CEO Descendant -0.001 -0.013 0.185* 0.252* -0.037 -0.034 -0.088* -0.013 -0.023 0.205* 0.019 0.153* 
19 CEO-Chair 0.016 -0.011 0.010 0.125* -0.020 -0.053* -0.064* -0.081* 0.025 0.164* 0.057* 0.053* 
20 CEO-Group 0.018 -0.028 0.198* 0.244* -0.077* -0.023 -0.054* -0.033 -0.074* 0.208* -0.049* 0.180* 
21 Firm Size 0.048* 0.188* -0.021 -0.099* 0.230* 0.259* 0.062* 0.121* -0.107* -0.193* -0.073* 0.057* 
22 Firm Age 0.001 -0.144* 0.084* 0.037 -0.022 0.101* -0.020 -0.019 -0.174* 0.014 -0.081* 0.028 
23 Sales Growth 0.323* 0.248* -0.044* -0.059* 0.068* 0.033 -0.002 -0.007 0.004 -0.088* -0.010 0.014 
24 Leverage -0.343* 0.178* -0.030 0.027 -0.018 -0.088* 0.090* 0.084* 0.107* 0.006 -0.007 0.016 
              
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 4.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables used in this study. The total sample includes 3,998 (3,997) firm-year observations of non-financial listed 
companies in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is shown in Panel 
B. Asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
  Panel B: Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
 Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
              
13 CV 1.000            
14 Board Size -0.256* 1.000           
15 Board Independence 0.149* -0.282* 1.000          
16 Board Experience -0.317* 0.228* -0.094* 1.000         
17 CEO Founder 0.139* -0.114* 0.106* -0.166* 1.000        
18 CEO Descendant -0.080* 0.074* 0.040 0.045* -0.197* 1.000       
19 CEO-Chair 0.051* -0.093* 0.106* -0.051* 0.472* 0.075* 1.000      
20 CEO-Group -0.013 -0.019 0.056* -0.027 -0.089* 0.514* -0.158* 1.000     
21 Firm Size -0.089* 0.217* -0.005 0.347* -0.066* 0.067* 0.012 0.012 1.000    
22 Firm Age -0.055* 0.131* 0.142* 0.084* -0.075* 0.054* -0.016 0.090* -0.100* 1.000   
23 Sales Growth 0.019 -0.040 -0.046* 0.078* 0.002 -0.013 -0.021 -0.009 0.244* -0.205* 1.000  
24 Leverage -0.036 -0.015 -0.168* 0.070* 0.022 -0.004 0.004 0.009 0.291* -0.182* 0.049*  
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4.6.3 Multivariate Analysis 
4.6.3.1 The Impact of Ownership Concentration and the Presence of 
Dominant Shareholders on Firm Performance 
In respect to the hypotheses, Ha1 and Ha2, this section investigates the impact of 
ownership concentration and the presence of dominant shareholders on firm 
performance. The fixed-effect models were applied according to Models 4.1 and 4.2, as 
discussed in Section 4.3. 
From Model 4.1, Table 4.8 reports the results of the multivariate regressions of the ROA 
and Quasi-q samples, respectively. The coefficient of Concentrated Own has positive 
relationships with both the ROA and Quasi-q at 10% and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively. In other words, for a given firm, as levels of ownership varies over time by 
one unit, the ROA (Quasi-q) increases by 0.050 (0.504) units. The evidence supports the 
notion of an alignment effect (Ha1) and suggests that the motivation of the largest 
shareholders to monitor managers increases as their proportion of shares increases.  
However, Model 4.2, Table 4.8, shows that the coefficient of D_Dominant is positively 
related only to Quasi-q at the 5% level of significance. The evidence also supports the 
alignment effect (Ha2) and suggests that firms with dominant shareholders have superior 
to firms without dominant shareholders, in terms of market performance. It may also 
imply that the existence of a dominant shareholder could be a substitute for governance, 
where legal protection is claimed to be weak (Denis and McConnell, 2003). While the 
evidence does not provide strong evidence for the benefit of dominant shareholders in 
terms of accounting performance, at least there is no evidence of exploitation by 
dominant shareholders. 
This evidence does not support the World Bank’s (1998) claims regarding the poor 
structure of high ownership concentration but it is consistent with much of the research 
from outside the US, which reports a positive effect of ownership concentration and the 
presence of dominant shareholders on firm performance (for examples, see Claessens 
	  	  
Chapter 4 
156	  
and Djankov, 1999; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Lins, 2003; Morck et al., 2000). In 
Thailand, the findings of this chapter are consistent with Wiwattanakantang (2001) and 
Yammeesri (2003), which report a superior performance of firms with the presence of 
dominant shareholders in Thailand. 
Furthermore, the evidence contradicts research from the US that suggests no significant 
role for blockholders as a mechanism for monitoring managers (for examples, see 
Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 1995). 
Likewise, in Thailand, Limpaphayom (2001) did not find any relationship between 
blockholders and firm performance.  
For control variables, the results estimated from Models 4.1 and 4.2 are consistent. 
Therefore, the main analysis discussed here is based on the results estimated from Model 
4.1.  
Regarding CV, the coefficient of CV is positive but not significant to both the ROA and 
Quasi-q as shown in Table 4.8. This implies that on average the use of pyramidal and 
cross-shareholding in Thai listed firms does not significantly harm them. This evidence, 
however, contradicts some research, which found a significant negative relationship 
between dominant shareholders and market performance when voting rights exceeded 
cash-flow rights (for example, see Edwards and Weichenrieder, 2004). 
Regarding other control variables, it appears that the difference in shareholding between 
the largest shareholders and the second largest shareholders does matter in the Quasi-q 
model. In fact, this study found a negative relationship between the ratio of the share 
difference and both the ROA and Quasi-q. However, the negative relationship is only 
statistically significant to Quasi-q.  
The evidence shows that firms derive some benefit from their second largest 
shareholders when the proportions of shares they own are similar to those of the largest 
shareholders, indicating an alignment effect and suggesting that they have more power 
and motivation to monitor managers and to check and balance the control of the largest 
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shareholders. The significant relationship, which appears only in the Quasi-q regression, 
may imply that investors view the presence of a second large shareholder as a 
mechanism to govern exploitation by the dominant shareholders. This evidence is also 
consistent with Edwards and Weichenrieder’s (2004) findings, which report that a 
second largest shareholder with more cash-flow rights contributes to firms in terms of 
monitoring. 
Regarding board structure, this study found a negative, significant relationship between 
board size and ROA. However, the coefficient of board size is negative but not 
significant to Quasi-q. This evidence suggests that oversized boards may have reduced 
efficiency, leading to poorer firm performance, which is consistent with other evidence 
from existing literature (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). 
Firm size and firm growth are positively related to the ROA at the 1% level of 
significance. The positive effects may indicate the benefits that larger firms can gain 
from economies of scale, which provide easy access to internal or external funding 
(Short and Keasey, 1999). However, firm size is negatively related to Quasi-q at the 1% 
level of significance. This suggests that the performance of larger firms was worse than 
that of smaller firms. This is consistent with Lang and Stulz’s (1994) findings, which 
suggest that larger firms tend to diversify their business, reducing firm performance. In 
addition, the negative effect may imply that investors expect more future growth and 
profitability from smaller firms than from larger firms.  
Leverage is negatively related to the ROA at the 1% level of significance. However, it is 
positively related to Quasi-q at the 1% level of significance. The evidence from the ROA 
sample supports the expectation of a conflict of interests between lenders and firms. 
Lenders may intervene in management decisions in order to protect their benefits (to 
secure a loan repayment, for example, and this may lead to inefficient investment 
decisions and thereby reduce firm performance. However, the positive effect noted on 
Quasi-q may imply that investors view leverage as a mechanism to limit managers’ 
discretion (on the inefficient use of large free cash flows, for example) (Jensen, 1986). 
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Nevertheless, the contradictory results between ROA and Quasi-q will be further 
investigated in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Table: 4.8 The Impact of Ownership Concentration and the Impact of the Presence of Dominant 
Shareholders on Firm Performance  
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate an impact of ownership concentration 
(Model 4.1) and the presence of dominant shareholders (Model 4.2) on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) from 
1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected 
standards errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% 
(***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
Model 4.1: FMit = β0 + β1Concentrated Ownit + γ1 Share Differenceit + γ2 CVit + γ3 Board Sizeit  
                              + γ4 Board Independenceit + γ5 Board Experienceit + γ6 CEO Founderit+ γ7 CEO Descendantit 
                      + γ8 CEO-Chairit + γ9 CEO-Groupit + γ10 Firm Size+ γ11 Firm Ageit + γ12Firm Growthit 
                      + γ13 Leverageit+ αi1 Firm fixed effect + αi2 Year fixed effect + εit 
 
Model 4.2: FMit = β0 + β1D_Dominantit + γ1 Share Differenceit + γ2 CVit + γ4 Board Sizeit  
                              + γ3 Board Independenceit + γ4 Board Experienceit + γ5 CEO Founderit+ γ6 CEO Descendantit 
                      + γ7 CEO-Chairit + γ8 CEO-Groupit + γ9 Firm Size+ γ10 Firm Ageit + γ11 Firm Growthit 
                      + γ12 Leverageit+ αi1 Firm fixed effect + αi2 Year fixed effect + εit 
 Model 4.1 Model 4.2 
Explanatory 
Variables ROA t Quasi-q t ROA t Quasi-q t 
         
Concentrated Own 0.050* (1.77) 0.504*** (3.00)     
D_Dominant     0.006 (0.74) 0.114** (2.15) 
Share Difference -0.004 (-0.29) -0.204** (-2.06) 0.011 (0.87) -0.085 (-0.95) 
CV 0.014 (0.99) 0.045 (0.42) 0.012 (0.85) 0.028 (0.27) 
Board Size -0.042*** (-3.61) -0.008 (-0.11) -0.044*** (-3.76) -0.027 (-0.37) 
Board 
Independence 0.027 (1.41) -0.04 (-0.39) 0.026 (1.36) -0.045 (-0.44) 
Board Experience -0.01 (-0.55) -0.088 (-0.78) -0.009 (-0.49) -0.083 (-0.74) 
CEO Founder 0.014 (1.08) -0.073 (-0.94) 0.014 (1.06) -0.079 (-1.01) 
CEO Descendant -0.001 (-0.05) 0.078 (0.69) 0.000 (-0.01) 0.084 (0.72) 
CEO-Chair 0.007 (0.49) 0.095 (1.34) 0.007 (0.46) 0.089 (1.27) 
CEO-Group 0.020 (1.45) 0.001 (0.01) 0.021 (1.50) 0.005 (0.06) 
Firm Size 0.041*** (6.09) -0.128*** (-2.72) 0.040*** (5.97) -0.135*** (-2.93) 
Firm Age 0.038 (1.41) -0.153 (-1.04) 0.033 (1.24) -0.195 (-1.33) 
Firm Growth 0.030*** (4.18) 0.130*** (3.57) 0.030*** (4.22) 0.135*** (3.76) 
Leverage -0.235*** (-14.93) 0.294*** (3.51) -0.236*** (-14.84) 0.288*** (3.44) 
Constant -0.435*** (-3.41) 3.594*** (4.09) -0.402*** (-3.16) 3.905*** (4.56) 
         
         Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,998  3,997  3,998  3,997  
Number of Clusters 441  441  441  441  
Adj. R-square 0.251  0.182  0.250  0.179  
F-test 20.179  19.850  19.908  19.645  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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4.6.3.2 The Impact of Ownership Concentration, by Type, and the 
Presence of Dominant Shareholders, by Type, on Firm Performance 
In respect to the hypotheses, Ha3 and Ha4, this section investigates the impact of 
ownership concentration, classified by shareholder type, and the presence of dominant 
shareholders, by their types, on firm performance. The fixed-effect models were applied 
according to Models 4.3 and 4.4, as discussed in Section 4.3. 
In respect to Model 4.3, Table 4.9, reports the results of the multivariate regression of 
the ROA and Quasi-q samples. Only the coefficient of Family Own is positively related 
to both the ROA and Quasi-q at 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. In other 
words, for a given firm, as the level ownership held by the largest shareholder who is 
family varied over time by one unit, the ROA (Quasi-q) increased by 0.060 (0.515) 
units. This evidence supports the notion of an alignment effect (Ha3), which suggests that 
the interests of the largest family shareholder will be more aligned with those of the firm 
and other shareholders as his/her proportion of shares increases. 
However, the results estimated from Model 4.4 show that the coefficient of D_Family 
Own is positively related only to Quasi-q, at the 5% level of significance. This evidence 
supports the alignment effect (Ha4) and suggests that the presence of dominant family 
shareholders does benefit listed firms in terms of market performance. This may imply 
that investors view the existence of dominant family shareholders as a substitute for 
governance in firms where legal protection is claimed to be weak (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003) even though firms with or without the presence of a dominant family 
shareholder did not differ in terms of accounting performance. Nevertheless, while the 
evidence does not strongly support the prediction of a benefit from dominant family 
shareholders, in terms of accounting performance, there is no evidence of exploitation 
by them.  
This evidence contradicts the World Bank’s (1998) view that a high concentration of 
ownership, especially by families, is a weak corporate structure in Thailand. The 
evidence in this study reveals that, at least, firms are not harmed by the presence of 
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dominant family shareholders. The evidence is consistent with a series of studies that 
suggest the superior performance of firms with dominant family shareholders (for 
examples, see Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Asaba and Kunugita, 2007; King and Santor, 
2008; Martínez et al., 2007; Suehiro, 2001; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Yammeesri et al., 
2006). 
Regarding other types of dominant shareholder, Model 4.4 shows that the coefficient of 
D_Non-Bank Financial Institutions is positively related only to ROA, at the 10% level 
of significance. The evidence supports the alignment effect (Ha12) and suggests that 
firms with a presence of dominant shareholders who are non-bank financial institutional 
investors had superior performance over firms without it, in terms of accounting 
performance. They did benefit from having non-bank financial institutional investors 
and this may be, for example, in terms of monitoring, as the investors held blocks of 
shares (Cornett et al., 2007). The evidence is consistent with the findings of other studies 
such as Seifert et al. (2005), Bhattacharya and Graham (2007) and Gorton and Schmid 
(2000). 
 For control variables, the results estimated from Models 4.3 and 4.4 are consistent. 
Therefore, the main analysis discussed here is based on the results estimated from Model 
4.3.  
This study found no evidence that the use of pyramidal and cross-shareholding 
structures destroys firm performance. In fact, the coefficient of CV is positively but not 
significantly related to the ROA and Quasi-q. Again, the difference between the 
shareholdings of the largest and the second largest shareholders does matter in the 
Quasi-q model, implying that investors had a positive view of the role of the second 
largest shareholders in listed firms. For control variables, most of the results are 
consistent with the previous model, discussed in Section 4.6.3.2. 
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Table: 4.9 The Impact of Ownership Concentration Classified by Shareholders’ Types and the 
Presence of Dominant Shareholders Classified by their Types on Firm Performance 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate the impact of ownership concentration by 
shareholders’ types and the presence of dominant shareholders by their types on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) 
from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected 
standards errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% 
(***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Model 4.3: FMit = β0 + β1Family Ownit +β2Government Ownit +β3Foreign Investors Ownit  
                              +β4Domestic Companies Ownit+β5Bank Ownit + β6Non-Bank Financial Institutions Ownit 
                                             + γ1Share Differenceit+ γ2 CVit+ γ3 Board Sizeit + γ4 Board Independenceit + γ5 Board Experiencei 
               + γ6 CEO Founderit+ γ7CEO Descendantit+ γ8 CEO-Chairit + γ9 CEO-Groupit + γ10Firm Size 
                              + γ11 Firm Ageit + γ12 Firm Growthit + γ13 Leverageit + αi1 Firm fixed effect + αi2 Year fixed effect  
                      + εit 
Model 4.4: FMit = β0 + β1D_Familyit +β2D_Governmentit +β3D_Foreign Investorsit  
                              +β4D_Domestic Companiesit+β5D_Bankit+ β6D_Non-Bank Financial Institutionsit 
                                             + γ1Share Differenceit+ γ2 CVit+ γ4 Board Sizeit+ γ3 Board Independenceit + γ4 Board Experienceit 
                              + γ5 CEO Founderit+ γ6 CEO Descendantit+ γ7 CEO-Chairit+ γ8 CEO-Groupit + γ9 Firm Size 
                              + γ10Firm Ageit + γ11Firm Growthit + γ12 Leverageit + αi1 Firm fixed effect+ αi2 Year fixed effect +εit 
 Model 4.3 Model 4.4 
Explanatory 
Variables ROA t Quasi-q t ROA t Quasi-q t 
         
Family Own 0.060** (2.57) 0.515*** (3.61)     
Government Own -0.021 (-0.26) 1.122 (1.23)     
Foreign Investor Own 0.044 (1.28) -0.004 (-0.02)     
Domestic Company 
Own 
0.029 (0.66) 0.307 (1.17)     
Bank Own 0.027 (0.22) -0.98 (-1.41)     
Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions Own 0.078 (1.16) -0.156 (-0.30)  
   
D_Family     0.006 (0.74) 0.130** (2.23) 
D_Government     0.010 (0.44) 0.484 (1.58) 
D_Foreign Investor      0.005 (0.35) 0.055 (0.73) 
D_Domestic company     -0.011 (-0.56) -0.048 (-0.48) 
D_Bank     0.027 (0.84) 0.018 (0.16) 
D_Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions     0.029* (1.95) 0.176 (1.32) 
Share Difference 0.002 (0.13) -0.174** (-1.97) 0.011 (0.83) -0.088 (-0.98) 
CV 0.015 (1.01) 0.1 (0.92) 0.008 (0.55) 0.026 (0.22) 
Board Size -0.042*** (-3.62) -0.018 (-0.25) -0.044*** (-3.69) -0.025 (-0.34) 
Board Independence 0.028 (1.50) -0.024 (-0.25) 0.024 (1.26) -0.049 (-0.49) 
Board Experience -0.011 (-0.59) -0.109 (-0.98) -0.009 (-0.49) -0.102 (-0.91) 
CEO Founder 0.014 (1.12) -0.074 (-0.94) 0.013 (1.00) -0.075 (-0.94) 
CEO Descendant -0.002 (-0.13) 0.072 (0.64) 0.000 (-0.02) 0.082 (0.71) 
CEO-Chair 0.007 (0.48) 0.074 (1.04) 0.007 (0.47) 0.076 (1.11) 
CEO-Group 0.021 (1.52) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.020 (1.43) 0.006 (0.07) 
         
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table: 4.9 The Impact of Ownership Concentration Classified by Shareholders’ Types and the 
Presence of Dominant Shareholders Classified by their Types on Firm Performance (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate the impact of ownership concentration by 
shareholders’ types and the presence of dominant shareholders by their types on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) 
from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected 
standards errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% 
(***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 4.3 Model 4.4 
Explanatory 
Variables ROA t Quasi-q t ROA t Quasi-q t 
         
Firm Size 0.040*** (5.94) -0.130*** (-2.84) 0.040*** (6.00) -0.136*** (-2.97) 
Firm Age 0.038 (1.45) -0.129 (-0.89) 0.033 (1.23) -0.199 (-1.36) 
Firm Growth 0.030*** (4.31) 0.130*** (3.65) 0.030*** (4.17) 0.133*** (3.72) 
Leverage -0.235*** (-15.0) 0.277*** (3.27) -0.235*** (-14.8) 0.287*** (3.43) 
Constant -0.443*** (-3.55) 3.552*** (4.20) -0.401*** (-3.19) 3.923*** (4.60) 
         
         
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,998  3,997  3,998  3,997  
Number of Clusters 441  441  441  441  
Adj. R-square 0.253  0.187  0.250  0.182  
F-test 17.433  17.234  17.132  17.087  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
         
 
4.6.3.3 The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance 
In respect to the fifth set of the hypotheses, this section aims to investigate the impact of 
managerial ownership on firm performance. The fixed-effects model is applied 
according to Model 4.5, as discussed in Section 4.3. 
Table 4.10 reports the result of the multivariate regressions of the ROA and the Quasi-q 
sample. The results show that the coefficients of Manager Own are positively related to 
the ROA and Quasi-q at the 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. In other 
words, for a given firm, as managerial ownership varies over time by one unit, the ROA 
(Quasi-q) increases by 0.034 (0.398) units. This supports the prediction of an alignment 
effect (Ha13) for the period studied, suggesting that the interests of managers were more 
aligned to value maximisation as their proportion of shares increased. The evidence is 
also consistent with the findings of existing research, which has found the alignment 
effect in some levels of managerial ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Bhabra, 2007; 
Chen et al., 2003; Hu and Zhou, 2008; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Maury, 2006; 
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Morck et al., 1988; Short and Keasey, 1999). However, while it is consistent with the 
findings of Yammesri (2003), it is inconsistent with Wiwattanakantang (2001), who 
found a negative relationship between dominant shareholders and firm performance in 
Thailand, when dominant shareholders were involved in management. 
According to the definition discussed in Section 4.4.2, managerial ownership in the 
above regression includes all of a board’s ownership. Morck et al. (1988) argue that the 
ownership of executive and non-executive directors might have different impacts on 
firm performance. While ownership by non-executive directors51 may increase their 
motivation to supervise management, ownership by executive directors may increase 
their opportunities to become entrenched because they might be able to avoid market 
disciplines such as the labour market and market for corporate control. 
 This study redefined managerial ownership to include only the percentage of shares 
owned by executive directors. The results for the ROA and Quasi-q samples are shown 
in Table 4.10 and indicate an insignificant, positive relationship between executive 
ownership and both measurements of firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q). Therefore, 
the results are inconsistent with those obtained using all board ownership, discussed 
above. The evidence suggests that levels of share ownership by executive directors 
themselves did not have any significant impact on firm performance. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that ownership has helped to increase motivation of 
directors to perform their duty. However, share ownership might be less efficient to 
align interests of management with other shareholders. Nevertheless, it is likely to 
increase the motivation of in particular, non-executive directors to supervise managers.  
In Thailand, it is normal for executive directors who are also dominant shareholders to 
be members of the founding family. The evidence from Section 4.6.2.2 also suggests 
that on average, executive directors of firms with dominant shareholders owned shares 
less than executive directors of firms without dominant shareholders. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Non-executive directors might not be motivated to put their time and effort into monitoring executive 
officers. They may also be easily dominated by influential officers. Therefore, without any financial 
interests (blocks of ownership), their motivation to supervise management efficiently may be reduced. 
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Therefore, it may imply that firms with dominant shareholders do not intend to use 
managerial ownership for the express purpose of aligning executives’ interests with 
those of other shareholders. However, dominant shareholders may intend to have a 
representative to control the firm by acting as management. 
Table: 4.10 An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate an impact of managerial ownership on firm 
performance (ROA and Quasi-q) from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. t-statistics 
for two-tails test based on corrected standards errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Model 4.5: FMit = β0 + β1Manager Ownit + γ1Share Differenceit + γ2 CVit + γ3 Board Sizeit + γ4 Board Independenceit 
                                             + γ5 Board Experienceit + γ6 CEO Founderit + γ7 CEO Descendantit+ γ8 CEO-Chairit  
                                             + γ9 CEO-Groupit  + γ10 Firm Size + γ11 Firm Ageit + γ12 Firm Growthit + γ13 Leverageit 
                                             + αi1 Firm fixed effect + αi2 Year fixed effect + εit  
 All Directors Only Executive Directors 
Explanatory 
Variables ROA t Quasi-q t ROA t Quasi-q t 
         
Manager Own 0.034** (2.08) 0.398*** (3.72) 0.007 (0.36) 0.135 (1.04) 
Share Difference 0.008 (0.70) -0.087 (-1.05) 0.015 (1.22) -0.017 (-0.21) 
CV 0.011 (0.77) 0.009 (0.08) 0.011 (0.82) 0.017 (0.16) 
Board Size -0.046*** (-3.91) -0.046 (-0.64) -0.044*** (-3.74) -0.022 (-0.30) 
Board 
Independence 0.026 (1.40) -0.048 (-0.49) 0.025 (1.33) -0.062 (-0.62) 
Board Experience -0.009 (-0.51) -0.082 (-0.76) -0.008 (-0.45) -0.067 (-0.61) 
CEO Founder 0.012 (0.90) -0.101 (-1.27) 0.013 (1.03) -0.086 (-1.13) 
CEO Descendant -0.003 (-0.14) 0.057 (0.51) -0.001 (-0.03) 0.077 (0.67) 
CEO-Chair 0.006 (0.40) 0.077 (1.12) 0.007 (0.48) 0.096 (1.35) 
CEO-Group 0.02 (1.44) 0.0002 (0.00) 0.021 (1.52) 0.012 (0.15) 
Firm Size 0.040*** (5.90) -0.140*** (-3.16) 0.040*** (6.00) -0.135*** (-2.93) 
Firm Age 0.039 (1.49) -0.128 (-0.89) 0.033 (1.22) -0.207 (-1.43) 
Firm Growth 0.030*** (4.26) 0.135*** (3.80) 0.030*** (4.22) 0.134*** (3.78) 
Leverage -0.236*** (-
14.94) 
0.286*** (3.42) -0.236*** (-
14.80) 
0.289*** (3.42) 
Constant -0.411*** (-3.31) 3.815*** (4.64) -0.399*** (-3.16) 3.965*** (4.69) 
         
         
Firm-Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,998  3,997  3,998  3,997  
Number of 
Clusters 441  441  441  441  
Adj. R-square 0.257  0.19  0.250  0.176  
F-test 20.554  19.19  19.913  20.347  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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4.6.3.4 The Corporate Governance Reforms 
In respect to the hypotheses, Ha1 to Ha13, this section separately investigates the impact 
of ownership structure on firm performance before and after corporate governance 
reform. Model 4.1 to Model 4.5 were re-examined for pre- reform period (1994 – 1998) 
and post- reform period (2000 – 2007).  
In respect to the hypotheses, Ha14 to Ha26, the test for equality of coefficients in pre-and 
post-reform periods is performed using the dummy variables approach discussed in 
Section 4.3.1. Only the incremental effects and the Wald test (F-statistic) from Model 
4.6 to 4.10 are reported.   
4.6.3.4.1 The Impact of Ownership Concentration and the Presence of 
Dominant Shareholders on Firm Performance 
In respect to Models 4.1 and 4.2, Panels A and B, in Table 4.11, show the results of the 
multivariate regressions of ownership concentration on firm performance before and 
after the corporate governance reforms, respectively.  
For accounting performance, the results in Panel A show that the coefficient of 
Concentrated Own is positively related to ROA, at the 5% level of significance, only 
after the reforms. Regarding market performance, Panel B shows that the coefficients of 
Concentrated Own are significantly and positively related to Quasi-q for both sub-
periods. 
No significant impact is observed on accounting performance from the presence of 
dominant shareholders in both sub-periods, as shown in Panel A. In contrast, it has a 
significant positive relationship to Quasi-q in both sub-periods, as shown in Panel B. 
This evidence may imply that while the presence of a dominant shareholder did not 
contribute to accounting performance in both sub-periods, it enhanced market 
performance before and after the reforms.  
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Regarding the equality test (Ha14, Ha15), the incremental effects of ownership 
concentration and the presence of a dominant shareholder in the post-reform period 
(Model 4.6 and Model 4.7) are not statistically significant. In addition, the Wald test 
shows that the coefficients of Concentrated Own and D_dominant in the pre-reform and 
the post-reform periods are not significantly different. 
Overall, the evidence in this section supports the notion of an alignment of interests 
(Ha1, Ha2), suggesting that the motivation for large shareholders to contribute to firms 
increased as their proportion of shares increased, regardless of whether they were 
dominant shareholders or not.  
In addition, the higher levels of benefit to firms with dominant shareholders than to 
those without dominant shareholders seem to be strong only in terms of market 
performance in both periods. This suggests that investors may have been over-expectant 
of the performance of firms with dominant shareholders. No evidence suggests any 
exploitation by dominant shareholders in either period. Therefore, the evidence also does 
not fully support the view that having dominant shareholders was as inefficient as it was 
claimed to be by the World Bank (1998). 
In contrast to the expectation, the evidence implies that ownership concentration/the 
presence of a dominant shareholder in the post-reform period do not significantly help to 
align interests of the largest shareholder/a dominant shareholder to their firms’ interests 
more than they do in the pre-reform period. 
For the control variables, the results estimated from Models 4.1 and 4.2, in Table 4.11, 
are mostly consistent. Therefore, the main analysis discussed here is based on the results 
estimated from Model 4.1.  
Regarding other forms of corporate governance, this study found that CV shows a 
significant, positive impact on the ROA, only after the reforms. Regarding entrenchment 
effect, this evidence could imply that the ROA decreases as the CV decreases after the 
reform. Therefore, there was an evidence of exploitation by the largest shareholders 
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when control rights largely exceeded cash-flow rights after the reform. Consistent to 
Connelly et al. (2012), this could imply that the largest shareholders may be 
conveniently to use the pyramidal and cross-sectional structures for opportunistic 
purposes because it may be more difficult for them to extract the firms’ assets in other 
channels since the reform. 
This study found no significant relationship between the ratios of the difference in 
shareholding between the largest and the second largest shareholders and the ROA either 
before or after the reforms. This study found a negative relationship between the ratio 
and Quasi-q, but this is only significant after the reforms. The evidence suggests that, 
after the reforms, investors may have sought other governance mechanisms to reduce the 
power of the largest shareholders, as this was claimed to have contributed to the 
financial crisis. Hence investors may have attached higher value to firms with substantial 
second largest shareholders, after the reforms, anticipating the importance of their role in 
checking and balancing the behaviour of the largest shareholders. The findings also 
imply that when second largest shareholders hold a similar proportion of shares to that 
held by the largest shareholders they have more motivation and power to monitor firms. 
The coefficient of Board size is significantly and negatively related to the ROA in both 
sub-periods. Regarding market performance, it appears that the coefficient of Board size 
has a significant negative relationship to Quasi-q only before the reforms. However, the 
negative effect disappears after the reforms. The evidence also shows a significant 
difference of coefficients of Board Size in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods 
and a significant improvement in the effect of board size on market performance in the 
post-period reform.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that larger boards were less efficient in terms of both 
accounting and market performance. Nevertheless, the improvement in their effect on 
market performance after the reforms may imply that investors became more 
comfortable with larger boards as a result of the reforms. For example, they may have 
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expected the bigger boards to have higher proportions of independent directors after the 
reforms.  
However, the results also show that the coefficient of Board independence has a 
significant positive relationship to the ROA only before the reforms. After the reforms, 
the relationship is still positive but not significant. Surprisingly, the positive impact of 
board independence on accounting performance is significantly reduced after the 
reforms. Since listed firms were required to have at least three independent directors 
after the reforms, this regulation increased the board size but may not have guaranteed 
that they were fully independent. In contrast to the findings on accounting performance, 
this study also found no significant relationship between board independence and market 
performance before or after the reforms. 
Regarding CEO characteristics, the analysis shows that the coefficient of CEO Founder 
is negatively related to the ROA at the 5% level of significance only before the reforms. 
As suggested by the literature, CEO-founders may have special influence over firms that 
allows them to exercise control over the board of directors; they may select board 
members with whom they have a close relationship, for instance (Morck et al., 1988). 
This would make it difficult for a board to perform efficiently in terms of monitoring the 
CEO founder. Nevertheless, the negative effect significantly disappears after the 
reforms. This evidence, based on accounting performance, contradicts other research 
that reports superior performance when founders serve as CEOs (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).   
In contrast to the results based on accounting performance, the coefficient of CEO 
Founder is positively related to Quasi-q at the 1% level of significance only before the 
reforms. Nevertheless, the significantly positive impacts of CEO founders on accounting 
and market performance largely disappear after the reforms. This may imply that better 
corporate governance partly replaced the role of CEO founders or limited their control 
over boards of directors. 
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Regarding the CEO-descendant variable, the results in Table 4.12, Panel A, show that it 
has a significant negative effect on the ROA after the reforms. This indicates that, after 
the reforms, accounting performance suffered when a CEO was a son/daughter of the 
founder and supports the notion that founders are likely to transfer a businesses to 
descendants, regardless of their competence (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Bertrand et al., 
2008; Mehrotra et al., 2013; Morck et al., 1988). However, the results from market 
performance reveal a significant positive impact of CEO descendants on Quasi-q only 
before the reforms. From an investor’s point of view, before the reforms, they may have 
had more confidence to invest in firms controlled by families, if families were perceived 
to act as a substitute for weak systems of corporate governance. 
Regarding the CEO-Chair variable, the results in Table 4.12, Panel A, show a significant 
negative effect of CEO-Chair on the ROA only after the reforms. This evidence is 
consistent with the view that joint positions may lead to inefficient boards, because they 
end up being controlled by the people who they are supposed to monitor (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), thereby compromising their independence. This evidence supports 
Jensen’s (1993) argument and the recommendation by the OECD (2004) to separate 
CEO and chairman positions in order to improve board efficiency. Nevertheless, the 
evidence contradicts the stewardship theory, which suggests that CEO duality is 
efficient. In addition, the findings are inconsistent with some existing research, which 
found superior performance in firms with CEO duality (for examples, see Boyd, 1995; 
Brickley et al., 1997; Dey et al., 2011).  
The negative impact of CEO duality on accounting performance after the reforms may 
imply that the combination of the two key positions reduced the efficiency of other 
governance mechanisms, such as a board of directors, when it came to limiting 
exploitation by dominant shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). However, this study found 
no significant impact of CEO duality on market performance in either sub-period. 
When a CEO and chairman come from the same group, the results in Table 4.11, Panel 
A, show a significant positive relationship between CEO-Chair Group and the ROA both 
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before and after the reforms. Nevertheless, no significant improvement was found in this 
relationship after the reforms. For market performance, this study found a significant 
negative relationship between CEO-Chair Group and Quasi-q, as shown in Table 4.11, 
Panel B.  
In terms of accounting performance, the evidence suggests that when the CEO and 
chairman came from the same group, firms benefitted from this structure. In fact, most 
firms in the sample had a chairman who was the father of the CEO. Typically, the CEO 
founder becomes a chairman after retirement, and his/her descendant becomes the CEO. 
It seems that this feature helps to reduce the conflict between chairmen and CEOs. In 
addition, the close relationship may offer benefits in terms of better communication 
(reducing asymmetric information), a better transfer of knowledge and better monitoring 
between fathers and their sons/daughters, which, in turn, enhances firm performance. 
However, this structure may also reduce investors’ confidence, because of the risk of 
exploitation by families, and lead to a reduction in market performance. 
Regarding leverage, the results in Table 4.11, Panel A, show a negative effect of 
leverage on the ROA, both before and after the reforms, at the 1% level of significance. 
Nevertheless, the negative impact significantly reduces after the reforms, suggesting that 
conflicts of interest between lenders and firms may also have been reduced. Regarding 
Quasi-q, the results in Table 4.11, Panel B, show a positive effect of leverage on Quasi-q 
at the 1% level of significance only before the reforms. This may imply that investors 
view the use of debt as a mechanism to govern exploitation by managers. However, 
experience from the 1997 financial crisis, which revealed some weaknesses of the 
financial system might challenge this expectation. 
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Table: 4.11 An Impact of Ownership Concentration and the Presence of the Dominant Shareholders on Firm Performance before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate an impact of ownership concentration and the presence of the dominant shareholders on firm performance 
(ROA and Quasi-q) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected standards 
errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform 
periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis 
that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: ROA 
 Model 4.1 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.6) Model 4.2 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Concentrated Own 0.093 (1.58) 0.080** (2.47) -0.013 0.03       
D_Dominant       0.018 (1.37) 0.001 (0.17) -0.017 0.98 
Share Difference -0.043 (-1.33) -0.005 (-0.27) 0.038 0.87 -0.024 (-0.77) 0.021 (1.32) 0.045 1.57 
CV -0.023 (-0.67) 0.028* (1.82) 0.051 1.71 -0.022 (-0.65) 0.021 (1.41) 0.043 1.27 
Board Size -0.042** (-2.16) -0.044*** (-2.71) -0.002 0.01 -0.040** (-2.10) -0.044*** (-2.69) -0.004 0.02 
Board Independence 0.114*** (2.69) 0.021 (1.07) -0.093* 3.57* 0.111*** (2.60) 0.020 (1.05) -0.091* 3.34* 
Board Experience -0.019 (-0.47) 0.014 (0.68) 0.033 0.54 -0.019 (-0.47) 0.018 (0.83) 0.037 0.67 
CEO Founder -0.034* (-1.68) 0.022 (1.02) 0.056* 3.43* -0.034 (-1.63) 0.022 (1.00) 0.056* 3.25* 
CEO Descendant 0.044 (1.10) -0.037* (-1.72) -0.081* 3.07* 0.042 (0.98) -0.036* (-1.68) -0.078 2.55 
CEO-Chair 0.022 (0.97) -0.031** (-2.26) -0.053* 3.44* 0.022 (0.92) -0.029** (-2.10) -0.051* 3.03* 
CEO-Group 0.075** (2.49) 0.037*** (2.73) -0.038 1.33 0.077** (2.38) 0.038*** (2.86) -0.039 1.23 
Firm Size 0.087*** (6.49) 0.037*** (3.58) -0.05*** 8.20*** 0.087*** (6.41) 0.035*** (3.41) -0.052*** 8.91*** 
Firm Age -0.025 (-0.62) -0.103*** (-4.28) -0.078 2.22 -0.019 (-0.46) -0.100*** (-4.16) -0.081 2.43 
Firm Growth 0.021 (1.33) 0.041*** (4.51) 0.02 1.11 0.023 (1.44) 0.043*** (4.54) 0.020 1.03 
Leverage -0.294*** (-12.69) -0.229*** (-10.77) 0.065** 3.99** -0.295*** (-12.65) -0.226*** (-10.45) 0.069** 4.52** 
Constant -0.900*** (-5.25) -0.029 (-0.20)   -0.907*** (-5.26) 0.015 (0.11)   
             
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,462  2,257    1,462  2,257    
Number of Clusters 331  375    331  375    
Adj. R-square 0.334  0.214    0.333  0.210    
F-test 17.331  13.117    17.173  12.291    
P-value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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Table: 4.11 An Impact of Ownership Concentration and the Presence of the Dominant Shareholders on Firm Performance before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate an impact of ownership concentration and the presence of the dominant shareholders on firm performance 
(ROA and Quasi-q) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected standards 
errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform 
periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis 
that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel B: Quasi-q 
 Model 4.1 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.6)  Model 4.2 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Concentrated Own 0.548* (1.80) 0.596** (2.51) 0.048 0.02       
D_Dominant       0.171** (2.27) 0.101* (1.78) -0.070 0.53 
Share Difference -0.179 (-1.09) -0.334** (-2.24) -0.155 0.46 -0.110 (-0.56) -0.182* (-1.67) -0.072 0.10 
CV 0.245 (1.27) 0.049 (0.57) -0.196 0.78 0.246 (1.27) 0.012 (0.14) -0.234 1.07 
Board Size -0.382*** (-3.96) 0.005 (0.06) 0.387*** 7.01*** -0.377*** (-3.76) 0.005 (0.05) 0.382*** 6.50*** 
Board Independence -0.284 (-1.14) 0.004 (0.04) 0.288 1.04 -0.304 (-1.23) 0.013 (0.11) 0.317 1.26 
Board Experience -0.287 (-1.19) 0.023 (0.16) 0.310 1.15 -0.296 (-1.24) 0.029 (0.19) 0.325 1.27 
CEO Founder 0.173* (1.69) -0.153 (-1.13) -0.326* 3.49* 0.175* (1.65) -0.161 (-1.18) -0.336* 3.57* 
CEO Descendant 0.476** (2.03) 0.053 (0.42) -0.423 2.30 0.475* (1.84) 0.057 (0.46) -0.418 1.94 
CEO-Chair -0.040 (-0.40) -0.086 (-1.34) -0.046 0.14 -0.054 (-0.54) -0.079 (-1.19) -0.025 0.04 
CEO-Group -0.596*** (-3.21) 0.043 (0.58) 0.639*** 9.27*** -0.584*** (-2.91) 0.048 (0.63) 0.632*** 7.92*** 
Firm Size -0.608*** (-6.98) -0.061 (-0.83) 0.547*** 22.18*** -0.606*** (-7.01) -0.074 (-1.00) 0.532*** 20.79*** 
Firm Age -1.461*** (-7.49) 0.593*** (4.19) 2.054*** 59.46*** -1.434*** (-7.54) 0.617*** (4.27) 2.051*** 59.12*** 
Firm Growth 0.103* (1.85) 0.143*** (2.93) 0.040 0.27 0.112** (2.03) 0.148*** (3.00) 0.036 0.22 
Leverage 0.426*** (4.18) -0.004 (-0.04) -0.430*** 6.90*** 0.417*** (4.07) 0.017 (0.14) -0.400** 5.85** 
Constant 14.826*** (12.17) 0.132 (0.13)   14.758*** (12.09) 0.345 (0.34)   
             
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,461   2,257   1,461  2,257    
Number of Clusters 331   375   331  375    
Adj. R-square 0.376   0.045   0.377  0.039    
F-test 22.550   3.328   22.600  3.141    
P-value 0.000   0.000   0.000  0.000    
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4.6.3.4.2 The Impact of Ownership Concentration, Classified by 
Shareholder Type, and the Presence of a Dominant Shareholder, by Type, 
on Firm Performance 
In respect to Model 4.3, Panels A and B, in Table 4.12, show the results of the 
multivariate regressions of ownership concentration, classified by shareholder type, on 
firm performance before and after the corporate governance reforms. 
Regarding ownership concentration by the largest shareholders who are family, the 
results in Panels A and B show that the coefficients of Family Own are positively related 
to the ROA and Quasi-q at 5% levels of significance before and after the reforms.  
Regarding the equality test (Ha16), the incremental effects of family block ownership on 
accounting and market performance are not statistically significant in post-reform 
period. In addition, the Wald test suggests that the coefficients of Family Own in pre-
reform and post-reform periods are not significantly different.  
The evidence confirms the findings from the previous sections in suggesting that the 
motivation of these shareholders was more aligned with firms’ interests as their 
proportion of shares increased. In contrast to the expectation, the family block 
ownership in the post-reform period does not significantly help to align interests of the 
largest shareholder who is family to the firms more than it does in the pre-reform period. 
Regarding the Government Own variable, the results in Panels A and B show that the 
coefficients of Government Own are positively related to the ROA and Quasi-q at 1% 
levels of significance only before the reforms. No significant results are found after the 
reforms.  
For the equality test (Ha17), there are significantly negative incremental effects of 
government block ownership on accounting and market performance in the post-reform 
period. The Wald test also confirms that the impacts of government block ownership on 
firm performance in the pre-reform and the post-reform are significantly different. 
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Overall, the evidence suggests that high levels of share ownership may have improved 
the motivation of the largest government shareholders to align their interests with those 
of firms, enhancing firm performance, before the reforms. This evidence supports the 
notion that the Thai government’s objective was close to value maximisation and is 
partly consistent with Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Sun et al. (2002). However, the 
evidence is inconsistent with the findings of Gao et al. (2008), who found that a 
reduction in the proportion of shares owned by the state contributed to firm performance 
in Chinese listed firms. 
Although, no strong evidence of any exploitation by government is found, the alignment 
effect is likely to have disappeared after the reforms, in terms of both accounting and 
market performance. Since Thai political environments are not stable, this may affect 
their monitoring policies and/or reduce investor confidence in firms that are largely 
owned by government. In addition, an awareness of good corporate governance might 
increase the interest of the public and regulators in the scrutiny of listed firms and reduce 
the motivation of governments to participate in monitoring processes (Sun et al., 2002).  
Regarding the Foreign Own variable, the results in Panel A show that the coefficients of 
Foreign Own are positively related to the ROA at the 10% level of significance, but only 
after the reforms. However, no significant effect was found regarding Quasi-q either 
before or after the reforms.  
For the equality test (Ha18), there are significantly positive incremental effects of foreign 
company block ownership only on accounting performance in the post-reform period. 
The Wald test also confirms that the impacts of foreign company block ownership on 
firm performance in the pre-reform and the post-reform are significantly different. 
The evidence partly suggests that an increase in the levels of shares owned by the largest 
shareholders who are foreign company investors increased their motivation to align their 
interests with those of firms, in turn enhancing accounting performance.  
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According to the Brooker Group (2001), the role of foreign direct investment became 
more important in Thailand after the 1997 financial crisis because it was expected to 
help the Thai economy to recover from the recession. Consequently, many laws and 
regulations of foreign ownership became more liberalised after the crisis. For example, 
the Foreign Business Law52 (1972) was amended in 1999 to be less restrictive to foreign 
ownership in many reserved53 businesses, in order to encourage foreign ownership in 
manufacturing industries such as cement, pharmaceuticals and textiles (Brooker Group, 
2002: 18). Since 1999, the Board of Investment (BOI) has relaxed some restrictions on 
foreign ownership and has launched incentive packages, such as corporate tax 
exemptions, in order to attract foreign investors, while limiting their investment to less 
than the capital investment. Therefore, as foreign ownership has increased after the 
reforms, foreign investors may have found it easier to exercise control over listed firms.  
Consistent with the expectation, the foreign company block ownership in the post-
reform period does significantly help to align interests of the largest shareholder who is 
family to the firms more than it does in the pre-reform period. This could imply that the 
corporate governance reform may help to motivate foreign company block investors to 
participate more in firms’ monitoring process and increase their alignment of interests to 
their firms. 
Regarding the Domestic Own variable, the results in Panels A and B show that the 
coefficients of Domestic Own are positively related to the ROA and Quasi-q at the 5% 
and 1% levels of significance, respectively, but only before the reforms. No significant 
effects were found on either of the measurements of performance after the reforms. The 
results support the notion of an alignment of interests between domestic company 
dominant shareholders in terms of both accounting and market performance prior to the 
reforms. There are significantly negative incremental effects of domestic company block 
ownership on accounting and market performance in the post-reform period. The Wald 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The Foreign Business Law (“Alien Business Law”) was enacted in 1972. Initially, the law allowed 
foreigners to do business in Thailand but with some limitation on foreign ownership. This aimed to 
reserve main business and specialised activities for Thai people in areas such as the banking sector, 
finance sector, law and accounting professions. 
53 See footnote 53. 
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test also confirms that the impacts of domestic company block ownership on firm 
performance in the pre-reform and the post-reform are significantly different. This could 
imply that the corporate governance reform might not be successful in aligning the 
interests of this type of the largest shareholders to the firms’ interests. 
Regarding the Bank Own variable, Table 4.12, Panel A, shows that there is no 
significant relationship between bank ownership and accounting performance either 
before or after the reforms. In terms of market performance, Panel B shows that the 
coefficient of Bank Own is negatively related to Quasi-q at the 1% level of significance 
before the reforms. Nevertheless, the coefficient of Bank Own is still negative but 
insignificant after the reform. 
For the equality test (Ha19), there is no significant incremental effect of the bank block 
ownership on firm performance in the post-reform period. The Wald test also shows the 
insignificant difference between the impacts of bank block ownership on firm 
performance in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods. 
In fact, a close relationship between a bank and a family may have reduced the 
motivation and ability of the bank to engage in efficient monitoring before the reforms, 
and more efficient monitoring by banks after the reforms may have improved investor 
confidence in firms that were substantially owned by banks. Additionally, it appears that 
banks were more likely to become dominant shareholders after the reforms. This may 
imply that an increase in their proportion of shares motivated banks to participate in 
monitoring processes and/or reduced the conflict of interests between banks and firms 
(Limpaphayom and Polwitoon, 2004).  
In contrast to the expectation, the bank block ownership in the post-reform period does 
not significantly help to align interests of the largest shareholder who is bank to the 
firms more than it does in the pre-reform period. Hence it could imply that the corporate 
governance reform might not have significant influence to reduce the conflicts of 
interests between the largest bank shareholder and firms. 
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However, this evidence is inconsistent with that of Limpaphayom and Polwitoon (2004), 
which suggests a positive relationship between bank ownership and market performance 
between 1990 and 1996. The different result may have been caused by a difference in 
the definition of bank ownership. While this study used the percentage of shares owned 
by the largest/dominant bank shareholders, Limpaphayom and Polwitoon (2004) 
included all the bank equity of the top ten shareholders. 
In respect to Model 4.4, Panels A and B, in Table 4.12, show the results of the 
multivariate regressions of the existence of dominant shareholders, by their types, on 
firm performance before and after the corporate governance reforms. 
Regarding Panel A in Table 4.12, there is no significant impacts of the presence of a 
dominant family shareholder on accounting performance in the pre-reform and the post 
reform periods. Nevertheless, Panel B, in Table 4.12, shows that the coefficient of 
D_Family is positively related to Quasi-q, at the 1% level of significance after the 
reforms.  
For the equality test (Ha21), there is no significant incremental effect of the presence of a 
dominant family shareholder on firm performance in the post-reform period. The Wald 
test also shows that the impacts in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods are not 
significantly different. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that, although families’ interests were increasingly 
aligned with those of firms as their share ownership increased though the period of the 
study, the presence of dominant family shareholders may have also increased investor 
confidence, in light of factors such as family reputation or loyalty after the reform. 
In contrast to the expectation, the presence of a dominant family shareholder in the post-
reform period does not significantly help to align interests of the dominant family 
shareholders to the firms more than it does in the pre-reform period. This could imply 
that the corporate governance reform might not be successful in aligning the interests of 
the dominant family shareholders to their firms’ interests. 
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The results in Panel A show that the coefficient of D_Non-Financial Institution Own is 
positively related only to the ROA at the 1% level of significance, and only before the 
reforms. No significant results were found for Quasi-q in either period.  
For the equality test (Ha23), there are significantly negative incremental effects of the 
presence of a dominant non-bank financial institution shareholder on accounting 
performance in the post-reform period. The Wald test also confirms that there is a 
significant difference of the impacts of the presence of this type of dominant shareholder 
on firm performance in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods.  
This evidence suggests that firms did benefit from having dominant shareholders who 
are non-bank financial institutional investors (in terms of monitoring, for example), but 
only before the reforms. In fact, many bank and non-bank financial institutions suffered 
from the financial crisis and were strictly regulated by the BOT following the reforms. 
This may have reduced their motivation to participate in the monitoring of the firms in 
which they had invested. 
In contrast to the expectation, the non-bank financial institution block ownership in the 
post-reform period significantly reduces the alignment of interests between the largest 
shareholders who are non-bank financial institutions and firms more than it does in the 
pre-reform period. This could imply that the corporate governance reform might not be 
successful to motivate or might reduce the motivation of this type of the dominant 
shareholder to participate more in firms’ monitoring process. 
The coefficient of D_Domestic Company is positively related to Quasi-q at the 1% level 
of significance but only before the reforms. This evidence suggests that the presence of a 
domestic company as a dominant shareholder only contributed to market performance 
before the reforms. Consistent with Model 4.3, there is significantly negative 
incremental effects of the presence of a dominant domestic company shareholder on 
market performance in post-reform period. The Wald test also confirms that the impacts 
in pre-reform and post-reform are significantly different. This could imply that the 
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reform might not be successful in aligning the interests of a dominant domestic company 
shareholder to the firms’ interests. 
For the control variables, the following analysis is mainly based on the estimation from 
Model 4.3. Regarding other control variables, it appears that the difference in 
shareholding between the largest shareholders and the second largest shareholders does 
matter in both the ROA and the Quasi-q models. Nevertheless, while this study found 
that the ratio of share difference has a significant negative effect on the ROA only before 
the reforms, it has a significant negative effect on Quasi-q only after the reforms. The 
evidence confirms the results in the previous sections, which suggest that listed firms did 
gain some benefits from their second largest shareholders when the proportions of shares 
they owned were similar to those of the largest shareholders.  
The contradictory results between the ROA and Quasi-q samples may suggest that 
second largest shareholders were more likely to provide better monitoring before the 
reforms. This may have been because the system of corporate governance used to be 
weaker, and they have reduced their role in monitoring since it has improved.  
However, the significant relationship in the Quasi-q sample after the reforms may also 
imply that investors viewed the presence of a substantial second largest shareholder as 
an effective corporate governance mechanism. 
Regarding CV, the results from Model 4.4 shows that the CV has a significant positive 
effect on Quasi-q only before the reform. The significant effect largely disappeared after 
the reform. The evidence reveals some exploitation by the largest shareholder when the 
control right exceeded cash-flow rights in term of market performance before the 
reform. 
Finally, the effect of other control variables before and after the reforms does not differ 
from those analysed in Section 4.6.3.4.2. 
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Table: 4.12 An Impact of Ownership Concentration Classified by Shareholders’ Types on Firm Performance and the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate the impact of ownership concentration classified by the largest shareholder’s types and the presence of the 
dominant shareholders by its types on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. 
t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected standards errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to 
test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions 
and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: ROA 
 Model 4.3 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.8) Model 4.4 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.9) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test 
(F)              
Family Own 0.143** (2.22) 0.053** (2.02) -0.090 1.58       
Government Own 0.512*** (2.92) -0.032 (-0.35) -0.544*** 7.08***       
Foreign Investor Own -0.090 (-1.24) 0.047* (1.85) 0.137* 3.04       
Domestic company Own 0.133** (2.35) -0.016 (-0.31) -0.149* 3.65       
Bank Own -0.078 (-0.17) 0.079 (0.62) 0.157 0.11       
Non-Bank Financial insti. 
Own 
0.088 (0.84) 0.032 (0.36) -0.056 0.16       
D_Family       0.017 (1.10) 0.001 (0.16) -0.016 0.69 
D_Government              
D_Foreign Investor       -0.009 (-0.52) 0.002 (-0.69) 0.011 0.21 
D_Domestic company       0.030 (1.07) -0.015 (-0.40) -0.045 1.49 
D_Bank              
D_Non-Bank Financial 
Insti. 
      0.058*** (4.03) -0.006 (1.13) -0.064*** 8.14*** 
Share Difference -0.052* (-1.70) 0.012 (0.73) 0.064* 2.98* -0.027 (-0.85) 0.021 (-2.65) 0.048 1.66 
CV -0.010 (-0.30) 0.018 (1.17) 0.028 0.54 -0.017 (-0.51) 0.018 (1.05) 0.035 0.81 
Board Size -0.040** (-2.07) -0.044*** (-2.64) -0.004 0.02 -0.040** (-2.09) -0.043*** (0.81) -0.003 0.02 
Board Independence 0.117*** (2.75) 0.022 (1.12) -0.095* 3.70* 0.110** (2.58) 0.020 (0.99) -0.090* 3.25* 
Board Experience -0.019 (-0.46) 0.013 (0.60) 0.032 0.49 -0.020 (-0.50) 0.017 (-1.70) 0.037 0.69 
CEO Founder -0.037* (-1.75) 0.021 (0.97) 0.058* 3.50* -0.034 (-1.59) 0.021 (-2.07) 0.055* 3.14* 
CEO Descendant 0.042 (1.14) -0.039* (-1.78) -0.081* 3.39* 0.042 (0.98) -0.037* (2.85) -0.079 2.56 
CEO-Chair 0.020 (0.85) -0.030** (-2.19) -0.05* 3.00* 0.021 (0.87) -0.029** (3.37) -0.050* 2.82* 
CEO-Group 0.075*** (2.61) 0.038*** (2.77) -0.037 1.36 0.077** (2.37) 0.038*** (-4.06) -0.039 1.21 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table: 4.12 An Impact of Ownership Concentration Classified by Shareholders’ Types on Firm Performance and the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate the impact of ownership concentration classified by the largest shareholder’s types and the presence of the 
dominant shareholders by its types on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. 
t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected standards errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to 
test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions 
and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: (Cont’) ROA 
 Model 4.3 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.8) Model 4.4 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.9) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test 
(F)              
Firm Size 0.088*** (6.58) 0.035*** (3.36) -0.053*** 9.08*** 0.087*** (6.40) 0.035*** (4.53) -0.052*** 9.05*** 
Firm Age -0.026 (-0.65) -0.096*** (-3.94) -0.070 1.86 -0.017 (-0.42) -0.099*** (-10.58) -0.082 2.41 
Firm Growth 0.020 (1.24) 0.042*** (4.54) 0.022 1.29 0.023 (1.44) 0.043*** (0.12) 0.02 1.02 
Leverage -0.296*** (-12.65) -0.227*** (-10.81) 0.069** 4.59** -0.296*** (-12.63) -0.225*** (-10.58) 0.071*** 4.79*** 
Constant -0.929*** (-5.46) -0.016 (-0.11)   -0.912*** (-5.25) 0.017 (0.12)   
             
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,462  2,257    1,462  2,257    
Number of Clusters 331  375    331  375    
Adj. R-square 0.34  0.212    0.333  0.209    
F-test 13.57  9.596    21.100  11.087    
P-value 0.00  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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Table: 4.12 An Impact of Ownership Concentration Classified by Shareholders’ Types on Firm Performance and the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate the impact of ownership concentration classified by the largest shareholder’s types and the presence of the 
dominant shareholders by its types on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. 
t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected standards errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to 
test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions 
and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel B: Quasi-q 
 Model 4.3 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.8) Model 4.4 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.9) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Family Own 0.628** (2.42) 0.473** (2.45) -0.155 0.22       
Government Own 8.159*** (5.07) 0.031 (0.07) -8.128*** 22.02***       
Foreign Investor Own 0.083 (0.23) -0.206 (-1.02) -0.289 0.52       
Domestic company Own 1.176*** (3.51) -0.239 (-0.83) -1.415*** 10.43***       
Bank Own -4.557* (-1.81) -0.929 (-1.04) 3.628 1.73       
Non-Bank Financial insti. 
Own 
-0.265 (-0.54) 0.614 (1.35) 0.879 1.71       
D_Family       0.066 (0.75) 0.168*** (2.78) 0.102 0.90 
D_Government             
D_Foreign Investor       0.067 (0.65) -0.017 (-0.23) -0.084 0.45 
D_Domestic company       0.394*** (3.19) -0.075 (-0.57) -0.469*** 6.34*** 
D_Bank             
D_Non-Bank Financial 
Insti. 
      -0.285 (-1.65) -0.081 (-1.20) 0.204 1.12 
Share Difference -0.08 (-0.64) -0.310*** (-2.67) -0.230 1.69 -0.050 (-0.30) -0.222** (-1.97) -0.172 0.71 
CV 0.266 (1.51) 0.031 (0.36) -0.235 1.27 0.327* (1.76) 0.026 (0.28) -0.301 1.83 
Board Size -0.370*** (-3.87) 0.013 (0.140 0.383*** 6.73*** -0.369*** (-3.79) 0.015 (0.17) 0.384*** 6.72*** 
Board Independence -0.311 (-1.26) 0.010 (0.09) 0.321 1.30 -0.286 (-1.16) 0.014 (0.12) 0.3 1.13 
Board Experience -0.264 (-1.15) -0.001 (-0.01) 0.263 0.90 -0.278 (-1.19) 0.012 (0.08) 0.29 1.05 
CEO Founder 0.176** (1.97) -0.17 (-1.29) -0.346 4.53 0.192* (1.90) -0.172 (-1.24) -0.364** 4.28** 
CEO Descendant 0.468** (2.05) 0.04 (0.31) -0.428 2.41 0.472* (1.85) 0.051 (0.40) -0.421 1.99 
CEO-Chair -0.062 (-0.66) -0.10 (-1.50) -0.038 0.09 -0.051 (-0.51) -0.092 (-1.38) -0.041 0.11 
CEO-Group -0.610*** (-3.30) 0.06 (0.70) 0.670*** 10.05*** -0.585*** (-2.92) 0.050 (0.63) 0.635*** 8.01*** 
      
 
       
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table: 4.12 An Impact of Ownership Concentration Classified by Shareholders’ Types on Firm Performance and the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate the impact of ownership concentration classified by the largest shareholder’s types and the presence of the 
dominant shareholders by its types on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. 
t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected standards errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to 
test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions 
and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel B: (Cont’) Quasi-q 
 Model 4.3 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.8) Model 4.4 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.9) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size -0.618*** (-7.08) -0.074 (-1.03) 0.544*** 22.07*** -0.609*** (-7.09) -0.080 (-1.09) 0.529*** 20.74*** 
Firm Age -1.465*** (-7.50) 0.636*** (4.42) 2.101*** 59.90*** -1.439*** (-7.51) 0.649*** (4.54) 2.088*** 60.52*** 
Firm Growth 0.100* (1.73) 0.149*** (3.07) 0.049 0.38 0.113** (2.04) 0.148*** (3.02) 0.035 0.21 
Leverage 0.417*** (4.00) 0.017 (0.15) -0.400*** 5.95*** 0.414*** (4.04) 0.023 (0.19) -0.391** 5.71** 
Constant 14.830*** (12.19) 0.29 (0.29)   14.755*** (12.13) 0.314 (0.31)   
             
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,461  2,257    1,461  2,257    
Number of Clusters 331  375    331  375    
Adj. R-square 0.407  0.055    0.378  0.046    
F-test 18.369  3.574    19.248  3.680    
P-value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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4.6.3.4.3 The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance 
Panels A and B, in Table 4.13, show the result of the multivariate regressions of 
managerial ownership on firm performance before and after the corporate governance 
reforms.  
Regarding director ownership, Panel A shows that the coefficients of Manager Own are 
not significantly related to the ROA either before or after the reforms. However, the 
coefficient of Manager Own has a significant positive relationship to Quasi-q, only after 
the reforms. 
By redefining managerial ownership to include only shares owned by executive 
directors, the results from Panel B show that the coefficient of Manager Own is not 
significantly related to either the ROA or Quasi-q in both sub-periods. 
For the equality test (Ha24), Panels A and B show that there are no significant 
incremental effects of managerial ownership on accounting and market performance in 
post-reform period. The Wald test also shows that the impacts of managerial ownership 
on both measurements of firm performance are not significantly different. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that managerial ownership could have helped to align the 
interests of directors, especially after the reforms. Inconsistent with the expectation, 
managerial ownership in the post-reform period does not significantly help to align 
interests of managers to the firms more than it does in the pre-reform period. This could 
imply that the corporate governance reform might not be successful in aligning the 
interests of managers to their firms’ interests. 
Regarding other firm governance and economic characteristics, the effect of other 
control variables before and after the reforms does not differ from that analysed in 
section 4.6.3.4.2. 
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Table: 4.13 An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate an impact of managerial ownership on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) before and after the 
corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected standards errors clustering at firm level are 
reported in parentheses. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an 
incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel A: Model 4.5 – Ownership of All Directors 
 ROA 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.10) Quasi-q 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Manager Own 0.040 (1.23) 0.018 (0.80) -0.022 0.28 -0.057 (-0.20) 0.486*** (3.23) 0.543 2.69 
Share Difference -0.016 (-0.55) 0.018 (1.170) 0.034 0.98 0.005 (0.03) -0.230** (-1.98) -0.235 1.41 
CV -0.023 (-0.67) 0.021 (1.40) 0.044 1.30 0.259 (1.34) 0.002 (0.02) -0.257 1.30 
Board Size -0.044** (-2.28) -0.045*** (-2.76) -0.001 0.00 -0.356*** (-3.74) -0.019 (-0.20) 0.337*** 5.29*** 
Board Independence 0.113*** (2.61) 0.020 (1.06) -0.093* 3.37* -0.296 (-1.19) 0.012 (0.11) 0.308 1.18 
Board Experience -0.017 (-0.42) 0.017 (0.82) 0.034 0.58 -0.272 (-1.15) 0.037 (0.25) 0.309 1.19 
CEO Founder -0.041* (-1.82) 0.021 (0.98) 0.062* 3.70* 0.176 (1.59) -0.170 (-1.24) -0.346* 3.62* 
CEO Descendant 0.035 (0.90) -0.037* (-1.70) -0.072 2.46 0.464* (1.77) 0.04 (0.29) -0.424 1.95 
CEO-Chair 0.028 (1.12) -0.030** (-2.19) -0.058* 3.54* -0.035 (-0.33) -0.10 (-1.51) -0.065 0.24 
CEO-Group 0.080** (2.55) 0.038*** (2.80) -0.042 1.51 -0.589*** (-2.89) 0.04 (0.58) 0.629*** 7.78*** 
Firm Size 0.087*** (6.40) 0.035*** (3.41) -0.052*** 8.63*** -0.614*** (-7.12) -0.068 (-0.95) 0.546*** 22.39*** 
Firm Age -0.019 (-0.47) -0.099*** (-4.12) -0.08 2.35 -1.406*** (-7.44) 0.653*** (4.64) 2.059*** 62.13*** 
Firm Growth 0.023 (1.42) 0.042*** (4.53) 0.019 1.02 0.118** (2.11) 0.146*** (2.99) 0.028 0.13 
Leverage -0.293*** (-12.58) -0.227*** (-10.5) 0.066*** 4.14*** 0.424*** (4.18) -0.008 (-0.07) -0.432*** 6.91*** 
Constant -0.896*** (-5.21) 0.005 (-0.04)   14.807*** (12.14) 0.16 (0.16)   
             
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,462  2,257    1,461  2,257    
Number of Clusters 331  375    331  375    
Adj. R-square 0.333  0.210    0.373  0.049    
F-test 17.127  12.378    22.213  3.676    
P-value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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Table: 4.13 An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate an impact of managerial ownership on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) before and after the 
corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected standards errors clustering at firm level are 
reported in parentheses. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an 
incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Panel B: Model 4.5 – Ownership of Executive Directors 
 ROA 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.10) Quasi-q 
Equality Test 
(Model 4.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre- 
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Manager Own 0.022 (1.00) 0.001 (0.03) -0.021 0.40 0.158 (1.22) -0.058 (-0.33) -0.216 0.950 
Share Difference -0.013 (-0.46) 0.022 (1.53) 0.035 1.12 -0.007 (-0.04) -0.131 (-1.30) -0.124 0.38 
CV -0.022 (-0.67) 0.021 (1.38) 0.043 1.27 0.245 (1.31) -0.004 (-0.04) -0.249 1.29 
Board Size -0.039** (-2.02) -0.044*** (-2.70) -0.005 0.04 -0.361*** (-3.68) 0.005 (0.06) 0.366*** 6.08*** 
Board Independence 0.112*** (2.61) 0.020 (1.04) -0.092* 3.40* -0.294 (-1.20) -0.001 (-0.01) 0.293 1.09 
Board Experience -0.016 (-0.40) 0.018 (0.85) 0.034 0.57 -0.268 (-1.13) 0.048 (0.33) 0.316 1.23 
CEO Founder -0.036* (-1.70) 0.022 (1.01) 0.058* 3.48* 0.160 (1.59 -0.153 (-1.18) -0.313* 3.49* 
CEO Descendant 0.036 (0.88) -0.036* (-1.67) -0.072 2.31 0.428* (1.79) 0.062 (0.48) -0.366 1.66 
CEO-Chair 0.026 (1.07) -0.029** (-2.11) -0.055* 3.37* -0.019 (-0.19) -0.071 (-1.08) -0.052 0.17 
CEO-Group 0.079** (2.47) 0.038*** (2.84) -0.041 1.38 -0.568*** (-2.88) 0.052 (0.66) 0.620*** 7.77*** 
Firm Size 0.086*** (6.34) 0.035*** (3.41) -0.051*** 8.55*** -0.615*** (-7.14) -0.078 (-1.04) 0.537*** 21.11*** 
Firm Age -0.018 (-0.44) -0.101*** (-4.17) -0.083 2.52 -1.421*** (-7.44) 0.612*** (4.26) 2.033*** 58.51*** 
Firm Growth 0.023 (1.48) 0.043*** (4.56) 0.02 0.97 0.118** (2.09) 0.151*** (3.04) 0.033 0.180 
Leverage -0.294*** (-12.61) -0.225*** (-10.5) 0.069** 4.39** 0.430*** (4.22) 0.028 (0.23) -0.402*** 6.04*** 
Constant -0.895*** (-5.18) 0.017 (0.12)   14.853*** (12.30) 0.474 (0.46)   
             
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,462  2,257    1,461  2,257    
Number of Clusters 331  375    331  375    
Adj. R-square 0.332  0.210    0.374  0.036    
F-test 17.015  12.289    21.908  3.027    
P-value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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4.7 Additional Tests and Sensitivity Analysis 
4.7.1 Test for Model Specifications 
4.7.1.1 Test for the Multicollinearity Problem 
In Table 4.7, Panels A and B report the correlation matrix for the full sample using the 
Pearson correlation coefficient and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, 
respectively. The results suggest the presence of multicollinearity, but it is imperfect. 
The method of OLS assumes that there is no perfect linear relationship between 
independent variables (Gujarati, 1995). In order to test whether the multicollinearity 
problem is severe in this study, Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) and tolerance (1/VIF) 
were tested for all independent variables (including year and industry dummy) in all the 
regressions. 
Table 4.14 shows that, on average, the VIF is less than 454. However, it appears that the 
VIF of individual variables (firm size, firm age and government_own) exceeds 10 in 
both the ROA and the Quasi-q samples. The high VIF may reduce the accuracy of the 
previous estimations. In order to test whether the presence of multicollinearity distorts 
the results from the previous regressions. This study took these variables out and re-
estimated all regressions; the results remained the same, suggesting that the previous 
estimators were not seriously affected by the presence of multicollinearity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 There is no rule of thumb for the exact threshold of VIF. Nevertheless, existing research commonly 
suggests that the VIF value should be below 10 to indicate no serious multicollinearity (O’Brien, 2007). 
	  	  
Chapter 4 
188	  
 
Table 4.14 Test for Multicollinearity – VIF Test 
ROA  Quasi-q 
Model 4.1 Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
Variables VIF 1/VIF  Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Concentrated Own 7.46 0.134  Concentrated Own 7.46 0.134 
Share Difference 6.22 0.161  Share Difference 6.22 0.161 
CV 5.58 0.179  CV 5.58 0.179 
Board Size 5 0.200  Board Size 5.02 0.199 
Board Independence 6.12 0.163  Board Independence 6.12 0.164 
Board Experience 6.33 0.158  Board Experience 6.33 0.158 
CEO Founder 9.38 0.107  CEO Founder 9.39 0.107 
CEO Descendant 7.91 0.126  CEO Descendant 7.92 0.126 
CEO-Chair 6.76 0.148  CEO-Chair 6.76 0.148 
CEO-Group 7.63 0.131  CEO-Group 7.63 0.131 
Firm Size 16.9 0.059  Firm Size 16.89 0.059 
Firm Age 43.51 0.023  Firm Age 43.51 0.023 
Firm Growth 1.8 0.555  Firm Growth 1.8 0.554 
Leverage 3.55 0.282  Leverage 3.55 0.281 
Mean VIF 2.99   Mean VIF 2.99  
       
Model 4.3: Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholders and Firm Performance 
Variables VIF 1/VIF  Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Family Own 9.04 0.111  Family Own 9.05 0.111 
Government Own 17.69 0.057  Government Own 17.77 0.056 
Foreign Investor Own 6.45 0.155  Foreign Investor Own 6.45 0.155 
Domestic company Own 3.16 0.316  Domestic company Own 3.16 0.316 
Bank Own 3.32 0.301  Bank Own 3.33 0.301 
Non-Bank Financial Insti. 
Own 
2.3 0.435  Non-Bank Financial Insti. 
Own 
2.3 0.435 
Share Difference 4.79 0.209  Share Difference 4.79 0.209 
CV 5.97 0.168  CV 5.97 0.168 
Board Size 5.03 0.199  Board Size 5.05 0.198 
Board Independence 6.17 0.162  Board Independence 6.16 0.162 
Board Experience 6.47 0.155  Board Experience 6.47 0.155 
CEO Founder 9.45 0.106  CEO Founder 9.45 0.106 
CEO Descendant 7.94 0.126  CEO Descendant 7.94 0.126 
CEO-Chair 6.8 0.147  CEO-Chair 6.8 0.147 
CEO-Group 7.65 0.131  CEO-Group 7.65 0.131 
Firm Size 17.24 0.058  Firm Size 17.23 0.058 
Firm Age 44.15 0.023  Firm Age 44.15 0.023 
Firm Growth 1.81 0.553  Firm Growth 1.81 0.553 
Leverage 3.57 0.280  Leverage 3.57 0.280 
Mean VIF 3.09   Mean VIF 3.09  
       Model 4.5: Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance – Ownership of All Directors	  
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF  Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Manager Own 5.76 0.174  Manager Own 5.77 0.173 
Share Difference 3.88 0.257  Share Difference 3.88 0.258 
CV 5.55 0.180  CV 5.55 0.180 
Board Size 5 0.200  Board Size 5.03 0.199 
Board Independence 6.11 0.164  Board Independence 6.11 0.164 
Board Experience 6.33 0.158  Board Experience 6.33 0.158 
CEO Founder 9.47 0.106  CEO Founder 9.48 0.105 
CEO Descendant 7.96 0.126  CEO Descendant 7.96 0.126 
CEO-Chair 6.77 0.148  CEO-Chair 6.78 0.148 
CEO-Group 7.63 0.131  CEO-Group 7.63 0.131 
Firm Size 16.88 0.059  Firm Size 16.86 0.059 
Firm Age 43.85 0.023  Firm Age 43.85 0.023 
Firm Growth 1.8 0.555  Firm Growth 1.8 0.555 
Leverage 3.55 0.282  Leverage 3.55 0.282 
Mean VIF 2.94   Mean VIF 2.94  
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4.7.1.2 Alternative Methodologies: Fixed Effect (FE), Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) and Random Effect (RE) 
This study tested for model specifications using alternative methodologies (Pooled OLS 
and Random Effect, RE). Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that a relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance may be spurious because both variables are 
industry specific. In order to account for an industry effect, this study employed two 
methods: (1) dummy variables55 and (2) performance-adjusted industry. These are 
widely used in existing research to control for common industry effects (Gromley and 
Matsa, 2013). Performance-adjusted industry56 was calculated by subtracting the 
industry median from the firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) of each sample firm 
before estimating the models. Industry was divided into eight categories, which are 
consistent with the industry categories used by the SET.  
Table 4.15 shows the coefficients of ownership variables estimated from fixed effect 
models and the alternative models. Most of the coefficients are consistent with those 
reported in the previous sections. In fact, the results confirm the positive impacts of 
managerial ownership, dominant shareholder ownership and dominant family 
shareholder ownership on firm performance. However, it appears that the impacts of 
other types of shareholder ownership (government and foreign company) on firm 
performance also become significant, especially under OLS regressions. Therefore, the 
evidence suggests that the use of OLS without controlling for firm fixed effects may 
lead to an endogeneity problem, arising from an unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This study classified industry sectors into eight categories in line with those used by the SET. In order to 
reflect the most current classification, industry sectors in this study are based on the most up-to-date 
classification by the SET. Note that the classifications before 2004 were based on 21 industry sectors, and 
they have since been reclassified into eight industry sectors and 28 business subsectors. The eight industry 
sectors are Agro & Food, Industry, Consumer Products, Industrials, Property & Construction, Resources, 
Services, Technology and Other. 
56 Gromley and Matsa (2013) argue that performance-adjusted industry used in the OLS regression is 
insufficient to control for unobserved group-level heterogeneity. They comment that this method could 
lead to an omitted variable problem if any within-group correlation across observations exists among or 
across independent variables in the model. Therefore, in order to obtain a consistent estimator, a fixed-
effect model should be directly used to control for unobserved group-level heterogeneity. 
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Finally, this study employed the Hausman test to compare the fixed-effects against 
random-effects models. The null hypothesis is that individual effects are random, so the 
random effect provides consistent estimators (Colin and Trivedi, 2010). The results of 
the tests show that the null hypothesis is rejected, suggesting that fixed-effect models are 
more efficient than random-effect models for the purposes of this study. 
4.7.1.3 The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance –  
A Non-Linear Relationship 
As recommended in the existing literature, this study tested whether the relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance is non-linear or not. In line with 
Short and Keasey’s (1999) model, this study included a square and cube of ownership 
structure in the fixed-effects regressions (Model 4.5). The results for three definitions of 
managerial ownership in the full sample and two sub-samples are shown in Table 4.16, 
Panels A, B and C, respectively.  
The results in Panels A and B show that there are no significant relationships between 
managerial ownership and both measurements of firm performance for all managerial 
ownership proxies. This may imply that the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance is linear in form in the case of Thailand. This evidence is also 
consistent with the findings of Yammeesri (2003) for Thailand. In fact, square and cubic 
models may suffer severely from the multicollinearity problem when used on managerial 
ownership variables. 
The results contradict previous research that applied non-linear models, including Cui 
and Mak (2002), Davis et al. (2005), Hu and Zhou (2008), Morck et al. (1988), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), Short and Keasey (1999) and Wiwattanakantang (2001). 
4.7.2 Alternative Proxies for Firm Performance 
While ROA can be manipulated, sales are more difficult to manipulate by management 
discretion (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). Therefore, this study used sales-to-assets ratio as 
alternative proxy for accounting performance. This study used the market-to-book ratio 
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as the alternative measurement for market performance. The results, shown in Table 
4.17, are consistent only for market performance. This study found no significant 
relationship between ownership structure and SA. The difference between the ROA and 
SA models may indicate that the ROA was affected by management discretions. Further 
investigation is performed and discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
4.7.3 Within-Firm Changes in Share Ownership 
Panel A in Table 4.18 shows a distribution of within-firm, year-to-year change in share 
ownership during 1995 to 2007. Panel B and C in Table 4.18 shows the distribution of 
within-firm, year-to-year change in share ownership during the pre-reform and the post-
reform periods, respectively. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that more than 70 percent of the sample have a year-to-
year change in share ownership less than 10%. Additionally, the largest shareholder who 
owns large proportion of shares (>=25%) seems to have smaller changes in their share 
ownership. Regarding each type of shareholders, it shows that many family blockholders 
tend to have a small change in their ownership comparing to other types of shareholders 
i.e. domestic, bank and non-bank financial institutions. 
The small variations of the year-to-year changes in ownership, especially in firms with 
the dominant shareholders may imply that shareholders are likely to hold large 
proportion of shares for long-term objectives.  
According to Zhou (2001: 560),  
 “With rational managers maximising expected long-term interest, it is not 
clear that small, one-year changes in ownership are indicative of notable 
changes in managerial incentives that are likely to lead to substantive 
within-year changes in firm performance. Even if large equity stakes over 
time lead to better performance over time, the effect is expected to show 
up in cross-sectional tests. Because HHP’s tests rely on firm fixed effects, 
which essentially remove all cross-sectional variation, their findings do 
not provide strong evidence against the view that managerial ownership 
incentives are important for firm performance” 
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Zhou (2001) argues that the small variation of ownership might be insufficient to change 
shareholders’ incentive to the level that could significantly change within-firm 
performance. Therefore, the fixed effect models might not efficiently detect the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
However, the results from Section 4.6.3 show that the fixed effect model can detect the 
impact of the changes of ownership structure on firm performance in this study. This 
could imply that although the ownership variation is small, it is likely to be sufficient to 
influence to the largest shareholders’ incentive and lead to a significant change within-
firm performance. In addition, most of the results from the fixed effect models are likely 
to be consistent to the results from alternative methods (i.e. OLS) presented in Section 
4.7.1.2. 
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Table 4.15: Alternative Methodologies: Fixed Effect (FE), Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Random Effect (RE) 
 ROA Quasi-q 
 FE 
FE– 
Industry- 
Adj. 
Median 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
industry-
Adj. 
Median RE 
RE– 
Industry-
Adj. 
Median FE 
FE– 
Industry- 
Adj. 
Median 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
industry-
Adj. 
Median RE 
RE– 
Industry-
Adj. 
Median 
Model 4.1             
Concentrated Own 0.050* 0.066** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.061*** 0.069*** 0.504*** 0.446*** 0.462*** 0.443*** 0.504*** 0.484*** 
 (1.77) (2.40) (5.38) (5.70) (2.83) (3.28) (3.00) (2.66) (6.09) (6.09) (3.56) (3.46) 
             
Model 4.3             
Family Own 
 
 
0.060** 0.072*** 0.065*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.515*** 0.466*** 0.393*** 0.408*** 0.470*** 0.469*** 
 (2.57) (3.23) (5.63) (6.18) (3.58) (4.12) (3.61) (3.17) (5.78) (6.18) (3.98) (3.95) 
Government Own 
 
 
-0.021 0.015 0.136*** 0.097*** 0.074** 0.065* 1.122 1.553* 0.822*** 0.693*** 1.114**  1.202*** 
 (-0.26) (0.21) (5.51) (4.77) (2.08) (1.96) (1.23) (1.72) (3.93) (3.52) (2.37) (2.72) 
Foreign Own 0.044 0.053 0.058*** 0.062*** 0.052** 0.057** -0.004 0.023 0.215*** 0.211*** 0.039 0.082 
 (1.28) (1.56) (4.56) (5.01) (2.09) (2.34) (-0.02)    (0.13) (3.13) (3.15) (0.27) (0.58) 
Domestic Own 0.029 0.043 0.010 0.016 0.014 0.028 0.307 0.233 0.637*** 0.630*** 0.366 0.314 
 (0.66) (0.98) (0.45) (0.71) (0.36) (0.69) (1.17) (0.94) (4.21) (4.35) (1.49) (1.38) 
Bank Own 0.027 0.026 0.101 0.100 0.007 0.026 -0.980 -0.793 -0.572 -0.313 -0.717 -0.452 
 (0.22) (0.23) (1.53) (1.52) (0.08) (0.29) (-1.41)    (-1.18)    (-1.57)    (-0.87)    (-1.25)    (-0.82)    
Non-Bank Financial 
Insti. Own 
0.078 0.023 0.069* 0.038 0.091 0.038 -0.156 -0.197 -0.694**  -0.74*** -0.216 -0.291 
 (1.16) (0.33) (1.65) (0.88) (1.53) (0.62) (-0.30)    (-0.40)    (-2.57)    (-2.75)    (-0.49)    (-0.68)    
             
Model 4.5             
Manager Own (All 
Directors) 0.034** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.398*** 0.365*** 0.128*** 0.136*** 0.273*** 0.274*** 
 (2.08) (2.88) (5.86) (6.39) (3.67) (4.36) (3.72) (3.40) (2.69) (3.01) (3.21) (3.26) 
             
             
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
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Table 4.16 The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance – A Non–Linear Relationship 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate an impact of managerial ownership on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) in a non-linear model. All variables definitions are 
presented in Table 4.1. t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected standards errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 
10% (*) level, respectively.  
Non-linear Model (Short and Keasey, 1999): 
  FMit = β0 + β1Manager Ownit + β2Manager Own2it + β3Manager Own3it + γ1Share Differenceit+ γ2 CVit + γ3 Board Sizeit+ γ4 Board Independenceit + γ5 Board Experienceit+ γ6 CEO Founderit 
 + γ7 CEO Descendantit + γ8 CEO-Chairit + γ9 CEO-Groupit+ γ10 Firm Size + γ11 Firm Ageit+ γ12 Firm Growthit+ γ13 Leverageit+ αi1 Firm fixed effect + αi2 Year fixed effect + εit 
Panel A: Ownership of All Directors 
 Full Sample Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 ROA t Quasi-q t ROA t Quasi-q t ROA t Quasi-q t 
             
Manager Own 0.008 (0.07) 0.235 (0.37) -0.042 (-0.25) -0.148 (-0.15) -0.154 (-1.41) 0.546 (0.82) 
Manager Own2 -0.046 (-0.15) 0.161 (0.09) 0.121 -0.24 -0.635 (-0.24) 0.374 (1.20) -0.884 (-0.45) 
Manager Own3 0.117 (0.47) 0.087 (0.06) -0.005 (-0.01) 1.107 (0.56) -0.205 (-0.81) 1.123 (0.69) 
Share Difference 0.006 (0.53) -0.095 (-1.16) -0.019 (-0.65) 0.001 (0.01) 0.013 (0.84) -0.244** (-1.99) 
CV 0.012 (0.87) 0.014 (0.13) -0.021 (-0.62) 0.273 (1.43) 0.026* (1.67) 0.013 (0.14) 
Board Size -0.045*** (-3.81) -0.043 (-0.59) -0.043** (-2.21) -0.350*** (-3.68) -0.044*** (-2.74) -0.019 (-0.21) 
Board Independence 0.026 (1.41) -0.047 (-0.48) 0.110** -2.52 -0.300 (-1.18) 0.019 (1.00) 0.002 (0.02) 
Board Experience -0.010 (-0.56) -0.084 (-0.77) -0.022 (-0.54) -0.300 (-1.27) 0.018 (0.85) 0.035 (0.24) 
CEO Founder 0.013 (0.97) -0.098 (-1.24) -0.040* (-1.83) 0.184* (1.68) 0.022 (1.04) -0.168 (-1.25) 
CEO Descendant -0.002 (-0.09) 0.060 (0.53) 0.040 (1.02) 0.491* (1.82) -0.035 (-1.61) 0.043 (0.34) 
CEO-Chair 0.007 (0.45) 0.080 (1.14) 0.028 (1.12) -0.042 (-0.39) -0.029** (-2.19) -0.102 (-1.55) 
CEO-Group 0.019 (1.38) -0.002 (-0.03) 0.076** (2.48) -0.606*** (-3.02) 0.037*** (2.81) 0.041 (0.54) 
Firm Size 0.041*** (6.03) -0.138*** (-3.06) 0.087*** (6.41) -0.612*** (-7.09) 0.037*** (3.54) -0.066 (-0.91) 
Firm Age 0.039 (1.48) -0.128 (-0.89) -0.023 (-0.55) -1.431*** (-7.52) -0.101*** (-4.21) 0.647*** (4.56) 
Firm Growth 0.030*** (4.19) 0.133*** (3.73) 0.021 (1.33) 0.109** (1.98) 0.042*** (4.47) 0.145*** (2.98) 
Leverage -0.235*** (-14.91) 0.288*** (3.46) -0.292*** (-12.57) 0.430*** (4.25) -0.226*** (-10.50) -0.007 (-0.06) 
Constant -0.419*** (-3.37) 3.796*** (4.57) -0.885*** (-5.07) 14.855*** (12.08) 0.007 (0.05) 0.177 (0.18) 
             
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,998  3,997  1,462  1,461  2,257  2,257  
Number of Clusters 441  441  331  331  375  375  
Adj. R-square 0.253  0.185  0.333  0.374  0.212  0.049  
F-test 19.358  18.107  15.493  20.064  11.522  3.308  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 4.16 The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance – A Non–Linear Relationship (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of firm-fixed effects regression to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (i.e. only executive directors) on firm performance (ROA and Quasi-q) in a non-linear model. 
All variables definitions are presented in Table 4.1. t-statistics for two-tails test based on corrected standards errors clustering at firm level are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively.  
Non-linear Model (Short and Keasey, 1999): 
FMit = β0 + β1Manager Ownit + β2Manager Own2it + β3Manager Own3it + γ1Share Differenceit+ γ2 CVit + γ3 Board Sizeit+ γ4 Board Independenceit + γ5 Board Experienceit+ γ6 CEO Founderit 
           + γ7 CEO Descendantit + γ8 CEO-Chairit + γ9 CEO-Groupit+ γ10 Firm Size + γ11 Firm Ageit+ γ12 Firm Growthit+ γ13 Leverageit+ αi1 Firm fixed effect + αi2 Year fixed effect + εit 
Panel B: Ownership of Executive Directors  
 Full Sample Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 ROA t Quasi-q t ROA t Quasi-q t ROA t Quasi-q t 
             
Manager Own 0.187 (0.92) 0.636 (0.71) -0.120 (-0.34) 0.776 (0.46) -0.129 (-0.64) -1.020 (-0.82) 
Manager Own2 -1.008 (-1.17) -2.421 (-0.60) 0.331 (0.23) -3.661 (-0.51) 0.378 (0.40) 6.666 (1.15) 
Manager Own3 1.224 (1.33) 2.693 (0.61) -0.092 (-0.06) 4.648 (0.62) -0.244 (-0.23) -8.718 (-1.33) 
Share Difference 0.015 (1.27) -0.013 (-0.16) -0.016 (-0.54) -0.002 (-0.01) 0.020 (1.41) -0.123 (-1.22) 
CV 0.012 (0.85) 0.018 (0.17) -0.025 (-0.71) 0.246 (1.36) 0.022 (1.46) -0.011 (-0.13) 
Board Size -0.043*** (-3.70) -0.022 (-0.29) -0.039** (-2.02) -0.361*** (-3.66) -0.043*** (-2.70) 0.009 (0.10) 
Board Independence 0.024 (1.29) -0.063 (-0.63) 0.111*** (2.60) -0.294 (-1.19) 0.019 (0.97) 0.002 (0.02) 
Board Experience -0.007 (-0.41) -0.066 (-0.59) -0.017 (-0.42) -0.267 (-1.12) 0.018 (0.86) 0.047 (0.32) 
CEO Founder 0.014 (1.04) -0.087 (-1.14) -0.035* (-1.67) 0.151 (1.45) 0.022 (1.03) -0.151 (-1.19) 
CEO Descendant 0.000 (0.01) 0.078 (0.67) 0.040 (0.93) 0.443* (1.80) -0.036* (-1.67) 0.058 (0.46) 
CEO-Chair 0.007 (0.48) 0.094 (1.36) 0.028 (1.20) -0.014 (-0.14) -0.029** (-2.11) -0.075 (-1.14) 
CEO-Group 0.020 (1.46) 0.011 (0.14) 0.077** (2.39) -0.575*** (-2.90) 0.037*** (2.77) 0.053 (0.68) 
Firm Size 0.040*** (6.11) -0.134*** (-2.92) 0.086*** (6.34) -0.615*** (-7.14) 0.035*** (3.43) -0.078 (-1.05) 
Firm Age 0.032 (1.23) -0.206 (-1.43) -0.019 (-0.46) -1.420*** (-7.43) -0.100*** (-4.18) 0.604*** (4.22) 
Firm Growth 0.030*** (4.21) 0.134*** (3.75) 0.023 (1.46) 0.116** (2.06) 0.043*** (4.57) 0.152*** (3.08) 
Leverage -0.236*** (-14.83) 0.290*** (3.42) -0.293*** (-12.64) 0.430*** (4.22) -0.226*** (-10.53) 0.026 (0.22) 
Constant -0.406*** (-3.22) 3.949*** (4.66) -0.886*** (-5.06) 14.852*** (12.37) 0.014 (0.10) 0.489 (0.48) 
             
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,998  3,997  1,462  1,461  2,257  2,257  
Number of Clusters 441  441  331  331  375  375  
Adj. R-square 0.251  0.176  0.332  0.373  0.210  0.038  
F-test 19.010  18.996  14.983  19.203  10.846  2.899  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 4.17 Test for Model Specifications - Alternative Measurement of Accounting Performance 
Sales-to-Assets Ratio (SA)  Market to Book Ratio (MB) 
        
Model 4.1 Ownership Concentration and Firm 
Performance 
    
Variables Coff. t  Variables Coff. t 
Concentrated Own 0.063 (0.96)  Concentrated Own 0.856** (2.14) 
Share Difference 0.011 (0.31)  Share Difference -0.16 (-0.68) 
CV 0.028 (0.56)  CV 0.472** (2.06) 
Board Size -0.045 (-1.21)  Board Size 0.042 (0.22) 
Board Independence 0.064 (1.07)  Board Independence 0.213 (0.78) 
Board Experience 0.043 (0.74)  Board Experience 0.162 (0.54) 
CEO Founder 0.022 (0.60)  CEO Founder -0.014 (-0.07) 
CEO Descendant 0.023 (0.53)  CEO Descendant 0.384 (1.24) 
CEO-Chair 0.014 (0.29)  CEO-Chair 0.226 (1.13) 
CEO-Group 0.015 (0.51)  CEO-Group 0.019 (0.08) 
Firm Size 0.158*** (6.56)  Firm Size -0.001 (-0.01) 
Firm Age -0.074 (-1.26)  Firm Age -0.501 (-1.46) 
Firm Growth 0.143*** (5.03)  Firm Growth 0.309*** (3.67) 
Leverage -0.613*** (-9.55)  Leverage -0.256 (-1.11) 
Adj. R-Square 0.232   Adj. R-Square 0.147  
Observations 3,998   Observations 3,997  
       
Model 4.3: Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholders and Firm Performance 
Variables Coff. t  Variables Coff. t 
Family Own 0.059 (1.00)  Family Own 1.132*** (3.48) 
Government Own -0.286 (-0.93)  Government Own 1.903 (1.16) 
Foreign Investor Own 0.101 (1.01)  Foreign Investor Own -0.053 (-0.12) 
Domestic company Own -0.051 (-0.45)  Domestic company Own 0.508 (0.72) 
Bank Own -0.042 (-0.13)  Bank Own 1.38 (0.67) 
Non-Bank Financial insti. Own 0.356 (1.58)  Non-Bank Financial insti. Own 0.142 (0.12) 
Share Difference 0.03 (0.88)  Share Difference -0.163 (-0.82) 
CV 0.016 (0.32)  CV 0.554** (2.24) 
Board Size -0.042 (-1.13)  Board Size 0.008 (0.04) 
Board Independence 0.065 (1.07)  Board Independence 0.241 (0.91) 
Board Experience 0.049 (0.84)  Board Experience 0.077 (0.25) 
CEO Founder 0.023 (0.65)  CEO Founder -0.025 (-0.13) 
CEO Descendant 0.022 (0.50)  CEO Descendant 0.358 (1.16) 
CEO-Chair 0.016 (0.33)  CEO-Chair 0.187 (0.91) 
CEO-Group 0.017 (0.60)  CEO-Group 0.005 (0.02) 
Firm Size 0.157*** (6.57)  Firm Size 0.012 (0.13) 
Firm Age -0.083 (-1.42)  Firm Age -0.401 (-1.20) 
Firm Growth 0.144*** (5.07)  Firm Growth 0.311*** (3.77) 
Leverage -0.609*** (-9.58)  Leverage -0.276 (-1.20) 
Adj. R-Square 0.234   Adj. R-Square 0.151  
Observations 3,998   Observations 3,997  
        
Model 4.5: Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance – Ownership of All Directors	  
 Variables Coff. t  Variables Coff. t 
Manager Own -0.015 (-0.31)  Manager Own 0.689** (2.58) 
Share Difference 0.038 (1.27)  Share Difference 0.036 (0.19) 
CV 0.025 (0.50)  CV 0.410* (1.82) 
Board Size -0.046 (-1.23)  Board Size -0.022 (-0.12) 
Board Independence 0.062 (1.04)  Board Independence 0.201 (0.75) 
Board Experience 0.045 (0.78)  Board Experience 0.171 (0.57) 
CEO Founder 0.023 (0.64)  CEO Founder -0.062 (-0.31) 
CEO Descendant 0.025 (0.59)  CEO Descendant 0.348 (1.13) 
CEO-Chair 0.014 (0.29)  CEO-Chair 0.195 (0.99) 
CEO-Group 0.016 (0.54)  CEO-Group 0.018 (0.07) 
Firm Size 0.157*** (6.54)  Firm Size -0.022 (-0.23) 
Firm Age -0.083 (-1.42)  Firm Age -0.455 (-1.36) 
Firm Growth 0.143*** (5.06)  Firm Growth 0.318*** (3.79) 
Leverage -0.613*** (-9.54)  Leverage -0.269 (-1.17) 
Adj. R-Square 0.232   Adj. R-Square 0.148  
Observations 3,998   Observations 3,997  
        
Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level 	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Table 4.18: Within-Firm Changes in Share Ownership 
This table presents a distribution of within-firm, year-to-year change in share ownership. The sample contains an unbalanced panel of firms listed in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand during 1995 to 2007. Share Ownership is calculated by an unsigned difference in share ownership divided by the last year’s share ownership. 
Panel A: Full Sample - Year 1995 to 2007 
The Largest Shareholders within Each Types of Shareholders The Largest 
Shareholder of 
the Listed Firm Family Government Foreign Domestic Bank 
Non-Bank  
Financial Insti. 
Range of Yearly % Change 
in Ownership Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. 
               
|%change| <=10% 2,704 77.10% 2,490 72.59% 196 73.41% 1,472 54.50% 493 56.28% 563 66.00% 918 36.20% 
10%< |%change| >=25% 449 12.80% 443 12.92% 21 7.87% 316 11.70% 70 7.99% 78 9.14% 356 14.04% 
25%< |%change| >=50% 220 6.27% 251 7.32% 12 4.49% 330 12.22% 67 7.65% 51 5.98% 350 13.80% 
50%< |%change| >=75% 64 1.82% 110 3.21% 11 4.12% 155 5.74% 20 2.28% 22 2.58% 247 9.74% 
75< |%change| >=100% 32 0.91% 71 2.07% 22 8.24% 254 9.40% 194 22.15% 130 15.24% 484 19.09% 
|%change| >100% 38 1.08% 65 1.90% 5 1.87% 174 6.44% 32 3.65% 9 1.06% 181 7.14% 
 3,507 100.00% 3,430 100.00% 267 100.00% 2,701 100.00% 876 100.00% 853 100.00% 2,536 100.00% 
               
 Ownership >=25% 
The Largest Shareholders within Each Types of Shareholders The Largest 
Shareholder of 
the Listed Firm Family Government Foreign Domestic Bank 
Non-Bank  
Financial Insti. 
Range of Yearly % Change 
in Ownership Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. 
               
|%change| <=10% 2,284 81.25% 1,858 81.14% 70 86.42% 380 82.25% 61 74.39% 10 66.67% 8 72.73% 
10%< |%change| >=25% 309 10.99% 256 11.18% 8 9.88% 32 6.93% 7 8.54% 3 20.00% 2 18.18% 
25%< |%change| >=50% 130 4.62% 104 4.54% 2 2.47% 17 3.68% 2 2.44% 1 6.67% 0 0.00% 
50%< |%change| >=75% 31 1.10% 23 1.00% 0 0.00% 5 1.08% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
75< |%change| >=100% 23 0.82% 11 0.48% 0 0.00% 5 1.08% 2 2.44% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
|%change| >100% 34 1.21% 38 1.66% 1 1.23% 23 4.98% 10 12.20% 1 6.67% 1 9.09% 
 2,811 100.00% 2,290 100.00% 81 100.00% 462 100.00% 82 100.00% 15 100.00% 11 100.00% 	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Table 4.18: Within-Firm Changes in Share Ownership (Cont’) 
This table presents a distribution of within-firm, year-to-year change in share ownership. The sample contains an unbalanced panel of firms listed in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand during 1995 to 1998. Share Ownership is calculated by an unsigned difference in share ownership divided by the last year’s share ownership. 
Panel B: Before CG Reforms - Year 1995 to 1998 
The Largest Shareholders within Each Types of Shareholders The Largest 
Shareholder of 
the Listed Firm Family Government Foreign Domestic Bank 
Non-Bank  
Financial Insti. 
Range of Yearly % Change 
in Ownership Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. 
               
|%change| <=10% 875 77.43% 818 73.23% 54 79.41% 467 54.11% 180 55.21% 203 77.19% 316 32.21% 
10%< |%change| >=25% 158 13.98% 163 14.59% 7 10.29% 95 11.01% 27 8.28% 29 11.03% 160 16.31% 
25%< |%change| >=50% 53 4.69% 70 6.27% 3 4.41% 108 12.51% 22 6.75% 7 2.66% 163 16.62% 
50%< |%change| >=75% 23 2.04% 30 2.69% 2 2.94% 51 5.91% 6 1.84% 4 1.52% 100 10.19% 
75< |%change| >=100% 9 0.80% 16 1.43% 1 1.47% 79 9.15% 71 21.78% 18 6.84% 148 15.09% 
|%change| >100% 12 1.06% 20 1.79% 1 1.47% 63 7.30% 20 6.13% 2 0.76% 94 9.58% 
 1,130 100.00% 1,117 100.00% 68 100.00% 863 100.00% 326 100.00% 263 100.00% 981 100.00% 
               
 Ownership >=25% 
The Largest Shareholders within Each Types of Shareholders The Largest 
Shareholder of 
the Listed Firm Family Government Foreign Domestic Bank 
Non-Bank  
Financial Insti. 
Range of Yearly % Change 
in Ownership Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. 
               
|%change| <=10% 721 80.83% 606 80.80% 16 88.89% 98 85.22% 18 66.67% n/a n/a 3 60.00% 
10%< |%change| >=25% 109 12.22% 92 12.27% 2 11.11% 5 4.35% 2 7.41% n/a n/a 1 20.00% 
25%< |%change| >=50% 32 3.59% 29 3.87% 0 0.00% 3 2.61% 0 0.00% n/a n/a 0 0.00% 
50%< |%change| >=75% 13 1.46% 10 1.33% 0 0.00% 2 1.74% 0 0.00% n/a n/a 0 0.00% 
75< |%change| >=100% 7 0.78% 2 0.27% 0 0.00% 2 1.74% 0 0.00% n/a n/a 0 0.00% 
|%change| >100% 10 1.12% 11 1.47% 0 0.00% 5 4.35% 7 25.93% n/a n/a 1 20.00% 
 892 100.00% 750 100.00% 18 100.00% 115 100.00% 27 100.00% n/a n/a 5 100.00% 
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Table 4.18: Within-Firm Changes in Share Ownership (Cont’) 
This table presents a distribution of within-firm, year-to-year change in share ownership. The sample contains an unbalanced panel of firms listed in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand during 2000 to 2007. Share Ownership is calculated by an unsigned difference in share ownership divided by the last year’s share ownership. 
Panel C: After CG Reforms - Year 2000 to 2007 
The Largest Shareholders within Each Types of Shareholders The Largest 
Shareholder of the 
Listed Firm Family Government Foreign Domestic Bank 
Non-Bank  
Financial Insti. 
Range of Yearly % 
Change in Ownership Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. 
               
|%change| <=10% 1,621 76.61% 1,482 72.12% 130 72.22% 904 55.39% 282 59.12% 320 61.19% 533 39.60% 
10< |%change| >=25 263 12.43% 247 12.02% 11 6.11% 191 11.70% 34 7.13% 35 6.69% 169 12.56% 
25< |%change| >=50 150 7.09% 160 7.79% 8 4.44% 202 12.38% 39 8.18% 39 7.46% 154 11.44% 
50< |%change| >=75 38 1.80% 71 3.45% 9 5.00% 91 5.58% 12 2.52% 15 2.87% 120 8.92% 
75< |%change| >=100 21 0.99% 53 2.58% 19 10.56% 152 9.31% 98 20.55% 108 20.65% 303 22.51% 
|%change| >100 23 1.09% 42 2.04% 3 1.67% 92 5.64% 12 2.52% 6 1.15% 67 4.98% 
 2,116 100.00% 2,055 100.00% 180 100.00% 1,632 100.00% 477 100.00% 523 100.00% 1,346 100.00% 
               
 Ownership >=25% 
The Largest Shareholders within Each Types of Shareholders The Largest 
Shareholder of the 
Listed Firm Family Government Foreign Domestic Bank 
Non-Bank  
Financial Insti. 
Range of Yearly % 
Change in Ownership Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. Obs. 
%  
of Obs. 
               
|%change| <=10% 1,390 81.33% 1,109 81.01% 50 89.29% 254 81.94% 40 76.92% 10 66.67% 4 80.00% 
10< |%change| >=25 179 10.47% 145 10.59% 4 7.14% 26 8.39% 5 9.62% 3 20.00% 1 20.00% 
25< |%change| >=50 86 5.03% 67 4.89% 1 1.79% 12 3.87% 2 3.85% 1 6.67% 0 0.00% 
50< |%change| >=75 18 1.05% 13 0.95% 0 0.00% 3 0.97% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
75< |%change| >=100 15 0.88% 9 0.66% 0 0.00% 1 0.32% 2 3.85% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
|%change| >100 21 1.23% 26 1.90% 1 1.79% 14 4.52% 3 5.77% 1 6.67% 0 0.00% 
 1,709 100.00% 1,369 100.00% 56 100.00% 310 100.00% 52 100.00% 15 100.00% 5 100.00% 
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4.8 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the potential impacts of various types of dominant 
shareholder and ownership concentration on firm performance, based on sample of listed 
firms in the Thai capital markets from 1994 to 2007, and it contributes to related 
literature on ownership structure, corporate governance and firm performance in the 
context of emerging capital markets.   
Firstly, the period covered by this sample has allowed this study to investigate the 
impact of government initiated corporate governance reforms. Indeed, the long-term 
data has also allowed this study to investigate the impact of ownership structure on firm 
performance before and after the introduction of corporate governance reforms in 
Thailand. It also allowed this study to investigate the impact of other corporate 
governance mechanisms such as board structure and CEO characteristics on firm 
performance. Hence this study adds to an on-going debate about the efficiency of the 
reforms and whether they have helped to partly reduce the conflict of interests between 
dominant shareholders and minority shareholders or not. 
Secondly, unlike most other studies on ownership structure, the analysis in this chapter 
used a fixed-effect model to control for problems related to the endogeneity of 
ownership variables that may have arisen from unobserved firm heterogeneity 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999).  
Finally, the use of specific sources of ownership data has allowed this study to identify 
ultimate shareholders and their ownership shareholdings, including their cash-flow and 
control rights for each firm, thereby improving the reliability and quality of the 
ownership variables.  
In respect to the first research question regarding any change of ownership structure in 
Thailand, the findings reveal that Thai listed companies tend to have been characterised 
by a high degree of ownership concentration during the periods studied. It has been 
shown that 79.81% of listed firms in the sample from the Thai capital market had a 
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dominant shareholder, most often in the form of a dominant family shareholder. In 
addition, the evidence in this study has found that, on average, family and foreign 
dominant shareholder ownership has statistically increased after the reforms, and this 
contradicts the finding of Gao et al., (2008), which suggests that the reforms reduced the 
incentive for dominant shareholders to hold shares in the firms they control. 
In respect to the second and third research questions regarding the impact of ownership 
structure on firm performance and whether its improvement after the reform, the 
evidence supports the notion of an alignment of interests, suggesting that increasing 
levels of ownership concentration are associated with high accounting performance 
(ROA) and market performance (Quasi-q). Analysis of data from before and after the 
corporate governance reforms has shown that the positive impact of ownership 
concentration on market performance can be detected in both periods, without any 
improvement following the reforms. However, while the level of ownership seems to 
have only had a significant impact on accounting performance after the reforms, the 
improvement is not statistically significant. 
Regarding the presence of dominant shareholders, firms seem to have consistently 
benefitted from their dominant shareholders only in terms of market performance over 
time and for each sub-period. This may imply that investors view the presence of 
dominant shareholders as a mechanism that acts as a substitute for corporate governance 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003). The evidence is partly consistent with the findings of 
other research such as Claessens and Djankov, (1999), Haniffa and Hudaib, (2006), 
Morck et al., (2000), Seifert et al., (2005), Wiwattanakantang, (2001) and Yammeesri 
(2003). 
Regarding the types of shareholder, the evidence from this study reveals that levels of 
ownership positively influenced family owners to align their interests with those of their 
firms, enhancing both accounting and market performance over time and before and 
after the reforms. The evidence also suggests that family blockholders are self-
constrained by the substantiality of their shareholding and/or their reputation in a firm 
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(Asaba and Kunugita, 2007; Maury, 2006; Mishra et al., 2001; Martínez et al., 2007; 
Bonilla et al., 2010; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Yammeesri et al., 2006) and that they are 
therefore less likely to exploit corporate assets. Nevertheless, the presence of dominant 
family shareholders has only benefited firms in terms of market performance, 
particularly after the reforms. 
For other types of shareholder, this study has found that the alignment of the interests of 
other types of shareholder (government and domestic companies) with those of firms 
increased as their proportion of shares increased, but only before the reforms. These 
shareholders may motivate by weak corporate governance system before the reform to 
provide closely monitoring to managers. The expectation of better corporate governance 
system after the reform therefore reduced the motivation of these shareholders’ to 
engage in monitoring. However, it appears that dominant foreign company shareholders 
have aligned their interests more closely with those of firms only after the reforms. This 
may have partly been caused by the Government’s campaign for foreign investment, 
which has led to an increase in the proportions of shares owned by foreign company 
investors.  
Regarding bank ownership, this study has found that the negative impact of bank 
ownership on market performance was only present before the reforms, and this supports 
the argument that the close relationships between banks and families may reduce the 
motivation and ability of the banks to provide efficient monitoring (Limpaphayom and 
Polwitoon, 2004). This study has found that banks were more likely to increase their 
proportion of shares in firms after the reforms. Therefore, this might suggest that the 
shift from bank-lenders to larger equity-owners after the reforms may have either forced 
banks to take a more active role in monitoring or reduced the conflict of interests 
between bank-owners and firms (Limpaphayom and Polwitoon, 2004; Morck et al., 
2000). 
Regarding managerial ownership, the evidence reveals a positive impact of managerial 
ownership, in particular by all directors, on accounting and market firm performance. 
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However, there is no significant relationship between ownership of executive directors 
and firm performance. This evidence suggests that ownership has helped to increase 
motivation of directors to perform their duty. However, share ownership might be less 
efficient to align interests of management with other shareholders in case of Thailand. 
Nevertheless, it does help to increase the motivation of in particular, non-executive 
directors to supervisor managers.  
Additionally, this study has not found any evidence to support the notion of a non-linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. While this is 
consistent with the findings of Yammeesri (2003) in Thailand, it is inconsistent with 
many findings from other countries (Cui and Mak, 2002; Davis et al., 2005; Hu and 
Zhou, 2008; Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 
1999). 
Overall, the findings above may imply that the motivation of large shareholders to align 
their interests with those of other shareholders depends more on the size of their block of 
shares rather than on whether they are dominant shareholders or not. Because the SEA, 
1992, requires at least 75% of the total number of shareholder votes in order for a 
resolution on major events to be passed at shareholder meetings, higher levels of shares 
may still guarantee a deciding proportion of the votes. The motivation of large 
shareholders/dominant shareholders also depends on their type. Contradictory to the 
World Bank’s claim, this study has not found any evidence that the presence of 
dominant shareholders and high ownership concentration has been detrimental to the 
performance of listed firms over time or before or after the reforms, except in the case of 
bank ownership. 
Regarding other governance mechanisms, this study has found evidence of exploitation 
via pyramidal and/or cross-shareholding arrangements after the reform in term of 
accounting performance. This suggests that the reform may increase incentive of the 
largest shareholder to extract the firms’ assets via these structures because it may be an 
easier channel to do after the reform. In addition, where the second largest shareholders 
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have a percentage of shares close to that of the largest shareholders, this seems to have 
motivated them to monitor the largest shareholder and thereby enhance accounting 
performance. 
Regarding boards of directors, this study provides evidence of their inefficiency, in 
terms of accounting performance in both sub-periods, when they are too big (for other 
examples of this, see Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). In 
addition, board independence appears to have had a positive impact only on accounting 
performance, and only before the reforms. This evidence casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of reforms that have been aimed at increasing the independence of boards, 
since 1999. It is possible that firms have failed to comply with the requirement of three 
independent board members and merely increased the size of their boards by appointing 
more directors who may not be truly independent. Furthermore, because the SEA, 1992, 
limits the number of shares held by independent directors to a maximum of 0.05% 
(amended to 1% since 2008), they may have limited ability and have lacked of economic 
incentive to supervise managers, who are often large shareholders. 
Regarding CEO characteristics, this study has found evidence of lower accounting 
performance from firms with CEO founders, but only before the reforms. The evidence 
suggests that CEO founders might exercise their control in the way that does not 
contribute to firm performance (for example, by selecting directors who come from the 
same group) (Morck et al., 1988). This contradicts previous research from the UK 
(Adam et al., 2009; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Sraer and 
Thesmar, 2007), which supports the notion of an alignment of interests between CEO 
founders and their firms. In addition, CEO descendants were found to have had a 
negative impact on accounting performance after the reforms. This contributes the on-
going debate about the competency of family descendants to manage family firms (for 
examples, see Bertrand et al., 2008; Mehrotra et al., 2013; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).  
In contrast, the findings reveal a positive impact on market performance before the 
reforms from CEOs who were either founders or their descendants. In fact, many big 
	  	  
Chapter 4 
205	  
businesses in Thailand are run by famous families in Thai society, in which the founder 
normally becomes the CEO. Additionally, before the reforms, when corporate 
governance was perceived as very weak, investors may have been reassured that famous 
families or firm founders had the knowledge, ambition and reputational concern to 
facilitate firm growth and profitability in the long run. 
Regarding CEO duality, the evidence reveals that, while the combination of chairman 
and CEO positions has not had any significant impact on firm accounting performance 
before the reforms, it has had a negative impact after the reforms. Hence the evidence 
seems to support the perspective of the agency theory rather than that of stewardship 
theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993).  
The evidence also suggests that specific environments (under the reforms) may have 
affected the motivation of CEO-chairmen to perform their tasks (Peng et al., 2007) by 
creating pressure on CEO-chairmen to engage in opportunistic activities (in order to 
avoid restrictive regulations, for example) (La Porta et al., 1999). However, it also 
suggests that firms are likely to have benefitted, in terms of accounting performance, 
(via better communication, checks and balances) from having a CEO and chairman who 
came from the same group but who were not the same person, both before and after the 
reforms. Nevertheless, this structure might not be favoured by investors, which would 
explain its negative impact on market performance. 
In conclusion, the evidence from this study challenges the claim by the World Bank and 
argues that highly concentrated ownership might not be detrimental to firm performance. 
Listed firms in Thailand still had high levels of ownership concentration, even after the 
reforms, so the reforms have not made a remarkable contribution in terms of improving 
the impact of concentrated ownership on firm performance. In addition, higher levels of 
concentrated ownership have tended to align rather than divert the interests of largest 
shareholders who are family, regardless of whether they were dominant shareholders or 
not, both prior to and following the reforms. The attempt to improve the quality of 
boards of directors seems not to have been successful.  
	  	  
Chapter 4 
206	  
Finally, the contradictions in the results, from different measurements of firm 
performance, raise a question over whether these variables are influenced by accounting 
discretion or investors’ perception. The two following chapters examine the impact of 
ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms on accounting 
discretion and investor perception, respectively. 	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Chapter 5: The Impact of Ownership Structure and 
Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
5.1 Introduction: Motivations and Research Questions 
The direct impacts of various ownership structures on firm performance were 
investigated in the previous chapter. The evidence suggests that high ownership 
concentration by the largest shareholders and the presence of dominant shareholders are 
beneficial rather than detrimental to minority shareholders and firms. Nevertheless, it 
has been debated whether the ROA and/or Quasi-q accurately reflect the performance of 
a firm or not, because their accuracy primarily depends on the quality of accounting 
information that may be subject to managers’ accounting discretion (for examples, see 
Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Wiwattanakantang, 2001). Hence the positive impacts 
found in Chapter 4 may partly be a result of the manipulation of accounts, which needs 
further investigation.  
Previously, the use of accounting discretion to manipulate earnings appears to have 
played a part in giant corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom (Giroux, 2008; 
Jensen, 2005). Although some academics1 argue that not all accounting discretion2 is for 
opportunistic purposes, the scandals have led to a negative perception of its use (Jiraporn 
et al., 2008), as well as raising awareness among market regulators and academics 
regarding the role of corporate governance mechanisms in detecting and preventing 
future scandals and leading to legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the 
US.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For example, Jiraporn et al. (2008), Subramanyam (1996) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986).	  
2 Accounting standards (IFRSs, US GAAP) intentionally allow managers to use their judgment to choose 
accounting methods and policies that convey accounting information that more accurately portrays a 
firm’s financial position and performance to users of financial reporting (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
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From the perspective of agency theory, the conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders, where ownership and control are separated, may motivate managers to 
engage in opportunistic accounting discretion to benefit themselves (as in the case of 
bonuses or compensation tied to earnings). Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms 
are seen as the first key for helping to reduce conflicts of interest and the motivation of 
management to engage in opportunistic accounting discretion. 
Existing research particularly focuses on investigating whether corporate governance 
mechanisms (such as the board of directors and external auditors) can partly limit the 
misuse of accounting discretion (for examples, see Klein, 2002; Bowen et al., 2008; Fan 
and Wong, 2002; Larcker et al., 2007; Wang, 2006; Wang and Yung, 2011) and whether 
poor corporate governance leads to financial misstatement and fraud (for example, see 
Dechow et al., 1996). Nevertheless, little is known about the role of ownership structure 
in managers’ accounting discretion.  
This study aims to explore and provide additional evidence on the impact of ownership 
structure and other corporate governance mechanisms on accounting discretion in 
Thailand. As shown in Chapter 4, ownership and control are commonly combined in 
most listed firms. Leuz et al. (2003) argue that this characteristic may motivate dominant 
shareholder-managers to engage in opportunistic accounting discretion if their interests 
diverge from those of minority shareholders or firms. Since the findings in Chapter 4 
provide evidence that suggests a positive relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance, this study also investigates whether or not the positive impact of 
ownership concentration on firm performance is a result of managers’ accounting 
discretion.  
In addition, while corporate governance mechanisms, such as investor protection, and 
accounting systems are perceived as strong in developed countries like the US or the 
UK, they are claimed to be less efficient in emerging countries. The high-profile 
corporate governance reforms in Thailand give an opportunity for this study to 
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contribute to the literature on whether reforms can help to limit the opportunistic use of 
accounting discretion by reducing conflicts of interest or not.  
Two research questions are addressed in this chapter: 
Q5.1: Whether ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms 
influence to managers’ accounting discretion 
Q5.2: Whether the impact of ownership structure and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion significantly differs between periods 
before and after the reforms 
This study contributes to the existing literature in many ways.  
Firstly, the literature suggests that a difference in corporate governance structure might 
affect the quality of reported earnings. For example, while the quality of financial 
reporting in firms with dispersed ownership is likely to be influenced by managers, in 
firms with concentrated ownership it is more likely to be influenced by large 
shareholders, who have substantial control. In addition, much research in this area has 
been done in the US, which is believed to have high accounting standards and good 
corporate governance systems (for examples, see Klein, 2002; Bowen et al., 2008; 
Larcker et al., 2007; Wang, 2006; Warfield et al. 1995). However, few papers have dealt 
with the context of emerging markets, in which ownership is highly concentrated rather 
than dispersed (for examples, Fan and Wong, 2002; Hashim and Devi, 2009; Wang and 
Yung, 2011; Yongxu et al. 2010). Therefore, the evidence from this study will adds to 
the limited literature on the context of emerging markets. 
Secondly, Ball et al. (2003) assert that earnings quality is subject to incentives of 
preparers of financial reporting rather than high quality of accounting standards required 
by the law. With high ownership concentration, large shareholders/dominant 
shareholders normally involve or have influence on a preparation of financial reporting. 
Therefore, this study investigates whether different types of influenced shareholders 
have different impact on a use of accounting discretions. The evidence adds on existing 
literature about the role of different types of shareholders on earnings quality in the 
context of high ownership concentration like Thailand. Additionally, this could 
	  	  
Chapter 5	  
210	  
contribute to regulators and accounting standard setters to develop accounting standards 
and to ensure that required standards are appropriately applied as their objectives.  
Thirdly, this study uses long-term data covering periods before and after the reforms, 
which allows it to compare the impact of ownership structure and other key corporate 
governance mechanisms on the use of accounting discretion between the two periods. In 
fact, it has not been well understood whether the reforms have helped to improve 
accounting quality (for example, by limiting managers’ opportunistic accounting 
discretion) in practice or not. Therefore, this study provides evidence that will show 
whether the reforms have functioned as they were intended to. At least, the reforms may 
have helped to limit the use of (opportunistic) accounting discretion, in turn enhancing 
the quality of reported earnings.  
Finally, there has been an on-going debate on the appropriate measurement for the 
magnitude of accounting discretion. Much research has focused on the accruals3 
component of earnings as the main source of accounting discretion. However, current 
accruals-based approaches still have some limitations, which may lead to errors 
(McNichols, 2000, 2002). This study therefore applies accruals-based approaches as 
well as revenue-based approaches (Stubben, 2010) to measure the magnitude of 
managers’ accounting discretion. This study also attempts to investigate the possibility 
of improving the validity of discretionary accruals in term of credit sales, by integrating 
both sets of approaches. Unfortunately, the integrated proxies do not improve the 
measurement of discretionary accruals from the existing models, which suggests that it 
is better for researchers to apply each approach separately.  
This chapter will be organised as follows:  Section 5.2 will begin with a literature review 
and develop hypotheses on the impact of ownership structure and other corporate 
governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion. The research design will 
be presented in Section 5.3, and sampling and data collection will be described in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Specifically, they measure accounting discretion on either general accruals (for examples, see DeAngelo, 
1986; Dechow et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 2005) or specific accruals (for 
examples, see Beatty et al., 1995; McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Moyer, 1990).	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Section 5.4. The univariate and multivariate analyses will be discussed in Sections 5.5 
and 5.6, respectively, and the last section will provide the conclusion and shed light on 
remaining arguments for further chapters. 
5.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
5.2.1 The Role of Ownership Structure and Accounting Information 
from Contracting and Agency Theory Perspectives 
As discussed in Chapter 2, contract parties4 write an initial contract to divide a firm’s 
cash flows between them (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Rational self-interests of contract parties limit particular parties to writing the contract in 
the way that enables them to transfer wealth from other contract parties. However, it is 
difficult to write completed contracts in an imperfect world5 (Hart, 1995a), and contract 
parties may bear agency costs as a result of a breach of contract (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). 
Fan and Wong (2002) argue that the nature of contracting and accounting information 
flows may be affected by ownership structure. In corporations with dispersed ownership, 
a manager is in the position of an owner’s steward. It is reasonable to believe that self-
interested managers may act for their own benefit, in turn affecting the distribution of 
cash flows to shareholders. Adam Smith (1776), cited by Jensen and Meckling (1976, 
p.305), suggests that  
“…being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, 
it cannot well be expected , that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are 
apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, 
and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence 
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “Contracting parties” refers to (1) internal parties, such as shareholders, dominant shareholders, 
management and employees, and (2) external parties, such as potential investors, creditors, suppliers and 
customers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). This chapter focuses mainly on shareholders. 
5 An imperfect world is one in which transaction costs and information asymmetry do exist. 
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In order to minimise conflicts of interest, rational shareholders demand monitoring and 
incentive contracts,6 to monitor what managers actually do and to provide them with an 
incentive to align their interests with those of other shareholders (Christie and 
Zimmerman, 1994; Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). This demand 
emphasises the role of accounting information7 as a stewardship8 mechanism to 
constrain managers to act on behalf of shareholder interests (Armstrong et al., 2010; 
Ronen and Yaari, 2008; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1986). Hence accounting 
numbers are commonly used as key performance indicators in various types of contract, 
such as management compensations or debt contracts (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
However, contracts based on accounting numbers are not always sufficient to align 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders if managers have full control over the use 
of accounting discretion in reported accounting numbers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
While an ex ante contract may limit managers to choosing a firm’s accounting methods 
and policies from an “accepted set”9 of accounting standards, it would be better for other 
contract parties to allow managers to exercise some, but not all, accounting discretion 
(Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  
In contrast, corporations with concentrated ownership normally have an owner (a 
dominant shareholder) who gains efficient control of the firm, leading to fewer conflicts 
of interest between managers and dominant shareholders. In fact, dominant shareholders 
normally participate in a firms’ operation, either in management positions or in the 
process of selecting managers (Armstrong et al., 2010), and this allows them to 
influence the distribution of cash flows among contract parties (Fan and Wong, 2002). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This study focuses on contracts that aim to resolve the agency problem that arises from the conflict of 
interests among contract parties. 
7 Literature also uses a term “accounting numbers” which are viewed in the same way as accounting 
information is (Schipper, 1989). 
8 Another role of accounting information (earnings) that is addressed in the literature is in informativeness, 
which responds to the demands of investors to use accounting information to make decisions on the 
provision of economic resources to firms (Renan and Yarri, 2008; IASB, Conceptual Framework). 
9 According to Watts and Zimmerman (1990: 136), the accepted set is “the set of accounting procedures 
within which managers have discretion”. This is another set of restrictions that the contract parties 
determine to be the “best” or the accepted accounting principles for each firm, in addition to the 
mandatory accounting standards. Therefore, managerial accounting discretion is expected to vary across 
firms, with different costs and benefits being incurred from the restrictions. 
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Therefore, firms with concentrated ownership may be faced with another form of 
conflict of interests, which occurs between dominant and minority shareholders. 
In such cases, the role of accounting information in stewardship may not be as profound 
as it is in the context of dispersed ownership. Fan and Wong (2002) argue that 
accounting information is limited to the public in firms with concentrated ownership, 
because a dominant shareholder/manager may rely primarily on private sources of 
information. In many cases, their efficient control enables dominant 
shareholder/managers to influence firms’ accounting policies. Minority shareholders 
may recognise this conflict and therefore not give much credit to the reported accounting 
numbers, believing that the dominant shareholder or manager may report accounting 
information for its owned interests. In turn, minority shareholders may lower the share 
prices10 of firms with concentrated ownership and demand high quality accounting 
information in order to mitigate the risk of exploitation by a dominant 
shareholder/manager (Fan and Wong, 2002; Wang, 2006). This may also lead to 
pressure to adopt international accounting standards and to improve corporate 
transparency in concentrated ownership environments such as Asian countries (World 
Bank, 1998).  
5.2.2 Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
5.2.2.1 Definitions 
Accounting standards (IFRSs, US GAAP) intentionally allow managers to use their 
judgment in preparing financial reports. With specific knowledge, a manager or 
dominant shareholder-manager is expected to choose accounting methods and policies 
for records, estimates and disclosures that are appropriate to a firms’ business economics 
(Field et al., 2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
However, at the same time, the flexibility of accounting standards provides opportunities 
for the manager or dominant shareholder-manager to exercise accounting discretion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 To reduce the effect of price-protection, dominant shareholders may give a commitment to produce high 
quality financial reporting and disclosure.  
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based on his/her “self-serving information”11 (Field et al., 2001; Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). Hence the exercise of accounting discretion may lead to (1) an increase in the 
wealth of all contract parties or (2) an increase in a manager or dominant shareholders’ 
wealth (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). The latter refers to “managerial opportunism”, in 
which wealth transfers to managers or dominant shareholder-managers and, in turn, 
creates costs for other contract parties. 
This study examines the opportunistic use of accounting discretion.12 Consistent with 
Healy and Wahlen’s (1999, p.368) definition, opportunistic accounting discretion is 
defined as a judgment in financial reporting made by managers and/or dominant 
shareholder-managers with an intention to mislead some stakeholders (shareholders) 
about firm’s underlying economic performance or to adjust outcomes (reported 
accounting numbers) on agreed contracts.  
5.2.2.2 Motivations for Opportunistic Accounting Discretion  
The opportunistic use of accounting discretion is a reflection of the conflict of interests 
(between managers or shareholders in firms with dispersed ownership and between 
dominant shareholders or minority shareholders in firms with concentrated ownership) 
that cannot be resolved within firms (for example, see Leuz et al., 2003). In this section, 
the term “manager” refers to either a manager or a dominant shareholder-manager who 
has control over the preparation of financial reporting. 
The literature addresses many potential motivations for managers to engage in 
opportunistic accounting discretion (for examples, see Dechow et al., 1996; Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Based on the existing literature, the 
motivations can be divided into 3 main categories: (1) contracting motivations, (2) 
capital market motivations and (3) political costs (regulatory and tax-related 
motivations). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For example, self-interested managers may choose accounting methods that aim to boost a firm’s 
earnings to meet bonus targets. 
12 Accounting discretion can be an efficient way to make financial reporting more informative for users 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999), but distinguishing between efficient and opportunistic accounting discretion is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
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5.2.2.2.1 Contracting Motivations 
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, a contract is written in order to mitigate agency problems 
between contract parties. In most cases, accounting numbers are used as a benchmark to 
control and monitor a contract (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
First, bonus or compensation plans are introduced to tie the interests of managers to 
those of other contract parties. Managers may be motivated to exercise accounting 
discretion in order to increase their bonus or compensation rewards, which are tied to 
accounting numbers, by increasing current earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
Researchers have investigated the relationship between accounting discretion (such as 
discretionary accruals) and earnings in the context of bonus plans and have provided 
evidence of income-increasing accounting discretion (for examples, see Gaver et al. 
1995; Guidry et al. 1999). In addition, stock-based compensation may motivate 
managers to exercise accounting discretion in order to maintain high stock prices or to 
increase them in order to sell them later (Cheng and Warfield, 2005). 
However, bonus plans may also lead to the use of accounting discretion to decrease 
earnings if managers intentionally use techniques such as deferred revenue to reduce 
current reported earnings if they do not meet a minimum threshold for bonus payment 
(Healy, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). While the “taking a bath” technique has no 
affect on bonus payment for the current period, it may help managers to meet the 
threshold for bonus payment in the next period (Healy, 1985).  
Secondly, the literature suggests that managers may be motivated to use accounting 
discretion in order to avoid the violation of debt covenants, possibly due to (1) a 
frequent use of financial leverage ratios, which are based on accounting numbers in debt 
covenants, or (2) the costs of debt covenant violation being high (Ghosh and Moon, 
2010). Much research attempts to examine whether managers exercise accounting 
discretion when firms are close to violating their debt covenants, but evidence to support 
this is still mixed (Field et al., 2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). While some researchers 
have found little evidence that debt covenant violation is the main motivation for 
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accounting discretion (for example, see Healy and Palepu, 1990), others have found 
evidence of managers using accounting discretion to increase earnings when firms are 
close to violating their debt covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Bowen et al. 2008; 
Ghosh and Moon, 2010; Kim et al., 2010; Sweeney, 1994).   
5.2.2.2.2 Capital Market Motivations 
The use of accounting information by market participants, such as securities analysts, 
market regulators or investors, for evaluating firm performance may motivate managers 
to exercise accounting discretion for capital market purposes (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
The motivations may derive from equity financing, short-term capital gains or the need 
to meet market or investors’ expectations, for example.  
Focusing on listed firms in the U.S. SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release 
(AAER), Dechow et al. (1996) found that the main motivations for managers’ of these 
firms to use accounting discretion was to access additional financing at lower costs. 
DeAngelo (1988) argues that managers have incentives to use accounting discretion to 
report better firm performance in order to protect themselves from dissident shareholders 
in a proxy contest. Her findings suggest that dissident shareholders use reported earnings 
rather than stock prices as a reason to change managers, motivating current managers to 
increase earnings during an election campaign. However, she found that in the case of a 
successful change, new managers tend to use accounting discretion to reduce earnings 
and report increased earnings in the following year. 
In addition, managers of firms that are more attractive to market participants may be 
motivated increase their earnings in order to meet the market expectations. For example, 
managers may want to manipulate investor’s perceptions of a firm’s performance in 
order to increase the short-term stock price (Dechow et al., 1996) and thereby benefit 
from capital gains by selling their shareholding at a higher price.  
Focusing on accounting discretion over revenues, Callen et al. (2008) argue that firms 
may be motivated to exercise accounting discretion over revenue (violate GAAP) in 
order to avoid loss in market valuations. They found that market participants value “loss 
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firms” by their revenue growth and report evidence of a positive relationship between 
the ex ante probability of revenue manipulation and the number of years in which firms 
experience loss. 
5.2.2.2.3 Political Costs, Regulatory and Taxes Motivations 
Furthermore, managers may be motivated to engage in accounting discretion in order to 
avoid political costs, regulatory violations or taxes. Firstly, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990) suggest that large firms may incur political costs by reporting large profits, 
suggesting that it is costly for firms to disclose their monopoly profits or to convince 
politicians to issue laws and regulations that enhance their monopoly. Especially in 
Asian countries, Ball et al. (2003) suggest that firms owned by “ethnic minorities” may 
be faced with political costs; if they report large profits, they may come under pressure 
to redistribute their wealth to the majority population. On the other hand, firms may be 
forced to avoid reporting large losses if a government wants to avoid public blame, due 
to corporate failure, for example. 
Secondly, regulations imposed by law or capital regulators may lead to the use of 
accounting discretion to meet regulatory requirements such as industry regulations, anti-
trust investigations or other regulations that may be tied to accounting numbers. For 
example, banks in the US are required to maintain their capital above a minimum level, 
based on accounting numbers (earnings), and insurance companies are required to have 
good financial positions (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). The existing literature provides 
some evidence that banks engage in accounting discretion over loan loss provision (for 
example) in order to avoid violations of capital requirements (Beatty et al., 1995; Moyer, 
1990; Leventis et al., 2011). Regarding other regulations, Jones (1991) found evidence 
of accounting discretion to decrease earnings (income-decreasing discretion accruals) 
during an import relief investigation in the US.  
Finally, managers may be motivated to exercise accounting discretion for tax purposes 
(Ball et al. 2003). In fact, managers may choose accounting policies or methods that 
minimise tax expenses rather than reflect firms’ true performance. For example, 
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Guenther (1994) provides evidence that managers reduce earnings prior to changes in 
corporate tax rate.13 Other authors suggest that managers may manage earnings via tax 
expenses or components of tax expenses (such as deferred taxes expenses) in order to 
meet analyst forecasts (Dhaliwal et al., 2004), or in order to avoid reporting a loss or a 
decline in earnings (Phillips et al., 2003). In Thailand, the Revenue Code requires 
conformity between financial and tax accounting when a firm calculates expenses for tax 
deduction. This may motivate managers to choose accounting policies or methods such 
as the depreciation method, by which they can minimise their tax payments. 
In summary, the literature addresses many incentives that may motivate managers to 
engage in accounting discretion. Evidence on contracting and capital market motivations 
may imply that a failure to mitigate the agency problem among contract parties enhances 
the opportunistic use of accounting discretion in order to protect the interests of 
particular contract parties (managers), and may confirm the importance of corporate 
governance in minimising this problem. Nevertheless, other motivations imply that 
managers may be driven by external factors (politics, taxes). 
5.2.2.3 Measurement for Capturing Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
There are many methods by which managers can exercise accounting discretion for 
opportunistic purposes,14 including the manipulation of accounting estimates changes in 
accounting methods and choice of accruals. It is likely that managers prefer to exercise 
accounting discretion over accruals because it is less costly and more difficult to observe 
than other methods are (Young, 1999). 
Consequently, much of the existing research uses total accruals (aggregate accruals) as a 
starting point in order to identify accounting discretion by managers (Dechow et al., 
1995). Total accruals (TAC) have two components: non-discretionary accruals (normal 
accruals or NDAC) and discretionary accruals (abnormal accruals or DAC). While non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In the US, corporate taxes were reduced from 46% to 34% following the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 
14 Managers can also exercise judgment on real operational decisions such as accelerations in sales, 
alterations in shipment schedules or changes in R&D expenditures (for example, see Roychowdhury, 
2006). 
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discretionary accruals are accounting adjustments to firms’ cash flows that are based on 
accounting standards, such as the depreciation of fixed assets, discretionary accruals are 
adjustments that are chosen by managers for specific purposes.  
McNichols (2000) classifies three main approaches to the measurement of DAC in the 
existing literature, based on aggregated accruals, specific accruals or the distribution of 
earnings, but none of them results in a perfect measurement. 
Firstly, aggregated accruals approaches have been continually developed by researchers 
including Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
McNichols (2002), Dechow et al. (1995, 2003, 2012) and Kothari et al. (2005). A 
common element in their models is the estimation of the components of non-
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between 
total accruals and estimated non-discretionary accruals. The differences between the 
models lie in the way in which they divide total accruals into non-discretionary and 
discretionary components and in how well they capture changes in firms’ economic 
circumstances.  
Among others, the models of Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) assume that non-
discretionary accruals are constant over time. Therefore, total accruals from estimation 
periods (the current and last year) are used as a proxy for non-discretionary accruals. 
However, Dechow et al. (1995) and Kaplan (1985) argue that this assumption is 
impractical because non-discretionary accruals may change along with changes in 
economic circumstances15.   
The Jones’ (1991) model was the first to allow non-discretionary accruals to change over 
time, applying a regression approach in order to specify a linear relationship between 
total accruals and changes in economic circumstances, such as changes in sales and 
gross property, plants and equipment. Nevertheless, this model still cannot estimate non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For example, changes in accounting receivables and inventories could be affected by a change in the 
level of sales and production. 
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discretionary accruals without errors, because some components (revenues) may be a 
part of discretionary accruals (Jones, 1991). 
A series of aggregate accruals approaches have attempted to improve the efficiency of 
the Jones (1991) model by estimating non-discretionary accruals in terms of credit sales 
(a modified Jones model by Dechow, 1995), cash flows (Dechow and Dichev, 2002 by 
McNichols, 2002), normal credit sales (Dechow, 2003), firm performance (Kothari et 
al., 2005) and reversal factors (Dechow et al. 2012). Although all of the extended Jones 
models have their limitations, which lead to systematic errors in estimation, the Jones 
and modified Jones models are the most powerful (Dechow et al. 1995; Young, 1999) 
and popular (McNichols, 2000). 
Secondly, a limited number of studies have attempted to measure accounting discretion 
based on the behaviour of specific accruals such as allowances for bad debts (McNichols 
and Wilson, 1988) or provisions for loan losses in banks (Beatty et al., 1995; Moyer, 
1990; Leventis et al., 2011). This approach requires researchers to identify a specific 
context, such as a specific industry setting, which is believed to motivate the use of 
accounting discretion over particular accruals. Then, normal and abnormal accruals are 
identified based on the behaviour of the specific accruals. Using a single accrual allows 
researchers to identify key factors that influence its behaviour and to determine how it is 
managed, reducing the possibility of errors in measurement (McNichols, 2000; Stubben, 
2010). However, this approach requires more institutional knowledge and data in order 
to identify managers’ incentives to exercise accounting discretion over the single 
component. As a result, research using specific accruals approaches is limited to a 
smaller sample than research using aggregate accruals approaches (McNichols, 2000). 
Additionally, this approach ignores managers’ accounting discretion that may be present 
in other accruals accounts (McNichols and Wilson, 1988).  
Finally, the distribution approach is another method, which attempts to test whether 
managers use accounting discretion to achieve a benchmark (zero earnings). Researchers 
take a frequency of earnings (after accounting discretion) that is above or below the 
	  	  
Chapter 5	  
221	  
earnings benchmark as evidence of accounting discretion to avoid losses or decreases in 
earnings, for example (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). However, McNichols (2000) 
claims that this approach attempts to make a specific prediction on firms that tend to 
engage in accounting discretion rather than to measure the magnitude of opportunistic 
accounting discretion by managers. 
Subsequently, Stubben (2010) has suggested using sales revenues rather than aggregate 
accruals to measure accounting discretion. He argues that revenues are only one 
component of earnings and are likely to be manipulated by managers.16 He develops a 
model for measuring accounting discretion with “discretionary revenues” rather than 
discretionary accruals. This discretionary revenue model is based on a linear relationship 
between reported revenues and account receivables and focuses on discretionary 
revenues17 derived from “premature revenue recognition”,18 which is a common type of 
accounting discretion over revenues. Stubben (2010) asserts that the discretionary 
revenue derived from the revenue model and conditional revenue model detects not only 
the accounting discretion over revenues but also the accounting discretion over earnings. 
He concludes that the models based on revenues are “less biased and better specified 
than accrual models” (p.711). 
In conclusion, all of the approaches discussed above have limitations. Although a large 
amount of existing research uses models based on aggregate accruals, critics argue that 
they estimate discretionary accruals inconsistently and are prone to error (Bernard and 
Skinner, 1996; Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow et al., 2012; Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 
1995). While models based on specific accruals are better in terms of finding out which 
and how accruals are managed (McNichols, 2000), their results can only explain the use 
of accounting discretion for a specific group, such as an industry, but not in general. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 Dechow and Schrand (2004: 42 - 43) report that almost 70% of listed firms in the U.S. SEC Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) were involved in revenue and related accounts misstatement 
(accounts receivable and provisions for bad debt). 17 “Discretionary revenues” occur in many forms of accounting discretion such as sales discounts and 
uncorrected revenue recognition (Stubben, 2010). 18	  Premature revenue recognition includes bill and hold sales, channel stuffing or revenues recognition in a 
way that violates accounting standards (Stubben, 2010: 699).	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Finally, Stubben’s (2010) model may mitigate errors that arise in aggregate accruals 
models, because it focuses only on discretionary revenue, but the fact that it ignores 
other accruals components may prevent it from capturing accounting discretion that 
arises from them. 
5.2.3 The Impact of Ownership Structure on Managers’ Accounting 
Discretion 
Ownership is one of the main sources of the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders or dominant and minority shareholders. Opportunistic accounting 
discretion is a result of the agency problem, which cannot be fully eliminated by the 
governance structure of a firm. Therefore, ownership structure may be a factor that 
influences opportunistic accounting discretion.  
This section focuses on the ways in which accounting discretion is affected by (1) 
ownership concentration and the presence of dominant shareholders; (2) ownership 
concentration, its types, and the presence of dominant shareholders and their types; and 
(3) managerial ownership. 
5.2.3.1 The Impact of Ownership Concentration and the Presence of 
Dominant Shareholders on Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, levels of share ownership influence the degree of 
alignment of interests between managers and shareholders or dominant shareholders and 
minority shareholders. There are two competing views on the ways in which incentive 
effects are able to affect managers’ accounting discretion.  
Firstly, the alignment effect suggests that the large shareholder, with a substantial 
proportion of shares, has a higher motivation and ability to participate in monitoring 
processes than small shareholders have (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986), because their wealth can be reduced as a result of mismanagement. In 
many cases, dominant shareholders also gain sufficient control over a firms’ operations 
when the proportion of their shares reaches a particular threshold, such as 20% or 25%. 
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Therefore, high ownership levels, especially in terms of cash flow rights, may prevent 
dominant shareholders from gaining private benefits because it is too costly for them to 
do so (Fan and Wong, 2002). Additionally, high ownership concentration can be viewed 
as a “credible commitment” for minority shareholders, such that a dominant shareholder 
will not exploit corporate assets (Fan and Wong, 2002).  
Therefore, the alignment effect suggests that increasing ownership concentration to a 
particular threshold may reduce the conflict of interests between dominant shareholders 
and minority shareholders, if they are motivated to monitor financial reporting, and 
thereby limit the opportunistic accounting discretion of managers. 
However, high levels of ownership concentration may lead to entrenchment effects, 
allowing dominant shareholders to apply pressure on managers to, for example, report 
firm performance in their interests, while creating cost to other shareholders (Zhong et 
al. 2007). Similarly, dominant shareholders may exploit corporate assets to gain benefits, 
such as “self-dealing transactions”, that transfer profits to their own private firms. Such 
exploitation can be carried out at little cost compared to the potential benefits (Fan and 
Wong, 2002). 
Regarding accounting discretion, it is likely that dominant shareholders who gain 
sufficient control in a firm will influence the preparation of financial reports. They may 
also limit the flow of information to the public in order to avoid political costs or hide 
their exploitation of corporate assets (Fan and Wong, 2002), thereby reducing corporate 
transparency and misleading minority shareholders. Therefore, the entrenchment effect19 
predicts that increased ownership concentration or the presence of a dominant 
shareholder may increase the opportunistic use of accounting discretion by managers. 
Evidence from the literature is mixed and limited. Azofra et al. (2003) found that 
ownership concentration, measured by the ownership of the top five largest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Fan and Wong (2002) suggests that an entrenchment effect in the context of dominant shareholders is 
similar to the managerial entrenchment suggested in literature (for example, see Morck et al., 1988), 
because dominant shareholders with high levels of ownership can avoid being governed by the board of 
directors and market disciplines. 
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shareholders, was associated with low absolute value of discretionary accruals in 
Spanish listed firms, suggesting that large shareholders played an active role in corporate 
monitoring processes that reduced the conflict of interests over choices of accounting 
policy. 
In contrast, Zhong et al. (2007) focused on the effect of outside blockholders on 
discretionary accruals in the US. They found that firms that experienced a decline in pre-
managed earnings tended to engage in income-increasing earnings management. 
Furthermore, they found a positive relationship between ownership by outside 
blockholders who did not manage the firms (less than or equal to 5%) and discretionary 
accruals, supporting the suggestion of an entrenchment effect in which the presence of 
outside managers tends to increase pressure on managers to report high firm 
performance. 
More recently, in research on listed firms in the Casablanca Stock Exchange, Morocco, 
Farooq et al. (2012) found a negative effect from the presence of the largest shareholders 
on absolute value of discretionary accruals, but they found no significant relationship 
between the ownership of the largest shareholders20 and absolute value of discretionary 
accruals. 
In summary, evidence from existing literature is still mixed and is limited, especially in 
Asian countries. In the context of Thailand, the evidence from Chapter 4 strongly 
supports the alignment effect and suggests that the ownership concentration/the presence 
of a dominant shareholder can help to align interests of the largest shareholders/the 
dominant shareholders to their firms’ interests leading to high firm performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes hypotheses based on the alignment effect predicting that 
the higher ownership concentration, the lower use of accounting discretions. 
Ha1: Ownership concentration has a negative impact on accounting discretion. 
Ha2: The presence of a dominant shareholder has a negative impact on 
accounting discretion. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 They define the level of ownership concentration according to the ownership of the largest shareholders.  
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5.2.3.2 The Impact of Ownership Concentration, by Shareholder Type, 
and the Presence of Dominant Shareholders, by their Type, on Managers’ 
Accounting Discretion 
The existing literature suggests that different types of shareholder may have different 
incentives to monitor the use of accounting discretion by managers. Based on the main 
identities of shareholders in Thai listed firms, this study focuses on shareholders who are 
family, government, a foreign company, a domestic company or an institutional investor 
(bank and financial institutions). 
5.2.3.2.1 Family 
As highlighted in previous chapters, existing literature in favour of the alignment effect 
suggests that family ownership can help to align the interests of a family towards firm 
value maximisation. A family firm is likely to be managed by family members, which 
may limit the conflict of interests arising from the separation of ownership and control. 
In addition, the close relationships between family members help to improve the 
efficiency of communication and monitoring processes (through the observation of 
managers’ efforts, for example). Therefore, a family firm is less likely to motivate its 
managers by rewards tied to earnings-based performance, and the lower use of earnings-
based performance in family firms may reduce the family’s incentive to manage 
earnings (Ali et al., 2007). 
Additionally, experience built up in family businesses (for example, through long-term 
relationships with management, suppliers or customers) contributes to the ability of 
family members to detect or mitigate opportunistic accounting discretion by managers 
(Ali et al., 2007; Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999). A family’s attitude towards their firm 
(love, trust and loyalty among family members), long-term investment goals and 
concern for reputation may also limit managers’ motivation to engage in opportunistic 
accounting discretion. 
However, existing literature in favour of the entrenchment effect argues that high levels 
of family ownership facilitate the entrenchment of family managers. Family attitudes 
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may motivate the family to focus on benefits to their group rather than to other 
shareholders. For example, dominant family shareholders are likely to engage in 
accounting discretion in order to hide related parties’ transactions among the family’s 
business groups. In addition, private communication between family managers may limit 
the flow of information to other shareholders. Therefore, if the family’s interest diverges 
from firm value maximisation, dominant family shareholders may increase opportunities 
for opportunistic accounting discretion at the expense of other shareholders. 
Focusing on the US listed firms in the S&P 500, Jiraporn and DaDalt (2009) found that 
US family firms were less likely to engage in accounting discretion over accruals than 
non-family firms were. Similarly, Wang (2006) found a negative relationship between 
founding family ownership and absolute discretionary accruals, indicating the low use of 
discretionary accruals in founding family firms. He also found that founding family 
ownership was associated with higher earnings quality than non-family ownership in 
terms of high informativeness and a lower persistence of transitory loss components in 
earnings. Although Wang (2006) only focused on founding family ownership, his 
evidence supports the notion that different types of shareholder have different 
motivations to exercise accounting discretion. 
Ali et al. (2007) compared corporate disclosure (quality of reported earnings,21 voluntary 
disclosure on corporate governance and managements’ poor earnings forecasts) in US 
family22 and non-family listed firms in the S&P500. They found a negative relationship 
between family firms and performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, indicating that 
family firms engaged less in accounting discretion than non-family firms did and, in 
turn, had higher earnings quality than non-family firms did. They also found that the 
quality of reported earnings from family firms was higher than that of non-family firms 
in terms of predicted future cash flows. Overall, their findings suggest that family firms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Proxies of earnings quality in Ali et al. (2007) include (performance-adjusted) discretionary accruals, 
earnings persistence and earnings response coefficients. 
22 Ali et al. (2007) recognise the classification of family firms in Business Week’s special issue on family 
firms (on 10 November 2003). 
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suffer less from agency problems, which results in less opportunistic use of accounting 
discretion than can be found in non-family firms.  
Evidence from US listed firms underlines the relationship between family ownership and 
accounting discretion in the context of more dispersed ownership. In contrast, research 
from outside the US mainly provides evidence of the relationship in the context of 
concentrated ownership. For example, Cascino et al. (2010) and Prencipe et al. (2008) 
focused on samples of Italian listed firms. While Cascino et al. (2010) measured 
earnings quality, with various earnings properties,23 Prencipe et al. (2008) focused on a 
specific type of accruals (research and development cost capitalisation). Both studies 
report higher earnings quality for family firms than for non-family firms.  
However, Prencipe et al. (2008) found that, unlike non-family firms, family firms are 
likely to engage in accounting discretion in order to avoid the violation of debt 
covenants, because they do not want to lose their control.  
Finally, Hashim and Devi (2009) also found a positive relationship between family 
ownership and accruals quality in Malaysian listed firms. 
In summary, evidence from existing literature is still mixed and is limited. In the context 
of Thailand, the evidence from Chapter 4 strongly supports the alignment effect in 
family owned/controlled firms. Therefore, this study proposes hypotheses based on the 
alignment effect predicting that the higher family block ownership/the presence of a 
dominant family shareholder, the lower use of accounting discretions. 
Ha3: Family block ownership has a negative impact on accounting discretion. 
Ha4: The presence of a dominant family shareholder has a negative impact on 
accounting discretion. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Earnings properties in Cascino et al., 2010) include accruals quality, persistence, predictability and 
smoothness. 
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5.2.3.2.2 Government 
As discussed in the previous chapters, governments can take an active role in monitoring 
if their objective is close to firm value maximisation (Le and Buck, 2011). Therefore, the 
alignment effect suggests that dominant government shareholders will limit the use of 
accounting discretion by managers. However, if a government is more concerned with 
other objectives, such as social welfare and political goals, it may facilitate accounting 
discretion in order to meet an expected threshold, for example (Chen et al., 2008). 
Research into the relationship between government ownership and accounting discretion 
has been carried out intensively in China. For example, Ding et al. (2007) examined 
relationship between dominant shareholder ownership and earnings management 
(discretionary accruals and the ratio of non-operating income to sales) by comparing 
state-owned with privately owned enterprises. They found that stated-owned enterprises 
were less likely to engage in accounting discretion than privately owned enterprises 
were. Their evidence also suggests an “inverted U-shape” form to the relationship: the 
positive relationship was found at low levels of government ownership and it became 
negative when the government owned over 55%–60% of shares. 
Evidence from Wang and Yung (2011) also confirms that state-owned enterprises used 
less discretionary accruals than privately owned enterprises, after controlling for the 
effect of tunnelling.24 They also found that the lower levels of accounting discretion25 in 
stated-owned firms may have been a result of government protection26 (guaranteed sales 
or the purchase of material at agreed levels), which reduced the incentive for managers 
to manipulate earnings, rather than of better monitoring. 
However, different types of government may have different incentives for exercising 
accounting discretion. For example, Chen et al. (2008a) found evidence of collusion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Wang and Yung (2011) used the ratio “non-operating income to sales” as a proxy for tunnelling. 
25 Wang and Yung (2011) also used accruals quality as a measurement of accounting discretion. While 
they found consistent results before the Chinese market liberalisation, the relationship become 
insignificant after the market liberalisation.	  
26 Wang and Yung (2011) found that stated-owned enterprise’s accounts (accounts receivables, inventories 
and accounts payables) are less volatile across periods of study.  
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between a local government and listed firms under its control, in the form of a 
government subsidy to increase earnings in order to avoid delisting regulation. In 
addition, Wu et al. (2012) found that, overall, the quality of earnings in stated-owned 
firms was lower than that in private firms, foreign firms and society-owned firms. They 
suggest that the State Assets Management Bureau (SAMB), which controls stated-
owned firms, may have less incentive or ability to monitor firms than other types of 
dominant shareholder do. 
In summary, evidence from existing literature is still mixed and is limited. In the context 
of Thailand, no evidence of exploitation in government owned/controlled firms was 
found from Chapter 4. Therefore, this study proposes hypotheses based on the alignment 
effect predicting that the higher government block ownership/the presence of a dominant 
government shareholder, the lower use of accounting discretions. 
Ha5: Government block ownership has a negative impact on accounting 
discretion. 
Ha6: The presence of a dominant government shareholder has a negative impact 
on accounting discretion. 
5.2.3.2.3 Foreign Companies 
Large proportions of share ownership may align the interests of foreign companies 
towards firm value maximisation. Therefore, foreign companies, as dominant 
shareholders, may be motivated to provide good monitoring to the firms in which they 
invested (Boardman et al., 1997). In addition, foreign companies from developed 
markets, such as the UK and the US, may motivate firms to prepare high quality 
financial reports by increasing the demand for high quality accounting standards and 
corporate governance (Aggarwal et al. 2005; Jeon and Ryoo, 2013).  
Jeon and Ryoo (2013) argue that, unlike domestic companies,27 foreign investors help 
firms to appoint non-executive directors who are independent from dominant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Domestic companies may be less independent if they come from the dominant shareholders’ business 
group. 
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shareholders. Therefore, the alignment effect suggests that firms with foreign companies 
as dominant shareholders may inhibit opportunistic accounting discretion. 
In contrast, the long distance between parent and subsidiary companies may lead to 
inefficient monitoring by foreign investors and provide some opportunities for managers 
to exercise accounting discretion (Boardman et al., 1997; Wiwattanakantang, 1999). 
Existing research provides evidence that foreign ownership enhances firm performance. 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) examined a sample of firms in 27 countries and report that 
firms with higher ownership by foreign and independent investors (who had no business 
relationship with the firms in which they invested) were likely to have better firm 
performance. In China, Wu et al. (2012) also found that foreign owned companies 
engaged less in accounting discretion than state-owned firms did. In the Korean capital 
market, Jeon and Ryoo (2013) found evidence that foreign ownership was positively 
associated with the proportion of outside shareholders. They suggest that dominant 
foreign shareholders are likely to prevent firms from appointing non-executive directors, 
increasing their ability to influence corporate policy and leading to higher dividend 
payments.  
Nevertheless, existing research that examines the effect of foreign ownership on 
accounting policy and accounting discretion is still very limited. In the context of 
Thailand, no evidence of exploitation in foreign company owned/controlled firms was 
found from Chapter 4. Therefore, this study proposes hypotheses based on the alignment 
effect predicting the higher foreign company block ownership/the presence of a 
dominant foreign company shareholder, the lower use of accounting discretions. 
Ha7: Foreign company block ownership has a negative impact on accounting 
discretion. 
Ha8: The presence of a dominant foreign company shareholder has a negative 
impact on accounting discretion. 
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5.2.3.2.4 Institutional Investors (Bank and Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions) 
Although research on the impact of institutional investors on accounting discretion is 
limited, other research into their impact on corporate governance and performance offers 
some insight into the motivations for institutional investors to monitor managers.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, factors influencing the degree of monitoring by institutional 
investors include their independence (Brickley et al., 1988; Ferreira and Matos, 2008) 
and their investment objectives (long-term or short-term investment horizons). Bushee 
(1998) suggests that large shareholdings reduce the incentive for institutional investors 
to invest in the short term, thereby increasing their incentives to participate in 
monitoring processes. 
Nevertheless, Gillan and Starks (2007) argue that monitoring is costly and that 
institutional investors with a large proportion of shares are therefore likely to be active 
in monitoring processes only if their investment return is large enough to compensate 
them.  
Evidence of the role of institutional investors in monitoring accounting discretion shows 
mixed results. Focusing on aggregate institutional investors, Charitou et al. (2007) 
examined distressed firms in the US to investigate (1) whether their managers were 
motivated to exercise accounting discretion over earnings or not and (2) the role of 
institutional ownership in mitigating this discretion. They found that managers had 
incentives to decrease earnings prior to filing for bankruptcy. In addition, they found a 
positive and significant relationship between institutional ownership (two years before 
bankruptcy filing) and discretionary accruals (prior to bankruptcy filing), suggesting that 
ownership by institutional investors may help to prevent managers of distressed firms 
from under reporting earnings prior to filing for bankruptcy. 
The literature also suggests that different incentives for each type of institutional 
investor (short or long-term horizon investors) lead to different degrees of monitoring. 
For example, Bushee (1998) examined whether ownership by institutional investors 
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helped to limit or enhance managers’ use of accounting discretion. He focused on 
managers’ decision to cut research and development (R&D) expenses as a strategy to 
boost short-term earnings. He found that firms with high institutional ownership were 
less likely to cut R&D expenses, supporting the view that institutional investors are 
sophisticated and are likely to provide good monitoring. However, he found that 
incentives for managers to cut R&D expenses, in order to boost short-term earnings, 
increased when firms were substantially owned by institutional investors with short-term 
investment goals (those who had high portfolio turnovers and used momentum-trading 
methods). 
Koh (2003) examined the relationship between institutional ownership and aggressive 
use of accounting discretion in Australian listed firms. He found a positive (negative) 
relationship between institutional ownership and income-increasing discretionary 
accruals at low (high) levels of institutional ownership. The positive relationship at low 
levels of institutional ownership supports the view that short-term institutional investors 
drive managers to misuse accounting discretion. The negative relationship at higher 
levels of institutional ownership implies better monitoring is provided by long-term 
institutional investors. 
Focusing on listed firms in the US, Koh (2007) classified sample firms into those that 
had and did not have incentive and ability to use accounting discretion (discretionary 
accruals) to beat their targets (group 1 and group 2, respectively). He found evidence 
that long-term institutional ownership helped to limit the use of discretionary accruals 
only for firms in group 1. He also found that pressure-sensitive investors, such as banks 
and insurance companies, were positively related to discretionary accruals only for firms 
in group 1, which exercised discretionary accruals to avoid having to report loss or 
decline in earnings. 
Later, Hidani et al. (2011) found a negative impact from the largest institutional 
investors on discretionary accruals in the US. They suggest that a large proportion of 
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shares held by the largest institutional investors motivate them to provide efficient 
monitoring to restrain accounting discretion. 
In summary, evidence from existing literature is still mixed and is limited. In the context 
of Thailand, no evidence of exploitation in bank company owned/controlled firms was 
found from Chapter 4. In addition, there is evidence that firms with the presence of a 
dominant non-bank financial institution shareholder perform better than firm without it. 
Therefore, this study proposes hypotheses based on the alignment effect predicting the 
higher bank/non-bank financial institution block ownership/the presence of a dominant 
bank/non-bank financial institution shareholder, the lower use of accounting discretions. 
Ha9: Bank block ownership has a negative impact on accounting discretion. 
Ha10: The presence of a dominant bank shareholder has a negative impact on 
accounting discretion. 
Ha11: Non-bank financial institution block ownership has a negative impact on 
accounting discretion. 
Ha12: The presence of a dominant non-bank financial institution shareholder has 
a negative impact on accounting discretion. 
5.2.3.3 The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting 
Discretion 
As discussed in Chapter 2, managerial ownership can either align managers’ interests to 
or diverge them from those of shareholders. Therefore, it could also affect to managers’ 
motivation to avoid or engage in misused of accounting discretions. 
Evidence from existing literature, classified by patterns of ownership structure 
(dispersed or concentrated ownership), provides mixed results. Earlier research has 
focused on countries, such as the US, where the ownership tends to be diffuse. For 
example, Warfield et al. (1995) examined the relationship between managerial 
ownership and managers’ accounting choices (absolute discretionary accruals) and 
found a negative association between managerial ownership and absolute discretionary 
accruals. They also report a doubling of absolute discretionary accruals in firms with 
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low managerial ownership (<5 percent) compared to firms with high levels of 
managerial ownership (>= 35 percent), revealing some evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and accounting discretion. They suggest that 
managers with low ownership have greater incentives to exercise opportunistic 
accounting discretion (in order to mitigate a restriction in accounting-based provision, 
for example).  
In contrast, Chen and Lee (1995) found that managers of US firms in the oil and gas 
industry exercised accounting discretion in order to increase earnings and achieve annual 
bonus targets. Cheng and Warfield (2005) found that managers with high equity 
incentives (from stock based compensation or share ownership) tended to sell their 
shares after earnings announcements and that they tended to report earnings to meet or 
just beat analyst forecasts so that they could receive capital gains from selling their 
stocks at a higher price. These findings show the conflict of interests between managers 
and firms and suggest that managerial ownership motivates managers to engage in 
accounting discretion. 
Other research focuses on countries in which ownership is concentrated. For example, 
Gabrielsen et al. (2002) found a positive but insignificant relationship between 
managerial ownership and absolute discretionary accruals in Danish listed firms in 
regulated industries (transportation and utilities firms). They suggest that, where their 
findings differ from those of Warfield et al. (1995), this may be a result of the higher 
ownership concentration and smaller size of Danish listed firms compared to US listed 
firms.  
Yang et al. (2008) examined the relationship between board ownership and discretionary 
accruals in Taiwanese listed firms. Their overall evidence is consistent with Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) and Gabrielsen et al. (2002), showing a positive relationship. When 
they further classified director ownership into that of executive and non-executive 
directors, they found evidence of a non-linear relationship, with an “inverted U-shape” 
form, between executive director ownership and discretionary accruals. Hence the 
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higher levels of ownership by executive directors may have tied their interests to those 
of shareholders. However, they found a positive relationship between non-executive 
directors and discretionary accruals, indicating that directors may have been motivated 
by equity incentives to engage in accounting discretion, in order to increase stock price 
for future selling (for example). 
In summary, evidence from existing literature is still mixed and is limited. With a 
combination of ownership and control, the evidence from Chapter 4 supports the 
alignment effect and suggests that the higher the managerial ownership, the higher firm 
performance. Therefore, this study proposes hypotheses based on the alignment effect 
predicting that the higher managerial ownership, the lower use of accounting discretions. 
Ha13: Managerial ownership has a negative impact on accounting discretion. 
5.2.4 The Impact of Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
This chapter focuses on three main corporate governance mechanisms in the Thai capital 
market: board of directors, CEO characteristics and external auditors. 
5.2.4.1 Board of Directors  
As discussed in Chapter 3, shareholders appoint a board of directors as their 
representatives and delegate power to it in order to supervise and monitor management 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). According to OECD (2004: 25), one of the key functions of 
the board of directors is  
 “Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial 
reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate 
systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk 
management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the 
law and relevant standards.”  
 
Therefore, the efficiency of a board of directors may affect the degree of accounting 
discretion by managers or dominant shareholders. According to Zahra and Pearce 
(1989), board attributes (composition, characteristics, structure and process) determine 
the efficiency of a board’s functions (service, strategy and control). This chapter focuses 
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on three key attributes of the board, (1) Board structure (Board size and Board 
independence) (2) Board experience and (3) CEO characteristics. 
5.2.4.1.1 Board Size 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, too big a board of directors may lead to inefficient 
monitoring and a smaller board may perform better control and monitoring functions 
due to better communication and less likelihood of the free-rider problem among its 
members (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). 
However, some research has found that larger boards may benefit larger firms (Coles et 
al., 2008) because they include wider expertise, which increases their ability to monitor 
top management. In addition, larger boards may have increased powers to govern a firm 
in shareholders’ interests and to limit CEO dominance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).   
The existing literature provides evidence that links board size to accounting discretion. 
In the US, Beasley (1996) found that the likelihood of financial statement fraud 
decreases as the board size decreases. Ghosh et al. (2010), using samples from before 
and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 (SOX), found a significant positive relationship 
between board size and earnings management techniques, such as discretionary accruals, 
both before and after SOX, indicating that larger boards tended to be inefficient in 
detecting earnings management, even after SOX.  
However, Xie et al. (2003) report a significant negative relationship between board size 
and discretionary accruals in the US, which suggests that larger boards may be better at 
monitoring accounting discretion because they have higher levels of expertise. 
In Asian countries, Abdul Rahman et al. (2006) found a positive relationship between 
board size and earnings management in Malaysian listed companies, suggesting more 
conflict of interests in larger boards than in smaller boards. In contrast, Hashim et al. 
(2009) found that larger boards tended to have higher earnings quality (less use of 
discretionary accruals) in Malaysian listed firms. This contradictory evidence may have 
been caused by the difference in sample firms and years. While Abdul Rahman et al. 
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(2006) used a sample of the 100 top-listed firms in 2001, Hashim et al. (2009) included 
all non-financial listed firms in 2005. Furthermore, the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (2000) has been introduced since 2000 in order to improve corporate 
governance in listed Malaysian firms, and this may have improved directors’ awareness 
of their responsibility and reduced conflict between them in firms with larger boards. 
The literature discussed above suggests either positive or negative effects of board size 
on accounting discretion. In Thailand, Sukeecheep et al. (2013) could not find the 
significant relationship between board size and earnings management of non-financial 
listed firms during the year 2006 to 2010. Nevertheless, the evidence from Chapter 4 
reveals an inefficiency of the bigger boards that leads to lower firm performance. A few 
research on board size and firm performance in Thailand such as Pathan et al. (2007) 
also found the negative impact of bank board size on firm performance during the year 
1999 to 2003. Nevertheless, with the limited research in Thailand, this study proposes 
hypotheses based on inefficiency of large board of directors and expects that the bigger 
board size, the higher use of accounting discretions. 
Ha14: Board size has a positive impact on accounting discretion. 
5.2.4.1.2 Independence and Experience of Board of Directors 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a board consists of two main types of director: executive and 
non-executive directors. According to ICSA (2010), a balance of the two types of 
director is important to a board’s efficiency.  
The existing literature addresses the importance of board independence as a feature that 
can enhance board efficiency and academics and regulators have focused on the role of 
non-executive directors who are independent. As discussed in Chapter 2, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) suggest that non-executive directors help to solve the agency problem that 
may arise from incentive issues such as board compensation. In addition, they are more 
likely to provide efficient monitoring to executive directors and less likely to collaborate 
with executive directors in order to extract wealth from shareholders (Beasley, 1996). A 
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board of directors comprised of a high proportion of non-executive directors is expected 
to be more independent and therefore more effective.  
Existing research in accounting reveals evidence that non-executive directors limit an 
opportunistic accounting discretion and fraud. In the US and the UK, Beasley (1996) 
found that firms experiencing fraud had lower proportions of independent directors than 
firms with no fraud did.  
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) report that firms with audit committees had less 
overstatement of financial reporting than those without them had. Dechow et al. (1996) 
focused on firms that had violated the financial requirements of the U.S. SEC and found 
that either they had fewer audit committee members or fewer non-executive directors 
compared to other firms. Peasnell et al. (2000) examined whether the Cadbury report’s 
recommendation on the role of non-executive directors affected earnings management or 
not. They found that managers tended to exercise fewer income-increasing accruals in 
order to avoid reporting loss in UK firms with high proportions of non-executive 
directors only in the “post-Cadbury period”.28 Klein (2002) and Davidson et al. (2005) 
found that the independence of audit committees and non-executive directors was 
negatively associated with (absolute) discretionary accruals. 
However, Park and Shin (2004) found that only non-executive directors who were 
representatives of financial intermediaries29 (as opposed to other types of non-executive 
director) helped to reduce the use of discretionary accruals in Canadian listed firms. 
They therefore argue that non-executive directors’ knowledge of companies’ business or 
accounting may enhance their ability to limit earnings management. In addition, they 
found no significant change in the effect of non-executive directors and discretionary 
accruals before or after the release of the Toronto Stock Exchange Corporate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In their study, the “post-Cadbury period” was from 1994 to 1995, after the Report of the Committee on 
the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) (Cadbury Report) recommended that listed firms 
be aware of the role of non-executive directors. 
29 Financial intermediaries include commercial banks, insurance companies, investment banks, finance 
companies, mutual funds and pension funds. 
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Governance Guidelines of 1994, which recommends that firms have a high proportion of 
non-executive directors on their boards.   
In the context of Asian countries, with highly concentrated ownership, Jaggi et al. 
(2009) found that board independence was a constraint to the use of accounting 
discretion to manipulate earnings in Hong Kong listed firms. However, research on 
Malaysian listed firms, such as Hashim and Devi (2009) and Abdul Rahman (2006), 
found no significant evidence of a relationship between board independence and the use 
of discretionary accruals. Their findings suggest that the knowledge of non-executive 
directors is more important to a board’s monitoring function than the proportion of non-
executive directors is. 
Overall, the literature suggests two possible effects of the independence boards on 
accounting discretion, either positive or negative relationships with accounting 
discretion. In Thailand, the high ownership concentrations in most of Thai listed firms 
increase a demand for independent directors to check and balance the control of 
controlling managers. Therefore, it is not surprise that board independence is viewed as 
an important governance mechanism and is much more promoted by government and 
regulators after the financial crisis. Therefore, this study proposes hypothesis based on 
the objective of this structure to limit the opportunistic behaviour of managers and 
expects that the higher proportion of independent directors, the lower use of accounting 
discretions. 
Ha15: Board independence has a negative impact on accounting discretion. 
Regarding board experience, existing literature suggests that board members who hold 
multiple directorships (e.g. take director position in other companies) may have more 
experience and knowledge, which could contribute to their ability to supervise 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Ferries et al., 2003; Fich, 2005). For example, in 
the U.S., Ferries et al. (2003) found that the numbers of appointments held by a director 
are associated with high firm performance. In Asian countries, Banderlipe ll (2009) in 
Philippine, Saleh et al. (2005) in Malaysia and Sukeecheep et al. (2013) in Thailand	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found that the independent directors who hold multiple directorial positions could help 
to limit earnings management. 
However, some argue that directors who hold multiple board appointment may be too 
busy to efficiently monitor management of many companies (Ferries et al., 2003; Fich 
and Shivdasani, 2006). For example, in the U.S., Core et al. (1999) found that the 
presence of multiple directorships led to an excess of CEO compensation implying that 
these directors inadequate monitor managers. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) found that 
firms with multiple directorial directors are likely to have poor corporate governance 
and lower firm performance. 
In summary, existing literature addresses that the multiple directorships could be viewed 
as either board experience/quality or board inefficiency. This study views the multiple 
directorships as a measurement of board experience. In fact, the network relationship 
and the connection with bank and government are addressed as important factors of 
firms’ success in the Thai business, e.g. to rapidly respond to business environment 
change (e.g. Suehiro, 1993). Directors are come from other companies in firms’ 
networks (including bank or government). Because opportunistic accounting discretion 
may be complicated and may need people who have more experience in business to 
discover it, this study hypothesises that the director experience measured by the multiple 
directorships may help the board to protect/limit the use of accounting discretions by 
managers. 
Ha16: Board experience has a negative impact on accounting discretion. 
5.2.4.2 CEO Characteristics 
This chapter focuses on four variables of CEO characteristics: CEO Duality (CEO-
Chair), CEO founder, CEO descendant, who is a son or daughter of the company’s 
founder and CEO-group (when the CEO belongs to the same group as the chairman). 
Note that, although most listed firms separate CEO from chairman roles, in many cases 
the CEO and chairman come from the same group (father and son). CEO-group is 
therefore included as another variable for CEO characteristics. 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, Jensen (1993) suggests that the independence of a chairman 
as a leader of board of directors is important for board efficiency. Therefore, the 
efficiency of a board in monitoring management may be reduced if CEO duality is 
present, as it may provide opportunities for CEOs to dominate boards. However, some 
research argues that CEO duality may reduce communication problems between CEOs 
and chairmen. In addition, separating two positions may create some costs to firms by, 
for example, (1) limiting the efficiency of CEOs to respond to changes in the business 
environment or (2) ignoring any valuable knowledge the CEO has that could help 
him/her to fulfil the chairman’s functions (for example, see Brickley et al., 1997).  
As discussed in Chapter 4, CEO founders may have control over firms (Morck et al., 
1988) and be less accountable for their actions (Dechow et al., 1996), which would 
allow them to dominate the board. However, CEO founders’ expertise and business 
connections may benefit firms (Morck et al., 1988; Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 
2004), and their motivation to transfer the business to their descendants may make them 
less likely to manipulate earnings (Jiraporn and DaDalt, 2007). Nevertheless, it is also 
possible that they block firms from hiring professional managers who may be more 
competent than their descendants are (for example, see Mehrotra et al., 2013). 
Regarding evidence on earnings management, Dechow et al. (1996) found that the firms 
that experienced financial misstatement by earnings manipulation in the US were likely 
to have either CEO founders or CEOs who also served as chairmen. However, Jiraporn 
and DaDalt (2007) found that founding family firms used fewer discretionary accruals 
than non-founding family firms did. 
Some research has not found a significant relationship between CEO duality and 
earnings management: for example, Xie et al. (2003) (using current discretionary 
accruals) and Ghosh et al. (2010) (using absolute discretionary accruals before and after 
SOX, 2002). In Asian countries, Jaggi et al. (2009) found a negative relationship for 
CEO duality and no significant relationship for CEO duality in respect to earnings 
management (discretionary accruals) in Hong Kong listed firms. In addition, while 
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Abdul Rahman et al. (2006) found no significant relationship between CEO duality and 
discretionary accruals, Hashim et al. (2009) found that CEO duality enhanced earnings 
quality in Malaysian listed firms, casting doubt on the recommendation of the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance (2000) for the separation of the position of the CEO 
from that of the chairman. 
Overall, the literature suggests either positive or negative effects of CEO characteristics 
on managers’ accounting discretion. In Thailand, CEO duality is likely to be presented 
in family controlled firms. Although the evidence from Chapter 4 suggests the alignment 
effect is strong in these firms, CEO duality may possibly reduce the effectiveness of the 
board to oversee the CEO. Therefore, this study hypothesises that CEO duality may 
reduce the board’s effectiveness to review financial reporting leading to a great 
opportunity for manager to use of accounting discretion. 
Ha17: The presence of CEO duality has a positive impact on accounting 
discretion. 
In Thailand, firms attempted to separate CEO and chairman positions to be comply with 
the good corporate governance guidance. However, it is possible that CEO and 
Chairman may come from the same group of people (i.e. father and son or relatives). 
This characteristic may reduce an independency of chairman and the board to supervise 
CEO. Therefore, this study hypothesises that the close relationship between CEO and 
chairman may reduce the board’s effectiveness to review financial reporting leading to a 
great opportunity for manager to use of accounting discretion. 
Ha18: The presence of a CEO and chairman who come from the same group has 
a positive impact on accounting discretion. 
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, Chapter 3, most of Thai firms’ founders are still alive and 
most of them are likely to take a CEO position. The alignment effect in family 
controlled firms reported in Chapter 4 could imply that CEO founder may have less 
motivation to use the opportunistic accounting discretion because it may reduce the 
firms’ reputation in long term. Their business experience may also increase their ability 
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to limit the use of opportunistic accounting discretions by other managers. Therefore, 
this study hypothesises that CEO founder may help to limit the use of opportunistic 
accounting discretions by managers.  
Ha19: The presence of CEO founder has a negative impact on accounting 
discretion. 
However, research in Thailand such as Bertrand et al. (2008) found that firms managed 
by many founders’ son are associated with lower firm performance. Their findings 
create a question on ability of the founders’ descendants to run the family business as 
good as the founders do. Therefore, this study hypothesises that CEO descendants may 
not effectively to limit the use of opportunistic accounting discretions by managers.   
Ha20: The presence of CEO descendants has a positive impact on accounting 
discretion. 
5.2.4.3 Auditor Reputation and Expertise 
External auditors are viewed as a governance mechanism to inhibit opportunistic 
accounting discretion by managers or dominant shareholders (for examples, see Becker 
et al. 1998; Lawrence et al., 2011). Auditors audit a company’s financial reporting and 
express their opinion on financial reports whether they are fairly presented in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles or not. According to Becker et al. (1998), 
auditors’ report may help to reduce information asymmetry between managers and users 
of financial reporting (stakeholders), and audit quality may affect the degree of 
accounting discretion used by managers. This chapter focuses on two proxies of audit 
quality, as suggested by the literature: type of audit firm (BIG4 or NON-BIG4 audit 
firms) and auditor partner tenure. 
5.2.4.3.1 Auditor Reputation 
Given the fact that BIG4 audit firms are the four biggest auditing firms in the world, 
some research uses “BIG4” vs. “NON-BIG4” to define external audit quality (Becker et 
al. 1998). Research suggests that an audit firm’s size may influence its incentive to 
provide high quality auditing (for example, see DeAngelo, 1981). Larger audit firms 
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normally have many clients and are therefore more likely produce high quality work in 
order to retain their reputation and their independence, because they have “more to lose” 
(DeAngelo, 1981: 184; Lawrence et al., 2011). In addition, larger audit firms may 
benefit from economies of scale and be motivated by their size and reputation to provide 
better training programs for their staff and to standardise audit methodologies and 
procedures through practices such as peer audit review (DeAngelo, 1981; Lawrence et 
al., 2011). 
Research from the US provides evidence that BIG4 auditors help to limit accounting 
discretion. Becker et al. (1998) found that firms with BIG4 auditors used fewer 
discretionary accruals than firms with NON-BIG4 auditors did. Krishnan (2003) found 
that firms with BIG4 auditors used discretionary accruals in order to convey private 
information to investors rather than in an aggressive or opportunistic way. In fact, he 
found that discretionary accruals for BIG4 firms were positively associated with future 
profitability (2-year ahead stock return). Benh et al. (2008) found evidence suggesting 
that analyst forecast earnings were more accurate in firms with BIG4 auditors and other 
research also provides evidence that BIG4 audit firms tend to provide more accurate and 
useful information in auditors’ reports about financial difficulties such as the issue of 
going concerns (Lennox, 1999; Geiger and Rama, 2006). 
However, some research argues that the size of audit firms alone should not make any 
difference to their quality of work because all auditors are regulated by the same 
professional standards (for examples, see DeAngelo, 1981; Lawrence et al., 2011). Louis 
(2005) suggests that smaller audit firms have competitive advantages in terms of better 
knowledge on local markets than larger firms do when it comes to helping their clients 
in specific circumstances (mergers and acquisitions). Lawrence et al. (2011) found no 
difference in audit quality between BIG4 and Non-BIG4 firms after controlling for client 
characteristics using “propensity-score matching models”. 
Overall, the literature suggests either positive or negative impacts of BIG4 auditors on 
managers’ accounting discretion. In Thailand, Thai law restricts accounting 
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professionals to Thai nationals. Therefore, BIG4 audit firms have merged with large and 
famous Thai audit firms. Research about earnings quality in Thailand such as Herrmann 
et al. (2008) found that BIG4 audit clients reported more conservative earnings than 
Non-BIG4 clients, especially during the financial crisis in Thailand. Nevertheless, 
Thoopsamut and Jaikengkit (2009) could not found any significant relationship between 
audit firm size measured by the presence of BIG4 audit firms and quarterly earnings 
management during the year 2005 to 2006. Given the reputation and large size of the 
BIG4 audit firms in Thailand, this study hypothesises that auditors from the BIG4 audit 
firms have high ability to detect the use of opportunistic accounting discretion by 
managers. 
Ha21: The presence of a BIG4 audit firm has a negative impact on accounting 
discretion. 
5.2.4.3.2 Auditor Partner Tenure   
Accounting scandals in large corporations, such as ENRON, may indicate that the size 
of audit firms alone cannot guarantee high audit quality. Academics and regulators have 
focused on auditor independence, and long periods of auditor tenure may reduce auditor 
independence over time and result in low quality audits that fail, for example, to limit 
the opportunistic use of accounting discretion (Myers et al., 2003). This argument has 
led to recommendations that either audit partners or firms be rotated after a fixed period. 
For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) mandates firms to rotate their audit partner 
every five years. In Thailand, firms have also had to rotate their audit partners every five 
years since 200630. Auditor rotation aims to solve the problem of continuing 
relationships between managers and auditors and new auditors may help to discover 
issues that have been overlooked (Carey and Simnett, 2006). 
In contrast, practitioners argue that long audit tenure can enhance the efficiency of audit 
work, as auditors with long tenures are likely to have a growing knowledge of a firm’s 
specific risks (Myers et al., 2003: 782), and their experience may help them to verify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The Notification of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand, No. Kor.Chor. 39/2548 (2005) 
requires listed firms to rotate their audit partner every five years, effective on 1 January 2006. 
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management discretion and estimations (Myers et al., 2003). In addition, audit rotation 
may create costs for new auditors or their client’s firms (Myers et al., 2003). 
Research on the link between auditor rotation and earnings quality was intensively 
conducted after SOX (2002). In general, researchers define “audit tenure” as the number 
of years for which firms have retained an auditor (either an audit firm or audit partner). 
In the US, Myers et al. (2003) found a negative relationship between audit tenure31 and 
earnings management (discretionary accruals and current accruals), suggesting that 
lengthening auditor tenure helps to limit the exercise of accounting discretion for 
specific purposes (income-increasing/decreasing discretionary accruals). Similarly, 
while Johnson et al. (2002) found no evidence that firms with long audit tenures (more 
than 9 years) had lower quality financial statements, they found evidence that short to 
medium audit-firm tenure was associated with low quality of earnings (discretionary 
accruals). These finding suggests that auditors in the early years of their tenure may lack 
of specific knowledge about client’s business, resulting in lower rates of detection for 
earnings manipulation. 
Focusing on auditor-partner tenure, Carey and Simnett (2006) found evidence 
suggesting that long auditor tenure was less likely to modify auditor opinion on going 
concerns in Australian listed firms. They also found some evidence that firms with long 
audit tenure tended to report earnings in a way that meet earnings benchmarks, 
supporting the alternative view that long auditor tenure may harm earnings quality. 
However, they did not find any significant relationship between long audit tenures and 
discretionary accruals.  
In Taiwan, Chi and Huang (2005) and Chen et al. (2008b) examined the effects of audit-
firm and audit-partner tenures on earnings quality (discretionary accruals). Both studies 
report evidence that supports the notion that earnings quality increases as audit tenure 
increases. Nevertheless, Chi and Huang (2005) found that earnings quality tended to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Myers et al. (2003: 784) examined audit-firm tenure; they define “auditor tenure as the number of years 
that the firm has retained the given auditor, and code auditor changes attributable to audit firm mergers as 
a continuation of the prior auditor.” 
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lower when audit tenure exceeded the threshold of five years. They also found that BIG4 
firms gained specific knowledge from their (new) client’s firms more rapidly than NON-
BIG4 firms. Chi et al. (2009) compared the effect of audit-partner tenure before and 
after auditor rotation (2003) in Taiwan. They found no evidence to support the notion 
that long auditor-tenure reduces earnings quality.  
Overall, the literature suggests either positive or negative effects of auditor-partner 
tenure on managers’ accounting discretion. For the Thai capital markets, a concern on an 
auditor’s independence has been arisen after the corporate scandals in the US. 
Subsequently, the SECT requires listed firms to rotate their auditor partner for every five 
years since 2005. Based on this requirement, this study hypothesises that long auditor 
partner tenure (i.e. >= 5 years) could reduce auditors’ independency and increase 
opportunities for managers to use of opportunistic accounting discretions. 
Ha22: Auditor-Partner tenure has a positive impact on accounting discretion. 
5.2.5 The Corporate Governance Reforms and their Implications for 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
Corporate governance reforms may influence the magnitude of accounting discretion 
over accruals and revenues. While they aim to reduce the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders, accounting standards reforms may provide some 
opportunities for managers to exercise accounting discretion over financial reporting.  
Evidence from the literature is still limited and mixed in respect to whether corporate 
governance reforms help to limit opportunistic accounting discretion or not. In the US, 
Wang et al. (2011) found that the use of discretionary accruals decreased after the 
introduction of SOX, 2002. Although SOX, 2002, has not been successful in reducing 
the motivation of firms with poor performance to engage in income-increasing earnings 
management, it may prevent firms with good performance from doing so.  
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In Australia, Hutchinson (2008) found that some governance mechanisms (board 
independence) were able to limit the use of accounting discretion after the Australian 
corporate governance reforms. 
In Thailand, it remains unclear whether the corporate governance reforms have 
improved the impact of ownership structure on accounting discretion or not. If the 
corporate governance mechanisms, imposed since 1999, have worked as well as they 
were intended to, they should have limited managers’ accounting discretion. Therefore, 
the hypotheses are proposed as follows: 
Ha23: The impact of ownership concentration on accounting discretion differs in 
pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-reform 
ownership will be more negatively effect to accounting discretion. 
Ha24: The impact of the presence of a dominant shareholder on accounting 
discretion differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the 
presence of a dominant shareholder in post-reform period will be more 
negatively related to accounting discretion. 
Ha25: The impact of family block ownership on accounting discretion differs in 
pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-reform 
ownership will be more negatively effect to accounting discretion. 
Ha26: The impact of government block ownership on accounting discretion differs 
in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-reform 
ownership will be more negatively effect to accounting discretion. 
Ha27: The impact of foreign company block ownership on accounting discretion 
differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-
reform ownership will be more negatively effect to accounting discretion. 
Ha28: The impact of bank block ownership on accounting discretion differs in 
pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-reform 
ownership will be more negatively effect to accounting discretion. 
Ha29: The impact of non-bank financial institutions block ownership on 
accounting discretion differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the 
sense that the post-reform ownership will be more negatively effect to 
accounting discretion. 
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Ha30: The impact of the presence of a dominant family shareholder on accounting 
discretion differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the 
presence of this type of a dominant shareholder in post-reform the post-
reform period will be more negatively related to accounting discretion. 
Ha31: The impact of the presence of a dominant government shareholder on 
accounting discretion differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the 
sense that the presence of this type of a dominant shareholder in post-reform 
the post-reform period will be more negatively related to accounting 
discretion. 
Ha32: The impact of the presence of a dominant foreign company shareholder on 
accounting discretion differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the 
sense that the presence of this type of a dominant shareholder in post-reform 
the post-reform period will be more negatively related to accounting 
discretion. 
Ha33: The impact of the presence of a dominant non-bank financial institution 
shareholder on accounting discretion differs in pre-reform and post-reform 
periods in the sense that the presence of this type of a dominant shareholder 
in post-reform the post-reform period will be more negatively related to 
accounting discretion. 
Ha34: The impact of managerial ownership on accounting discretion differs in 
pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the post-reform 
ownership will be more negatively related to accounting discretion. 
Ha35: The impact of board size on accounting discretion differs in pre-reform and 
post-reform periods in the sense that post-reform board size will be more 
negatively related to accounting discretion. 
Ha36: The impact of board independence on accounting discretion differs in pre-
reform and post-reform periods in the sense that post-reform board 
independence will be more negatively related to accounting discretion. 
Ha37: The impact of board experience on accounting discretion differs in pre-
reform and post-reform periods in the sense that post-reform board 
experience will be more negatively related to accounting discretion. 
Ha38: The impact of the presence of CEO duality on accounting discretion differs 
in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the presence of CEO 
duality in the post-reform period will be more negatively related to 
accounting discretion. 
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Ha39: The impact of the presence of a CEO and chairman who come from the 
same group on accounting discretion differs in pre-reform and post-reform 
periods in the sense that the presence of a CEO and chairman who come 
from the same group in the post-reform period will be more negatively 
related to accounting discretion. 
Ha40: The impact of the presence of CEO founder on accounting discretion 
differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the presence 
of CEO founder in the post-reform period will be more negatively related to 
accounting discretion. 
Ha41: The impact of the presence of CEO descendants on accounting discretion 
differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the presence 
of CEO descendants in the post-reform period will be more negatively 
related to accounting discretion. 
Ha42: The impact of the presence of a BIG4 audit firm on accounting discretion 
differs in pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that the presence 
of a BIG4 audit firm in the post-reform period will be more negatively 
related to accounting discretion. 
Ha43: The impact of auditor-partner tenure on accounting discretion differs in 
pre-reform and post-reform periods in the sense that auditor-partner tenure 
in the post-reform period will be more negatively related to accounting 
discretion. 
5.3 Research Design and Methodology 
5.3.1 Framework 
This chapter investigates whether ownership structure and other observed corporate 
governance have any effects on managers’ accounting discretion in the Thai capital 
market. Other observed corporate governance mechanisms include board structure, CEO 
characteristics and audit quality. These mechanisms have been selected because they are 
the key mechanisms that play an important role in the Thai corporate governance 
system, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
The perspectives of existing literature, discussed in Section 5.2.1, have been used to 
develop theoretical hypotheses and empirical testing methods (Bowen et al., 2008; 
Demsetz, 1983; Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Core et al., 1999; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990).	   According to this framework, ownership structure and corporate 
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governance mechanisms are chosen by shareholders in order to respond to the current 
and anticipated economic environments. Governance mechanisms therefore induce 
optimal contracts, which lead to firm value maximisation in long run. Under an optimal 
contract, shareholders have already incorporated all economic determinants of expected 
managerial opportunism over accounting discretion within a firms’ governance 
structure. In other words, they choose ownership structures and a set of governance 
mechanisms that minimise the agency problem, balancing the monitoring and contract 
costs and benefits gained from a reduction in expected manager opportunism.	  
If a contract is optimal, there should be no relationship between ownership structure, 
observed corporate governance mechanisms and accounting discretion because all 
economic determinants of accounting discretion have been specified by the contract 
parties. Thus if a contract is optimal, 
Accounting Discretion = ƒ[ownership structure, board structure, CEO characteristics, 
          audit quality, other economic determinants]    
However, incentive effects (alignment or entrenchment effects) may influence managers 
to exercise accounting discretion in short-run periods because contract parties may 
revise the initial contract from time to time in order to respond to new information, such 
as changes in economic circumstances, that affects their expectation of future 
performance and managerial opportunism. The hypotheses being tested here have been 
discussed in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4. 
5.3.2 Linear Regression Model 
The objective of this chapter is to test the impact of ownership structure and other 
observed corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion. Linear 
regression models have been chosen to test these relationships as follows: 
 ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1Concentrated Ownit +  β2-3  Control Mechanismsit  
                           + γ1-3 Board Structuresit + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit  
                                         + χ1-2 External Auditorit + η14 Other Economic Determinantit  
                                         + η5 Industry dummy + η6 Year dummy + εit  (5.1) 
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 ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1D_Dominantit +  β2-3  Control Mechanismsit  
                           + γ1-3 Board Structuresit + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit  
                                         + χ1-2 External Auditorit + η14 Other Economic Determinantit  
                                         + η5 Industry dummy + η6 Year dummy + εit   (5.2) 
 ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1Family Ownit + β2Government Ownit + β3Foreign Ownit 
    + β4Domestic Ownit + β5Bankit + β6Non-Bank Financial Institution- 
                          Ownit +  β7-8  Control Mechanismsit + γ1-3 Board Structuresit  
                          + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit + χ1-2 External Auditorit  
                          + η14 Other Economic Determinantit + η5 Industry dummy  
                          + η6 Year dummy + εit     (5.3) 
 ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1D_Familyit + β2D_Governmentit + β3D_Foreignit  
    + β4D_Domesticit + β5D_Bankit+ β6D_Non-Bank Financial  
    Institutionit +  β7-8  Control Mechanismsit + γ1-3 Board Structuresit 
                          + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit + χ1-2 External Auditorit  
                          + η14 Other Economic Determinantit + η5 Industry dummy  
                          + η6 Year dummy + εit      (5.4) 
 ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1Manager Ownit +  β2-3  Control Mechanismsit  
                           + γ1-3 Board Structuresit + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit  
                                         + χ1-2 External Auditorit + η14 Other Economic Determinantit  
                                         + η5 Industry dummy + η6 Year dummy + εit   (5.5) 
Where subscript i and t denote firms and years, ADi,t+1  is unsigned discretionary 
accruals or discretionary revenues. As suggested by Bowen et al. (2008), the corporate 
governance and economic determinants are assumed to have been chosen by 
shareholders before accounting discretion has occurred. Therefore, all accounting 
discretion proxies were measured at the following year, after corporate governance has 
been implemented (one-year-ahead discretionary accruals and revenues). Using one-year 
ahead dependent variables may also help to control for some potential endogeneity 
problems without completely eliminating them. For each regression, dummy variables 
for industry and year were included in each regression to control for any possible 
variations across industries and years.  
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The definitions of all variables are described in Table 5.4. In addition, the preliminary 
test for heteroskedasticity32 for all models rejected the null hypothesis of constant 
variance in error terms. Therefore, in order to rectify the problem of heteroskedasticity, 
the standard error of each regression model was adjusted by White’s (1980) 
“heteroskedasticity-consistent variances” (also known as “robust standard error”). 
5.3.2.1 Test for Equality between Coefficients before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms 
The specification models (Model 5.1 – 5.5) are separately estimated using sub-period 
samples, a pre-period (1994 – 1998) and post-period of the corporate governance reform 
(2000 – 2007). The dummy variable approach as suggested by Gujarati (1970a, 1970b) 
is applied to test equality between sets of coefficients in the pre-reform and post-reform 
regressions. The single regressions for each specification model are as following: 
 ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1Concentrated Ownit +  β2-3  Control Mechanismsit  
  + γ1-3 Board Structuresit + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit  
  + χ1-2 External Auditorit + η14 Other Economic Determinantit  
  + η5 Industry dummy + Post × [β0 + β1Concentrated Ownit  
  +  β2-3  Control Mechanismsit + γ1-3 Board Structuresit 
  + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit + χ1-2 External Auditorit 
  + η14 Other Economic Determinantit + η5 Industry dummy] + εit 
          (5.6) 
 ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1D_Dominantit +  β2-3  Control Mechanismsit  
  + γ1-3 Board Structuresit + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit  
  + χ1-2 External Auditorit + η14 Other Economic Determinantit  
  + η5 Industry dummy + Post × [β0 + β1D_Dominantit  
  +  β2-3  Control Mechanismsit + γ1-3 Board Structuresit 
  + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit + χ1-2 External Auditorit 
  + η14 Other Economic Determinantit + η5 Industry dummy] + εit 
          (5.7) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 An important assumption of the method of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is that the variance of error 
term is the same for all observations, this is called “homoskedasticity” (Gujarati, 1995). The original 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test obtained from the Stata package (command: -estat hettest-) was 
performed. The test rejected the null hypothesis that the error term has equal variance. Therefore, White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent variances were used to robust standard errors for all models. 
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 ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1Family Ownit + β2Government Ownit + β3Foreign Ownit 
  + β4Domestic Ownit + β5Bankit + β6Non-Bank Financial Institution- 
   Ownit +  β7-8  Control Mechanismsit + γ1-3 Board Structuresit  
  + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit + χ1-2 External Auditorit  
  + η14 Other Economic Determinantit + η5 Industry dummy  
  + Post × [β0 + β1Family Ownit + β2Government Ownit 
  + β3Foreign Ownit + β4Domestic Ownit + β5Bankit + β6Non-Bank 
   Financial Institution-Ownit +  β7-8  Control Mechanismsit  
  + γ1-3 Board Structuresit + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit + χ1-2 External  
  Auditorit + η14 Other Economic Determinantit + η5 Industry dummy] + εit
          (5.8) 
 ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1D_Familyit + β2D_Governmentit + β3D_Foreignit  
  + β4D_Domesticit + β5D_Bankit+ β6D_Non-Bank Financial  Institutionit 
  +  β7-8  Control Mechanismsit + γ1-3 Board Structuresit 
  + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit + χ1-2 External Auditorit  
  + η14 Other Economic Determinantit + η5 Industry dummy  
  + Post × [β0 + β1D_Familyit + β2D_Governmentit  
  + β3D_Foreignit + β4D_Domesticit + β5D_Bankit+ β6D_Non-Bank 
   Financial Institutionit+  β7-8  Control Mechanismsit + γ1-3 Board 
   Structuresit + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit + χ1-2 External Auditorit  
  + η14 Other Economic Determinantit + η5 Industry dummy] + εit  
          (5.9) 
 ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1Manager Ownit +  β2-3  Control Mechanismsit  
  + γ1-3 Board Structuresit + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit  
  + χ1-2 External Auditorit + η14 Other Economic Determinantit  
  + η5 Industry dummy + Post × [β0 + β1Manager Ownit  
  +  β2-3  Control Mechanismsit + γ1-3 Board Structuresit  
  + δ1-4 CEO Characteristicsit + χ1-2 External Auditorit  
  + η14 Other Economic Determinantit + η5 Industry dummy  + εit  
            (5.10) 
Where Post is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 for periods after the reform 
(2000 - 2007) and is equal to 0 for periods before the reform (1994 - 1998).  
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The significantly positive sign of the coefficient of (Post × variable) indicates the 
positive incremental effect in post-reform period. In other words, ownership and/or 
governance variable has more positive (less negative) influence on the use of accounting 
discretion in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform period. This could imply that 
the ownership structure and/or other governance mechanisms works less efficient either 
in aligning the largest shareholders’ interests to other shareholders’ interests or limiting 
their opportunistic behaviour in firms in the post-reform period.  
On the other hand, the significantly negative sign of coefficient of (Post × variable) 
indicates the negative incremental effect in post-reform period. In other words, the 
ownership variable and/or governance variable has more negative (less positive) impact 
on firm performance in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform period. This could 
imply the more efficiency of the ownership structure and/or governance mechanisms 
either in aligning the largest shareholders’ interests to other shareholders’ interests or 
limiting their opportunistic behaviour in firms in the post-reform period.  
The Wald test is also performed in order to test whether the coefficients of variables in 
the post-reform period (βPost = βPre + incremental effect) significantly differ from those 
in the pre-reform period (βPre). As in Chapter 4, the Wald tests are computed by using 
“test” command in Stata. The null hypothesis is that βpost = βPre, which is equivalent to 
βPost – βPre = 0. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that βpost is significantly 
different from βPre. 
5.3.3 Models to Estimate Accounting Discretion (Dependent Variables) 
5.3.3.1 Accruals and Revenue-Based Approaches 
As discussed in Section 5.2.2, there are many methods by which managers or dominant 
shareholders can engage in accounting discretion. The complexity of accruals accounts 
makes them attractive to managers who exercise opportunistic accounting discretion 
(Young, 1999). 
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Table 5.1 shows the numbers of accounting misstatements and irregularities that were 
investigated and publicly reported by the SECT during 2003 to 2011, revealing that most 
of the cases (34.62%) involved revenue recognition and allowances for doubtful 
accounts and suggesting that managers and dominant shareholders in the Thai capital 
market were motivated to exercise accounting discretion over revenue as well as other 
accruals. 
Table 5.1: Summary of the Securities and Exchange Commissions Rectification Orders for 
Accounting Misstatements and Irregularities Categorised by Issues during the year 2003 to 
2011 
Accounting Misstatements and Irregularities Number of Cases % 
   
Doubtful accounts and bad debts 9 17.31 
Revenue Recognition/Revenue Recognition for Real Estate 
Business 
9 17.31 
Impairment of assets 8 15.38 
Scope limitation of auditing or reviewing by auditors 6 11.54 
Employee Benefits 4 7.69 
Consolidated financial statements and investments in subsidiaries 4 7.69 
Disclosure of events after the balance sheet date 3 5.77 
Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets 3 5.77 
Recording asset not in compliance with generally accepted 
accounting principles 
2 3.85 
Derecognising assets and liabilities not in compliance with 
generally accepted accounting principles 
2 3.85 
Others 2 3.85 
Total 52 100.00 
   
Source: Annual Reports and the SEC News from 2003 to 2011, The Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Thailand (SECT) 
 
Accordingly, accounting discretion was measured using proxies that were derived from 
accruals and revenue-based models. In order to estimate discretionary accruals, two 
common models were adopted: the cross-sectional Jones model and the cross-sectional 
modified Jones model. As alternative measurements, the cross-sectional revenues model 
suggested by Stubben (2010) was adopted in order to estimate discretionary revenues. 
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This study aims to find the impact of ownership and other corporate governance on 
accounting discretion in general; therefore, a “pre-event” period is not defined.33 
Accounting discretion is assumed to have occurred in the estimation periods and scaled 
and unscaled constant terms are included into all models (Kothari et al., 2005). As 
argued by Kothari (2005), the inclusion of unscaled constant terms in an estimation 
model can be an additional control for heteroskedasticity that might be left over from 
scale differences such as asset deflators.  
According to Reynold and Francis (2000: 380), 
 “In the absence of specific directional prediction, Warfield et al., 1995 
and Francis et al. (1999a) argue that the extent to which companies use 
accruals to manage earnings is best measured by the unsigned (absolute) 
value of accruals. The magnitude of unsigned accruals measures a 
company’s success in managing earnings either up or down, as needed, 
depending on year-specific situation.” 
Since accounting discretion can be used either to increase or decrease earnings unsigned 
discretionary accruals are used instead of signed discretionary accruals in the accounting 
discretion regressions (for examples, see Bowen et al., 2008; Warfield et al., 1995; 
Wang, 2006).  
5.3.3.1.1 Discretionary Accruals Estimated from the Cross-Sectional 
Jones Model (1991)  
Estimation involved two steps. Firstly, non-discretionary accruals were estimated from 
Model DA1, as shown below and firm-specific parameters (α1, β1 and β2) for each 
industry and each year were estimated using the OLS regression. Secondly, discretionary 
accruals are residuals obtained from the estimation and are equal to the difference 
between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals. 
TACijt / Aijt-1  = α0 + α11/Aijt-1 + β1∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 + β2PPEijt/Aijt-1 + εijt  (DA1) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 McNichols (2002) argues that it is important for research to identify specific motives and times for the 
study of earnings management, but this study is designed to investigate the use of accounting discretion in 
general rather than specific cases.  
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Where, 
α0 = Unscaled constant term 
α1 = Scaled constant term 
TACijt = Total accruals of sample firm i in industry j for year t 
∆SALESijt = Revenue from sales of sample firm i for industry j in year t less revenue from its sales 
at time t-1 
PPEijt = Gross property, plants and equipment of sample firm i in industry j for year t 
Aijt-1 = Total assets of sample firm i in industry j for year t -1 
εijt = Error term of sample firm i in industry j for year t -1 
 
Total Accruals34 (TACit) was calculated as [∆current assets – ∆cash] less [∆current 
liabilities] less Depreciation, scaled by lagged total assets.  
5.3.3.1.2 Discretionary Accruals Estimated from the Cross-Sectional 
Modified Jones Model by Dechow et al. (1995)  
Dechow et al. (1995) extended the Jones model (1991), assuming that changes in all 
credit sales (changes in accounting receivables) in an event period occurred due to the 
intention of managers to manage earnings; through revenue recognition, it is easier to 
manipulate credit sales than it is to manipulate cash sales. Therefore, the model 
estimation was similar to DA1, with an exception to include changes in net receivables 
(∆ARt = ARijt - ARijt-1) as follows: 
TACijt / Aijt-1  = α0 + α11/Aijt-1 + β1(∆SALESijt - ∆ARijt)/Aijt-1 + β2PPEijt/Aijt-1 + εit  (DA2) 
Where, 
α0 = Unscaled constant term 
α1 = Scaled constant term 
TACijt = Total accruals of sample firm i in industry j for year t 
∆SALESijt = Revenue from sales of sample firm i for industry j in year t less revenue from its sales 
for year t-1 
∆ARijt = Net receivables of sample firm i in industry j for year t less net receivables for year t-1 
PPEijt = Gross property, plants and equipment of sample firm i in industry j for year t 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Total accruals in Jones (1991) are defined as “the change in non-cash working capital before income 
taxes payable less total depreciation expenses”. Note that most of data for current portion of long-term 
debt in SETSMART are missing. Therefore, in order to maintain sufficient data for regression, non-cash 
working capital in this study is calculated by subtracting non-cash current assets with current liabilities 
less depreciation (for example, see Jones, 1991: 211). 
	  	  
Chapter 5	  
259	  
Aijt-1 = Total assets of sample firm i in industry j for year t -1 
εijt = Error term of sample firm i in industry j for year t -1 
 
5.3.3.1.3 Discretionary Revenues Models by Stubben (2010) 
According to Stubben’s (2010: 700) model to estimate managers’ discretion over 
revenues from sales accounts, the reported sales revenues (R) consist of two 
components: non-discretionary revenues (NR) and discretionary revenues (DR). 
Rit = NRit + DRit 
Assuming that c is a fraction of non-discretionary revenues that are uncollected at the 
year-end and all discretionary revenues are not collectable, accounts receivable (AR) is 
the sum of uncollected non-discretionary revenues and uncollected discretionary 
revenues. 
ARit = (c × NRit)+ DRit 
Non-discretionary revenues are not directly observed. Using the relationship between 
reported revenues and accounts receivable, Stubben (2010:700) expresses “receivables 
accrual” in terms of reported revenues from sales and takes the first difference to obtain 
an expression as follows: 
∆ARit = c × ∆Rit + (1 – c) × ∆DRit 
The discretionary revenues35 (DR) are measured as a residual from the following 
equation36: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 It is worth noting that the reported revenues (Rit) include discretionary accruals, therefore discretionary 
revenues from the models above are understated by the amount of the factor (1-c) (Stubben, 2010). Jones 
(1991: 212) suggests that it is possible that managers intend to decrease reported earnings. For example, 
goods shipments may be postponed in order to delay recognition of revenues into the next period.  
36 Stubben (2010) argues that, while sales from early quarters are expected to collect during the current 
year, revenues from late in the year may be still uncollected at the year-end. Therefore, it could be more 
accurate to separate the fourth-quarter revenues from those of the first three quarters because they have 
different timings for cash collection, as follows: ∆ARit = α + β1∆R1_3it  + β2∆R4it  +εit. However, in his 
paper, he focuses on annual revenues, which could be compared to other accruals-based models. 
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∆ARit = α + β∆Rit  +εit 
That is, 
DRit = ∆ARit - 
€ 
ˆ α  - 
€ 
ˆ β 1∆Rit   
To control for firm-specific determinants of account receivables, Stubben (2010: 701 - 
702) presents the conditional revenue model for cross-sectional estimation, which 
incorporates the determinants of account receivables suggested by Callen et al. (2008)37 
as follows: 
 ∆ARit = α0 + β1∆Rit  + β2∆Rit × SIZEit + β3∆Rit × AGEit+ β4∆Rit × AGE_SQit  
    + β5∆Rit × GRR_Pit + β6∆Rit × GRR_Nit + β7∆Rit × GRMit  
    + β8∆Rit × GRM_SQit +εit 
Firm size (SIZE) is a proxy for a firm’s financial strength. Larger firms are assumed to 
be wealthier than smaller firms are. Firm age (AGE) is a proxy for a firm’s business 
cycle and its square (AGE_SQ) captures a non-linear relationship between age and 
credit policy. In order to control for operating performance, a positive or negative 
industry-median-adjusted growth rate (GRR_P, GRR-N, respectively) and industry-
median-adjusted gross margin (GRM) and its square (GRM_SQ) are also added into the 
estimation. 
Therefore, discretionary revenues (DRijt) were measured as residuals of the cross-
sectional revenue-based models, using annual sales (DR1), and the conditional revenue 
models (DR2) were measured using annual sales, as suggested by Stubben (2010), as 
shown below. Additionally, unsigned discretionary revenues from both models were 
used as proxies for accounting discretion.  
∆ARijt/Aijt-1 = α0 +α11/Aijt-1  + β1∆SALESijt /Aijt-1  +εijt    (DR1) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Callen et al. (2008: 6) suggest that firms’ investment in account receivables is a function of their 
financial strength, operational performance compared to industrial competitors, and stage of business life. 
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∆ARijt/Aijt-1 = α0 +α11/Aijt-1  + β1∆SALESijt/Aijt-1  + β2∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × SIZEit  
 + β3∆SALESijt/Aijt-1× AGEit + β4∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × AGE_SQit  
 + β5∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × GRR_Pit + β6∆SALESijt1/Aijt-1 × GRR_Nit  
 + β7∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × GRMit + β8∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × GRM_SQit +εijt (DR2)
  
Where, 
α0 = Unscaled constant term 
α1 = Scaled constant term 
TACijt = Total accruals of sample firm i in industry j for year t 
∆SALESijt = Revenue from sales of sample firm i for industry j in year t less revenue from its sales 
for year t-1 
∆ARijt = Net receivables of sample firm i in industry j for year t less net receivables for year t-1 
Aijt-1 = Total assets of sample firm i in industry j for year t -1 
SIZEit = Log of firm’s total assets 
AGEit = Log of firm’s age 
GRR_Pit = A positive industry-median-adjusted sales growth38 (= 0 if negative) 
GRR_Nit = A negative industry-median-adjusted sales growth (= 0 if positive) 
GRMit = An industry-median-adjusted gross margin39 
_SQ = Square of variables 
εijt = Error term of sample firm i in industry j for year t -1 
 
 5.3.2.2 Some Links between Accruals-based Models and Revenue-Based 
Models 
“[N]o single model will properly capture such heterogeneous discretion, 
and that aggregating across dissimilar types of earnings management can 
reduce the ability to estimate the magnitude of manipulation…”  
      (McNichols, 2003: 387) 
The literature discussed in Section 5.2.2.3 suggests that, while discretionary accruals-
based models may measure discretionary accruals with errors, discretionary revenue is 
less biased and may be a better measurement of accounting discretion (Stubben, 2010).  
Nevertheless, the two approaches are linked to some extent. The Jones model (1991) 
assumes that all sales are unmanaged, treating all sales revenues (∆SALES) as non-
discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) argues that credit sales rather than cash 
sales can be a source of manipulation and, assuming that all credit sales are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Sales growth is a ratio of current sales (t) to prior year’s sales (t-1). 
39 Gross profit margin was calculated by sales less the costs of sales, divided by sales. 
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discretionary, they excluded all changes in credit sales (∆AR) in order to correct for the 
understatement of discretionary accruals in the Jones model (1991). However, it is 
possible that credit sales are uncollected sales that arise in the normal course of business 
rather than as a result of managers’ manipulation. Therefore, the assumption of Dechow 
et al. (1995) may overestimate discretionary accruals for firms such as those with a 
higher proportion of credit sales (growth firms, for example). Dechow et al. (2003) 
attempted to minimise this error by adjusting all credit sales (∆AR) with an estimate of 
normal credit sales (k×SALES), which was derived from a regression of change in 
receivables on change in sales. However, this adjustment had an insignificant impact on 
estimated discretionary accruals in their study. 
The Stubben model (2010) predicts non-discretionary and discretionary revenue based 
on a direct relationship between accounting receivables and sales. In fact, the model 
could be viewed as belonging to a subset of accruals-based models, derived from sales 
revenues. Therefore, using the prediction of discretionary sales revenues from the 
Stubben model (2010) to estimate normal sales may improve accruals-based models and 
enable them to more accurately identify non-discretionary and discretionary accruals 
that have partly arisen from revenue manipulation. 
Applying the approach of Dechow et al. (2003: 358), the coefficient of ∆SALES, 
derived from the Stubben model (2010), was applied to adjust for expected credit sales 
in the accruals-based models. The slope coefficients (k) in the Stubben model (2010) 
measure an expected change in accounts receivables relative to a given change in sales 
revenues, representing the unmanaged part of the changes in credit sales.  
As in Dechow et al. (2003), the change in accounts receivables (∆AR) was adjusted by 
subtracting them from the estimated change in accounts receivables (kj × ∆SALES), 
which were derived from the revenue-based models of Stubben (2010), and using annual 
sales and conditional annual sales.  
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The differences between the two variables (∆AR - kj × ∆SALES) are the expected credit 
sales arising from managers’ discretion. Therefore, non-discretionary sales revenues 
were calculated as follows: 
∆Non-discretionary salesit = ∆SALESit - (∆ARit - kj × ∆SALESit) 
This can be rearranged as, 
∆Non-discretionary salesit = (1+kj) × ∆SALESit - ∆ARit 
Where kj represents the slope coefficients from the annual (k1) and conditional revenue-
based models (k2) suggested by Stubben (2010), k1, and k2 are restricted to between 0 
and 1 in order to ensure that the amount of estimated change in accounts receivables 
from the models does not exceed the change based on reported accounting receivables. 
The adjusted models based on cross-sectional modified Jones model are as follows: 
Adjusted Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
 
TACijt/Aijt-1 = α0 + α11/Aijt-1 + β1[(1+k1) × ∆SALESijt - ∆ARijt]/Ait-1 + β2PPEijt/Aijt-1 + εijt 
             
           (DA2_DR1) 
 
 
TACijt/Aijt-1  = α0 + α11/Aijt-1 + β1[(1+k2) × ∆SALESijt - ∆ARijt]/Aijt-1 + β2PPEit/Aijt-1 + εijt 
             
           (DA2_DR2) 
 
5.3.2.3 Test for the Explanatory Power of Accruals, Revenues and 
Adjusted Accruals-Based Models 
This section aims to examine the relative explanatory power of discretionary accruals 
and discretionary revenue obtained from the models discussed in Sections 5.3.2.1. and 
5.3.2.2. The data used in the calculation came from the SETSMART, provided by the 
SET, from 1994 to 2007. All models were calculated based on industry-year groups. For 
this analysis, firms in the financial and banking sectors and firms in rehabilitation were 
excluded from the calculation because they are regulated separately.  
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At least ten observations in each industry-year group were required (for examples, see 
Dechow et al. 2003; Stubben, 2010). A summary of the statistics and correlations 
between all variables for each model are shown in Table 5.2, and the mean coefficients, 
estimated based on the industry-year regressions from all models,40 are presented in 
Table 5.3.  
Regarding the Jones and modified Jones models (DA1, DA2), Table 5.2, shows that the 
mean coefficients on change in revenues from sales (∆SALES) and change in revenues 
from sales less change in accounts receivables (∆SALES-∆AR) have a positive sign in 
all accrual-based models. Jones (1991) suggests that the sign for the coefficient of 
∆SALES can be either positive or negative. For example, while an increase in accounts 
receivable generates income-increasing accruals, an increase in accounts payable 
generates income-decreasing accruals.  
Nevertheless, the results from Table 5.3, Panel A, show that the mean coefficients for 
∆SALES-∆AR in Model DA2 (0.04) are lower than those for ∆SALES in Model DA1 
(0.073). In addition, Fama and Macbeth t-statistics differ insignificantly from zero. The 
lack of power in the model after the exclusion of ∆AR may imply that ∆AR is a major 
factor driving the correlation between accruals and ∆SALES (for example, see Stubben, 
2010). 
Regarding adjusted accruals-based models (DA2_DR1, DA2_DR2), the signs of the 
mean coefficients for adjusted changes in sales revenues and other variables are as 
expected and are consistent with those from the unadjusted models (DA1, DA2). 
Therefore, it appears that the adjusted accruals-based models do not improve the 
explanatory power of the mean coefficients from the unadjusted models in turn do not 
significantly impact to the residuals (adjusted discretionary accruals) from each model.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40 For each industry-year group, winsorising the total accruals and related independent variables at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles does not change any of the values of the variables from their actual values. 
	  	  
Chapter 5	  
265	  
As expected, the mean coefficients of property, plants and equipment (PPE) have a 
negative sign in all models, because PPE normally generates income-decreasing accruals 
(depreciation).  
Regarding the Stubben models (DR1, DR2), Table 5.3, Panel B, shows that, on average, 
the coefficients of ∆SALES have a positive sign in all revenue-based models. It also 
shows that, on average, the explanatory power of the variables from the revenue-based 
models is much higher than those from the accruals-based models are. In addition, on 
average, the goodness of fit (R2) for all revenue-based models is higher than those from 
the accruals-based models are. This may be because the revenue-based models link 
directly to changes in accounts receivables accruals to changes in revenue from sales. 
Stubben (2010) argues that while the accounts receivables component of accruals 
directly relates to sales, other accruals come from many sources within accounts, 
resulting in an unclear relation to sales. Nevertheless, on average, additional independent 
variables to control for credit policy in the conditional revenue models (DR2) are not 
statistically significant in respect to ∆AR. 
In conclusion, the results from Table 5.3 suggest that credit sales, rather than cash sales, 
have a significant impact on accruals. Therefore, the exclusion of changes in accounts 
receivables accruals weakens the correlation between accruals and change in sales 
revenues, creating more noise in the discretion estimated from the accruals-based 
models (Stubben, 2010). Unfortunately, the adjusted accruals-based models do not 
significantly improve the discretionary accruals estimated from the original accruals-
based models. Therefore, it might be more reasonable to estimate accruals and 
discretionary revenue separately. 
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Table 5.2: Summary of for All Variables for Accruals and Revenue-Based Models 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
       
DA1 (Cross-Sectional Jones Model, 1991)  
TAC 3,209 -0.045 0.190 -0.531 -0.048 0.016 
∆SALES 3,209 0.086 0.369 -0.537 0.051 0.160 
PPE 3,209 1.662 22.252 0.049 0.788 1.078 
       
DA2 (Cross-Sectional Modified Jones Model)  
TAC  3,146 -0.045 0.189 -0.531 -0.048 0.016 
∆SALES - ∆AR 3,146 0.075 0.326 -0.483 0.045 0.140 
PPE 3,146 1.686 22.473 0.056 0.796 1.080 
       
DR1 (Stubben, 2010) – Annual (Sales) Revenues 
∆AR 4,009 0.017 0.113 -0.203 0.004 0.030 
∆SALES 4,009 0.095 0.381 -0.562 0.052 0.166 
       
DR2 (Stubben, 2010) – Conditional Annual (Sales) Revenues 
∆SALES 3,988 0.094 0.380 -0.563 0.052 0.166 
∆AR 3,988 0.017 0.105 -0.203 0.004 0.030 
SIZE 3,988 1.420 5.447 -7.763 0.764 2.448 
AGE 3,988 0.266 1.086 -1.753 0.154 0.510 
AGE_SQ 3,988 0.785 3.307 -5.760 0.456 1.542 
GRR_P 3,988 0.244 7.423 0.000 0.000 0.016 
GRR_N 3,988 0.017 0.155 -0.015 0.000 0.002 
GRM 3,988 0.002 0.057 -0.125 0.000 0.009 
GRM_SQ 3,988 0.000 0.067 -0.030 0.000 0.001 
       
Note: All variables are deflated by last year’s total assets 
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Table 5.3: Estimations of Accruals and Revenue-Bases Models 
Panel A: Estimation of Discretionary Accruals from Accruals-Based Models and Adjusted Accruals-
Based Models 
Jones Model (1991) TACijt  = α0 + α11/Aijt-1 + β1∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 + β2PPEijt/Aijt-1 + εijt  (DA1) 
Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) 
TACijt  = α0 + α11/Aijt-1 + β1(∆SALESijt - ∆ARijt)/Aijt-1 + β2PPEijt/Aijt-1 + εijt (DA2) 
Adjusted Modified 
Jones Model (Annual 
Sales) 
TACijt/Aijt-1 = α0 + α11/Aijt-1 + β1[(1+k1) × ∆SALESijt - ∆ARijt]/Ait-1  
                      + β2PPEijt/Aijt-1 + εijt 
(DA2_DR1) 
Adjusted Modified 
Jones Model 
(Conditional Annual 
Sales) 
TACijt/Aijt-1  = α0 + α11/Aijt-1 + β1[(1+k2) × ∆SALESijt - ∆ARijt]/Aijt-1  
                       + β2PPEit/Aijt-1 + εijt 
(DA2_DR2) 
 DA1 DA2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 
Variables Mean  
Coef. 
FM 
t-stat 
Mean  
Coef. 
FM 
t-stat 
Mean  
Coef. 
FM 
t-stat 
Mean  
Coef. 
FM 
t-stat 
         ∆SALES 0.073*** 2.64       
∆SALES-∆AR   0.04 1.07     
Adj. ∆SALES (kj)     0.039 1.31 0.024 0.75 
PPE -0.075*** -6.51 -0.074*** -5.96 -0.075*** -6.08 -0.074*** -6.02 
         
No. of Observations 3,209  3,146  3,146  3,146  
No. of Industry-Years 89  89  89  89  
R-squared 0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  
         
Panel B: Estimation of Discretionary Revenues from Sales from Revenue-Based Models 
         Stubben (2010) 
(Annual Sales) 
∆ARijt/Aijt-1 = α0 +α11/Aijt-1  + β1∆SALESijt /Aijt-1  +εijt (DR1) 
Stubben (2010) 
(Conditional Annual 
Sales) 
∆ARijt/Aijt-1 = α0 +α11/Aijt-1 + β1∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 + β2∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × SIZEit  
                       + β3∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × AGEit + β4∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × AGE_SQit  
                       + β5∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × GRR_Pit + β6∆SALESijt1/Aijt-1 × GRR_Nit  
                                  + β7∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × GRMit + β8∆SALESijt/Aijt-1 × GRM_SQit +εijt 
(DR2) 
 DR1  DR2 
Variables 
Mean  
Coef. 
FM 
t-stat 
  Mean 
Coef. 
FM 
t-stat 
       ∆SALES 0.162*** 12.67   0.629 1.34 
∆SALES *SIZE     -0.011 -1.30 
∆SALES *AGE     -0.215 -0.78 
∆SALES *AGE_SQ     0.032 0.76 
∆SALES *GRR_P     0.086 0.87 
∆SALES *GRR_N     -0.084 -0.74 
∆SALES *GRM     -0.019 -0.19 
∆SALES *GRM_SQ     -0.151 -0.26 
       No. of Observations 4,009    3,988  
No. of Industry-Years 90    89  
R-squared 0.3201    0.1179  
       Note: *, **, *** Indicate that the coefficients estimated are significantly different from zero at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level 
of significance, respectively using two-sided test. FM t-stat is Fama and Macbeth (1973) t-statistic. Sample years 
include the year from 1994 to 2007. Industry code is based on 8 industries (excluded financial and banking sector and 
firms in rehabilitation) classified by the SET. 
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5.3.4 Ownership Variables 
As in Chapter 4, ownership concentration was measured by the percentage of shares 
owned by the largest shareholders. Assuming that there was no cooperation of 
shareholders within each type or across types, ownership concentration by shareholder 
type was also measured as the percentage of shares owned directly or indirectly by the 
largest shareholders within each type (family, government, foreign company investor, 
domestic company, bank or non-bank financial institutional investor). 
A shareholder was classified as a dominant shareholder if they owned at least 25% and 
was the largest shareholder of the firm. The details used to identify ultimate shareholders 
have been already discussed in Section 4.4.2, Chapter 4. Finally, managerial ownership 
was taken to be the percentage of shares owned by all directors. 
The set of other ownership variables (the ratio of the difference between largest and 
second largest shareholders and the ratio of cash flow rights to control rights) were 
defined in the same way as described in Sections 4.4.2 to 4.4.5 in Chapter 4 and the 
definition of all ownership variables is provided again in Table 5.4. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, second largest shareholders may play some role in limiting 
opportunistic accounting discretion by managers and dominant shareholders. Therefore, 
the ratio of share difference between the largest and second largest shareholders was 
included in order to control for the effect of the second largest shareholders. 
Additionally, the use of pyramidal and cross-shareholding structures may allow 
dominant owners to gain efficient control over financial reporting without owning a 
block of shares (Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010; Fan and Wong, 2002). While these 
structures may increase the incentive of dominant shareholders to monitor firms, they 
also provide opportunities for them to divert corporate resources without too much cost 
(Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010). Nevertheless, the net effects of these mechanisms 
depend on the relative predominance of alignment or entrenchment effects. Fan and 
Wong (2002) reveal that the intentional use of these structures to separate cash flow 
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rights from control rights may have led to low informativeness of accounting earnings in 
East Asian countries. Therefore, the ratio of cash flow to control rights (CV) was added 
as a control variable.  It ranges from 0 to 1 and is closer to 0 if the divergence is large.  
The literature suggests two possible effects of the second largest shareholders and a use 
of ratio of pyramidal and cross-shareholding structures on accounting discretion. 
Therefore, either positive or negative impacts of these variables are expected on 
accounting discretion. 
5.3.5 Board of Directors and CEO Characteristics 
Board of directors, board structure and CEO characteristics are consistently defined here 
as they are in Section 4.4.5, Chapter 4, and shown again in Table 5.4.  
5.3.6 Auditor Reputation and Expertise 
Emulating previous research, the size and reputation of audit firms was captured in the 
BIG4 variable and the length of audit tenure was taken to indicate their expertise. The 
dummy variable was defined as 1 if a firm was audited by a BIG4 audit firm otherwise it 
was 0.  
Likewise, “auditor-partner tenure” was defined as the numbers of years for which a firm 
had retained their auditors. The dummy variable was then given a value of 1 if the 
auditor-partner had audited the firm for five years or more, which is based on the 
benchmark that has been used by the SECT for the regulation of auditor-partner 
rotation41 since 2005, otherwise it was 0. 
5.3.7 Other Economic Determinants 
5.3.7.1 Leverage 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1990: 139), high debt to equity ratios may 
motivate managers to exercise accounting discretion that increases income (“the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Notification of the Securities and Exchange Commission No. Kor.Chor 39/2548 (2005) Re: Rule, 
Condition and Procedure for Reporting Information Disclosure on Financial Status and Operating Result 
of Issuing Company (No.20), effective date 16/10/2005. 
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debt/equity hypothesis”), because they place firms closer to restrictions in debt 
covenants. As firms move closer to restrictions, the risk of violating their debt covenants 
increases. Debt violations create costs for firms, such as renegotiation costs, investment 
costs and costs from control rights being transferred to lenders (Chava and Roberts, 
2008; Kim et al., 2010). Therefore, managers may be motivated to use accounting 
discretion in order to avoid violations of debt covenants (for examples, see DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Bowen et al. 2008; Ghosh and Moon, 2010; Kim et al., 2010; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1990). Alternatively, managers in firms with high debts may use 
accounting discretion to convey private information about future profitability, thereby 
increasing the quality of earnings (Ghosh and Moon, 2010). 
The existing literature reveals evidence that supports the debt/equity hypothesis. For 
example, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) report the use of accounting discretion 
(abnormal total and working capital accruals) before the year of violation. Kim et al. 
(2010) found that tighter “net worth debt covenant slack” led to greater use of real 
earnings management, while the findings of Ghosh and Moon (2010) reveal a non-linear 
relationship between debt and earnings quality. They found that earnings quality 
(accruals) was higher at lower levels of debt and lower at higher levels of debt, 
indicating that managers may have been willing to exercise accounting discretion in 
order to avoid covenant violations if the benefits of avoiding them were greater than the 
cost incurred by having lower earnings quality.  
The literature suggests two possible effects of leverage on managers’ accounting 
discretion. Therefore, either a positive or a negative impact of this variable is expected 
on managers’ accounting discretion. 
5.3.7.2 Firm Size, Firm Age and Growth 
Firm size, firm growth and firm age were included as control variables for other 
economic determinants that may influence the degree of managers’ accounting 
discretion. All definitions of these variables were discussed in Chapter 4.  
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Firm age is a proxy for a firm’s business cycle, which may provide an incentive for 
managers to exercise accounting discretion (Stubben, 2010).  
Regarding firm growth, Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) suggest 
that investors may have overoptimistic expectations about a firm’s future performance in 
the case of high growth firms. A failure to meet investors’ expectations may lead to 
subsequent losses in share price. In other words, a lower return in growth stock price is 
caused by errors in investors’ expectations (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Therefore, 
managers of high growth firms have incentives to manage earnings in order to meet 
earnings benchmarks and to avoid the subsequent loss (Bowen et al. 2008).   
Regarding firm size, large firms are more likely to be followed and monitored by market 
participants (institutional investors or analysts) and regulators than smaller firms are 
(Das et al., 1998; Helwege et al., 2007). In addition, larger firms may be more likely to 
enforce the provision of better internal control systems and to bear higher costs in terms 
of their reputation than smaller firms are (Kim et al., 2003; Core et al., 1999; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999). Hence there is a lower likelihood that managers will exercise 
opportunistic accounting discretion in large firms than in small firms. However, larger 
firms may be forced to meet earnings benchmarks (analyst forecasts) (Barton and 
Simko, 2002). In addition, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) suggest that large firms tend to 
bear higher political costs and that managers therefore tend to exercise accounting 
discretion over accounting profits (income-decreasing profits). 
Because the literature suggests two possible effects of these variables on managers’ 
accounting discretion, either positive or negative impacts are expected. 
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Table 5.4: Summary of All Dependent and Explanatory Variables Used in Chapter 5 
Dependent Variables: Accounting Discretions 
Variables Description  
One-Year Ahead Discretionary Accruals 
DAt+1 - Jones (1991) Unsigned discretionary accruals based on cross-sectional Jones Model (1991) 
at time t+1 
DAt+1 - Dechow (1995) Unsigned discretionary accruals based on cross-sectional Modified Jones 
Model (Dechow et al., 1995) at time t+1 
One-Year Ahead Discretionary (Sales) Revenues 
DR1t+1 Unsigned discretionary (sales) revenues, which calculated by annual revenue 
model (Stubben, 2010) at time t+1 
DR2t+1 Unsigned discretionary (sales) revenues, which calculated by annual 
conditional revenue model (Stubben, 2010) at time t+1 
One-Year Ahead Adjusted Discretionary Accruals 
DA_DR1t+1 Unsigned discretionary accruals based on cross-sectional modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995) at time t+1 and adjusted with expected normal 
sales from annual revenue model, (Stubben, 2010) 
DA_DR2t+1 Unsigned discretionary accruals based on cross-sectional modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995) at time t+1 and adjusted with expected normal 
sales from conditional annual revenue Model (Stubben, 2010) 
Explanatory Variables: Ownership Variables 
Variables Description Expected effect 
on Accounting 
Discretions 
Concentrated Own Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder Positive or 
Negative 
Family Own Percentage of shares owned by family who is the largest 
shareholder in family shareholder’s category 
Positive or 
Negative 
Government Own Percentage of shares owned by government who is the 
largest shareholder in government shareholder’s category 
Positive or 
Negative 
Foreign Company Own Percentage of shares owned by foreign company who is 
the largest shareholder in foreign company shareholder’s 
category 
Positive or 
Negative 
Domestic Company Own Percentage of shares owned by domestic company who is 
the largest shareholder in domestic company shareholder’s 
category 
Positive or 
Negative 
Bank Own Percentage of shares owned by bank who is the largest 
shareholder in bank shareholder’s category 
Positive or 
Negative 
Non-Bank Financial 
institution Own 
Percentage of shares owned by non-bank financial 
institutional investor who is the largest shareholder in non-
bank financial institutional investor shareholder’s category 
(excluded insurance companies) 
Positive or 
Negative 
(This table is continued on the next pages) 
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Table 5.4:  Summary of All Dependent and Explanatory Variables Used in This Chapter (Cont’) 
Explanatory Variables: Ownership Variables 
Variables Description Expected effect 
on Accounting 
Discretions  
Manager Own Percentage of shares owned by all directors Positive or 
Negative 
D_Dominant Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the largest shareholder and 
own equal or more than 25 percent of voting shares, 
otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Family Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the family largest 
shareholder and own equal or more than 25 percent of 
voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Government Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the government largest 
shareholder and own equal or more than 25 percent of 
voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Foreign Investors Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the foreign company 
largest shareholder and own equal or more than 25 
percent of voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Domestic Company Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the domestic company 
largest shareholder and own equal or more than 25 
percent of voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Bank Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the bank largest 
shareholder and own equal or more than 25 percent of 
voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
D_Non-Bank Financial 
institutions 
Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a 
dominant shareholder who is the non-bank financial 
institutions largest shareholder and own equal or more 
than 25 percent of voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or 
Negative 
Explanatory Variables: Control Mechanisms 
Ratio of Share 
Difference 
The difference of shares owned by the largest and the 
second largest shareholders divided by shares owned by 
the largest shareholder 
Positive or 
Negative 
CV The ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights Positive or 
Negative 
(This table is continued on the next pages) 
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Table 5.4: Summary of all dependent and explanatory variables used in this chapter (Cont’) 
Explanatory Variables: Ownership Variables 
Variables Description Expected effect on 
Accounting 
Discretion 
Explanatory Variables: Board Structure 
Board Size Natural log of number of directors in the board Positive or Negative 
Board Independence Number of Independent directors divided by total 
number of directors in the board 
Positive or Negative 
Board Experience Number of directors who are directors of other 
companies divided by total number of directors in the 
board 
Positive or Negative  
   Explanatory Variables: CEO Characteristics 
CEO Founder Dummy variable, which equal to one if CEO is also a 
founder of the firm, otherwise as zero 
Positive or Negative 
CEO Son/Daughter Dummy variable, which equal to one if CEO is 
founder’s descendants, otherwise as zero 
Positive or Negative 
CEO-Chair Dummy variable, which equal to one if firm has CEO 
who also serves as chairman, otherwise as zero 
Positive or Negative 
CEO-Group Dummy variable, which equal to one if CEO and 
chairman come from the same family, otherwise as zero 
Positive or Negative 
Explanatory Variables: Auditor Reputation and Expertise 
 BIG4 Dummy variable equal to one if firm is audited by Big 
4 firms, otherwise equal to zero 
Positive or Negative 
Audit Partner Tenure Dummy variable equal to one if the same audit partner 
audits the firm at least 5 years. 
Positive or Negative 
Control Variables: Other Economic Determinants 
Firm Size Natural log of total assets at the year ended 31 
December 
Positive or Negative 
Firm Age Natural log of number of year since established Positive or Negative  
Firm Growth An average of annual change in sales, average over 
three years, or available years, prior to the current year 
Positive or Negative 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets (at the year ended 31 
December) 
Positive or Negative 
σCFO Standard deviation of Cash flows from balance sheet 
approach 
Positive or Negative 
ROA Current Earnings before interests and income taxes, 
scaled by book value of total assets (at the end of 31 
December) 
Positive or Negative 
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5.4 Sampling and Data Collection 
This chapter focuses on a sample of non-financial firms in the SET from 1994 to 2007. 
Firms in the rehabilitation sector were excluded, as discussed in Chapter 4, and firms 
were classified into eight industry sectors according to the industry classifications of the 
SET (see Table 5.5). Data on accounting, ownership, board of directors and external 
auditors came from SETSMART database, and the details of this data and the method 
used to identify the ultimate shareholders have already been discussed in Chapter 4. The 
SETSMART also provided details of auditors, including the names of auditor partners, 
their audit firms and their clients (company name and year of audit). 
Discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues were calculated using the methods 
discussed in Section 5.3.3. The SETSMART database provided only the net amount of 
property, plant and equipment (PPE). Therefore, gross PPE and depreciation accounts 
were obtained from DataStream (Code#WC02301 and Code#WC01148, respectively). 
All variables were winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
Regarding the research design, figures for ownership data, board of directors, external 
auditors and other economic determinants were constructed using data from the years 
1994 to 2007. Because managers’ accounting discretion can operate for short periods, 
one-year-ahead discretionary accruals were used to measure discretionary accruals and 
discretionary revenues from the base year for which the ownership structure, corporate 
governance and other economic determinants were identified (from 1995 to 2008). This 
may help to reduce some causality problems that arise between discretionary accruals 
and corporate governance variables (Bowen et al., 2008). With the exception of firms 
with missing values, which were excluded, no other criteria were used for selecting 
firms. Therefore, the sample used in this chapter consists of pooled cross-sectional data, 
which contains 3,229 firm-year observations42 from 1994 to 2007. The sample was 
separated into data from before and after the corporate governance reforms (Pre-Reform 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This firm-year observation was based on the use of discretionary accruals from the Jones (1991) 
models. The use of other approaches to measure discretionary accruals/revenues would result in unequal 
sample sizes due to missing data. 
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and Post-Reform). The year 1999 was a cut-off year, because it is the year in which the 
first corporate governance mechanism (the requirement of for three independent board 
members) was implemented after the financial crisis of 1997. 
Table 5.5 Distribution of Sample Firm-Year Observations Classified by Industry Sectors  
(Based on Jones Model Sample, DA1) 
Year Indus 1 Indus 2 Indus 4 Indus 5 Indus 6 Indus 7 Indus 8 Indus 9 Total/Year 
          
1994 25 17 20 29 1 24 10 0 126 
1995 28 18 27 33 2 30 15 0 153 
1996 30 22 31 32 2 35 17 0 169 
1997 26 20 30 33 1 42 16 1 169 
1998 30 23 29 34 0 49 18 1 184 
1999 41 29 39 43 0 65 21 0 238 
2000 42 29 41 44 0 62 23 0 241 
2001 40 29 37 37 0 60 23 0 226 
2002 40 28 36 35 8 59 25 0 231 
2003 39 29 35 40 11 65 26 4 249 
2004 40 32 35 51 12 69 34 0 273 
2005 39 31 38 65 15 72 37 0 297 
2006 41 32 60 74 17 81 30 0 335 
2007 40 33 60 75 20 79 31 0 338 
          
Total 
/Industry 501 372 518 625 89 792 326 6 3,229 
          
Note: Industry sectors are consistently classified by the SET 
Ins. 1 Argo & Food Industry 
Ins. 2 Consumer Products 
Ins. 4 Industrials 
Ins. 5 Property & Construction 
Ins. 6 Resources 
Ins. 7 Services 
Ins. 8 Technology 
Ins. 9 Other 
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5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis – Full Sample 
Table 5.6, Panel A, presents the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics based on the 
Jones model (1991) (DA1). It shows that sample firms had total assets that averaged 
9,792 million Baht, with a maximum of 892,000 million Baht and a minimum of 79.14 
million Baht, indicating that the sample consists of large and small firms. Earnings 
before interests and taxes were about 973 million Baht for average firms in the sample 
and the return on assets averaged 7.06%, indicating that, on average, firms were able to 
efficiently allocate and manage their resources in order to generate earnings. In addition, 
on average, firms had 5,843 million baht of total liabilities, which was lower than the 
average total assets. While firms had about 3,708 million Baht of book value shareholder 
equity, they had about 7,581 million Baht of market capitalisation, indicating that, on 
average, they were valuable to investors.  
Table 5.6, Panel B, presents descriptive statistics for the ownership structure, corporate 
governance and economic determinants variables. It shows that, on average, firms in the 
sample had high levels of ownership concentration. Additionally, on average, largest 
shareholders who are family owned 36% of the sample firms’ voting shares, indicating 
that most of the largest shareholders who are family were dominant shareholders. Other 
types of largest shareholder owned shares ranging from 1% to 10%. 
The ratio of share difference between the largest and second largest shareholders is 
about 0.637. This may imply that, on average, the control of the largest shareholders was 
close to absolute, which would have reduced the monitoring role of the second largest 
shareholders. The ratio of cash flow to voting rights is about 0.846, indicating that the 
two rights were not widely separated from each other. On average, boards of directors 
consisted of 12 directors, including 5 independent directors, and auditor-partners had 
about 6 years of experience in their clients’ firms. 
Table 5.6, Panel C, presents descriptive statistics for accounting discretion, measured by 
one-year ahead absolute discretionary accruals (DA1, DA2), absolute discretionary 
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revenues (DR1, DR2) and one-year ahead absolute adjusted discretionary accruals 
(DA2_DR1, DA2_DR2). It shows that, on average, all one-year ahead absolute 
discretionary accruals represented 10% of the previous year’s total assets. Based only on 
accruals derived from sales revenues, firms, on average, had 3.50% and 3.00% of one-
year ahead discretionary sales revenues based on the annual (DR1) and conditional 
revenues models (DR2), respectively. In addition, the means of the adjusted 
discretionary accruals (DA2_DR1, DA2_DR2) do not differ from those calculated in the 
original accruals-based models. 
Pearson and Spearman correlation matrixes for all variables (based on DA1 sample) are 
presented in Panels A and B, in Table 5.7, respectively. The correlations between 
accounting discretion and other variables from Pearson and Spearman do not differ 
widely, but the correlation statistic suggests that there are some significant correlations 
between independent variables (ownership by types, board of directors, CEO 
characteristics and audit quality), and this may suggest that imperfect multicollinearity is 
present in the sample. Therefore, the VIF test was applied in the sensitivity analysis. 
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Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample during 1994 to 2007	  
	   No.  Mean Median SD Maximum Minimum 
 Panel A: Firm Characteristics (Million Baht) 
Total Assets 3,229 9,792 2,447 34,300 892,000 79.14 
Total Liabilities 3,229 5,843 1,170 21,100 494,000 0.47 
Total Equity 3,229 3,708 1,148 12,900 361,000 -23,600 
Market Capitalisation 3,229 7,581 1,102 36,500 1,060,000 2.16 
Total Sales 3,229 7,802 1,922 44,200 1,500,000 -645.59 
EBIT 3,229 973 167 6,068 165,000 -25,800 
Return on Assets (ROA) 3,229 7.06% 7.79% 10.43% 31.17% -42.93% 
       
Panel B: Ownership structure, corporate governance and economic determinants variables 
Ownership Variables 
 Ownership Concentration by the Largest Shareholders 
Concentrated Own  3,229 42.25% 41.50% 18.21% 83.80% 7.50% 
       Ownership Concentration by the Largest Shareholders within each Type 
 Family 3,229 35.96% 35.80% 21.73% 83.30% 0.00% 
 Government 3,229 1.17% 0.00% 6.22% 47.90% 0.00% 
 Foreign company 3,229 10.20% 3.90% 14.73% 66.80% 0.00% 
 Domestic company 3,229 2.09% 0.00% 7.30% 51.60% 0.00% 
 Bank 3,229 1.00% 0.00% 2.44% 12.20% 0.00% 
 Non-Bank Financial Institutions 3,229 2.16% 1.00% 3.35% 19.80% 0.00% 
       Managerial Ownership       
All Directors Ownership 3,229 38.80% 42.03% 24.53% 83.90% 0.00% 
Executive Directors Ownership 3,229 6.35% 0.00% 15.00% 63.90% 0.00% 
       
Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
       
Control Mechanisms       
Ratio of Share Difference 3,229 0.637 0.722 0.282 0.982 0.010 
Ratio of Cash Flow Rights to Voting 
Rights (CV) 3,229 0.846 1.000 0.249 1.000 0.085 
       
       
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
(This table is continued on the next pages) 
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Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample during 1994 to 2007 (Cont’)	  
	   No.  Mean Median SD Maximum Minimum 
	         
Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms (Cont’) 
       
Board Structure       
Number of Total Directors 3,229 12 12 4 32 3 
Number of Independent Directors 3,229 5 6 2 18 0 
Number of Directors who are 
appointed in Multiple Companies 3,229 5 4 3.8 26 0 
Board Size 3,229 2.477 2.485 0.296 3.219 1.792 
Board independence 3,229 0.466 0.462 0.216 1.000 0.080 
Board Experience 3,229 0.392 0.375 0.240 0.933 0.000 
       
External Auditor       
Auditor-Partner Tenure 3,229 6.071 5 3.701 18 1 
       
Other Control Variables       
Number of Year Since Established 3,229 25 22 15 131 1 
Firm Age (ln Age) 3,229 3.061 3.091 0.511 4.466 1.609 
Leverage 3,229 0.501 0.498 0.256 1.322 0.040 
Sales Growth 3,229 0.171 0.099 0.372 2.778 -0.408 
Firm Size 3,229 14.911 14.710 1.319 18.610 12.632 
       
Panel C: Dependent Variables 
One-year-Ahead Discretionary Accruals (Absolute Value) 
DA1 (Jones Model) 3,229 0.101 0.066 0.112 0.626 0.001 
DA2 (Modified Jones Model) 3,151 0.100 0.066 0.110 0.621 0.001 
       One-year-Ahead Discretionary Revenues (Absolute Value) 
DR1 - Annual sales 3,737 0.035 0.022 0.042 0.248 0.000 
DR2 - Conditional sales 3,735 0.030 0.019 0.033 0.193 0.000 
       One-year-Ahead Adjusted Discretionary Accruals (Absolute Value) 
DA2_DR1 3,151 0.099 0.065 0.110 0.621 0.001 
DA2_ DR2 3,151 0.099 0.065 0.110 0.621 0.001 
       
       
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
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Table 5.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables based on Jones Model Sample used in this study. The total sample includes 3,229 firm-year observations of 
non-financial listed companies in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient 
is shown in Panel B. Asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at 1% level. 
  Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 DA1 (Jones Model) 1.000            
2 Concentrated Own -0.038 1.000           
3 Family Own 0.001 0.720* 1.000          
4 Government Own -0.032 -0.005 -0.215* 1.000         
5 Foreign Com. Own -0.051* 0.010 -0.468* -0.036 1.000        
6 Domestic Com. Own 0.011 -0.043 -0.286* 0.015 0.005 1.000       
7 Bank Own 0.040 -0.118* -0.144* 0.007 -0.069* 0.103* 1.000      
8 Non- Bank Fin. Own 0.046* -0.154* -0.155* -0.009 -0.036 0.042 0.040 1.000     
9 Director Ownership -0.007 0.491* 0.803* -0.258* -0.478* -0.275* -0.164* -0.132* 1.000    
10 Executive Director 
Ownership 
0.023 0.066* 0.168* -0.076* -0.125* -0.082* -0.080* -0.016 0.243* 1.000   
11 Ratio of Share 
Difference -0.015 0.737* 0.557* -0.034 -0.194* -0.073* -0.096* -0.130* 0.358* 0.079* 1.000  
12 CV 0.045 -0.145* -0.184* 0.009 0.108* -0.089* -0.106* 0.096* -0.055* 0.081* -0.092* 1.000 
13 Board Size -0.003 -0.116* -0.102* 0.173* 0.059* 0.072* 0.154* -0.049* -0.108* -0.012 -0.137* -0.311* 
14 Board Independence -0.047* 0.083* 0.003 0.003 0.024 -0.033 -0.070* -0.085* 0.008 0.013 0.059* 0.201* 
15 Board Experience -0.013 0.100* 0.117* 0.125* -0.049* -0.011 0.157* -0.061* -0.036 -0.083* 0.119* -0.313* 
16 CEO Founder -0.027 -0.080* 0.060* -0.098* -0.154* -0.074* -0.091* -0.037 0.203* 0.217* -0.017 0.177* 
17 CEO Descendant -0.031 0.160* 0.232* -0.060* -0.093* -0.076* -0.003 -0.031 0.201* 0.122* 0.152* -0.045* 
18 CEO-Chair -0.018 0.008 0.120* -0.068* -0.116* -0.086* -0.073* -0.029 0.170* 0.082* 0.051* 0.094* 
19 CEO-Group -0.002 0.174* 0.228* -0.072* -0.097* -0.027 0.006 -0.071* 0.202* 0.056* 0.171* 0.036 
20 BIG4 -0.042 -0.051* -0.179* -0.009 0.288* 0.076* 0.045* -0.047* -0.210* -0.058* -0.088* 0.084* 
21 Auditor Tenure -0.028 0.031 0.038 -0.008 -0.027 -0.028 0.033 0.011 0.038 -0.059* 0.033 -0.066* 
22 Firm Size -0.017 -0.008 -0.096* 0.238* 0.114* 0.017 0.014 -0.113* -0.214* -0.032 0.065* -0.063* 
23 Firm Age -0.111* 0.064* 0.017 -0.093* 0.099* 0.052* 0.033 -0.101* -0.019 -0.056* 0.034 -0.013 
24 Sales Growth 0.003 -0.048* -0.066* 0.096* -0.011 -0.022 -0.006 -0.013 -0.094* -0.007 0.008 0.008 
25 Leverage 0.294* -0.021 0.030 -0.017 -0.076* 0.010 0.057* 0.061* -0.005 0.047* 0.018 -0.005 
              
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables based on Jones Model Sample used in this study. The total sample includes 3,229 firm-year observations of 
non-financial listed companies in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient 
is shown in Panel B. Asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
  Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
 Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
              
13 Board Size 1.000            
14 Board Independence -0.408* 1.000           
15 Board Experience 0.212* -0.099* 1.000          
16 CEO Founder -0.137* 0.097* -0.158* 1.000         
17 CEO Descendant 0.088* 0.033 0.070* -0.207* 1.000        
18 CEO-Chair -0.128* 0.120* -0.036 0.463* 0.068* 1.000       
19 CEO-Group -0.004 0.043 -0.006 -0.092* 0.472* -0.169* 1.000      
20 BIG4 0.019 0.026 0.112* -0.048* -0.028 -0.054* -0.058* 1.000     
21 Auditor Tenure 0.003 -0.138* 0.006 -0.061* -0.035 -0.028 0.014 -0.077* 1.000    
22 Firm Size 0.227* -0.046* 0.374* -0.091* 0.079* -0.036 0.016 0.210* -0.065* 1.000   
23 Firm Age 0.112* 0.067* 0.107* -0.098* 0.049* -0.008 0.080* 0.033 0.006 -0.114* 1.000  
24 Sales Growth -0.016 -0.028 0.075* 0.004 -0.011 -0.026 -0.013 0.057* -0.028 0.205* -0.233* 1.000 
25 Leverage 0.003 -0.105* 0.089* 0.018 0.003 0.007 0.025 0.000 -0.034 0.282* -0.151* 0.018 
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Table 5.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables based on Jones Model Sample used in this study. The total sample includes 3,229 firm-year observations of 
non-financial listed companies in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient 
is shown in Panel B. Asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at 1% level. 
  Panel B: Spearman Correlation Matrix 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 DA1 (Jones Model) 1.000            
2 Concentrated Own -0.036 1.000           
3 Family Own -0.012 0.717* 1.000          
4 Government Own -0.052* -0.039 -0.149* 1.000         
5 Foreign Com. Own -0.018 -0.210* -0.443* 0.021 1.000        
6 Domestic Com. Own 0.051* -0.196* -0.272* 0.046* 0.031 1.000       
7 Bank Own 0.042 -0.141* -0.154* 0.069* -0.001 0.153* 1.000      
8 Non- Bank Fin. Own 0.066* -0.214* -0.166* 0.008 0.000 0.035 0.066* 1.000     
9 Director Ownership -0.020 0.512* 0.806* -0.236* -0.474* -0.255* -0.179* -0.153* 1.000    
10 Executive Director 
Ownership 
0.004 -0.124* 0.024 -0.144* -0.120* -0.027 -0.056* -0.007 0.176* 1.000   
11 Ratio of Share Difference -0.010 0.792* 0.600* -0.011 -0.331* -0.176* -0.111* -0.097* 0.403* -0.075* 1.000  
12 CV 0.022 -0.194* -0.266* 0.013 0.125* -0.018 -0.060* 0.052* -0.135* 0.073* -0.152* 1.000 
13 Board Size -0.020 -0.115* -0.111* 0.173* 0.142* 0.110* 0.172* -0.038 -0.115* -0.019 -0.147* -0.274* 
14 Board Independence -0.057* 0.068* -0.003 -0.012 -0.053* -0.069* -0.080* -0.153* 0.012 0.010 0.050* 0.199* 
15 Board Experience 0.001 0.087* 0.101* 0.170* 0.072* 0.014 0.148* -0.059* -0.050* -0.138* 0.100* -0.316* 
16 CEO Founder -0.037 -0.089* 0.055* -0.086* -0.107* -0.047* -0.099* 0.015 0.192* 0.246* -0.021 0.150* 
17 CEO Descendant -0.027 0.173* 0.241* -0.021 -0.046* -0.084* -0.001 -0.025 0.196* 0.022 0.148* -0.089* 
18 CEO-Chair -0.017 0.003 0.118* -0.004 -0.057* -0.067* -0.076* 0.030 0.156* 0.057* 0.047* 0.072* 
19 CEO-Group 0.008 0.186* 0.233* -0.072* -0.045 -0.057* -0.020 -0.073* 0.200* -0.044 0.182* -0.020 
20 BIG4 -0.032 -0.060* -0.184* 0.040 0.286* 0.066* 0.070* -0.023 -0.209* -0.090* -0.091* 0.071* 
21 Auditor Tenure -0.027 0.032 0.039 -0.048* -0.019 -0.039 -0.020 0.059* 0.037 -0.063* 0.040 -0.055* 
22 Firm Size 0.002 -0.017 -0.086* 0.217* 0.279* 0.062* 0.122* -0.059* -0.196* -0.068* 0.061* -0.089* 
23 Firm Age -0.113* 0.066* 0.018 -0.007 0.078* 0.004 0.018 -0.143* -0.008 -0.078* 0.026 -0.045 
24 Sales Growth -0.001 -0.039 -0.045* 0.058* 0.042 -0.011 -0.021 -0.017 -0.079* 0.002 0.017 0.016 
25 Leverage 0.187* -0.026 0.027 -0.016 -0.033 0.098* 0.091* 0.097* -0.009 -0.005 0.027 -0.066* 
              
(This table is continued on the next page) 
 
	  	  
Chapter 5	  
284	  
 
Table 5.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables based on Jones Model Sample used in this study. The total sample includes 3,229 firm-year observations of 
non-financial listed companies in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient 
is shown in Panel B. Asterisks (*) denote statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
  Panel B: Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
 Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
              
13 Board Size 1.000            
14 Board Independence -0.391* 1.000           
15 Board Experience 0.231* -0.103* 1.000          
16 CEO Founder -0.132* 0.102* -0.165* 1.000         
17 CEO Descendant 0.087* 0.039 0.077* -0.207* 1.000        
18 CEO-Chair -0.129* 0.116* -0.044 0.463* 0.068* 1.000       
19 CEO-Group -0.013 0.046* -0.009 -0.092* 0.472* -0.169* 1.000      
20 BIG4 0.017 0.041 0.121* -0.048* -0.028 -0.054* -0.058* 1.000     
21 Auditor Tenure 0.018 -0.145* 0.001 -0.061* -0.035 -0.028 0.014 -0.077* 1.000    
22 Firm Size 0.192* -0.043 0.366* -0.078* 0.084* -0.006 0.022 0.212* -0.072* 1.000   
23 Firm Age 0.137* 0.057* 0.096* -0.103* 0.050* -0.015 0.078* 0.025 -0.010 -0.117* 1.000  
24 Sales Growth -0.043 -0.024 0.094* 0.002 0.002 -0.031 0.007 0.075* -0.039 0.265* -0.184* 1.000 
25 Leverage -0.006 -0.122* 0.097* 0.024 0.005 0.009 0.020 0.016 -0.036 0.318* -0.175* 0.071* 
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5.5.2 Univariate Analysis 
5.5.2.1 Managers’ Accounting Discretion in Firms With and Without 
Dominant Shareholders 
Panel A, in Table 5.8, presents the mean comparisons of accounting discretion between 
firms with and without the presence of dominant shareholders. Panel B focuses only on 
firms with dominant shareholders and presents the mean comparisons of accounting 
discretion among different types of dominant shareholders. 
Panel A shows that, on average, the magnitude of discretionary accruals was not 
significantly different between firms with and without dominant shareholders. 
Nevertheless, it seems that firms without dominant shareholders had a greater magnitude 
of discretionary revenues (DR1) than firms with dominant shareholders had. 
Panel B shows that firms with dominant family shareholders appear to have had a 
greater magnitude of discretionary accruals (DA1, DA2, DA2_DR1, DA2_DR2) and 
revenues (DR1) than firms with other types of dominant shareholder had. While firms 
with dominant government shareholders appear to have had a smaller magnitude of 
discretionary revenues (DR2), firms with dominant bank shareholders seem to have had 
a smaller magnitude of discretionary accruals. Firms with dominant foreign shareholders 
appear to have had a smaller magnitude of discretionary accruals but a greater 
magnitude of discretionary revenues (DR1). Finally, firms with non-bank financial 
institutions acting as dominant shareholders seem to have had a greater magnitude of 
discretionary revenues (DR1). 
Overall, these results suggest that each type of dominant shareholder may have different 
motivations and abilities to either encourage or limit the use of managers’ accounting 
discretion. 
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Table 5.8: Univariate Analysis – Full Sample 
Panel A: A Mean Comparison of Accounting Discretions between Firms with and without Dominant 
Shareholders  
 
 
Firm without 
Dominant 
Shareholders (1) 
< 25% 
Firm with 
Dominant 
Shareholders (2) 
>= 25% 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
DA1  617 0.107 2,612 0.099 -0.008 -1.51 0.131 -1.29 0.197 
DA2 587 0.105 2,564 0.098 -0.007 -1.31 0.191 -1.35 0.176 
DR1 721 0.038 3,016 0.034 -0.004 -2.13 0.033 1.00 0.319 
DR2 721 0.030 3,014 0.030 -0.000 -0.00 0.998 1.90 0.058 
DA2_DR1 587 0.105 2,564 0.098 -0.006 -1.27 0.205 -1.40 0.163 
DA2_DR2 587 0.105 2,564 0.098 -0.007 -1.29 0.198 -1.42 0.155 
          
Panel B: A Mean Comparison of Accounting Discretions Among Different Types of Dominant 
Shareholders  
Firms with Dominant Family Shareholders v.s. Firms with Other Types of Dominant Shareholders 
      
 
Firms with 
Other Types of 
Dominant 
Shareholders (1) 
Firms with 
Dominant Family 
Shareholders (2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
DA1  543 0.087 2,069 0.103 0.016 2.93 0.003 1.99 0.046 
DA2 533 0.086 2,031 0.102 0.016 3.03 0.003 1.79 0.073 
DR1 607 0.037 2,409 0.034 -0.003 -1.76 0.078 -2.26 0.024 
DR2 607 0.030 2,407 0.030 -0.001 -0.60 0.546 -0.51 0.613 
DA2_DR1 533 0.085 2,031 0.102 0.016 3.07 0.002 1.89 0.059 
DA2_DR2 533 0.085 2,031 0.102 0.016 3.04 0.002 1.74 0.082 
          Firms with Dominant Government Shareholders v.s. Firms with Other Types of Dominant 
Shareholders 
      
 
Firms with 
Other Dominant 
Shareholders (1) 
Firms with 
Dominant 
Government 
Shareholders (2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
DA1  2,546 0.100 66 0.081 -0.019 -1.40 0.162 -1.83 0.067 
DA2 2,498 0.099 66 0.083 -0.016 -1.18 0.237 -1.43 0.152 
DR1 2,948 0.034 68 0.029 -0.006 -1.16 0.245 -0.64 0.524 
DR2 2,946 0.030 68 0.016 -0.014 -3.46 0.001 -4.09 0.000 
DA2_DR1 2,498 0.099 66 0.082 -0.016 -1.19 0.233 -1.45 0.147 
DA2_DR2 2,498 0.099 66 0.082 -0.017 -1.24 0.216 -1.48 0.139 
          
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.8: Univariate Analysis – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel B: A Mean Comparison of Accounting Discretions Among Different Types of Dominant 
Shareholders (Cont’) 
Firms with Dominant Foreign Company Shareholders v.s. Firms with Other Types of Dominant 
Shareholders 
      
 
Firms with 
Other Types of 
Dominant 
Shareholders (1) 
Firms with 
Dominant 
Foreign 
Company 
Shareholders (2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
DA1  2,227 0.102 385 0.086 -0.015 -2.52 0.011 -1.86 0.063 
DA2 2,187 0.101 377 0.084 -0.016 -2.70 0.007 -1.72 0.085 
DR1 2,589 0.034 427 0.038 0.005 2.17 0.030 2.40 0.016 
DR2 2,587 0.029 427 0.032 0.003 1.64 0.101 2.10 0.036 
DA2_DR1 2,187 0.101 377 0.084 -0.017 -2.74 0.006 -1.83 0.068 
DA2_DR2 2,187 0.101 377 0.084 -0.017 -2.72 0.007 -1.75 0.080 
          Firms with Dominant Domestic Company Shareholders v.s. Firms with Other Types of Dominant 
Shareholders  
      
 
Firms with 
Other Types of 
Dominant 
Shareholders (1) 
Firms with 
Dominant 
Domestic 
Company 
Shareholders (2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
DA1  2,552 0.099 60 0.101 0.001 0.08 0.938 1.47 0.143 
DA2 2,504 0.098 60 0.099 0.001 0.02 0.988 1.24 0.215 
DR1 2,936 0.034 80 0.035 0.001 0.05 0.958 0.50 0.618 
DR2 2,934 0.030 80 0.031 0.002 0.44 0.661 -0.35 0.725 
DA2_DR1 2,504 0.098 60 0.098 0.000 0.00 0.992 1.20 0.229 
DA2_DR2 2,504 0.098 60 0.099 0.001 0.06 0.954 1.39 0.164 
          Firms with Dominant Domestic Bank Shareholders v.s. Firms with Other Types of Dominant 
Shareholders 
          
 
Firms with 
Other Types of 
Dominant 
Shareholders (1) 
Firms with 
Dominant Bank 
Shareholders (2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
DA1  2,594 0.100 18 0.047 -0.053 -2.02 0.044 -2.27 0.023 
DA2 2,548 0.099 16 0.045 -0.054 -1.96 0.050 -2.20 0.028 
DR1 3,000 0.034 16 0.028 -0.006 -0.61 0.541 -0.54 0.588 
DR2 2,998 0.030 16 0.029 -0.000 -0.06 0.951 0.41 0.684 
DA2_DR1 2,548 0.098 16 0.045 -0.053 -1.94 0.052 -2.16 0.031 
DA2_DR2 2,548 0.099 16 0.046 -0.053 -1.93 0.054 -2.13 0.033 
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.8: Univariate Analysis – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel B: A Mean Comparison of Accounting Discretions Among Different Types of Dominant 
Shareholders (Cont’) 
Firms with Dominant Non-Bank Financial Institutional Shareholders v.s. Firms with Other Types of 
Dominant Shareholders 
      
 
Firms with 
Other Types of 
Dominant 
Shareholders (1) 
Firms with 
Dominant Non-
Bank 
Institutional 
Shareholders (2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
DA1  2,598 0.099 14 0.131 0.032 1.08 0.280 1.46 0.143 
DA2 2,550 0.098 14 0.125 0.027 0.92 0.356 1.28 0.201 
DR1 3,000 0.034 16 0.056 0.022 2.18 0.030 1.67 0.095 
DR2 2,998 0.030 16 0.043 0.013 1.61 0.107 1.44 0.150 
DA2_DR1 2,550 0.098 14 0.125 0.027 0.93 0.355 1.34 0.181 
DA2_DR2 2,550 0.098 14 0.126 0.028 0.94 0.345 1.44 0.149 
                    
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
 
5.5.2.2 Before and After the Corporate Governance Reforms 
Table 5.9, Panels A, B and C, show the mean comparisons of firm characteristics, 
ownership variables, other corporate governance variables and proxies for accounting 
discretion between the periods before and after the corporate governance reforms. 
Overall, Table 5.9, Panel A, suggests that the sample firms became bigger in terms of 
total assets, book value of equity, market value of equity, sales and earnings after the 
reforms. The significant reduction in return on assets (8.06% to 7.16%) suggests that 
listed firms, on average, were still able to generate their earnings from their assets but 
were less efficient after the reforms. In addition, firms, on average, had smaller total 
liabilities after the reforms, but, based on mean comparison, this is not significant. After 
the financial crisis in 1997, it may have been more difficult for listed firms to access 
loans from banks because the Bank of Thailand had enforced more restrictive credit 
policies. 
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Panel B shows that, on average, while the proportions of shares owned by family and 
financial institutional investors significantly reduced after the reforms (37.8% to 35.2% 
and 1.8% to 0.09%), ownership by other types of shareholder appears to have increased, 
which may imply that family ownership was distributed to other shareholders and 
financial institutional investors slowed their investment due to the financial crisis. It also 
appears that listed firms, on average, had larger boards of directors and included more 
independent directors after the reforms. This may have resulted from the requirement for 
listed firms to appoint at least three independent directors. Auditor-partner tenure 
significantly reduced after the reforms, suggesting that most of the listed firms had often 
changed their auditors. 
Panel C shows that, on average, firms exercised less accounting discretion, measured by 
discretionary accruals, discretionary revenues and adjusted discretionary accruals 
according to all the models, after the reforms. The preliminary evidence suggests that the 
corporate governance reforms may have helped to limit the use of accounting discretion 
by managers. 
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Table 5.9: Univariate Analysis – A Mean Comparison of Variables between before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
 
Pre-Reform 
1994 to 1998 
(1) 
Post- Reform 
2000 to 2007 
(2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
Sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
Firm Characteristics  
(‘000 Baht) Total Assets 801 9,008 2,190 10,300 1,249 0.86 0.39 -2.45 0.01 
Total Liabilities 801 6,317 2,190 5,686 -631 -0.72 0.47 -6.35 0.00 
Total Equity 801 2,462 2,190 4,317 1,855 3.39 0.00 4.12 0.00 
Market 
Capitalisation 801 4,864 2,190 8,920 4,056 2.61 0.01 4.28 0.00 
Total Sales 801 4,201 2,190 9,530 5,329 2.82 0.00 4.29 0.00 
EBIT 801 642 2,190 1,175 533 2.06 0.04 -1.96 0.05 
ROA 801 8.06% 2,190 7.16% -0.90% -2.17 0.03 -1.62 0.10 
          Panel B: Ownership structure, Corporate Governance and Other Economic Determinants Variables 
Ownership Concentration 
Ownership Concentration by the Largest Shareholders 
Concentrated Own 801 41.11% 2,190 42.37% 1.26% 0.35 0.73 0.15 0.88 
          Ownership Concentration by the Largest Shareholders within each Type 
Family 801 37.80% 2,190 35.20% -2.6% -2.93 0.00 -3.08 0.00 
Government 801 0.60% 2,190 1.40% 0.80% 2.98 0.00 2.47 0.01 
Foreign company  801 8.90% 2,190 10.60% 2.5% 2.89 0.00 -0.72 0.47 
Domestic 
company 801 1.90% 2,190 2.10% 0.20% 0.66 0.51 -2.28 0.02 
Bank 801 0.90% 2,190 1.00% 0.01% 0.95 0.34 0.27 0.79 
Non-Bank 
Financial 
Institutions 801 2.80% 2,190 1.80% -1.00% -6.85 0.00 -11.84 0.00 
          Managerial Ownership 
Director 
Ownership 801 39.70% 2,190 38.30% -1.40% -1.35 0.17 -1.25 0.21 
Executive 
Director 
Ownership 801 6.31% 2,190 6.39% 0.08% 0.14 0.89 0.94 0.35 
          (This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.9: Univariate Analysis – A Mean Comparison of Variables between before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B: Ownership structure, Corporate Governance and Other Economic Determinants Variables 
(Cont’) 
 
Pre-Reform 
1994 to 1998 
(1) 
Post- Reform 
2000 to 2007 
(2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
Sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
(‘000 Baht) Control Mechanisms 
CV 801 0.83 2,190 0.851 0.021 2.08 0.04 4.03 0.00 
Ratio of Share 
Difference 801 0.66 2,190 0.631 -0.032 2.79 0.01 -3.41 0.00 
          Board Structure 
Number of Total 
Directors 801 12.16 2,190 12.44 0.275 1.73 0.08 3.16 0.0016 
Number of 
Independent 
Directors 801 2.38 2,190 6.542 4.162 64.86 0.00 40.88 0.00 
Number of 
Directors who are 
appointed in 
Multiple 
Companies 801 5.38 2,190 4.93 -0.45 -2.91 0.00 -2.47 0.00 
Board Size 801 2.44 2,190 2.48 0.04 3.28 0.00 3.16 0.00 
Board 
Independence 801 0.22 2,190 0.56 0.34 52.57 0.00 38.92 0.00 
Board Experience 801 0.42 2,190 0.38 -0.04 -3.96 0.00 -3.53 0.00 
          External Auditor 
Auditor-Partner 
Tenure 801 6.99 2,190 5.64 -1.35 -9.04 0.00 -11.17 0.00 
          
Other Economic Determinants Variables 
Number of Year 
Since Established 801 22 2,190 26 4 6.00 0.00 9.16 0.00 
Age (ln_Age) 801 2.92 2,190 3.12 0.20 9.43 0.00 9.16 0.00 
Leverage 801 0.59 2,190 0.46 -0.13 -12.32 0.00 -12.30 0.00 
Sales Growth 801 0.21 2,190 0.17 -0.04 -2.81 0.01 -4.79 0.00 
Firm Size 801 15.00 2,190 14.90 -0.10 -1.87 0.06 -2.44 0.01 
          
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.9: Univariate Analysis – A Mean Comparison of Variables between before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel C: Dependent Variables: Accounting Discretions 
 
Pre-Reform 
1994 to 1998 
(1) 
Post- Reform 
2000 to 2007 
(2) 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
Sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
One-year-Ahead Discretionary Accruals (Absolute Value) 
DA1  
(Jones Model) 801 0.12 2,190 0.09 -0.03 -6.15 0.00 -6.46 0.00 
DA2  
(Modified Jones 
Model) 774 0.11 2,148 0.09 -0.02 -5.84 0.00 -6.30 0.00 
          One-year-Ahead Discretionary Revenues (Absolute Value) 
DR1 - Annual 
sales 1,344 0.04 2,155 0.03 -0.01 -5.58 0.00 -6.72 0.00 
DR2 - Conditional 
sales 1,343 0.04 2,155 0.03 -0.01 -7.28 0.00 -8.43 0.00 
          One-year-Ahead Adjusted Discretionary Accruals (Absolute Value) 
DA2_DR1 774 0.11 2,148 0.09 -0.02 -5.71 0.00 -6.15 0.00 
DA2_ DR2 774 0.11 2,148 0.09 -0.02 -5.68 0.00 -6.11 0.00 
          
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
 
5.5.3 Multivariate Analysis 
5.5.3.1 The Impact of Ownership Concentration and the Presence of 
Dominant Shareholders on Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
Regarding the hypotheses Ha1 and Ha2, this section investigates the impact of ownership 
concentration (Model 5.1) and the presence of dominant shareholders (Model 5.2) on 
managers’ accounting discretion. The results are shown in Panels A and B in Table 5.10, 
respectively. 
5.5.3.1.1 Discretionary Accruals and Adjusted Discretionary Accruals 
Panels A and B in Table 5.10 show that none of the coefficients of Concentrated Own 
and D_Dominant are significantly related to unsigned discretionary accruals, as 
measured by all models. The evidence does not strongly support the alignment effect 
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(Ha1 and Ha2) and suggests that levels of ownership concentration and the presence of 
dominant shareholders had no significant impact on the magnitude of managers’ 
accounting discretion over accruals. 
These findings are partly consistent with those of Farooq et al. (2012), who found no 
association between levels of ownership concentration and discretionary accruals. 
However, while they found that the presence of dominant shareholders may limit 
accounting discretion, this study finds no significant relationship between these 
variables. Additionally, these findings are inconsistent with others in previous literature, 
such as those of Azofra et al. (2003), which indicate a negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and absolute discretionary accruals in Spain, and Zhong et al. 
(2007), which indicate a positive relationship between outside blockholders and 
discretionary accruals in the US. 
Nevertheless, the insignificant results shown in this section may be due to the different 
motivations of each type of shareholder to participate in monitoring. Therefore, the types 
of shareholder will be taken into account in the subsequent sections. 
5.5.3.1.2 Discretionary Revenues 
The results from Panel A show that the coefficient of Concentrated Own is negatively 
and significantly associated only in the case of unsigned discretionary revenues with 
annual sales (DR1). Hence the magnitude of discretionary revenues decreases as levels 
of ownership increase. The result supports the alignment effect (Ha1) and suggests that 
levels of ownership may motivate the largest shareholders to participate in financial 
reporting, particularly in respect to revenues from sales accounts, in turn limiting some 
accounting discretion. 
The inconsistent results obtained from accruals and revenues-based approaches may be 
caused by the fact that managers’ accounting discretion over accruals is more 
complicated and difficult for the largest shareholders to verify than revenues accounts 
are, as accruals combine the effect of all accounting methods and policies into the single 
account (Watt and Zimmerman, 1990, Young, 1999). 
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However, the results in Panel B show that there is no significant relationship between 
the presence of dominant shareholders and discretionary revenues measured by DR1 and 
DR2. 
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Table 5.10: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample 
Panel A: An Impact of Ownership Concentration and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting 
discretion (Model 5.1) from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in 
parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), discretionary revenues from 
annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary 
revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% 
(***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Model 5.1: ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1Concentrated Ownit +  β2 Share Differenceit + β3 CVit+ γ1 Board Sizeit + γ2 Board Independenceit + γ3 Board Experienceit + δ1 CEO Founderit  
                                                   + δ2 CEO Descendantit + δ3 CEO-Chairit + δ4 CEO-Groupit + χ1 BIG4it + χ2 Auditor Tenureit + η1 Firm Sizeit+ η2 Firm Ageit + η3 Firm Growthit 
                                                   + η4 Leverageit+ η5 Industry dummy + η6 Year dummy + εit  
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             
Concentrated Own -0.007 (-0.48) -0.017 (-1.10) -0.011* (-1.93) -0.005 (-1.04) -0.017 (-1.13) -0.018 (-1.19) 
Share Difference 0.009 (0.96) 0.012 (1.27) 0.003 (0.91) 0.002 (0.87) 0.013 (1.36) 0.013 (1.37) 
CV 0.024*** (3.00) 0.020** (2.51) 0.000 (-0.16) 0.001 (0.34) 0.020** (2.50) 0.019** (2.44) 
Board Size 0.020** (2.00) 0.018* (1.74) -0.010*** (-2.84) -0.010*** (-3.92) 0.018* (1.75) 0.018* (1.77) 
Board Independence 0.023 (1.32) 0.027 (1.61) -0.001 (-0.15) -0.006 (-1.41) 0.027 (1.58) 0.027 (1.60) 
Board Experience 0.002 (0.24) 0.001 (0.10) -0.004 (-1.30) -0.003 (-1.05) 0.001 (0.14) 0.002 (0.23) 
CEO Founder -0.018*** (-3.51) -0.018*** (-3.58) -0.003 (-1.22) -0.003* (-1.65) -0.018*** (-3.49) -0.018*** (-3.56) 
CEO Descendant -0.013** (-2.15) -0.013** (-2.16) -0.003 (-1.28) -0.001 (-0.51) -0.013** (-2.16) -0.014** (-2.23) 
CEO-Chair 0.002 (0.32) 0.001 (0.22) -0.002 (-0.78) 0.001 (0.65) 0.001 (0.20) 0.001 (0.22) 
CEO-Group 0.003 (0.49) 0.004 (0.69) 0.002 (0.67) 0.001 (0.29) 0.004 (0.69) 0.004 (0.73) 
BIG 4 -0.002 (-0.52) 0.00002 (0.00) -0.002 (-1.40) -0.002* (-1.66) 0.0003 (0.09) -0.0002 (-0.06) 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.009** (-2.20) -0.009** (-2.33) -0.003* (-1.68) -0.002 (-1.27) -0.009** (-2.35) -0.009** (-2.35) 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.10: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel A: An Impact of Ownership Concentration and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample 
(Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting 
discretion (Model 5.1) from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in 
parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), discretionary revenues from 
annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary 
revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% 
(***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             
Firm Size -0.012*** (-6.48) -0.012*** (-5.90) -0.006*** (-8.48) -0.003*** (-5.37) -0.012*** (-5.90) -0.012*** (-5.95) 
Firm Age -0.017*** (-3.95) -0.018*** (-4.16) -0.005*** (-3.35) -0.003** (-2.43) -0.018*** (-4.18) -0.018*** (-4.12) 
Firm Growth 0.002 (0.31) 0.004 (0.71) 0.004* (1.75) 0.003* (1.73) 0.004 (0.71) 0.004 (0.63) 
Leverage 0.128*** (11.06) 0.123*** (10.29) 0.012*** (3.64) 0.003 (1.27) 0.122*** (10.26) 0.123*** (10.32) 
Constant 0.218*** (6.10) 0.218*** (6.26) 0.153*** (13.15) 0.105*** (11.91) 0.219*** (6.30) 0.219*** (6.27) 
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,229  3,151  3,737  3,735  3,151  3,151  
Adj. R-squared 0.142  0.131  0.087  0.073  0.129  0.130  
F-test 9.987  9.022  9.439  7.170  8.949  8.989  
p_value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
             
 
	  	  
Chapter 5	  
297	  
 
Table 5.10: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel B: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – 
Full Sample 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ 
accounting discretion (Model 5.2) from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported 
in parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), discretionary revenues from 
annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary 
revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% 
(***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Model 5.2: ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1D_Dominantit +  β2 Share Differenceit + β3 CVit + γ1 Board Sizeit + γ2 Board Independenceit + γ3 Board Experienceit + δ1 CEO Founderit  
                                                  + δ2 CEO Descendantit + δ3 CEO-Chairit + δ4 CEO-Groupit + χ1 BIG4it + χ2 Auditor Tenureit + η1 Firm Sizeit+ η2 Firm Ageit + η3 Firm Growthit 
                                                  + η4 Leverageit  + η5 Industry dummy + η6 Year dummy + εit 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             
D_Dominant 0.0003 (0.06) -0.0003 (-0.05) -0.001 (-0.49) 0.002 (0.92) -0.0002 (-0.04) -0.0004 (-0.08) 
Share Difference 0.006 (0.76) 0.005 (0.62) -0.001 (-0.33) -0.001 (-0.32) 0.005 (0.71) 0.005 (0.69) 
CV 0.024*** (3.06) 0.021*** (2.66) 0.000 (0.01) 0.001 (0.53) 0.021*** (2.66) 0.021*** (2.59) 
Board Size 0.020** (2.02) 0.018* (1.80) -0.009*** (-2.72) -0.010*** (-3.89) 0.018* (1.81) 0.019* (1.83) 
Board Independence 0.022 (1.30) 0.027 (1.58) -0.001 (-0.16) -0.007 (-1.46) 0.026 (1.55) 0.027 (1.57) 
Board Experience 0.002 (0.23) 0.001 (0.07) -0.004 (-1.35) -0.003 (-1.08) 0.001 (0.12) 0.002 (0.21) 
CEO Founder -0.018*** (-3.49) -0.018*** (-3.51) -0.002 (-1.11) -0.003 (-1.61) -0.017*** (-3.41) -0.018*** (-3.48) 
CEO Descendant -0.013** (-2.17) -0.013** (-2.18) -0.003 (-1.32) -0.001 (-0.60) -0.013** (-2.18) -0.014** (-2.26) 
CEO-Chair 0.002 (0.32) 0.001 (0.22) -0.002 (-0.79) 0.001 (0.66) 0.001 (0.20) 0.001 (0.22) 
CEO-Group 0.003 (0.47) 0.004 (0.63) 0.001 (0.54) 0.000 (0.19) 0.004 (0.63) 0.004 (0.67) 
BIG 4 -0.002 (-0.55) -0.0002 (-0.05) -0.002 (-1.48) -0.002* (-1.73) 0.0001 (0.03) -0.0005 (-0.12) 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.009** (-2.20) -0.009** (-2.31) -0.003* (-1.69) -0.002 (-1.30) -0.009** (-2.33) -0.009** (-2.33) 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.10: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel B: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – 
Full Sample (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ 
accounting discretion (Model 5.2) from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported 
in parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), discretionary revenues from 
annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary 
revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% 
(***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             
Firm Size -0.012*** (-6.46) -0.011*** (-5.86) -0.005*** (-8.32) -0.003*** (-5.36) -0.011*** (-5.86) -0.012*** (-5.91) 
Firm Age -0.017*** (-3.95) -0.018*** (-4.15) -0.005*** (-3.36) -0.003** (-2.44) -0.018*** (-4.17) -0.018*** (-4.11) 
Firm Growth 0.002 (0.33) 0.005 (0.74) 0.005* (1.78) 0.003* (1.79) 0.005 (0.74) 0.004 (0.66) 
Leverage 0.128*** (11.08) 0.123*** (10.31) 0.012*** (3.65) 0.003 (1.29) 0.122*** (10.28) 0.123*** (10.33) 
Constant 0.216*** (6.08) 0.214*** (6.18) 0.150*** (13.00) 0.103*** (11.82) 0.214*** (6.22) 0.214*** (6.19) 
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,229  3,151  3,737  3,735  3,151  3,151  
Adj. R-squared 0.142  0.130  0.086  0.073  0.129  0.130  
F-test 9.995  9.022  9.435  7.283  8.947  8.982  
p_value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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5.5.3.2 The Impact of Ownership Concentration, by Types of 
Shareholder, and the Presence of Dominant Shareholders, by their Types, 
on Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
Regarding the hypotheses Ha3 to Ha12, this section investigates the impact of ownership 
concentration on managers’ accounting discretion by the types of shareholders (Model 
5.3) and the presence of dominant shareholders, by their types (Model 5.4). The results 
are shown in Panels A and B in Table 5.11, respectively. 
5.5.3.2.1 Discretionary Accruals and Adjusted Discretionary Accruals 
Table 5.11, Panel A, shows that the coefficients of Family Own, Government Own, 
Foreign Company Own, Domestic Company Own, Bank Own and Non-Bank Financial 
Institution Own are not significantly related to discretionary accruals based on the Jones 
model (DA1). However, the coefficients of Government Own and Foreign Company 
Own are negatively related to unsigned discretionary accruals based on the modified 
Jones model (DA2) and all the adjusted-modified Jones models (DA2_DR1, 
DA2_DR2). 
Although the results are significant for some but not all discretionary accruals 
estimations, they provide some evidence of an alignment of interests (Ha5), suggesting 
that firms with government as the largest shareholders were likely to exercise less 
accounting discretion over accruals and implying that the government provided better 
monitoring. This evidence is consistent with the findings of other researchers including 
Ding et al. (2007) and Wang and Yung (2011) in China.  
In addition, the negative effect of levels of foreign companies investors block ownership 
supports the alignment effect (Ha7) and is consistent with other studies (for examples, 
see Aggarwal et al. 2005; Jeon and Ryoo, 2013). It suggests that when the largest 
shareholders are a foreign company, they may demand high quality earnings reports and 
be more likely to participate in corporate governance by, for example, choosing 
independent directors. 
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Regarding the presence of dominant shareholders, by their types, Panel B shows that 
only the coefficients of D_Bank are negatively and significantly related to discretionary 
accruals, as measured by all models. The findings support the alignment effect (Ha10) 
and suggest that the presence of Bank acting as the dominant shareholder was associated 
with a low magnitude of accounting discretion over accruals. In fact, banks often 
became the dominant shareholders after the corporate governance reforms, as some 
listed companies that had suffered in the financial crisis transferred share ownership 
from families to banks. Therefore, banks as owners may be motivated to be active in 
monitoring financial reporting. 
5.5.3.2.2 Discretionary Revenues 
Unlike the findings based on discretionary accruals, Table 5.11, Panel A, shows that the 
coefficients of Family Own are negatively and significantly related to absolute 
discretionary revenues at the 1% and 5% levels of significance for the annual and 
conditional revenues models (DR1, DR2), respectively. This evidence supports the 
alignment effect (Ha3) and is consistent with other studies (for examples, see Bowen et 
al., 2008; Jiraporn and DaDalt, 2009; Wang, 2006) that found less conflict of interests in 
family firms, since it is common in most Thai listed companies that are family firms to 
have family members involved in management. Therefore, the strong attributes of family 
firms, such as their close relationships, love, trust and loyalty and concern for family 
reputation, appear to have influenced them to produce high reported earnings in order to, 
for example, retain their reputation and survive in the long term (Ali et al. 2007).  
The coefficients of Domestic Company Own are also negatively related to absolute 
discretionary revenues at the 5% and 10% levels of significance for the annual and 
conditional revenues models, respectively. In addition, the coefficients of Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions Own are also negatively related to absolute discretionary revenues 
at the 5% level of significance for the annual revenues model (DR1). This evidence 
suggests that domestic companies may have provided the resources for better 
monitoring. The evidence also supports the alignment effect (Ha11) and suggests that 
non-bank financial institutional shareholders played an active role in monitoring 
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managers. This is consistent with the findings of existing research from the US, such as 
Brickley et al. (1988) and Ferreira and Matos (2008), and from Australia, such as Koh 
(2007). 
Panel B shows that the coefficient of D_Family is negatively related to DR1 at the 10% 
level of significance. Hence the presence of dominant family shareholders is associated 
with a lower magnitude of discretionary revenues. This supports the notion of an 
alignment effect (Ha4) and is consistent with the findings in Panel A, suggesting that 
dominant family shareholders had some influence over financial reporting, in terms of 
revenues from sales accounts, and used it to limit the opportunistic use of accounting 
discretion over revenues. 
However, the coefficients of D_Foreign_Company are positively related to DR1 and 
DR2 at the 10% and 5% levels of significance. This evidence does not support the 
alignment effect (Ha8) and suggests that the presence of dominant shareholders who are 
a foreign company was associated with higher magnitudes of discretionary revenues and 
that, with higher levels of control, they may have influenced managers to exercise 
(opportunistic) accounting discretion over revenues rather than accruals in order to, for 
example, increase sales in parent companies. Geographical distance may also play a part 
in limiting the ability of parent companies to monitor managers and provide them with 
opportunities to exercise accounting discretion in order to, for example, meet incentive 
targets (Boardman et al., 1997; Lin and Shiu, 2003; Wiwattanakantang, 1999). The 
evidence differs from that found by Wu et al. (2012) in China. 
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Table 5.11: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders, by their Types, and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample    
Panel A: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting 
Discretion – Full Sample  
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration, by types of shareholder, and other corporate governance mechanisms on 
managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.3) from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors 
are reported in parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), discretionary 
revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by 
discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Model: 5.3: ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1Family Ownit + β2Government Ownit + β3Foreign Ownit + β4Domestic Ownit + β5Bankit + β6Non-Bank Financial Institution Ownit 
    +  β7 Share Differenceit + β8 CVit + γ1 Board Sizeit + γ2 Board Independenceit + γ3 Board Experienceit + δ1 CEO Founderit + δ2 CEO Descendantit 
     + δ3 CEO-Chairit + δ4 CEO-Groupit + χ1 BIG4it   + χ2 Auditor Tenureit + η1 Firm Sizeit  + η2 Firm Ageit+ η3 Firm Growthit+ η4 Leverageit  
                                                   + η5 Industry dummy + η6 Year dummy + εit 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             Family Own 0.003 (0.21) -0.008 (-0.59) -0.018*** (-3.60) -0.010** (-2.54) -0.007 (-0.55) -0.009 (-0.65) 
Government Own -0.054 (-1.61) -0.059* (-1.83) 0.009 (0.68) 0.002 (0.25) -0.059* (-1.84) -0.061* (-1.88) 
Foreign company 
Own -0.014 (-0.89) -0.026* (-1.68) 0.004 (0.70) 0.004 (0.71) -0.026* (-1.70) -0.026* (-1.67) 
Domestic company 
Own 0.008 (0.33) -0.006 (-0.25) -0.020** (-1.98) -0.014* (-1.76) -0.004 (-0.17) -0.004 (-0.18) 
Bank Own 0.013 (0.15) 0.017 (0.19) 0.008 (0.23) 0.014 (0.48) 0.022 (0.25) 0.021 (0.24) 
Non-Bank Fin. Insti. 
Own -0.068 (-1.02) -0.086 (-1.33) -0.046** (-2.15) -0.014 (-0.88) -0.087 (-1.36) -0.093 (-1.44) 
Share Difference 0.003 (0.37) 0.004 (0.54) 0.005 (1.58) 0.004* (1.79) 0.005 (0.60) 0.005 (0.62) 
CV 0.028*** (3.35) 0.024*** (2.85) -0.002 (-0.72) 0.000 (-0.18) 0.024*** (2.86) 0.023*** (2.80) 
Board Size 0.022** (2.19) 0.020* (1.94) -0.011*** (-3.09) -0.011*** (-4.10) 0.020* (1.95) 0.020** (1.96) 
Board Independence 0.024 (1.39) 0.028* (1.67) -0.003 (-0.47) -0.007 (-1.61) 0.028 (1.64) 0.028* (1.65) 
Board Experience 0.002 (0.25) 0.001 (0.10) -0.003 (-0.88) -0.002 (-0.78) 0.001 (0.12) 0.002 (0.24) 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.11: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders, by their Types, and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel A: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting 
Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration, by types of shareholder, and other corporate governance mechanisms on 
managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.3) from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based robust standards errors are 
reported in parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), discretionary 
revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by 
discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             CEO Founder -0.020*** (-3.73) -0.020*** (-3.85) -0.002 (-0.78) -0.002 (-1.30) -0.020*** (-3.76) -0.020*** (-3.82) 
CEO Descendant -0.014** (-2.23) -0.014** (-2.22) -0.002 (-0.81) 0.000 (-0.24) -0.014** (-2.22) -0.014** (-2.28) 
CEO-Chair 0.002 (0.26) 0.001 (0.18) -0.001 (-0.55) 0.002 (0.81) 0.001 (0.15) 0.001 (0.19) 
CEO-Group 0.001 (0.20) 0.003 (0.41) 0.002 (1.05) 0.001 (0.63) 0.002 (0.40) 0.003 (0.44) 
BIG 4 -0.002 (-0.45) 0.001 (0.15) -0.003** (-2.06) -0.002** (-2.10) 0.001 (0.23) 0.000 (0.06) 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.009** (-2.20) -0.010** (-2.38) -0.003* (-1.83) -0.002 (-1.36) -0.010** (-2.40) -0.010** (-2.41) 
Firm Size -0.012*** (-6.12) -0.011*** (-5.52) -0.006*** (-8.99) -0.003*** (-5.53) -0.011*** (-5.51) -0.011*** (-5.57) 
Firm Age -0.017*** (-3.98) -0.018*** (-4.12) -0.005*** (-3.74) -0.003*** (-2.69) -0.018*** (-4.14) -0.018*** (-4.11) 
Firm Growth 0.002 (0.33) 0.004 (0.71) 0.004* (1.68) 0.003* (1.68) 0.004 (0.72) 0.004 (0.64) 
Leverage 0.127*** (10.96) 0.122*** (10.18) 0.013*** (4.14) 0.004 (1.61) 0.120*** (10.15) 0.122*** (10.22) 
Constant 0.210*** (5.73) 0.212*** (5.89) 0.168*** (13.49) 0.112*** (11.67) 0.212*** (5.91) 0.213*** (5.91) 
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,229  3,151  3,737  3,735  3,151  3,151  
Adj. R-squared 0.141  0.131  0.091  0.075  0.129  0.130  
F-test 8.716  7.829  8.906  6.494  7.782  7.818  
p_value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 5.11: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders, by their Types, and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample  (Cont’) 
Panel B: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ 
Accounting Discretion – Full Sample  
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders by types of shareholders, and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.4) from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust 
standards errors are reported in parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), 
discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model 
adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Model 5.4: ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1D_Familyit + β2D_Governmentit + β3D_Foreignit + β4D_Domesticit + 56D_Bankit + β6D_Non-Bank Financial Institutionit 
    +  β7 Share Differenceit + β8 CVit + γ1 Board Sizeit + γ2 Board Independenceit + γ3 Board Experienceit + δ1 CEO Founderit+ δ2 CEO Descendantit 
    + δ3 CEO-Chairit + δ4 CEO-Groupit + χ1 BIG4it   + χ2 Auditor Tenureit + η1 Firm Sizeit  + η2 Firm Ageit + η3 Firm Growthit  + η4 Leverageit 
                                  + η5 Industry dummy + η6 Year dummy + εit 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             
D_Family 0.004 (0.77) 0.005 (0.76) -0.004* (-1.67) 0.000 (-0.02) 0.005 (0.78) 0.004 (0.73) 
D_Government -0.019 (-1.33) -0.018 (-1.23) 0.006 (1.35) 0.002 (0.59) -0.018 (-1.24) -0.019 (-1.31) 
D_Foreign 
Company 
-0.006 (-0.85) -0.008 (-1.20) 0.005* (1.95) 0.005** (2.46) -0.008 (-1.20) -0.008 (-1.19) 
D_Domestic 
Company 
0.008 (0.64) 0.006 (0.50) -0.005 (-0.95) 0.001 (0.16) 0.007 (0.51) 0.007 (0.54) 
D_Bank -0.050*** (-4.80) -0.051*** (-4.85) -0.004 (-0.46) 0.005 (0.63) -0.051*** (-4.83) -0.051*** (-4.81) 
D_Non-Bank Fin. 
Insti. -0.006 (-0.20) -0.009 (-0.29) 0.014 (0.92) 0.012 (1.20) -0.009 (-0.29) -0.009 (-0.28) 
Share Difference 0.002 (0.28) 0.001 (0.08) 0.001 (0.41) 0.000 (0.21) 0.001 (0.16) 0.001 (0.14) 
CV 0.029*** (3.57) 0.027*** (3.23) -0.003 (-1.03) 0.000 (-0.16) 0.027*** (3.24) 0.026*** (3.17) 
Board Size 0.023** (2.25) 0.021** (2.02) -0.010*** (-2.94) -0.010*** (-3.98) 0.021** (2.03) 0.021** (2.05) 
Board Independence 0.025 (1.44) 0.030* (1.74) -0.002 (-0.38) -0.007 (-1.59) 0.029* (1.71) 0.029* (1.73) 
Board Experience 0.003 (0.36) 0.001 (0.16) -0.004 (-1.29) -0.002 (-0.96) 0.002 (0.20) 0.003 (0.30) 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.11: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders, by their Types, and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample  (Cont’) 
Panel B: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ 
Accounting Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders by types of shareholders, and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.4) from 1994 to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust 
standards errors are reported in parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), 
discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model 
adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             
CEO Founder -0.019*** (-3.67) -0.019*** (-3.71) -0.001 (-0.59) -0.002 (-1.26) -0.019*** (-3.62) -0.019*** (-3.68) 
CEO Descendant -0.015** (-2.35) -0.015** (-2.37) -0.002 (-0.99) -0.001 (-0.37) -0.015** (-2.37) -0.015** (-2.44) 
CEO-Chair 0.001 (0.11) -0.0002 (-0.04) -0.001 (-0.46) 0.002 (0.90) -0.0003 (-0.06) -0.0002 (-0.03) 
CEO-Group 0.002 (0.33) 0.003 (0.45) 0.002 (1.01) 0.001 (0.48) 0.003 (0.45) 0.003 (0.49) 
BIG 4 -0.001 (-0.35) 0.001 (0.20) -0.003** (-2.11) -0.003** (-2.26) 0.001 (0.28) 0.001 (0.12) 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.008** (-2.00) -0.009** (-2.13) -0.003* (-1.66) -0.002 (-1.27) -0.009** (-2.14) -0.009** (-2.14) 
Firm Size -0.012*** (-6.18) -0.011*** (-5.61) -0.006*** (-8.64) -0.003*** (-5.38) -0.011*** (-5.60) -0.011*** (-5.65) 
Firm Age -0.016*** (-3.77) -0.017*** (-3.89) -0.005*** (-3.75) -0.003*** (-2.81) -0.017*** (-3.91) -0.017*** (-3.87) 
Firm Growth 0.002 (0.37) 0.005 (0.76) 0.005* (1.82) 0.003* (1.84) 0.005 (0.76) 0.004 (0.68) 
Leverage 0.126*** (11.01) 0.122*** (10.23) 0.013*** (4.02) 0.004 (1.57) 0.120*** (10.20) 0.122*** (10.26) 
Constant 0.201*** (5.48) 0.197*** (5.53) 0.159*** (13.36) 0.107*** (11.81) 0.198*** (5.56) 0.197*** (5.52) 
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,229  3,151  3,737  3,735  3,151  3,151  
Adj. R-squared 0.143  0.132  0.089  0.074  0.130  0.131  
F-test 9.458  8.713  8.918  6.632  8.647  8.648  
p_value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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5.5.3.3 The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting 
Discretion 
Regarding the hypothesis Ha13, this section investigates the impact of managerial 
ownership on managers’ accounting discretion. The results of the OLS regressions 
(Model 5.5) on different definitions of managerial ownership (all director ownership and 
executive director ownership) are shown in Panels A and B in Table 5.12. 
In respect to discretionary accruals, none of the coefficients of Manager Own are 
significantly related to discretionary accruals or adjusted discretionary accruals for all 
models, as shown in Panels A and B. The results are also consistent among all 
definitions of managerial ownership. 
In contrast to the findings on discretionary revenues, the coefficients of Manager Own, 
defined as “all directors” ownership, are negatively related to discretionary revenues, 
measured by DR1, at the 5% level of significance. This suggests that the magnitude of 
discretionary revenues decreases as levels of managerial ownership increase. The results 
were unchanged when managerial ownership was included only ownership of executive 
directors as shown in Panel B in Table 5.12. 
The evidence supports the alignment hypothesis (Ha13), which suggests that ownership 
does motivate managers to align their interests with those of other shareholders (for 
example, see Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and, at least, limits their use of opportunistic 
accounting discretion over revenues. This also implies that ownership also motivate non-
executive directors to supervise managers in turn limiting a use of accounting 
discretions. 
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Table 5.12: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample  
Panel A: An Impact of Ownership of all Directors on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership of all directors on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) from 1994 to 2007. All 
variables definitions are presented in Table 5.5. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary accruals from 
cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional 
revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and 
by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Model 5.5: ADi,t+1 = β0 + β1Manager Ownit +  β2 Share Differenceit + β3 CVit + γ1 Board Sizeit + γ2 Board Independenceit + γ3 Board Experienceit + δ1 CEO Founderit 
   + δ2 CEO Descendantit + δ3 CEO-Chairit + δ4 CEO-Groupit + χ1 BIG 4it   + χ2 Auditor Tenureit + η1 Firm Sizeit + η2 Firm Ageit+ η3 Firm Growthit 
                                                 + η4 Leverageit + η5 Industry dummy + η6 Year dummy + εit 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals 
Explanatory Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             
Manager Own 0.0002 (0.02) 0.002 (0.17) -0.008** (-2.40) -0.003 (-1.24) 0.002 (0.16) 0.000 (0.03) 
Share Difference 0.006 (0.81) 0.004 (0.56) 0.0002 (0.08) 0.001 (0.54) 0.005 (0.66) 0.005 (0.66) 
CV 0.024*** (3.06) 0.021*** (2.67) -0.00001 (-0.01) 0.001 (0.42) 0.021*** (2.67) 0.021*** (2.61) 
Board Size 0.020** (2.02) 0.018* (1.80) -0.010*** (-2.85) -0.010*** (-3.94) 0.018* (1.81) 0.019* (1.83) 
Board Independence 0.022 (1.30) 0.027 (1.59) -0.002 (-0.31) -0.007 (-1.49) 0.026 (1.56) 0.027 (1.57) 
Board Experience 0.002 (0.23) 0.001 (0.07) -0.004 (-1.28) -0.003 (-1.04) 0.001 (0.11) 0.002 (0.21) 
CEO Founder -0.018*** (-3.39) -0.018*** (-3.45) -0.001 (-0.66) -0.002 (-1.35) -0.018*** (-3.35) -0.018*** (-3.39) 
CEO Descendant -0.013** (-2.12) -0.014** (-2.16) -0.002 (-1.01) -0.001 (-0.38) -0.014** (-2.16) -0.014** (-2.21) 
CEO-Chair 0.002 (0.32) 0.001 (0.21) -0.002 (-0.64) 0.001 (0.72) 0.001 (0.19) 0.001 (0.22) 
CEO-Group 0.003 (0.46) 0.004 (0.59) 0.002 (0.82) 0.001 (0.37) 0.004 (0.60) 0.004 (0.65) 
BIG 4 -0.002 (-0.55) -0.0001 (-0.03) -0.003* (-1.77) -0.002* (-1.85) 0.000 (0.05) 0.000 (-0.12) 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.009** (-2.20) -0.009** (-2.31) -0.003* (-1.70) -0.002 (-1.28) -0.009** (-2.33) -0.009** (-2.33) 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.12: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel A: An Impact of Ownership of all Directors on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership of all directors on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) from 1994 to 2007. All 
variables definitions are presented in Table 5.5. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary accruals from 
cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional 
revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and 
by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             
Firm Size -0.012*** (-6.32) -0.011*** (-5.76) -0.006*** (-8.58) -0.003*** (-5.41) -0.011*** (-5.76) -0.012*** (-5.83) 
Firm Age -0.017*** (-3.90) -0.018*** (-4.08) -0.005*** (-3.53) -0.003** (-2.53) -0.018*** (-4.10) -0.018*** (-4.06) 
Firm Growth 0.002 (0.33) 0.005 (0.75) 0.005* (1.76) 0.003* (1.73) 0.005 (0.75) 0.004 (0.66) 
Leverage 0.128*** (11.09) 0.123*** (10.32) 0.012*** (3.73) 0.003 (1.33) 0.122*** (10.29) 0.123*** (10.35) 
Constant 0.216*** (5.74) 0.212*** (5.84) 0.156*** (13.23) 0.106*** (11.70) 0.213*** (5.88) 0.214*** (5.87) 
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,229  3,151  3,737  3,735  3,151  3,151  
Adj. R-squared 0.142  0.130  0.087  0.073  0.129  0.130  
F-test 10.007  9.034  9.602  7.225  8.959  9.001  
p_value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 5.12: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel B: An Impact of Ownership of Executive Directors on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (executive directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) from 1994 
to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.5. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary 
accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from 
conditional revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model 
(DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             
Manager Own 0.007 (0.53) 0.011 (0.74) -0.008* (-1.82) 0.0002 (0.04) 0.011 (0.74) 0.010 (0.73) 
Share Difference 0.006 (0.78) 0.004 (0.57) -0.001 (-0.55) 0.0003 (0.17) 0.005 (0.66) 0.004 (0.63) 
CV 0.024*** (3.02) 0.021*** (2.61) 0.0004 (0.15) 0.001 (0.44) 0.021*** (2.61) 0.020** (2.55) 
Board Size 0.020** (2.01) 0.018* (1.77) -0.009*** (-2.68) -0.010*** (-3.89) 0.018* (1.78) 0.018* (1.80) 
Board Independence 0.022 (1.30) 0.027 (1.58) -0.001 (-0.18) -0.006 (-1.43) 0.026 (1.55) 0.027 (1.57) 
Board Experience 0.002 (0.26) 0.001 (0.11) -0.004 (-1.41) -0.003 (-1.08) 0.001 (0.15) 0.002 (0.24) 
CEO Founder -0.019*** (-3.47) -0.019*** (-3.56) -0.002 (-0.77) -0.003 (-1.60) -0.018*** (-3.46) -0.019*** (-3.53) 
CEO Descendant -0.014** (-2.16) -0.014** (-2.21) -0.002 (-1.05) -0.001 (-0.54) -0.014** (-2.21) -0.015** (-2.28) 
CEO-Chair 0.002 (0.36) 0.002 (0.27) -0.002 (-0.86) 0.001 (0.65) 0.001 (0.25) 0.002 (0.27) 
CEO-Group 0.003 (0.48) 0.004 (0.65) 0.001 (0.47) 0.0004 (0.22) 0.004 (0.66) 0.004 (0.69) 
BIG 4 -0.002 (-0.53) -0.0001 (-0.03) -0.002 (-1.50) -0.002* (-1.71) 0.0002 (0.05) -0.0004 (-0.10) 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.009** (-2.18) -0.009** (-2.29) -0.003* (-1.75) -0.002 (-1.27) -0.009** (-2.31) -0.009** (-2.31) 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.12: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel B: An Impact of Ownership of Executive Directors on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – Full Sample (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (executive directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) from 1994 
to 2007. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.5. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. ADi,t+1 include discretionary 
accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2), discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from 
conditional revenues model (DR2), adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model 
(DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
Discretionary Accruals Discretionary Revenues Adjusted Discretionary Accruals Explanatory 
Variables DA1 t DA2 t DR1 t DR2 t DA2_DR1 t DA2_DR2 t 
             
Firm Size -0.012*** (-6.44) -0.011*** (-5.86) -0.005*** (-8.44) -0.003*** (-5.33) -0.011*** (-5.86) -0.012*** (-5.91) 
Firm Age -0.017*** (-3.90) -0.018*** (-4.08) -0.005*** (-3.41) -0.003** (-2.42) -0.018*** (-4.10) -0.017*** (-4.05) 
Firm Growth 0.002 (0.34) 0.005 (0.75) 0.005* (1.79) 0.003* (1.76) 0.005 (0.75) 0.004 (0.67) 
Leverage 0.128*** (11.06) 0.123*** (10.29) 0.012*** (3.72) 0.003 (1.28) 0.122*** (10.26) 0.123*** (10.32) 
Constant 0.216*** (6.09) 0.214*** (6.19) 0.150*** (12.99) 0.103*** (11.82) 0.215*** (6.23) 0.214*** (6.20) 
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Obs. 3,229  3,151  3,737  3,735  3,151  3,151  
Adj. R-squared 0.142  0.131  0.086  0.072  0.129  0.130  
F-test 10.009  9.047  9.433  7.164  8.973  9.010  
p_value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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5.5.3.4 The Impact of Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms and 
Other Economic Determinants on Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
Regarding hypotheses Ha14 to Ha22, this section investigates the impact of board 
structure, CEO characteristics and auditor reputation and expertise on managers’ 
accounting discretion. The results of the OLS regressions (Model 5.1 to 5.5) are shown 
in Tables 5.10 to 5.12. 
5.5.3.4.1 Discretionary Accruals and Adjusted Discretionary Accruals 
The results shown in Tables 5.10 to 5.12 are consistent among all models (5.1 to 5.5). 
Therefore, this analysis is focused on the results in Panel A, Table 5.11. 
Regarding other ownership control mechanisms, none of coefficients of Share 
Difference are significant to any discretionary accruals, suggesting that the second 
largest shareholders might not have a significant role in monitoring the largest 
shareholders. This is also suggested by the fact that, on average, the largest shareholders 
owned substantially more shares than the second largest shareholders did, which would 
have reduced the ability of the latter to monitor the former.  
Nevertheless, the coefficients of CV are positively related to absolute discretionary 
accruals at the 1% level of significance for all discretionary accruals measurements, 
possibly implying that, where gap of cash flow rights and voting rights were large, listed 
firms were less likely to use accounting discretion. The evidence may also imply that 
pyramidal and cross-shareholding structures were not used for opportunistic purposes, at 
least in terms of accounting discretions. In fact, cross-shareholding, which further 
separates cash flow rights from control rights, appears to have been used within business 
groups in Thailand, and this may be a result of “positive group synergies” in business 
groups controlled by families (Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010: 2220). The evidence is 
partly in line with the findings of Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010), who report that 
pyramidal structures were less associated with discounted firm values than dual class 
shares were. They also report a positive but insignificant impact of cross-shareholding 
	  	  
Chapter 5	  
312	  
on firm value. However, this study’s evidence contradicts the findings of other studies 
(for example, see Fan and Wong, 2002), which suggest that a larger separation of cash 
flow rights from control rights leads to low earnings quality. 
Regarding board structure, the coefficients of Board size are positively and significantly 
related to absolute discretionary accruals for all discretionary accruals measurements, 
suggesting that, on average, absolute discretionary accruals increase as board size 
increases, if all other variables are constant. Consistent with the hypothesis Ha14, the 
evidence implies an inefficiency of larger boards in respect to detecting the use of 
accounting discretion over accruals. This finding is consistent with results from previous 
studies including Ghosh et al. (2010), in the US, and Abdul Rahman et al. (2006), in 
Malaysia. 
In addition, a positive relationship is found with board independence, at the 10% level of 
significance, but the relationship is significant only for absolute discretionary accruals 
estimated by DA2 and DA2_DR2. In addition, none of the coefficients of board 
experience show significant relationships. This evidence contradicts the expectation 
(Ha15) and the findings of most other research, such as that from the US, the UK and 
Hong Kong, which suggests that board independence may restrict accounting discretion 
(for examples, see Davidson et al., 2005; Jaggi et al., 2009; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 
2000), and suggests that independent directors in the sampled firms may not have been 
completely independent. Since many Thai businesses rely heavily on business networks, 
it may have been difficult for shareholders to identify and appoint truly independent 
directors. In addition, the lack of board independence may partly explain why, on 
average, Thai listed firms with larger boards tended to have higher discretionary 
accruals. 
Regarding CEO characteristics, the coefficients of CEO founder and CEO descendants 
are negatively and significantly related to all absolute discretionary accruals 
measurements. These results suggest that CEOs who are founders and/or their 
descendants help to limit the use of accounting discretion over accruals. These results 
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also provide evidence that supports the expectation of an alignment of interests (Ha19 and 
Ha20) between firms and CEOs or their descendants (Jiraporn and DaDalt, 2007). 
However, they contradict the findings of Dechow et al. (1996), who report that firms 
with CEO founders had a greater tendency to manage earnings, and this discrepancy 
may be caused by the difference in the institutional environments in which the studies 
were based. 
Regarding external auditors, the coefficients of auditor-partner tenure are negatively 
related to all absolute discretionary accruals at the 1% level of significance, suggesting 
that the longer tenure of an audit partner improves their knowledge of their clients’ 
business and increases their ability to detect and identify management discretion for 
specific purposes (Myers et al., 2003). These findings contradict the expectation (Ha22) 
but are consistent with other research that shows audit experience as negatively 
associated with the use of accounting discretion, such as Myers et al. (2003) and 
Johnson et al. (2002), in the US. The finding also agrees with Chen and Huang (2005), 
who report the lower use of discretionary accruals when auditor tenure exceeded five 
years in Taiwan. Since Thai listed firms have been required to rotate their auditor partner 
every five years since 2006, this regulation might reduce the benefits that firms can gain 
from auditor’s experience, in terms of mitigating accounting discretion. However, no 
significant relationship is found between BIG4 and all absolute discretionary accruals. 
Regarding other economic determinants, larger firm size or older firms are significantly 
associated with lower absolute discretionary accruals for all discretionary accruals 
measurements, suggesting that larger firms might have been induced by market 
participants to provide better internal control systems (Kim et al., 2003; Core et al., 
1999; Himmelberg et al., 1999). 
However, significant positive associations were found between leverage and absolute 
discretionary accruals, suggesting that high leverage may motivate managers and 
dominant shareholders to manage earnings for some purposes such as to avoid the 
violation of debt covenants (for examples, see DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Bowen et 
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al. 2008; Ghosh and Moon, 2010; Kim et al., 2010; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
These findings are consistent with those of other studies such as DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) and Ghosh and Moon (2010) in the US. 
5.5.3.4.2 Discretionary Revenues 
Although board size has been shown to have a positive impact on a discretionary 
accruals (see Section 5.5.3.4.1), Table 5.11, Panel A, shows that the coefficients of 
board size are negatively related to absolute discretionary revenues, at the 1% level of 
significance, in all models. This is consistent with the evidence from existing research 
from the US (for examples, see Beasley, 1996; Xie et al., 2003) and from Malaysia 
(Hashim et al., 2009), which suggests that larger boards are likely to limit managers’ 
opportunistic accounting discretion. Since revenue is a large account in income 
statements, it is normally spotted by regulators and the board may therefore pay more 
attention to it than to accruals in general. A less complexity of revenues accounts may 
also increases ability of the board to detect accounting discretion over revenues. 
Regarding auditor reputation and expertise, the coefficients of BIG4 are negatively 
related to absolute discretionary revenues at the 5% level of significance in the annual 
and conditional revenue models. The evidence supports the expectation (Ha21) and 
suggests that firms that are audited by BIG4 audit firms were less likely to use 
accounting discretion over revenues. The coefficients of Audit Partner Tenure are also 
significantly and negatively related to the magnitude of discretionary revenues, as 
measured in each of the revenues-based models. The evidence does not support the 
expectation (Ha22) but is consistent with the findings from discretionary accruals 
reported in Section 5.5.3.4.1.  
The significant negative relationship between BIG4 and absolute discretionary revenues 
may imply that auditors may have more concern on revenues components of accruals 
rather than other accruals. For example, revenues and accounts receivables accounts are 
key accounts and normally have significant amount. Regarding other economic 
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determinants, the results are consistent with those from discretionary accruals discussed 
in Section 5.5.3.4.1. 
5.5.3.5 The Corporate Governance Reforms 
This section investigates whether there has been any improvement in the impact of 
ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ 
accounting discretion in Thailand. The pooled cross-sectional data were partitioned into 
pre-reform period (1994 to 1998) and post-reform (2000 to 2007) period and the OLS 
regressions of Models 5.1 to 5.5 were re-estimated for each sub-period. 
In respect to the hypotheses, Ha23 to Ha43, the tests for equality of coefficients in pre-
reform and post-reform periods are performed using the dummy variables approach 
discussed in Section 5.3.2.1. Only the incremental effects and the Wald test (F-statistic) 
from Model 5.6 to 5.10 are reported.   
5.5.3.5.1 The Impact of Ownership Concentration and the Presence of 
Dominant Shareholders on Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
Table 5.13, Panels A.1 to A.3 and B.1 to B.3, shows the results of the regressions of 
ownership concentration (Model 5.1) and the presence of dominant shareholders (Model 
5.2) on discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues before and after the corporate 
governance reforms, respectively. 
Regarding discretionary accruals, the evidence from Panels A.1 and A.3 suggests that 
levels of ownership concentration were significantly and negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals, as measured by all models, only before the reforms. However, the 
effects largely disappear after the reforms. Additionally, the equality test (Ha23) shows 
that there are significantly positive incremental effects of ownership concentration on 
discretionary accruals, as measured by all models in the post-reform period. The Wald 
test also confirms that the impacts of ownership concentration on the discretionary 
accruals in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods are significantly different. 
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Regarding discretionary revenues, the evidence from Panel A.2 suggests that levels of 
ownership concentration did not have any significant impact on discretionary revenues 
before the reforms but did have significant negative associations with discretionary 
revenues (DR1) after the reforms. Nevertheless, the equality test (Ha23) reveals that the 
incremental effects of ownership concentration on discretionary revenues, as measured 
by all models in the post-reform period are negative but not significant. The Wald test 
also confirms that the impacts of ownership concentration on the discretionary revenues 
in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods are not significantly different. 
The evidence from Panels B.1 to B.3 shows no significant impact of the presence of 
dominant shareholders on discretionary accruals and revenues for all measuring models 
both before and after the reforms. 
Overall, the evidence from this section suggests that the motivation of blockholders to 
monitor firms’ accounting methods and policies is likely to have been strong and to have 
limited accounting discretion over accruals, but only before the reforms. As suggested 
by the existing literature (for examples, see Denis and McConnell, 2003; La Porta et al., 
1998, 1999, 2000), weak legal protection, including weak corporate governance, is one 
reason for ownership concentration; shareholders are likely to own substantial 
proportions of shares because they cannot rely on the system to protect their ownership 
rights. Since corporate governance and investor protection before the reforms were 
claimed to be weak (World Bank, 1998), it is no surprise that large shareholders played 
an important role in firm policies and operations prior to the reforms. 
In addition, the gradually adoption of the international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS) after the reform may reduce the role of large shareholders on influencing the 
financial reporting, especially in accruals accounts. Nevertheless, the evidence provides 
some clue that levels of ownership did motivate blockholders to limit accounting 
discretion over revenues rather than accruals after the reforms, possibly because sales 
accounts are more obvious to regulators and the public. 
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
Panel A.1: An Impact of Ownership Concentration and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Accruals – before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting 
discretion (Model 5.1) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards 
errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones 
model (DA2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental 
effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.1 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t Inct. Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Concentrated Own -0.075** (-2.09) 0.007 (0.41) 0.082** 4.32** -0.091** (-2.46) 0.004 (0.25) 0.095** 5.55** 
Share Difference 0.047** (2.06) 0.002 (0.19) -0.045* 3.23* 0.049** (2.10) 0.004 (0.40) -0.045* 3.12* 
CV 0.026 (1.48) 0.020** (2.20) -0.006 0.09 0.015 (0.83) 0.019** (2.05) 0.004 0.04 
Board Size 0.036** (2.21) 0.031** (2.48) -0.005 0.06 0.026 (1.61) 0.030** (2.38) 0.004 0.03 
Board 
Independence 0.012 (0.22) 0.028 (1.56) 0.016 0.08 0.021 (0.39) 0.029 (1.64) 0.008 0.02 
Board Experience -0.006 (-0.33) 0.008 (0.74) 0.014 0.43 -0.004 (-0.24) 0.007 (0.64) 0.011 0.28 
CEO Founder -0.010 (-0.66) -0.021*** (-3.87) -0.011 0.57 -0.009 (-0.66) -0.022*** (-4.06) -0.013 0.72 
CEO Descendant -0.004 (-0.22) -0.016** (-2.43) -0.012 0.46 -0.008 (-0.45) -0.016** (-2.39) -0.008 0.18 
CEO-Chair -0.017 (-1.03) 0.008 (1.27) 0.025 2.05 -0.015 (-0.97) 0.006 (0.99) 0.021 1.61 
CEO-Group 0.012 (0.82) 0.003 (0.51) -0.009 0.29 0.017 (1.12) 0.003 (0.40) -0.014 0.76 
BIG 4 0.003 (0.36) -0.004 (-0.82) -0.007 0.49 0.010 (1.04) -0.003 (-0.69) -0.013 1.54 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.011 (-1.24) -0.008* (-1.94) 0.003 0.11 -0.015 (-1.64) -0.008* (-1.80) 0.007 0.59 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.1: An Impact of Ownership Concentration and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Accruals – before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting 
discretion (Model 5.1) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards 
errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones 
model (DA2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental 
effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.1 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t Inct. Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size -0.002 (-0.47) -0.016*** (-7.15) -0.014*** 9.64*** -0.001 (-0.21) -0.015*** (-6.60) -0.014*** 9.06*** 
Firm Age -0.021** (-2.56) -0.019*** (-3.79) 0.002 0.06 -0.023*** (-2.68) -0.020*** (-4.00) 0.003 0.10 
Firm Growth -0.008 (-0.82) 0.005 (0.76) 0.013 1.24 -0.014 (-1.20) 0.010 (1.30) 0.024* 2.94* 
Leverage 0.114*** (4.52) 0.109*** (7.80) -0.005 0.03 0.102*** (3.82) 0.107*** (7.54) 0.005 0.03 
Constant 0.043 (0.66) 0.231*** (4.98)   0.073 (1.14) 0.223*** (4.89)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 801  2,190    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.098  0.108    0.081  0.104    
F-test 3.174  7.089    2.648  6.624    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.2: An Impact of Ownership Concentration and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Revenues – before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting 
discretion (Model 5.1) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards 
errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2). A 
single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from 
post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 
1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.1 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Concentrated Own -0.006 (-0.55) -0.013* (-1.89) -0.007 0.25 0.0001 (0.02) -0.005 (-0.97) -0.005 0.27 
Share Difference 0.006 (0.95) 0.001 (0.31) -0.005 0.39 0.007 (1.42) -0.0005 (-0.13) -0.007 1.51 
CV 0.004 (0.84) 0.000 (0.03) -0.004 0.43 0.004 (0.95) 0.001 (0.25) -0.003 0.38 
Board Size -0.014*** (-2.81) -0.001 (-0.12) 0.013* 3.47* -0.012*** (-2.93) -0.006* (-1.65) 0.006 1.33 
Board Independence 0.000 (-0.02) 0.010 (1.49) 0.010 0.39 -0.005 (-0.43) 0.000 (-0.02) 0.005 0.15 
Board Experience 0.001 (0.14) -0.009** (-2.15) -0.010 2.06 0.004 (0.96) -0.006** (-2.03) -0.010** 3.92** 
CEO Founder 0.000 (-0.10) -0.003 (-1.38) -0.003 0.42 0.003 (0.85) -0.004** (-1.98) -0.007* 3.10* 
CEO Descendant -0.003 (-0.61) -0.002 (-0.76) 0.001 0.02 -0.001 (-0.26) -0.0004 (-0.19) 0.001 0.02 
CEO-Chair -0.002 (-0.46) -0.002 (-0.82) 0.000 0.00 -0.001 (-0.28) 0.001 (0.25) 0.002 0.13 
CEO-Group 0.002 (0.39) 0.001 (0.34) -0.001 0.02 0.001 (0.15) -0.00001 (-0.00) -0.001 0.02 
BIG 4 -0.005* (-1.81) 0.000 (-0.02) 0.005 2.14 -0.003* (-1.67) -0.001 (-0.64) 0.002 0.98 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.007*** (-2.76) -0.001 (-0.35) 0.006** 4.36** -0.004* (-1.84) -0.001 (-0.43) 0.003 1.70 
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.2: An Impact of Ownership Concentration and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Revenues – before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting 
discretion (Model 5.1) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards 
errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2). A 
single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from 
post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 
1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.1 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size -0.005*** (-4.24) -0.006*** (-6.59) -0.001 0.13 -0.003*** (-2.72) -0.003*** (-4.59) 0.000 0.04 
Firm Age -0.006*** (-2.69) -0.001 (-0.56) 0.005* 3.07* -0.004** (-2.46) 0.000 (0.33) 0.004** 4.66** 
Firm Growth 0.007 (1.36) 0.006* (1.92) -0.001 0.03 0.005 (1.27) 0.004** (2.06) -0.001 0.02 
Leverage 0.014** (2.22) 0.012*** (3.16) -0.002 0.05 0.001 (0.27) 0.005* (1.83) 0.004 0.54 
Constant 0.157*** (8.19) 0.116*** (7.11)   0.109*** (7.26) 0.086*** (6.92)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,344  2,155    1,343  2,155    
Adj. R-squared 0.069  0.080    0.048  0.062    
F-test 6.235  7.148    4.148  4.685    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.3: An Impact of Ownership Concentration and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Adjusted Discretionary Accruals – before and after 
the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting 
discretion (Model 5.1) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards 
errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary 
revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single regression using dummy variable 
approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from 
the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
 Model 5.1 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t Inct. Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             Concentrated Own -0.091** (-2.47) 0.003 (0.20) 0.094** 5.46** -0.093** (-2.53) 0.002 (0.14) 0.095** 5.61** 
Share Difference 0.050** (2.18) 0.005 (0.47) -0.045* 3.27* 0.050** (2.16) 0.005 (0.51) -0.045* 3.14* 
CV 0.015 (0.83) 0.019** (2.04) 0.004 0.04 0.011 (0.64) 0.020** (2.12) 0.009 0.17 
Board Size 0.027* (1.69) 0.029** (2.29) 0.002 0.00 0.027 (1.63) 0.030** (2.41) 0.003 0.03 
Board 
Independence 0.023 (0.43) 0.027 (1.54) 0.004 0.01 0.021 (0.40) 0.030* (1.66) 0.009 0.02 
Board Experience -0.005 (-0.29) 0.007 (0.69) 0.012 0.36 -0.004 (-0.24) 0.008 (0.73) 0.012 0.32 
CEO Founder -0.008 (-0.58) -0.022*** (-4.01) -0.014 0.83 -0.008 (-0.58) -0.023*** (-4.09) -0.015 0.90 
CEO Descendant -0.009 (-0.49) -0.016** (-2.37) -0.007 0.14 -0.010 (-0.55) -0.016** (-2.43) -0.006 0.12 
CEO-Chair -0.016 (-1.07) 0.006 (1.01) 0.022 1.90 -0.017 (-1.14) 0.006 (1.04) 0.023 2.12 
CEO-Group 0.017 (1.16) 0.003 (0.40) -0.014 0.82 0.017 (1.18) 0.003 (0.45) -0.014 0.81 
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.3: An Impact of Ownership Concentration and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Adjusted Discretionary Accruals – before and after 
the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting 
discretion (Model 5.1) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards 
errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary 
revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single regression using dummy variable 
approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from 
the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
 Model 5.1 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.6) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t Inct. Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             BIG 4 0.011 (1.15) -0.003 (-0.62) -0.014 1.72 0.009 (0.99) -0.003 (-0.68) -0.012 1.44 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.015* (-1.66) -0.007* (-1.78) 0.008 0.62 -0.014 (-1.50) -0.008* (-1.93) 0.006 0.34 
Firm Size 0.000 (-0.10) -0.015*** (-6.60) -0.015*** 9.76*** -0.001 (-0.22) -0.015*** (-6.60) -0.014*** 9.06*** 
Firm Age -0.023*** (-2.72) -0.020*** (-3.96) 0.003 0.13 -0.023*** (-2.64) -0.020*** (-3.96) 0.003 0.09 
Firm Growth -0.013 (-1.13) 0.010 (1.29) 0.023* 2.74* -0.013 (-1.16) 0.009 (1.25) 0.022* 2.75* 
Leverage 0.096*** (3.75) 0.107*** (7.55) 0.011 0.14 0.102*** (3.84) 0.108*** (7.58) 0.006 0.03 
Constant 0.066 (1.03) 0.226*** (4.98)   0.073 (1.13) 0.221*** (4.87)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 774  2,148    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.080  0.104    0.082  0.104    
F-test 2.619  6.600    2.639  6.637    
p_value 0.001  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.1: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Accruals – before and 
after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ 
accounting discretion (Model 5.2) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on 
robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional 
modified Jones model (DA2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows 
only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.2 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             D_Dominant 0.007 (0.56) -0.001 (-0.21) -0.008 0.36 0.006 (0.47) -0.001 (-0.20) -0.007 0.26 
Share Difference 0.005 (0.30) 0.006 (0.73) 0.001 0.00 0.001 (0.04) 0.007 (0.83) 0.006 0.10 
CV 0.032* (1.82) 0.020** (2.15) -0.012 0.38 0.023 (1.30) 0.019** (2.01) -0.004 0.05 
Board Size 0.039** (2.43) 0.031** (2.47) -0.008 0.17 0.030* (1.85) 0.030** (2.37) 0.000 0.00 
Board Independence 0.017 (0.32) 0.028 (1.59) 0.011 0.05 0.026 (0.49) 0.030* (1.66) 0.004 0.00 
Board Experience -0.010 (-0.53) 0.008 (0.74) 0.018 0.70 -0.009 (-0.48) 0.007 (0.64) 0.016 0.56 
CEO Founder -0.010 (-0.65) -0.022*** (-3.94) -0.012 0.60 -0.009 (-0.61) -0.022*** (-4.13) -0.013 0.82 
CEO Descendant -0.002 (-0.14) -0.016** (-2.41) -0.014 0.54 -0.005 (-0.31) -0.016** (-2.38) -0.011 0.29 
CEO-Chair -0.016 (-0.97) 0.008 (1.27) 0.024 1.89 -0.015 (-0.93) 0.006 (0.99) 0.021 1.54 
CEO-Group 0.009 (0.62) 0.003 (0.53) -0.006 0.12 0.013 (0.85) 0.003 (0.41) -0.010 0.38 
BIG 4 0.001 (0.13) -0.004 (-0.82) -0.005 0.24 0.007 (0.72) -0.003 (-0.68) -0.010 0.90 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.011 (-1.23) -0.008* (-1.95) 0.00 0.10 -0.015 (-1.56) -0.008* (-1.81) 0.007 0.49 
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.1: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Accruals – before and 
after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ 
accounting discretion (Model 5.2) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on 
robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional 
modified Jones model (DA2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows 
only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.2 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald Test 
(F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size -0.002 (-0.47) -0.016*** (-7.17) -0.014*** 9.64*** -0.001 (-0.23) -0.015*** (-6.59) -0.014*** 8.89*** 
Firm Age -0.021** (-2.50) -0.019*** (-3.79) 0.002 0.04 -0.022** (-2.58) -0.020*** (-4.00) 0.002 0.05 
Firm Growth -0.008 (-0.76) 0.005 (0.74) 0.013 1.10 -0.013 (-1.13) 0.009 (1.28) 0.022 2.71 
Leverage 0.112*** (4.46) 0.109*** (7.81) -0.003 0.02 0.100*** (3.76) 0.107*** (7.55) 0.007 0.05 
Constant 0.021 (0.33) 0.233*** (5.09)   0.048 (0.74) 0.224*** (4.98)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 801  2,190    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.094  0.108    0.074  0.104    
F-test 2.973  7.100    2.292  6.623    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.003  0.000    
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.2: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Revenues – before and 
after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ 
accounting discretion (Model 5.2) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on 
robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues 
model (DR2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental 
effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.2 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
D_Dominant -0.003 (-0.72) -0.001 (-0.40) 0.002 0.13 0.003 (0.98) 0.001 (0.32) -0.002 0.38 
Share Difference 0.006 (1.14) -0.004 (-1.00) -0.010 2.30 0.005 (1.25) -0.003 (-1.13) -0.008* 2.81* 
CV 0.004 (0.82) 0.001 (0.22) -0.003 0.29 0.004 (1.01) 0.001 (0.38) -0.003 0.36 
Board Size -0.013*** (-2.76) 0.000 (-0.06) 0.013* 3.50* -0.012*** (-2.97) -0.006* (-1.66) 0.006 1.39 
Board Independence 0.001 (0.04) 0.010 (1.39) 0.009 0.28 -0.005 (-0.50) -0.001 (-0.11) 0.004 0.17 
Board Experience 0.000 (0.08) -0.009** (-2.14) -0.009 1.86 0.004 (0.97) -0.006** (-2.04) -0.010** 3.95** 
CEO Founder 0.000 (-0.04) -0.003 (-1.22) -0.003 0.38 0.003 (0.78) -0.004* (-1.90) -0.007 2.71 
CEO Descendant -0.003 (-0.54) -0.002 (-0.83) 0.001 0.00 -0.001 (-0.33) -0.001 (-0.25) 0.000 0.03 
CEO-Chair -0.002 (-0.49) -0.002 (-0.82) 0.000 0.00 -0.001 (-0.25) 0.001 (0.25) 0.002 0.11 
CEO-Group 0.001 (0.34) 0.001 (0.27) 0.000 0.01 0.000 (0.12) 0.000 (-0.05) 0.000 0.02 
BIG 4 -0.005* (-1.85) 0.000 (-0.05) 0.005 2.17 -0.003* (-1.68) -0.001 (-0.66) 0.002 0.97 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.007*** (-2.72) -0.001 (-0.32) 0.006*
* 
4.29** -0.004* (-1.94) -0.001 (-0.41) 0.003 1.95 
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.2: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Revenues – before and 
after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ 
accounting discretion (Model 5.2) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on 
robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues 
model (DR2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental 
effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.2 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size -0.005*** (-4.18) -0.006*** (-6.49) -0.001 0.14 -0.003*** (-2.75) -0.003*** (-4.55) 0.000 0.03 
Firm Age -0.006*** (-2.68) -0.001 (-0.55) 0.005* 3.05* -0.004** (-2.49) 0.000 (0.35) 0.004** 4.81** 
Firm Growth 0.007 (1.37) 0.006* (1.95) -0.001 0.02 0.005 (1.28) 0.004** (2.10) -0.001 0.01 
Leverage 0.014** (2.22) 0.012*** (3.18) -0.002 0.04 0.001 (0.25) 0.005* (1.86) 0.004 0.59 
Constant 0.155*** (8.09) 0.113*** (7.05)   0.109*** (7.27) 0.084*** (6.90)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,344  2,155    1,343  2,155    
Adj. R-squared 0.069  0.079    0.049  0.062    
F-test 6.177  7.190    4.197  4.819    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.3: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Adjusted Discretionary Accruals – 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ 
accounting discretion (Model 5.2) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on 
robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by 
discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single regression using dummy 
variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) 
from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
 Model 5.2 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
D_Dominant 0.006 (0.47) -0.001 (-0.17) -0.007 0.25 0.007 (0.53) -0.002 (-0.29) -0.009 0.36 
Share Difference 0.002 (0.14) 0.007 (0.87) 0.005 0.06 0.001 (0.03) 0.007 (0.92) 0.006 0.13 
CV 0.023 (1.29) 0.019** (2.01) -0.004 0.04 0.020 (1.11) 0.019** (2.09) -0.001 0.00 
Board Size 0.031* (1.92) 0.029** (2.28) -0.002 0.01 0.030* (1.86) 0.030** (2.41) 0.000 0.00 
Board Independence 0.028 (0.53) 0.028 (1.56) 0.000 0.00 0.027 (0.51) 0.030* (1.68) 0.003 0.00 
Board Experience -0.009 (-0.53) 0.007 (0.69) 0.016 0.67 -0.009 (-0.48) 0.008 (0.73) 0.017 0.62 
CEO Founder -0.007 (-0.52) -0.022*** (-4.07) -0.015 0.93 -0.007 (-0.52) -0.023*** (-4.14) -0.016 1.00 
CEO Descendant -0.006 (-0.35) -0.016** (-2.36) -0.010 0.24 -0.007 (-0.41) -0.016** (-2.42) -0.009 0.21 
CEO-Chair -0.016 (-1.04) 0.006 (1.01) 0.022 1.82 -0.017 (-1.10) 0.006 (1.04) 0.023 2.01 
CEO-Group 0.013 (0.88) 0.003 (0.41) -0.010 0.42 0.013 (0.89) 0.003 (0.46) -0.010 0.40 
BIG 4 0.008 (0.82) -0.003 (-0.62) -0.011 1.03 0.006 (0.66) -0.003 (-0.68) -0.009 0.81 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.015 (-1.57) -0.007* (-1.79) 0.008 0.52 -0.013 (-1.42) -0.008* (-1.93) 0.005 0.27 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.13: An Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.3: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Adjusted Discretionary Accruals – 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders and other corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ 
accounting discretion (Model 5.2) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on 
robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by 
discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single regression using dummy 
variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) 
from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
 Model 5.2 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size -0.001 (-0.12) -0.015*** (-6.59) -0.014*** 9.59*** -0.001 (-0.24) -0.015*** (-6.58) -0.014*** 8.87*** 
Firm Age -0.022*** (-2.62) -0.020*** (-3.96) 0.002 0.08 -0.022** (-2.54) -0.020*** (-3.96) 0.002 0.04 
Firm Growth -0.012 (-1.06) 0.009 (1.28) 0.021 2.52 -0.012 (-1.08) 0.009 (1.23) 0.021 2.52 
Leverage 0.095*** (3.68) 0.107*** (7.56) 0.012 0.19 0.100*** (3.77) 0.108*** (7.59) 0.008 0.06 
Constant 0.040 (0.63) 0.227*** (5.06)   0.047 (0.73) 0.222*** (4.95)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 774  2,148    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.072  0.104    0.074  0.104    
F-test 2.284  6.599    2.280  6.635    
p_value 0.003  0.000    0.003  0.000    
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5.5.3.5.2 The Impact of Ownership Concentration by Shareholder Types 
and the Presence of Dominant Shareholders, by their Types, on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
Table 5.14, Panels A.1 to A.3 and B.1 to B.3, shows the results of the regressions of 
ownership concentration by shareholder types (Model 5.3) and the presence of dominant 
shareholders by their types (Model 5.4) on the magnitude of accounting discretion 
measured by discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues before and after the 
corporate governance reforms, respectively. 
Regarding discretionary accruals, the results from Panels A.1 and A.3 reveal that levels 
of family ownership are significant and negative to the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals for some measurements (DA2, DA2_DR2) before the reforms. Additionally, the 
equality test (Ha25) shows the significantly positive incremental effects of family block 
ownership on the discretionary accruals in the post-reform period. The Wald test also 
confirms that the impacts of family block ownership on the discretionary accruals in the 
pre-reform and the post-reform periods are significantly different. Hence it could imply 
that the motivation of the large family shareholders to limit the use of discretionary 
accruals significantly reduces after the reform. Nevertheless, the results from Panel B.1 
and B.3 show no significant impact of the presence of dominant family shareholders on 
discretionary accruals for all measurements. 
In addition, the results from Panels A.1 and A.3 reveal that levels of ownership by 
foreign company investors are significantly and negatively associated with the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals for all measurements, but only before the reforms. 
The equality test (Ha27) shows the significantly positive incremental effects of foreign 
company block ownership on the discretionary accruals in the post-reform period. The 
Wald test also confirms that the impacts of foreign company block ownership on the 
discretionary accruals in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods are significantly 
different. Hence it could imply that the roles of foreign company blockholders to limit 
the use of discretionary accruals may significantly reduce after the reform. Nevertheless, 
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the results from Panel B.1 and B.3 show no significant impact of the presence of a 
dominant foreign company shareholder on discretionary accruals for all measurements. 
However, the results from Panels A.1 and A.3 show that levels of ownership by bank are 
significant and positively associated with the magnitude of discretionary accruals (DA1) 
before the reforms but the significant results largely disappear after the reforms. 
Additionally, the equality test (Ha28) shows the significantly negative incremental effects 
of bank block ownership on the discretionary accruals in the post-reform period. The 
Wald test also confirms that the impacts of bank block ownership on the discretionary 
accruals in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods are significantly different. Hence 
the evidence could imply the more alignment of interests between bank owners and 
firms in term of discretionary accruals. The results from Panels B.1 and B.3 also suggest 
that the presence of banks1 as the dominant shareholders after the reforms did restrain 
managers from engaging in accounting discretion over accruals. 
Regarding discretionary revenues, the results from Panel A.2 show that levels of family 
ownership are negatively associated with the magnitude of discretionary revenues (DR1, 
DR2), but only after the reforms, and no significant improvement is shown between two 
sub-periods.  
Additionally, levels of ownership of bank are significant and have a negative 
relationship with the magnitude of discretionary revenues (DR1, DR2) before the 
reforms. However, the equality test (Ha28) shows the significantly positive incremental 
effects of bank block ownership in the post-reform period. The Wald test also confirms 
that the impacts of bank block ownership on discretionary accruals in the pre-reform and 
the post-reform periods are significantly different. Inconsistent with the expectation 
(Ha28) and the results from discretionary accruals, the evidence suggests more conflict of 
interests between bank owners and firms in term of discretionary revenues after the 
reforms. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 There is no the presence of dominant bank shareholders before the corporate governance reform. 
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Levels of ownership by domestic companies are significant and negatively related to the 
magnitude of discretionary revenues (DR1) before the reforms. The results from Panel 
B.2 show that the presence of a domestic company as a dominant shareholder may have 
limited the use of accounting discretion over revenues, measured by DA1, only before 
the reforms.  
Last, levels of ownership by non-bank financial institutions are significant and 
negatively related to the magnitude of discretionary revenues (DR1) before the reforms. 
Nevertheless, the equality test (Ha29) reveals that the incremental effects of non-bank 
financial institutions block ownership on the discretionary revenues in the post-reform 
period are positive but not significant. The Wald test also confirms that the impacts of 
non-bank financial institutions block ownership on the discretionary revenues in the pre-
reform and the post-reform periods are not significantly different. 
However, it appears that the presence of non-bank financial institutions as the dominant 
shareholders is significant and positively associated with discretionary revenues, 
measured by all models (DR1, DR2) after the reforms. The equality test (Ha33) also 
shows the significantly positive incremental effects of the presence of the dominant non-
bank financial institution shareholder on the discretionary revenues in the post-reform 
period. The Wald test also confirms that the impacts of the presence of this type of the 
dominant shareholder on discretionary revenues in the pre-reform and the post-reform 
periods are significantly different. This finding reveals the more conflict of interests (for 
example, in terms of short-term investment strategy  (Coffee, 1991) or active traders 
(Chen et al., 2005)) between dominant shareholders who are non-bank financial 
institutions and firms, after the reforms. 
Overall, consistent with the results discussed in Section 5.5.3.5.2, the evidence confirms 
that block ownership had some influence over the degree of the alignment of interests of 
shareholders and their participation in monitoring. Additionally, the evidence confirms 
that different types of shareholders may have had different motivations and abilities to 
limit the use of accounting discretion. 
!!
Chapter 5!
""#!
In particular, the evidence from this section suggests that higher levels of family and 
foreign company block ownership may have more motivated families and foreign 
company blockholders to limit the use of accounting discretion over accruals only before 
the reforms. In addition, high levels of ownership by domestic companies and non-bank 
financial institutions limited the use of accounting discretion over revenues only before 
the reforms. However, the significant impacts of these types of ownership structures on 
accounting discretions over accruals and revenues disappeared after the corporate 
governance reform. The evidence suggests that the stronger corporate governance and 
accounting standards since 1999 may have significantly reduced these blockholders’ 
motivation and ability to exercise control over financial reporting (for examples, see La 
Porta et al. 1998, 1999, 2000). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that family block 
ownership seems to have restrained family blockholders from engaging in accounting 
discretion over revenues after the reforms. 
Regarding bank block ownership, there is evidence that an increase levels of banks 
block ownership may motivate bank blockholders to engage in opportunistic accounting 
discretion over accruals before the reforms. Hence some conflict of interests between 
bank owners and firms is evident. In fact, higher proportions of shares owned by banks 
are expected to lead to more discretionary accruals, and this evidence is consistent with 
some research findings, such as those of Brickley et al. (1988), which suggest that banks 
are “pressure-sensitive” investors and more likely to vote in favour of managers because 
of their business relationship.  
Since most Thai listed firms have very close relationships with banks,2 their ability to 
independently monitor firms may be limited. Nevertheless, stronger corporate 
governance seems to have minimised these conflicts. In addition, having the role of 
dominant shareholders does appear to have helped banks to align their interests with 
those of firms, inhibiting the use of accounting discretion over accruals after the reforms.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Detailed discussion on the relationships between banks and Thai business groups is presented in Section 
3.3 in Chapter 4. 
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
Panel A.1: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Accruals – 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration by types of shareholder and other corporate governance mechanisms on 
managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.3) before and after the corporate governance reform. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test 
based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-
sectional modified Jones model (DA2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table 
shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.3 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Family Own -0.037 (-1.22) 0.016 (1.04) 0.053 2.46 -0.053* (-1.67) 0.013 (0.81) 0.066* 3.49* 
Government Own -0.105 (-1.17) -0.044 (-1.10) 0.061 0.40 -0.102 (-1.12) -0.050 (-1.32) 0.052 0.27 
Foreign Company 
Own -0.073* (-1.88) 0.006 (0.40) 0.079* 3.62* -0.093** (-2.36) -0.002 (-0.13) 0.091** 4.66** 
Domestic Company 
Own -0.050 (-0.60) 0.018 (0.82) 0.068 0.63 -0.056 (-0.68) 0.001 (0.03) 0.057 0.45 
Bank Own 0.525* (1.96) -0.093 (-1.13) -0.618** 4.95** 0.430 (1.59) -0.074 (-0.88) -0.504* 3.23* 
Non-Bank Fin.Insti. 
Own 
-0.165 (-1.54) 0.057 (0.65) 0.222 2.57 -0.171 (-1.52) 0.028 (0.34) 0.199 2.07 
Share Difference 0.017 (0.90) 0.00002 (0.00) -0.017 0.69 0.016 (0.83) 0.001 (0.14) -0.015 0.51 
CV 0.039** (2.09) 0.022** (2.34) -0.017 0.61 0.026 (1.36) 0.022** (2.21) -0.004 0.03 
Board Size 0.035** (2.16) 0.034*** (2.72) -0.001 0.00 0.026 (1.62) 0.034*** (2.67) 0.008 0.15 
Board Independence 0.004 (0.08) 0.030* (1.68) 0.026 0.21 0.015 (0.27) 0.032* (1.79) 0.017 0.09 
Board Experience -0.016 (-0.86) 0.010 (0.91) 0.026 1.46 -0.013 (-0.68) 0.008 (0.74) 0.021 0.94 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.1: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Accruals – 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration by types of shareholder and other corporate governance mechanisms on 
managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.3) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test 
based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-
sectional modified Jones model (DA2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table 
shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.3 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
CEO Founder -0.009 (-0.59) -0.022*** (-3.86) -0.013 0.69 -0.010 (-0.65) -0.024*** (-4.18) -0.014 0.83 
CEO Descendant 0.002 (0.12) -0.017*** (-2.58) -0.019 1.12 -0.003 (-0.16) -0.018*** (-2.59) -0.015 0.59 
CEO-Chair -0.016 (-1.03) 0.008 (1.18) 0.024 1.98 -0.015 (-0.96) 0.005 (0.87) 0.020 1.52 
CEO-Group 0.010 (0.64) 0.003 (0.42) -0.007 0.17 0.015 (0.95) 0.002 (0.24) -0.013 0.61 
BIG 4 0.002 (0.21) -0.004 (-0.77) -0.006 0.29 0.009 (0.97) -0.003 (-0.55) -0.012 1.26 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.009 (-0.96) -0.007* (-1.74) 0.002 0.03 -0.014 (-1.45) -0.007 (-1.63) 0.007 0.44 
Firm Size -0.001 (-0.33) -0.016*** (-6.85) -0.015*** 8.53*** -0.001 (-0.17) -0.015*** (-6.25) -0.014*** 7.54*** 
Firm Age -0.019** (-2.18) -0.019*** (-3.84) 0.000 0.00 -0.021** (-2.25) -0.020*** (-4.01) 0.001 0.00 
Firm Growth -0.012 (-1.17) 0.006 (0.82) 0.018 2.06 -0.017 (-1.45) 0.010 (1.34) 0.027** 3.81** 
Leverage 0.111*** (4.30) 0.109*** (7.73) -0.002 0.00 0.100*** (3.67) 0.107*** (7.47) 0.007 0.05 
Constant 0.039 (0.56) 0.212*** (4.46)   0.075 (1.05) 0.203*** (4.31)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 801  2,190    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.104  0.108    0.084  0.104    
F-test 2.833  5.593    2.393  5.140    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
             !
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.2: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Revenues – 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration by types of shareholder and other corporate governance mechanisms on 
managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.3) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test 
based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional 
revenues model (DR2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an 
incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.3 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Family Own -0.014 (-1.47) -0.022*** (-3.61) -0.008 0.42 -0.008 (-1.07) -0.012*** (-2.58) -0.004 0.25 
Government Own 0.012 (0.35) 0.007 (0.46) -0.005 0.02 -0.018 (-1.24) 0.007 (0.58) 0.025 1.79 
Foreign Company 
Own 0.010 (0.81) -0.006 (-0.80) -0.016 1.25 0.004 (0.41) 0.0003 (0.05) -0.004 0.09 
Domestic Company 
Own -0.033** (-2.41) -0.010 (-0.71) 0.023 1.35 -0.014 (-1.11) -0.013 (-1.20) 0.001 0.01 
Bank Own -0.142*** (-3.20) 0.053 (1.16) 0.195*** 9.35*** -0.122*** (-3.21) 0.054 (1.44) 0.176*** 10.89*** 
Non-Bank Fin.Insti. 
Own -0.081** (-2.50) -0.020 (-0.64) 0.061 1.83 -0.030 (-1.18) -0.0002 (-0.01) 0.030 0.79 
Share Difference 0.008 (1.39) 0.003 (0.77) -0.005 0.57 0.009** (2.18) 0.002 (0.54) -0.007 2.16 
CV 0.003 (0.67) -0.002 (-0.50) -0.005 0.70 0.003 (0.80) -0.001 (-0.42) -0.004 0.79 
Board Size -0.013*** (-2.71) -0.003 (-0.54) 0.010 2.25 -0.011*** (-2.87) -0.007** (-2.13) 0.004 0.66 
Board Independence -0.004 (-0.28) 0.009 (1.26) 0.013 0.60 -0.007 (-0.65) -0.001 (-0.18) 0.006 0.26 
Board Experience 0.004 (0.83) -0.009** (-2.02) -0.013* 3.70* 0.007 (1.53) -0.007** (-2.02) -0.014** 5.95** 
CEO Founder -0.001 (-0.14) -0.002 (-0.98) -0.001 0.15 0.002 (0.68) -0.003* (-1.65) -0.005 2.05 
CEO Descendant -0.003 (-0.71) -0.001 (-0.28) 0.002 0.23 -0.002 (-0.45) 0.0003 (0.13) 0.002 0.21 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.2: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Discretionary Revenues – 
before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration by types of shareholder and other corporate governance mechanisms on 
managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.3) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test 
based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional 
revenues model (DR2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an 
incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.3 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) 
Explanatory 
Variables Pre-Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
CEO-Chair -0.003 (-0.56) -0.001 (-0.50) 0.002 0.08 -0.002 (-0.37) 0.001 (0.49) 0.003 0.31 
CEO-Group 0.002 (0.44) 0.002 (0.69) 0.000 0.00 0.001 (0.26) 0.001 (0.35) 0.000 0.00 
BIG 4 -0.005* (-1.92) -0.001 (-0.38) 0.004 1.83 -0.003* (-1.68) -0.002 (-1.02) 0.001 0.58 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.008*** (-2.94) -0.001 (-0.75) 0.007** 4.13** -0.004* (-1.89) -0.001 (-0.83) 0.003 1.28 
Firm Size -0.006*** (-4.79) -0.006*** (-6.71) 0.000 0.02 -0.003*** (-2.82) -0.003*** (-4.50) 0.000 0.01 
Firm Age -0.008*** (-3.39) -0.001 (-0.60) 0.007** 5.55** -0.006*** (-2.92) 0.0004 (0.28) 0.006*** 6.43*** 
Firm Growth 0.007 (1.43) 0.006* (1.83) -0.001 0.07 0.005 (1.32) 0.004** (1.99) -0.001 0.05 
Leverage 0.018*** (2.84) 0.012*** (3.19) -0.006 0.59 0.003 (0.67) 0.005* (1.81) 0.002 0.12 
Constant 0.179*** (8.73) 0.129*** (7.55)   0.118*** (7.41) 0.094*** (7.08)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,344  2,155    1,343  2,155    
Adj. R-squared 0.080  0.085    0.052  0.066    
F-test 5.432  6.549    3.851  4.019    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.3: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Adjusted Discretionary 
Accruals – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration by types of shareholder and other corporate governance mechanisms on 
managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.3) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test 
based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model 
adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single regression 
using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period 
(Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) 
or 10% (*) level, respectively.  
 Model 5.3 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Family Own -0.052 (-1.64) 0.013 (0.85) 0.065* 3.45* -0.054* (-1.71) 0.012 (0.76) 0.066* 3.53* 
Government Own -0.102 (-1.14) -0.051 (-1.32) 0.051 0.28 -0.108 (-1.20) -0.053 (-1.40) 0.055 0.31 
Foreign Company 
Own -0.096** (-2.44) -0.002 (-0.15) 0.094** 4.97** -0.096** (-2.43) -0.003 (-0.18) 0.093** 4.90** 
Domestic Company 
Own -0.054 (-0.65) 0.003 (0.12) 0.057 0.44 -0.059 (-0.72) 0.006 (0.25) 0.065 0.59 
Bank Own 0.437 (1.61) -0.072 (-0.86) -0.509* 3.28* 0.444 (1.64) -0.076 (-0.90) -0.520* 3.40* 
Non-Bank Fin.Insti. 
Own -0.173 (-1.55) 0.028 (0.35) 0.201 2.15 -0.179 (-1.61) 0.022 (0.27) 0.201 2.15 
Share Difference 0.017 (0.88) 0.001 (0.16) -0.016 0.57 0.016 (0.84) 0.002 (0.21) -0.014 0.49 
CV 0.026 (1.37) 0.022** (2.22) -0.004 0.03 0.022 (1.19) 0.023** (2.31) 0.001 0.00 
Board Size 0.027* (1.69) 0.033*** (2.59) 0.006 0.08 0.027 (1.63) 0.035*** (2.71) 0.008 0.15 
Board Independence 0.017 (0.31) 0.030* (1.70) 0.013 0.05 0.015 (0.28) 0.032* (1.81) 0.017 0.09 
Board Experience -0.014 (-0.75) 0.009 (0.79) 0.023 1.12 -0.013 (-0.69) 0.009 (0.85) 0.022 1.06 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.3: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Adjusted Discretionary 
Accruals – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of ownership concentration by types of shareholder and other corporate governance mechanisms on 
managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.3) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test 
based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model 
adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single regression 
using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period 
(Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) 
or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.3 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.8) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
CEO Founder -0.009 (-0.58) -0.024*** (-4.13) -0.015 0.92 -0.008 (-0.57) -0.024*** (-4.19) -0.016 1.00 
CEO Descendant -0.004 (-0.20) -0.017** (-2.58) -0.013 0.53 -0.005 (-0.26) -0.018*** (-2.61) -0.013 0.47 
CEO-Chair -0.016 (-1.07) 0.006 (0.89) 0.022 1.80 -0.017 (-1.14) 0.006 (0.93) 0.023 2.02 
CEO-Group 0.015 (0.98) 0.002 (0.23) -0.013 0.65 0.015 (1.00) 0.002 (0.29) -0.013 0.65 
BIG 4 0.010 (1.09) -0.002 (-0.49) -0.012 1.44 0.009 (0.93) -0.003 (-0.56) -0.012 1.20 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 
-0.014 (-1.46) -0.007 (-1.60) 0.007 0.47 -0.012 (-1.31) -0.007* (-1.75) 0.005 0.23 
Firm Size 0.000 (-0.06) -0.015*** (-6.24) -0.015*** 8.13*** -0.001 (-0.17) -0.015*** (-6.24) -0.014*** 7.56*** 
Firm Age -0.021** (-2.27) -0.020*** (-3.97) 0.001 0.00 -0.020** (-2.20) -0.020*** (-3.98) 0.000 0.00 
Firm Growth -0.016 (-1.39) 0.010 (1.34) 0.026* 3.62* -0.016 (-1.42) 0.010 (1.30) 0.026* 3.64* 
Leverage 0.094*** (3.58) 0.107*** (7.47) 0.013 0.19 0.100*** (3.68) 0.107*** (7.51) 0.007 0.06 
Constant 0.067 (0.95) 0.205*** (4.37)   0.075 (1.05) 0.200*** (4.26)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 774  2,148    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.084  0.104    0.086  0.104    
F-test 2.408  5.125    2.412  5.172    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.1: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Discretionary Accruals – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders by types of shareholder and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.4) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for 
two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and 
from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. 
This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre 
= "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively.   
 Mode 5.4 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
D_Family 0.015 (1.04) 0.002 (0.26) -0.013 0.71 0.014 (0.92) 0.003 (0.45) -0.011 0.44 
D_Government 0.003 (0.08) -0.024 (-1.36) -0.027 0.40 0.010 (0.27) -0.024 (-1.41) -0.034 0.66 
D_Foreign -0.006 (-0.45) -0.003 (-0.35) 0.003 0.06 -0.006 (-0.42) -0.005 (-0.69) 0.001 0.00 
D_Domestic 0.067 (1.33 -0.006 (-0.57) -0.073 2.04 0.062 (1.31) -0.008 (-0.78) -0.070 2.14 
D_Bank Own - (-) -0.053*** (-4.73) - - - (-) -0.051*** (-4.72) - - 
D_Non-Bank Fin. 
Insti. 
-0.042 (-1.59) 0.039 (0.83) 0.081 2.29 -0.048 (-1.63) 0.029 (0.64) 0.077 2.06 
Share Difference -0.005 (-0.28) 0.004 (0.45) 0.009 0.19 -0.009 (-0.48) 0.004 (0.45) 0.013 0.39 
CV 0.041** (2.34) 0.023** (2.34) -0.018 0.83 0.032* (1.81) 0.022** (2.28) -0.010 0.23 
Board Size 0.038** (2.36) 0.034*** (2.74) -0.004 0.03 0.030* (1.80) 0.034*** (2.67) 0.004 0.05 
Board Independence 0.013 (0.26) 0.032* (1.76) 0.019 0.11 0.024 (0.44) 0.034* (1.87) 0.010 0.03 
Board Experience -0.005 (-0.29) 0.009 (0.91) 0.014 0.49 -0.004 (-0.22) 0.008 (0.75) 0.012 0.32 
CEO Founder -0.013 (-0.86) -0.022*** (-3.95) -0.009 0.35 -0.012 (-0.80) -0.023*** (-4.20) -0.011 0.58 
CEO Descendant -0.002 (-0.11) -0.017** (-2.55) -0.015 0.67 -0.005 (-0.26) -0.017** (-2.57) -0.012 0.44 
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.1: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Discretionary Accruals – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders by types of shareholder and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.4) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for 
two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and 
from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. 
This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre 
= "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively.   
 Mode 5.4 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
CEO-Chair -0.015 (-0.95) 0.007 (1.10) 0.022 1.67 -0.014 (-0.90) 0.005 (0.75) 0.019 1.26 
CEO-Group 0.005 (0.34) 0.004 (0.56) -0.001 0.01 0.009 (0.58) 0.002 (0.37) -0.007 0.15 
BIG 4 0.000 (0.01) -0.003 (-0.70) -0.003 0.11 0.005 (0.57) -0.002 (-0.47) -0.007 0.52 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.012 (-1.30) -0.007 (-1.63) 0.005 0.26 -0.016* (-1.66) -0.006 (-1.49) 0.010 0.84 
Firm Size -0.002 (-0.54) -0.016*** (-6.94) -0.014*** 8.41*** -0.002 (-0.39) -0.015*** (-6.35) -0.013*** 7.31*** 
Firm Age -0.021** (-2.40) -0.019*** (-3.73) 0.002 0.05 -0.022** (-2.42) -0.020*** (-3.88) 0.002 0.05 
Firm Growth -0.009 (-0.90) 0.005 (0.71) 0.014 1.33 -0.014 (-1.22) 0.009 (1.26) 0.023* 2.91* 
Leverage 0.109*** (4.25) 0.108*** (7.79) -0.001 0.00 0.097*** (3.60) 0.106*** (7.52) 0.009 0.09 
Constant 0.027 (0.42) 0.217*** (4.51)   0.057 (0.87) 0.204*** (4.32)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 801  2,190    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.095  0.110    0.076  0.106    
F-test 2.655  6.619    2.092  6.439    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.004  0.000    
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.2: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Discretionary Revenues – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders by types of shareholder and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.4) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for 
two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and 
from conditional revenues model (DR2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table 
shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively.    
 Model 5.4 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
D_Family -0.004 (-1.02) -0.004 (-1.49) 0.000 0.00 0.002 (0.75) -0.001 (-0.60) -0.003 0.91 
D_Government 0.006 (0.47 0.008 (1.52) 0.002 0.01 -0.002 (-0.31) 0.003 (0.84) 0.005 0.48 
D_Foreign 0.004 (0.79 0.004 (1.25) 0.000 0.01 0.006 (1.60) 0.005 (1.60) -0.001 0.11 
D_Domestic -0.017** (-2.50) 0.002 (0.20) 0.019* 3.02* 0.000 (-0.03) 0.001 (0.20) 0.001 0.03 
D_Bank Own - (-) -0.006 (-0.75) - - - (-) 0.003 (0.36) - - 
D_Non-Bank Fin. 
Insti. -0.014 (-1.46) 0.043* (1.69) 0.057** 4.38** -0.005 (-0.57) 0.026 (1.58) 0.031* 2.77* 
Share Difference 0.008 (1.51) -0.002 (-0.53) -0.010 2.39 0.005 (1.35) -0.002 (-0.71) -0.007 2.28 
CV 0.002 (0.43) -0.002 (-0.66) -0.004 0.54 0.004 (0.90) -0.001 (-0.35) -0.005 0.88 
Board Size -0.013*** (-2.64) -0.003 (-0.55) 0.010 2.10 -0.012*** (-2.90) -0.007** (-2.00) 0.005 0.79 
Board Independence 0.001 (0.06) 0.007 (0.98) 0.006 0.11 -0.006 (-0.53) -0.002 (-0.42) 0.004 0.09 
Board Experience 0.001 (0.17) -0.008** (-2.13) -0.009 2.02 0.005 (1.07) -0.006** (-2.01) -0.011** 4.16** 
CEO Founder 0.001 (0.19) -0.002 (-0.65) -0.003 0.25 0.003 (0.85) -0.003 (-1.52) -0.006 2.28 
CEO Descendant -0.002 (-0.52) -0.001 (-0.41) 0.001 0.06 -0.001 (-0.32) 0.000 (0.05) 0.001 0.09 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.2: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Discretionary Revenues – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders by types of shareholder and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.4) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for 
two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and 
from conditional revenues model (DR2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table 
shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.4 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
CEO-Chair -0.003 (-0.52) -0.001 (-0.39) 0.002 0.08 -0.001 (-0.25) 0.001 (0.57) 0.002 0.24 
CEO-Group 0.002 (0.43) 0.002 (0.79) 0.000 0.01 0.001 (0.13) 0.001 (0.34) 0.000 0.00 
BIG 4 -0.005** (-1.97) -0.001 (-0.63) 0.004 1.50 -0.004* (-1.85) -0.002 (-1.19) 0.002 0.64 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.008*** (-2.80) -0.001 (-0.44) 0.007** 4.32** -0.004* (-1.92) -0.001 (-0.54) 0.003 1.74 
Firm Size -0.005*** (-4.34) -0.006*** (-6.84) -0.001 0.10 -0.003*** (-2.79) -0.003*** (-4.52) 0.000 0.02 
Firm Age -0.007*** (-3.04) -0.001 (-0.62) 0.006** 4.03** -0.005*** (-2.65) 0.000 (0.14) 0.005** 4.82** 
Firm Growth 0.007 (1.40) 0.005* (1.89) -0.002 0.12 0.005 (1.28) 0.004** (2.10) -0.001 0.06 
Leverage 0.016** (2.49) 0.013*** (3.39) -0.003 0.12 0.002 (0.38) 0.006** (2.02) 0.004 0.53 
Constant 0.161*** (8.23) 0.127*** (7.69)   0.110*** (7.28) 0.091*** (7.11)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,344  2,155    1,343  2,155    
Adj. R-squared 0.071  0.086    0.047  0.065    
F-test 5.346  6.725    3.554  4.242    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    !
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.3: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Adjusted 
Discretionary Accruals – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders by types of shareholder and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.4) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for 
two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones 
model adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single 
regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-
reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% 
(***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.4 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
D_Family 0.014 (0.94) 0.003 (0.48) -0.011 0.43 0.015 (1.00) 0.002 (0.36) -0.013 0.59 
D_Government 0.011 (0.27) -0.024 (-1.41) -0.035 0.66 0.009 (0.23) -0.026 (-1.51) -0.035 0.68 
D_Foreign Company -0.007 (-0.47) -0.005 (-0.68) 0.002 0.01 -0.006 (-0.44) -0.006 (-0.75) 0.000 0.00 
D_Domestic company 0.063 (1.32) -0.008 (-0.78) -0.071 2.15 0.063 (1.32) -0.007 (-0.72) -0.070 2.10 
D_Bank Own - (-) -0.051*** (-4.69) - - - (-) -0.051*** (-4.65) - - 
D_Non-Bank Fin. 
Insti. 
-0.046 (-1.62) 0.029 (0.64) 0.075 1.99 -0.045* (-1.69) 0.028 (0.62) 0.073 1.94 
Share Difference -0.008 (-0.40) 0.004 (0.48) 0.012 0.32 -0.010 (-0.50) 0.004 (0.54) 0.014 0.46 
CV 0.032* (1.82) 0.022** (2.29) -0.010 0.22 0.029 (1.64) 0.023** (2.37) -0.006 0.08 
Board Size 0.030* (1.87) 0.033*** (2.59) 0.003 0.01 0.030* (1.81) 0.035*** (2.72) 0.005 0.05 
Board Independence 0.026 (0.49) 0.032* (1.77) 0.006 0.01 0.024 (0.46) 0.034* (1.90) 0.010 0.03 
Board Experience -0.005 (-0.27) 0.008 (0.79) 0.013 0.41 -0.004 (-0.22) 0.009 (0.85) 0.013 0.38 
CEO Founder -0.010 (-0.72) -0.023*** (-4.15) -0.013 0.68 -0.010 (-0.72) -0.024*** (-4.22) -0.014 0.73 
CEO Descendant -0.005 (-0.30) -0.017** (-2.56) -0.012 0.38 -0.007 (-0.37) -0.017*** (-2.60) -0.010 0.33 
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Table 5.14: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by their Types and Other 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.3: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Adjusted 
Discretionary Accruals – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of the presence of dominant shareholders by types of shareholder and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion (Model 5.4) before and after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for 
two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones 
model adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single 
regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-
reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% 
(***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.4 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.9) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
CEO-Chair -0.016 (-1.00) 0.005 (0.77) 0.021 1.50 -0.017 (-1.07) 0.005 (0.81) 0.022 1.70 
CEO-Group 0.009 (0.61) 0.002 (0.36) -0.007 0.17 0.009 (0.61) 0.003 (0.42) -0.006 0.16 
BIG 4 0.006 (0.68) -0.002 (-0.40) -0.008 0.63 0.005 (0.53) -0.002 (-0.49) -0.007 0.48 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 
-0.016* (-1.67) -0.006 (-1.47) 0.010 0.87 -0.014 (-1.51) -0.007 (-1.62) 0.007 0.54 
Firm Size -0.001 (-0.28) -0.015*** (-6.35) -0.014*** 7.92*** -0.002 (-0.38) -0.015*** (-6.32) -0.013*** 7.33*** 
Firm Age -0.022** (-2.46) -0.019*** (-3.84) 0.003 0.08 -0.021** (-2.38) -0.019*** (-3.85) 0.002 0.04 
Firm Growth -0.013 (-1.15) 0.009 (1.26) 0.022* 2.72* -0.014 (-1.18) 0.009 (1.22) 0.023* 2.74* 
Leverage 0.091*** (3.49) 0.106*** (7.53) 0.015 0.26 0.097*** (3.60) 0.107*** (7.56) 0.010 0.10 
Constant 0.049 (0.75) 0.206*** (4.39)   0.054 (0.83) 0.200*** (4.27)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 774  2,148    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.074  0.106    0.076  0.106    
F-test 2.117  6.420    2.102  6.405    
p_value 0.003  0.000    0.003  0.000    
             !
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5.5.3.5.3 The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting 
Discretion 
Table 5.15, Panels A.1 to A.3, shows the results of the regressions of managerial 
ownership, defined as the total ownership of all directors (Model 5.5), on discretionary 
accruals and discretionary revenues before and after the corporate governance reforms.  
Regarding discretionary accruals, the results in Panels A.1 and A.3 suggest that there 
was no significant impact of managerial ownership (all directors) on the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals, for all measurements and in both sub-periods. 
Regarding discretionary revenues, the results in Panel A.2 reveal that managerial 
ownership may have aligned managers’ interests with firms’ interests and thereby 
limited the use of accounting discretion over revenues (DR1) after the reforms. In 
addition, the equality test (Ha34) shows the significantly negative incremental effects of 
managerial ownership on THE discretionary revenues in the post-reform period. The 
Wald test also confirms that the impacts of managerial ownership on the discretionary 
revenues in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods are significantly different. This 
finding reveals that managerial ownership could significantly reduce the motivation of 
managers to engage in accounting discretion over revenues after the reforms. 
However, focusing only on ownership by executive directors, Table 5.15, Panel B.2, 
shows that the coefficients of Manager Own (executive director ownership) are 
significantly and positively associated with discretionary revenues, measured by all 
models before the reforms but have a significantly negative association with them after 
the reforms. In addition, the equality test (Ha34) shows the significantly negative 
incremental effects of executive director ownership on the discretionary revenues in the 
post-reform period. The Wald test also confirms that the impacts of executive director 
ownership on the discretionary revenues in the pre-reform and the post-reform periods 
are significantly different. This finding reveals that the executive director ownership 
could significantly reduce the motivation of executive directors to engage in accounting 
discretion over revenues after the reforms. 
!! "')!
The evidence strongly suggests that increasing levels of ownership by executive 
directors led to their entrenchment and higher levels of accounting discretion over 
revenues before the reforms. However, many regulations regarding the role and 
responsibility of directors have become clearer and more restrictive. Therefore, the 
reforms may have partly limited the opportunistic behaviour of executive directors, at 
least in respect to their accounting discretion over revenues. These findings contrast with 
those of Hutchinson et al. (2008), from Australia, which suggest that high levels of 
executive ownership led to high earnings management, even after the Australian 
corporate governance reforms. 
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
Panel A.1: An Impact of Ownership of All Directors on Discretionary Accruals – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (All directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and after 
the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2). A single regression 
using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period 
(Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) 
or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             Manager Own 0.010 (0.59) -0.001 (-0.09) -0.011 0.29 0.006 (0.34) 0.004 (0.33) -0.002 0.01 
Share Difference 0.007 (0.49) 0.005 (0.67) -0.002 0.01 0.004 (0.23) 0.005 (0.63) 0.001 0.01 
CV 0.030* (1.71) 0.020** (2.14) -0.010 0.28 0.022 (1.22) 0.019** (2.05) -0.003 0.02 
Board Size 0.040** (2.47) 0.030** (2.46) -0.010 0.21 0.031* (1.88) 0.030** (2.39) -0.001 0.00 
Board Independence 0.020 (0.38) 0.028 (1.58) 0.008 0.02 0.029 (0.54) 0.030* (1.67) 0.001 0.00 
Board Experience -0.011 (-0.62) 0.008 (0.74) 0.019 0.83 -0.010 (-0.55) 0.007 (0.63) 0.017 0.63 
CEO Founder -0.010 (-0.67) -0.021*** (-3.74) -0.011 0.53 -0.009 (-0.61) -0.023*** (-4.03) -0.014 0.83 
CEO Descendant -0.002 (-0.14) -0.016** (-2.32) -0.014 0.52 -0.005 (-0.30) -0.016** (-2.37) -0.011 0.32 
CEO-Chair -0.016 (-1.02) 0.008 (1.27) 0.024 2.01 -0.015 (-0.97) 0.006 (0.95) 0.021 1.59 
CEO-Group 0.008 (0.56) 0.004 (0.53) -0.004 0.08 0.012 (0.81) 0.002 (0.34) -0.010 0.37 
BIG 4 0.001 (0.15) -0.004 (-0.84) -0.005 0.27 0.007 (0.73) -0.003 (-0.62) -0.010 0.87 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.011 (-1.20) -0.008* (-1.95) 0.003 0.08 -0.014 (-1.53) -0.007* (-1.79) 0.007 0.46 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.1: An Impact of Ownership of All Directors on Discretionary Accruals – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (All directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and after 
the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2). A single regression 
using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period 
(Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) 
or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size -0.001 (-0.37) -0.016*** (-7.00) -0.015*** 10.11**
* 
-0.001 (-0.17) -0.015*** (-6.43) -0.014*** 9.06*** 
Firm Age -0.020** (-2.37) -0.019*** (-3.76) 0.001 0.01 -0.022** (-2.48) -0.020*** (-3.93) 0.002 0.04 
Firm Growth -0.008 (-0.77) 0.005 (0.74) 0.013 1.13 -0.013 (-1.12) 0.010 (1.30) 0.023* 2.73* 
Leverage 0.112*** (4.45) 0.109*** (7.81) -0.003 0.01 0.100**
* 
(3.77) 0.107*** (7.55) 0.007 0.05 
Constant 0.013 (0.20) 0.234*** (4.76)   0.042 (0.65) 0.221*** (4.59)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 801  2,190    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.093  0.108    0.074  0.104    
F-test 2.970  7.088    2.278  6.622    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.003  0.000    !
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
Panel A.2: An Impact of Ownership of All Directors on Discretionary Revenues– before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (All directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and after 
the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2). A single regression using dummy 
variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) 
from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Manager Own 0.002 (0.38) -0.011** (-2.49) -0.013* 3.05* -0.0003 (-0.06) -0.004 (-1.29) -0.004 0.45 
Share Difference 0.003 (0.68) -0.002 (-0.54) -0.005 0.76 0.007* (1.94) -0.002 (-0.66) -0.009** 3.85** 
CV 0.004 (0.84) 0.000 (0.06) -0.004 0.41 0.004 (0.94) 0.001 (0.27) -0.003 0.37 
Board Size -0.013*** (-2.78) -0.001 (-0.23) 0.012* 3.15* -0.012*** (-2.96) -0.006* (-1.73) 0.006 1.26 
Board Independence 0.000 (0.01) 0.009 (1.28) 0.009 0.26 -0.005 (-0.43) -0.001 (-0.15) 0.004 0.11 
Board Experience 0.000 (0.08) -0.009** (-2.09) -0.009 1.80 0.004 (0.96) -0.006** (-2.00) -0.010** 3.83** 
CEO Founder -0.001 (-0.16) -0.002 (-0.71) -0.001 0.05 0.003 (0.83) -0.003* (-1.70) -0.006 2.44 
CEO Descendant -0.003 (-0.63) -0.001 (-0.44) 0.002 0.11 -0.001 (-0.25) 0.000 (-0.04) 0.001 0.04 
CEO-Chair -0.002 (-0.48) -0.002 (-0.61) 0.000 0.02 -0.001 (-0.28) 0.001 (0.33) 0.002 0.16 
CEO-Group 0.001 (0.26) 0.002 (0.57) 0.001 0.01 0.001 (0.16) 0.000 (0.13) -0.001 0.01 
BIG 4 -0.005* (-1.82) -0.001 (-0.47) 0.004 1.42 -0.003* (-1.67) -0.001 (-0.86) 0.002 0.72 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.008*** (-2.80) -0.001 (-0.43) 0.007** 4.31** -0.004* (-1.83) -0.001 (-0.47) 0.003 1.62 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.2: An Impact of Ownership of All Directors on Discretionary Revenues– before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (All directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and after 
the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2). A single regression using dummy 
variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) 
from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size -0.005*** (-4.16) -0.006*** (-6.69) -0.001 0.32 -0.003*** (-2.69) -0.003*** (-4.62) 0.000 0.07 
Firm Age -0.006*** (-2.63) -0.001 (-0.70) 0.005 2.64 -0.004** (-2.45) 0.000 (0.25) 0.004** 4.40** 
Firm Growth 0.007 (1.37) 0.006* (1.88) -0.001 0.04 0.005 (1.27) 0.004** (2.04) -0.001 0.02 
Leverage 0.014** (2.17) 0.012*** (3.23) -0.002 0.02 0.001 (0.28) 0.005* (1.87) 0.004 0.56 
Constant 0.154*** (7.96) 0.123*** (7.60)   0.109*** (7.14) 0.088*** (6.95)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,344  2,155    1,343  2,155    
Adj. R-squared 0.069  0.081    0.048  0.062    
F-test 6.167  7.310    4.143  4.738    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
             !
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.3: An Impact of Ownership of All Directors on Adjusted Discretionary Accruals– before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (All directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and after 
the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model 
(DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of 
coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is 
performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Manager Own 0.006 (0.34) 0.004 (0.34) -0.002 0.01 0.006 (0.36) 0.003 (0.26) -0.003 0.02 
Share Difference 0.005 (0.34) 0.005 (0.68) 0.000 0.00 0.004 (0.25) 0.006 (0.70) 0.002 0.01 
CV 0.021 (1.21) 0.019** (2.04) -0.002 0.02 0.018 (1.03) 0.020** (2.12) 0.002 0.00 
Board Size 0.032* (1.96) 0.029** (2.30) -0.003 0.02 0.031* (1.90) 0.030** (2.42) -0.001 0.00 
Board Independence 0.031 (0.58) 0.028 (1.57) -0.003 0.00 0.030 (0.56) 0.030* (1.68) 0.000 0.00 
Board Experience -0.011 (-0.60) 0.007 (0.68) 0.018 0.75 -0.010 (-0.55) 0.008 (0.72) 0.018 0.70 
CEO Founder -0.008 (-0.52) -0.023*** (-3.98) -0.015 0.94 -0.008 (-0.53) -0.023*** (-4.03) -0.015 1.00 
CEO Descendant -0.006 (-0.34) -0.016** (-2.35) -0.010 0.27 -0.007 (-0.40) -0.016** (-2.39) -0.009 0.23 
CEO-Chair -0.017 (-1.07) 0.006 (0.97) 0.023 1.87 -0.018 (-1.14) 0.006 (1.01) 0.024 2.09 
CEO-Group 0.013 (0.84) 0.002 (0.34) -0.011 0.40 0.013 (0.86) 0.003 (0.40) -0.010 0.38 
BIG 4 0.008 (0.83) -0.003 (-0.56) -0.011 0.99 0.006 (0.67) -0.003 (-0.63) -0.009 0.79 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.014 (-1.55) -0.007* (-1.76) 0.007 0.49 -0.013 (-1.39) -0.008* (-1.91) 0.005 0.25 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel A.3: An Impact of Ownership of All Directors on Adjusted Discretionary Accruals– before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (All directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and after 
the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model 
(DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of 
coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is 
performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size 0.000 (-0.07) -0.015*** (-6.43) -0.015*** 9.77*** -0.001 (-0.18) -0.015*** (-6.44) -0.014*** 9.11 
Firm Age -0.022** (-2.52) -0.020*** (-3.90) 0.002 0.06 -0.021** (-2.44) -0.020*** (-3.90) 0.001 0.03 
Firm Growth -0.012 (-1.05) 0.010 (1.29) 0.022 2.54 -0.012 (-1.08) 0.009 (1.25) 0.021 2.54 
Leverage 0.095*** (3.70) 0.107*** (7.56) 0.012 0.18 0.101*** (3.79) 0.108*** (7.59) 0.007 0.05 
Constant 0.035 (0.54) 0.223*** (4.66)   0.041 (0.63) 0.219*** (4.57)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 774  2,148    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.072  0.104    0.074  0.104    
F-test 2.275  6.599    2.272  6.636    
p_value 0.003  0.000    0.003  0.000    
             !
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.1: An Impact of Ownership of Executive Directors on Discretionary Accruals– before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (Executive directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and 
after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2). A single regression 
using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period 
(Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) 
or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Manager Own -0.003 (-0.11) 0.003 (0.21) 0.006 0.04 0.008 (0.29) 0.004 (0.20) -0.004 0.02 
Share Difference 0.011 (0.75) 0.005 (0.63) -0.006 0.13 0.005 (0.35) 0.006 (0.74) 0.001 0.00 
CV 0.031* (1.76) 0.020** (2.15) -0.011 0.34 0.022 (1.22) 0.019** (2.02) -0.003 0.03 
Board Size 0.039** (2.45) 0.030** (2.47) -0.009 0.20 0.030* (1.85) 0.030** (2.37) 0.000 0.00 
Board Independence 0.018 (0.34) 0.028 (1.59) 0.010 0.04 0.028 (0.52) 0.030* (1.66) 0.002 0.00 
Board Experience -0.010 (-0.57) 0.008 (0.75) 0.018 0.76 -0.010 (-0.54) 0.007 (0.65) 0.017 0.63 
CEO Founder -0.009 (-0.57) -0.022*** (-3.83) -0.013 0.66 -0.009 (-0.62) -0.023*** (-4.03) -0.014 0.71 
CEO Descendant -0.002 (-0.09) -0.016** (-2.29) -0.014 0.63 -0.005 (-0.30) -0.016** (-2.26) -0.011 0.31 
CEO-Chair -0.017 (-1.01) 0.008 (1.28) 0.025 1.99 -0.015 (-0.92) 0.006 (1.00) 0.021 1.52 
CEO-Group 0.009 (0.62) 0.004 (0.54) -0.005 0.12 0.013 (0.85) 0.003 (0.42) -0.010 0.38 
BIG 4 0.001 (0.12) -0.004 (-0.81) -0.005 0.23 0.007 (0.73) -0.003 (-0.68) -0.010 0.92 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.011 (-1.19) -0.008* (-1.94) 0.003 0.08 -0.014 (-1.53) -0.008* (-1.80) 0.006 0.44 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.1: An Impact of Ownership of Executive Directors on Discretionary Accruals– before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (Executive directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and 
after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary accruals from cross-sectional Jones model (DA1) and from cross-sectional modified Jones model (DA2). A single regression 
using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period 
(Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) 
or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DA1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DA2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size -0.002 (-0.45) -0.016*** (-7.15) -0.014*** 9.73*** -0.001 (-0.21) -0.015*** (-6.58) -0.014*** 9.03*** 
Firm Age -0.021** (-2.45) -0.019*** (-3.78) 0.002 0.04 -0.022** (-2.51) -0.020*** (-3.98) 0.002 0.04 
Firm Growth -0.008 (-0.78) 0.005 (0.74) 0.013 1.15 -0.013 (-1.13) 0.010 (1.29) 0.023* 2.74* 
Leverage 0.113*** (4.48) 0.109*** (7.82) -0.004 0.02 0.101*** (3.77) 0.107*** (7.56) 0.006 0.04 
Constant 0.021 (0.33) 0.233*** (5.07)   0.047 (0.73) 0.224*** (4.95)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 801  2,190    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.093  0.108    0.074  0.104    
F-test 2.981  7.138    2.309  6.672    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.003  0.000    
             !
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.2: An Impact of Ownership of Executive Directors on Discretionary Revenues – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (Executive directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and 
after the corporate governance reform. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2). A single regression using dummy 
variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) 
from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Manager Own 0.017* (1.95) -0.022*** (-4.94) -0.039*** 15.56*** 0.014** (1.97) -0.010*** (-2.60) -0.024*** 8.95*** 
Share Difference 0.003 (0.73) -0.003 (-1.07) -0.006 1.47 0.007* (1.95) -0.002 (-0.94) -0.009** 4.52** 
CV 0.004 (0.82) 0.002 (0.50) -0.002 0.13 0.004 (0.89) 0.002 (0.52) -0.002 0.17 
Board Size -0.014*** (-2.84) 0.000 (-0.06) 0.014* 3.69* -0.012*** (-3.02) -0.006 (-1.61) 0.006 1.51 
Board Independence 0.000 (-0.01) 0.009 (1.34) 0.009 0.31 -0.005 (-0.44) -0.001 (-0.10) 0.004 0.13 
Board Experience 0.000 (0.02) -0.010** (-2.43) -0.010 2.24 0.004 (0.88) -0.007** (-2.21) -0.011** 4.06** 
CEO Founder -0.002 (-0.63) -0.001 (-0.48) 0.001 0.08 0.001 (0.33) -0.003 (-1.48) -0.004 1.06 
CEO Descendant -0.004 (-0.80) 0.000 (-0.16) 0.004 0.37 -0.002 (-0.45) 0.000 (0.17) 0.002 0.23 
CEO-Chair -0.002 (-0.34) -0.003 (-1.02) -0.001 0.02 -0.001 (-0.16) 0.000 (0.14) 0.001 0.04 
CEO-Group 0.001 (0.32) 0.000 (0.11) -0.001 0.04 0.001 (0.17) 0.000 (-0.14) -0.001 0.05 
BIG 4 -0.005* (-1.91) 0.000 (-0.12) 0.005 2.20 -0.003* (-1.72) -0.001 (-0.70) 0.002 1.00 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.007*** (-2.71) -0.001 (-0.45) 0.006** 3.98** -0.004* (-1.76) -0.001 (-0.49) 0.003 1.44 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.2: An Impact of Ownership of Executive Directors on Discretionary Revenues – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (Executive directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and 
after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include discretionary revenues from annual revenues model (DR1) and from conditional revenues model (DR2). A single regression using dummy 
variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) 
from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size -0.005*** (-4.23) -0.006*** (-6.63) -0.001 0.15 -0.003*** (-2.74) -0.003*** (-4.61) 0.000 0.04 
Firm Age -0.006*** (-2.58) -0.001 (-0.63) 0.005 2.66 -0.004** (-2.34) 0.000 (0.28) 0.004** 4.13** 
Firm Growth 0.007 (1.43) 0.006** (2.03) -0.001 0.03 0.005 (1.33) 0.004** (2.12) -0.001 0.02 
Leverage 0.013** (2.17) 0.013*** (3.37) 0.000 0.00 0.001 (0.23) 0.006** (1.97) 0.005 0.72 
Constant 0.155*** (8.13) 0.114*** (7.11)   0.109*** (7.31) 0.085*** (6.94)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 1,344  2,155    1,343  2,155    
Adj. R-squared 0.072  0.084    0.051  0.064    
F-test 6.372  7.653    4.401  4.925    
p_value 0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000    
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.3: An Impact of Ownership of Executive Directors on Adjusted Discretionary Accruals – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (Executive directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and 
after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model 
(DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of 
coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is 
performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Manager Own 0.008 (0.26) 0.004 (0.22) -0.004 0.01 0.009 (0.30) 0.003 (0.18) -0.006 0.03 
Share Difference 0.007 (0.46) 0.006 (0.79) -0.001 0.00 0.005 (0.37) 0.006 (0.79) 0.001 0.00 
CV 0.022 (1.21) 0.019** (2.02) -0.003 0.02 0.019 (1.03) 0.019** (2.10) 0.000 0.00 
Board Size 0.031* (1.92) 0.029** (2.28) -0.002 0.02 0.031* (1.87) 0.030** (2.41) -0.001 0.00 
Board Independence 0.030 (0.56) 0.028 (1.56) -0.002 0.00 0.029 (0.54) 0.030* (1.68) 0.001 0.00 
Board Experience -0.010 (-0.59) 0.007 (0.70) 0.017 0.75 -0.010 (-0.54) 0.008 (0.74) 0.018 0.70 
CEO Founder -0.008 (-0.53) -0.022*** (-3.98) -0.014 0.82 -0.008 (-0.54) -0.023*** (-4.04) -0.015 0.87 
CEO Descendant -0.006 (-0.34) -0.016** (-2.25) -0.010 0.26 -0.007 (-0.40) -0.016** (-2.30) -0.009 0.23 
CEO-Chair -0.016 (-1.03) 0.006 (1.02) 0.022 1.80 -0.017 (-1.09) 0.007 (1.05) 0.024 1.99 
CEO-Group 0.013 (0.89) 0.003 (0.41) -0.010 0.41 0.013 (0.90) 0.003 (0.46) -0.010 0.40 
BIG 4 0.008 (0.83) -0.003 (-0.62) -0.011 1.05 0.006 (0.68) -0.003 (-0.68) -0.009 0.83 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.014 (-1.55) -0.007* (-1.78) 0.007 0.47 -0.013 (-1.39) -0.008* (-1.92) 0.005 0.23 
             
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.15: An Impact of Managerial Ownership on Managers’ Accounting Discretion – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B.3: An Impact of Ownership of Executive Directors on Adjusted Discretionary Accruals – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
(Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to investigate an impact of managerial ownership (Executive directors) on managers’ accounting discretion  (Model 5.5) before and 
after the corporate governance reforms. All variables definitions are presented in Table 5.4. t-statistics for two-tails test based on robust standards errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variables (ADi,t+1) include adjusted discretionary accruals from cross-sectional modified Jones model adjusted by discretionary revenues from annual revenues model 
(DA2_DR1) and by discretionary revenues from conditional revenues model (DA2_DR2). A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of 
coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post ! variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is 
performed to test the null hypothesis that "Pre = "Post. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 5.5 
 DA2_DR1 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) DA2_DR2 
Equality Test 
(Model 5.10) 
Explanatory Variables 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform t 
Post-
Reform t 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
             
Firm Size 0.000 (-0.10) -0.015*** (-6.59) -0.015*** 9.72*** -0.001 (-0.21) -0.015*** (-6.58) -0.014*** 9.03*** 
Firm Age -0.022** (-2.55) -0.020*** (-3.95) 0.002 0.07 -0.021** (-2.47) -0.020*** (-3.94) 0.001 0.03 
Firm Growth -0.012 (-1.06) 0.009 (1.28) 0.021 2.54 -0.012 (-1.09) 0.009 (1.25) 0.021 2.56 
Leverage 0.095*** (3.70) 0.107*** (7.57) 0.012 0.16 0.101*** (3.79) 0.107*** (7.60) 0.006 0.04 
Constant 0.040 (0.62) 0.227*** (5.04)   0.046 (0.72) 0.222*** (4.92)   
             Industry Dummy Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
No. of Obs. 774  2,148    774  2,148    
Adj. R-squared 0.072  0.104    0.074  0.104    
F-test 2.306  6.648    2.302  6.680    
p_value 0.003  0.000    0.003  0.000    
             !
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5.5.3.5.4 The Impact of Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
Regarding Ha14 to Ha22, the impacts of other corporate governance mechanisms and 
economic determinants on discretionary accruals and revenues for both sub-periods are 
consistent between different models (Models 5.1 to 5.5). Therefore, this analysis focuses 
on Model 5.3 in Panels A.1 to A.3, Table 5.14. 
Firstly, a significant positive relationship is shown between the ratios of share difference 
between the largest and the second largest shareholders and discretionary revenues 
(DR2), but only before the reforms, which may imply that a large difference in the 
proportion of shares held by the largest and the second largest shareholders limited the 
ability of the second largest shareholders to monitor financial reporting. Nevertheless, 
the role of the second largest shareholders seems to have disappeared after the reforms. 
Additionally, the evidence suggests that low ratios of cash flow rights to voting rights 
(CV) did restrain managers to engage in accounting discretion over accruals both before 
and after the reforms. However, there is no significant relationship between CV and 
discretionary revenues. While this implies that firms may benefit from the “positive 
group synergies” that are derived from pyramidal and cross-shareholding structures 
(Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010:2220), it contradicts the view that a wide separation of 
cash flows and control rights is the source of entrenchment (Fan and Wong, 2002). 
Secondly, the evidence suggests that larger boards tended to consistently facilitate the 
use of accounting discretion over accruals both before and after the reforms. This 
evidence of the inefficiency of large boards in inhibiting the use of accounting discretion 
is consistent with Ghosh et al. (2010), who found that firms with larger boards tended to 
engage in earnings management in the US, even after the release of the SOX, 2002. 
However, larger boards tended to limit the use of accounting discretion over revenues 
both before and after the reforms. 
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Thirdly, the evidence suggests that a high proportion of independent directors did 
significantly facilitate the use of accounting discretion over accruals after the reforms. 
Fourthly, high proportions of experienced board members appear to have limited the use 
of accounting discretion over revenues after the reforms. In addition, the equality test 
(Ha37) also shows the significantly negative incremental effects of board experience on 
discretionary revenues, measured by all models in the post-reform period. The Wald test 
also confirms that the impacts of board experience on the discretionary revenues in the 
pre-reform and the post-reform are significantly different. This finding could imply that 
board experience is an important attribute to increase the board efficiency to 
detect/prevent the use of accounting discretion over revenues after the reforms. 
Overall, the evidence provides some suggestion of inefficiency in board structures and 
reveals that the reforms, which emphasised their role, may not have significantly 
improved their efficiency. It also suggests that directors’ experience and firm-specific 
knowledge, rather than just their independence, might be an important contributor to 
their efficiency in mitigating the use of managers’ accounting discretion (for examples, 
see Abdul Rahman, 2006; Hashim and Devi, 2009; Park and Shin, 2004). 
Fifthly, the evidence reveals that on average firms with founders or their descendants as 
CEOs appear to have used less discretionary accruals after the reforms, which may 
imply that attitudes such as loyalty or concern for a family’s reputation were strong 
enough to align their interests with those of firms, even after the reforms.  
Finally, regarding auditor reputation and expertise, the evidence suggests that long audit 
tenure appears to have limited the use of managers’ accounting discretion over accruals 
(DA1, DA2_DR2) only after the reforms. Nevertheless, the equality test (Ha43) shows 
the negative but insignificant incremental effects of auditor-partner tenure on the 
discretionary revenues in the post-reform period. The Wald test also confirms that the 
impacts of auditor-partner tenure on the discretionary accruals in the pre-reform and the 
post-reform are not significantly different. 
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Regarding discretionary revenues, the evidence suggests that long audit tenure appears 
to have limited the use of managers’ accounting discretion over revenues, measured by 
all models only before the reforms. The equality test (Ha43) shows the significantly 
negative incremental effects of auditor-partner tenure on the discretionary revenues 
(DR1) in the post-reform period. The Wald test also confirms that the impacts of 
auditor-partner tenure on the discretionary revenues in the pre-reform and the post-
reform periods are significantly different. This finding could imply that the less 
efficiency of the auditors to detect the use of accounting discretion over revenues after 
the reforms. Therefore, this evidence cast doubts on the requirement of auditor-partner 
rotation for every five years after the reforms. 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
5.6.1 Additional Control Variables 
The main analysis from the previous sections used unsigned discretionary accruals and 
discretionary revenue to measure the magnitude of accounting discretion. Hribar and 
Nichols (2007: 1049) found that the means of absolute discretionary accruals were 
correlated with the standard deviation of signed discretionary accruals. Therefore, 
omitted variables that might be correlated with variance in residuals from accruals-based 
models may result in estimation bias if a researcher uses unsigned discretionary accruals 
instead of signed discretionary accruals in the tests. In order to mitigate this potential 
problem, variables that may have influenced the variances (firms’ underlying operating 
volatility, such as cash flows volatility) should be included in the test using unsigned 
discretionary accruals. Hribar and Nichols (2007) suggest that accruals volatility relies 
on cash flow volatility. Therefore, cash flow volatility, measured by a three-year-ahead 
median of the standard deviation of cash flows from operations, scaled by the previous 
year’s total assets (!CFO), was used as another control variable.  
Additionally, the literature discussed in previous sections suggests that accruals-based 
models, such as the Jones model or modified Jones model, might be a misspecification, 
especially in the case of firms with extreme performance, partly because of the 
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relationship between discretionary accruals and firm performance (Kothari et al., 2005). 
This may imply that accounting discretion is influenced by firm performance, which 
leads to unequal errors across firms (Kothari et al., 2005; Hribar and Nichols, 2007). 
Therefore, the current return on assets (ROAt) was included as another control variable, 
and all regressions on discretionary accruals3 and discretionary revenues were re-
estimated with the additional control variables. The results of Models 5.1 to 5.5 for the 
full sample and sub-period samples are shown in Table 5.16, Panels A, B and C, and 
Table 5.17, Panels A to F. 
Overall, the results show that the ROA and !CFO did influence the use of accounting 
discretion, as suggested by the literature. Hence most of the results from Tables 5.16 and 
5.17 show that the coefficients of ROAt are negatively related to unsigned discretionary 
accruals but not to unsigned discretionary revenues, implying that, on average, firms 
with lower performance were more likely to exercise accounting discretion over 
accruals. In addition, most of coefficients of !CFO are significantly and positively 
related to unsigned discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues. Consistent with 
other literature (for example, see Bowen et al. 2008), the evidence suggests that firms 
with high cash flow volatility (risk) tended to engage more in accounting discretion over 
the revenues component of accruals as well as other accruals. 
Regarding the full sample, the results from Panels A, B and C in Table 5.16 show that 
most of the significant results reported in Sections 5.5.3.1 to 5.5.3.4 remain unchanged 
after control for firm performance and cash flow volatility.  
Regarding ownership structure, the results in Panel B suggest that the levels of 
ownership by the largest shareholders who are family appear to have limited unsigned 
discretionary revenues. However, the presence of dominant family shareholders appears 
to have a significant positive relationship to the magnitude of discretionary accruals, as 
measured by all models. The contradictory results imply some conflicts over !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The results of the regressions on adjusted discretionary accruals are similar to those from original 
accruals-based models and are not presented here. 
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discretionary accruals by dominant family shareholders. Additionally, the significant 
negative effects of the coefficients of government and foreign company ownership on 
unsigned discretionary accruals, measured by the modified Jones models and adjusted 
models, disappear after being controlled for the ROA and !CFO.  
Regarding board structure, while the evidence still reveals that board size may limit the 
use of accounting discretion over revenues, the positive significant relationship between 
board size and discretionary accruals disappears. In respect to other variables, the results 
confirm that the presence of CEO founders and more experienced auditors are associated 
with a lower use of accounting discretion over accruals. 
Regarding the sample sub-periods overall, Table 5.17, Panels A to F, show a   significant 
influence from !CFO on absolute discretionary accruals and discretionary revenue for 
both sub-periods in most of the models. However, the ROA seems to have had greater 
influence on the use of accounting discretion for some unsigned discretionary accruals 
and discretionary (sales) revenue after the reforms. This may imply that listed firms with 
poor performance were likely to exercise more accounting discretion after the reforms, 
which may be because there were many more restrictions and regulations on corporate 
governance after the reforms, increasing the motivation for firms to engage in 
accounting discretion in order to avoid reporting large losses (Charoenwong and 
Jiraporn, 2009).  
Regarding the main variables, the results confirm that levels of ownership had a strong 
influence on the motivation of the largest shareholders, especially family, to inhibit 
accounting discretion over accruals before the reforms and over revenues after them. 
Additionally, larger boards tended to limit the use of discretionary revenues before the 
reforms but to facilitate the use of discretionary accruals after the reforms. In respect to 
other variables, the results confirm that the presence of a CEO founder and more 
experienced auditors were more influential in limiting the use of accounting discretion 
over accruals after the reforms. 
!! ")'!
In conclusion, the results after controlling for the ROA and !CFO are not much different 
from those without these variables in terms of other corporate governance mechanisms. 
However, these additional control variables do affect the significant results of ownership 
variables, suggesting that it would be better for researchers to control for these variables 
in tests for accounting discretion. 
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Table 5.16: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – Full Sample 
Panel A: An Impact of Ownership Concentration (Model 5.1), the Presence of Dominant Shareholders (Model 5.2) and Other Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion with Additional Variables 
 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 
DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 Explanatory 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
             
Concentrated Own 
/D_Dominant 0.005 -0.003 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 0.009* 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.008 
Share Difference -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 
CV 0.009 0.007 -0.002 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.008 0.007 
Board Size 0.011 0.009 -0.006 -0.006** 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.009 -0.006 -0.006** 0.009 0.009 
Board Independence 0.018 0.022 0.001 -0.001 0.021 0.021 0.017 0.021 0.001 -0.002 0.020 0.020 
Board Experience -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 
CEO Founder -0.009* -0.009** -0.002 -0.004** -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.001 -0.004** -0.009* -0.009* 
CEO Descendant 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
CEO-Chair 0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.005 0.005 
CEO-Group 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 
BIG 4 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.009** -0.009** -0.001 -0.001 -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.001 -0.001 -0.009** -0.009** 
Firm Size -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
Firm Age -0.006 -0.007* -0.002 -0.002 -0.007* -0.007* -0.006 -0.007* -0.002 -0.002 -0.007* -0.007 
Firm Growth 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.003* 0.009 0.009 
Leverage 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.003 0.002 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.003 0.002 0.048*** 0.048*** 
!CFO 0.359*** 0.358*** 0.017** 0.002 0.356*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.359*** 0.018** 0.002 0.357*** 0.361*** 
ROAt -0.058** -0.063** -0.007 0.005 -0.062** -0.063** -0.062** -0.067** -0.008 0.004 -0.066** -0.067** 
Constant 0.140*** 0.147*** 0.133*** 0.094*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.140*** 0.145*** 0.130*** 0.092*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 
             
No. of Obs. 3,021 2,950 3,072 3,070 2,950 2,950 3,021 2,950 3,072 3,070 2,950 2,950 
Adj. R-squared 0.308 0.294 0.073 0.055 0.293 0.296 0.309 0.295 0.072 0.055 0.293 0.297 
F-test 14.033 13.226 5.811 4.337 13.271 13.420 14.194 13.426 5.854 4.466 13.479 13.624 
p_value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
             
 
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
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Table 5.16: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel B: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder (Model 5.3), the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholder 
(Model 5.4) and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion with Additional Variables 
 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 
DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 Explanatory 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
             
Family 0.006 -0.005 -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.004 -0.005 0.011* 0.010* -0.002 -0.001 0.010* 0.010* 
Government -0.020 -0.020 0.007 0.002 -0.021 -0.022 -0.003 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.000 
Foreign 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.007** 0.005** 0.007 0.007 
Domestic 0.007 -0.010 -0.008 -0.015* -0.009 -0.009 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Bank -0.056 -0.078 0.035 0.047 -0.069 -0.073 -0.030** -0.032** -0.004 0.003 -0.032** -0.032** 
Non-Bank Fin.Insti.  -0.011 -0.016 -0.041* -0.016 -0.018 -0.023 0.015 0.010 0.024 0.016 0.010 0.011 
Share Difference -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.010 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 -0.010 
CV 0.010 0.007 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.009 -0.004 -0.001 0.009 0.009 
Board Size 0.012 0.010 -0.008** -0.007*** 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.010 -0.007* -0.007** 0.010 0.010 
Board 
Independence 0.018 0.021 -0.001 -0.002 0.021 0.021 0.018 0.022 -0.001 -0.002 0.021 0.021 
Board Experience -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 
CEO Founder -0.009* -0.010* 0.000 -0.003* -0.009* -0.009* -0.010* -0.009** 0.000 -0.003* -0.009* -0.009* 
CEO Descendant 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
CEO-Chair 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 
CEO-Group 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 
BIG 4 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.009** -0.009** -0.001 -0.001 -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.001 -0.001 -0.009** -0.009** 
             
             
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
(This table is continued on the next pages) 
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Table 5.16: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel B: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder (Model 5.3), the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholder 
(Model 5.4) and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion with Additional Variables (Cont’) 
 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 
DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 Explanatory 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
             
Firm Size -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
Firm Age -0.007 -0.007* -0.003** -0.002* -0.008* -0.007* -0.006 -0.006 -0.003* -0.002* -0.006 -0.006 
Firm Growth 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.003* 0.009 0.009 
Leverage 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.005 0.003 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.004 0.002 0.047*** 0.048*** 
!CFO 0.359*** 0.359*** 0.018*** 0.003 0.357*** 0.361*** 0.359*** 0.358*** 0.019*** 0.003 0.356*** 0.360*** 
ROAt -0.058** -0.062** -0.006 0.005 -0.062** -0.062** -0.061** -0.067** -0.008 0.004 -0.067** -0.067** 
Constant 0.139*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.102*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.133*** 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.096*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 
             
No. of Obs. 3,021 2,950 3,072 3,070 2,950 2,950 3,021 2,950 3,072 3,070 2,950 2,950 
Adj. R-squared 0.308 0.293 0.079 0.060 0.292 0.295 0.309 0.295 0.077 0.057 0.293 0.296 
F-test 12.445 11.606 5.812 4.174 11.645 11.788 12.767 12.058 5.715 4.147 12.102 12.218 
p_value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
              
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
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Table 5.16: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel C: An Impact of Managerial Ownership (Model 5.5) on Managers’ Accounting Discretion 
with Additional Variables  
         
 Model 5.5 
 All Directors Executive Directors 
DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 Explanatory 
Variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
         
Manager Own -0.002 -0.001 -0.008** -0.003 0.005 0.010 -0.013*** -0.003 
Share Difference 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
CV 0.009 0.007 -0.002 0.001 0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.001 
Board Size 0.011 0.009 -0.006* -0.006** 0.011 0.009 -0.005 -0.006** 
Board 
Independence 0.018 0.022 0.000 -0.002 0.018 0.022 0.001 -0.001 
Board Experience -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 
CEO Founder -0.009* -0.009* 0.000 -0.004** -0.010* -0.010** 0.000 -0.004** 
CEO Descendant 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
CEO-Chair 0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.001 
CEO-Group 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 
BIG 4 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.009** -0.009** -0.001 -0.001 -0.009** -0.009** -0.001 -0.001 
Firm Size -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003*** 
Firm Age -0.006 -0.007* -0.003* -0.002* -0.006 -0.007* -0.003* -0.002 
Firm Growth 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.003 
Leverage 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.004 0.002 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.004 0.002 
!CFO 0.359*** 0.358*** 0.018** 0.002 0.359*** 0.357*** 0.018** 0.002 
ROAt -0.057** -0.063** -0.006 0.005 -0.058** -0.063** -0.008 0.005 
Constant 0.143*** 0.147*** 0.137*** 0.095*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 0.130*** 0.092*** 
         
No. of Obs. 3,021 2,950 3,072 3,070 3,021 2,950 3,072 3,070 
Adj. R-squared 0.308 0.294 0.074 0.055 0.308 0.294 0.075 0.055 
F-test 13.865 13.129 5.892 4.353 13.907 13.224 5.851 4.326 
p_value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
         
         
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
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Table 5.17: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
Panel A: An Impact of Ownership Concentration (Model 5.1) and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting Discretion with 
Additional Variables 
 Model 5.1 
 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
             
Concentrated -0.074** 0.017 0.091** -0.091** 0.015 0.106*** 0.007 -0.013** -0.020 0.0001 -0.008 -0.008 
Share Difference 0.052** -0.012 -0.064*** 0.054** -0.012 -0.066*** -0.005 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.001 
CV 0.018 0.004 -0.014 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.004 -0.002 -0.006 0.007* 0.000 -0.007 
Board Size 0.019 0.020* 0.001 0.010 0.020 0.010 -0.012** -0.001 0.011 -0.008** -0.004 0.004 
Board Independence -0.004 0.021 0.025 0.002 0.023 0.021 -0.008 0.008 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.002 
Board Experience -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007* -0.005 0.003 -0.006* -0.009 
CEO Founder -0.002 -0.011** -0.009 -0.001 -0.013** -0.012 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.004** -0.005 
CEO Descendant 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.002 -0.007 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
CEO-Chair -0.011 0.010* 0.021 -0.006 0.009 0.015 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.004 
CEO-Group 0.007 0.004 -0.003 0.015 0.004 -0.011 0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.005 0.000 -0.005 
BIG 4 0.004 -0.004 -0.008 0.009 -0.004 -0.013 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.009 -0.007* 0.002 -0.011 -0.006 0.005 -0.006* 0.000 0.006* -0.002 0.000 0.002 
Firm Size -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.002* -0.005*** -0.003* -0.002* -0.003*** -0.001 
Firm Age -0.011 -0.008 0.003 -0.012 -0.009* 0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.004 -0.004* 0.000 0.004* 
Firm Growth 0.003 0.008 0.005 -0.003 0.012 0.015 0.001 0.008** 0.007 0.002 0.005** 0.003 
Leverage 0.038 0.050*** 0.012 0.023 0.053*** 0.030 -0.004 0.007 0.011 -0.011* 0.008** 0.019*** 
!CFO 0.286*** 0.377*** 0.091 0.312*** 0.356*** 0.044 0.010 0.023** 0.013 0.006 0.003 -0.003 
ROAt -0.047 -0.055* -0.008 -0.058 -0.052 0.006 0.006 -0.015 -0.021 0.006 0.010 0.004 
Constant 0.087 0.113**  0.124** 0.113**  0.113*** 0.111***  0.090*** 0.085***  
             
No. of Obs. 754 2,036  730 1,997  839 2,001  838 2,001  
Adj. R-squared 0.205 0.274  0.211 0.250  0.038 0.089  0.044 0.060  
F-test 4.243 9.695  4.874 8.426  2.426 6.111  2.251 3.863  
p_value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000  0.002 0.000  
             
 
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
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Table 5.17: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel B: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders (Model 5.2) and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ Accounting 
Discretion with Additional Variables 
 Model 5.2 
 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
             
D_Dominant 0.015 0.005 -0.010 0.015 0.005 -0.010 0.0003 0.0003 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.001 
Share Difference 0.005 -0.007 -0.012 -0.001 -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
CV 0.023 0.003 -0.020 0.014 0.005 -0.009 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.008* 0.000 -0.008 
Board Size 0.021 0.019* -0.002 0.012 0.019 0.007 -0.012** -0.001 0.011 -0.008** -0.004 0.004 
Board Independence -0.001 0.022 0.023 0.005 0.023 0.018 -0.009 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Board Experience -0.007 -0.005 0.002 -0.007 -0.005 0.002 -0.001 -0.007* -0.006 0.003 -0.006* -0.009 
CEO Founder -0.002 -0.012** -0.010 -0.001 -0.013*** -0.012 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.004* -0.005 
CEO Descendant 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 -0.002 -0.007 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
CEO-Chair -0.009 0.010* 0.019 -0.005 0.009 0.014 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.003 
CEO-Group 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.011 0.004 -0.007 0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 
BIG 4 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.010 -0.007* 0.003 -0.011 -0.006 0.005 -0.006* 0.000 0.006* -0.002 0.000 0.002 
Firm Size -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.002* -0.005*** -0.003 -0.002* -0.003*** -0.001 
Firm Age -0.009 -0.008 0.001 -0.010 -0.009* 0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.004 -0.004* 0.000 0.004* 
Firm Growth 0.004 0.008 0.004 -0.003 0.012 0.015 0.001 0.008** 0.007 0.002 0.005** 0.003 
Leverage 0.034 0.050*** 0.016 0.019 0.053*** 0.034 -0.004 0.006 0.010 -0.011** 0.007** 0.018*** 
!CFO 0.290*** 0.378*** 0.088 0.316*** 0.356*** 0.040 0.010 0.023** 0.013 0.007 0.003 -0.004 
ROAt -0.046 -0.055* -0.009 -0.057 -0.053 0.004 0.006 -0.017 -0.023 0.006 0.008 0.002 
Constant 0.062 0.117***  0.095 0.117***  0.116*** 0.107***  0.090*** 0.083***  
             
No. of Obs. 754 2,036  730 1,997  839 2,001  838 2,001  
Adj. R-squared 0.202 0.273  0.206 0.249  0.038 0.087  0.044 0.060  
F-test 4.269 9.733  4.694 8.470  2.426 6.147  2.281 3.963  
p_value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000  0.002 0.000  
             
 
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. !
!!
Chapter 5!
"%'!
!
Table 5.17: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel C: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder (Model 5.3) and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ 
Accounting Discretion with Additional Variables 
 Model 5.3 
 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
             
Family Own -0.039 0.018 0.057* -0.060* 0.015 0.075** -0.010 -0.022*** -0.012 -0.010 -0.014*** -0.004 
Government Own -0.082 -0.018 0.064 -0.072 -0.021 0.051 -0.011 0.010 0.021 -0.003 0.003 0.006 
Foreign Company 
Own -0.031 0.015 0.046 -0.040 0.010 0.050 0.022 -0.003 -0.025 0.015 0.001 -0.014 
Domestic Company 
Own  -0.009 0.003 0.012 -0.023 -0.016 0.007 -0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.003 -0.017 -0.014 
Bank Own 0.348 -0.127 -0.475* 0.227 -0.133 -0.360 -0.064 0.055 0.119 -0.053 0.060 0.113 
Non-Bank Fin. Insti. 
Own -0.038 0.030 0.068 -0.032 0.016 0.048 -0.092*** -0.015 0.077 -0.050* -0.001 0.049 
Share Difference 0.032* -0.010 -0.042 0.033* -0.011 -0.044** 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.003 -0.004 
CV 0.027 0.005 -0.022 0.011 0.006 -0.005 0.004 -0.004 -0.008 0.007 -0.003 -0.010* 
Board Size 0.020 0.023* 0.003 0.012 0.023* 0.011 -0.013** -0.004 0.009 -0.008** -0.006 0.002 
Board Independence -0.005 0.022 0.027 0.002 0.024 0.022 -0.011 0.007 0.018 -0.001 0.001 0.002 
Board Experience -0.010 -0.002 0.008 -0.006 -0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.007 -0.010 0.006 -0.006* -0.012* 
CEO Founder -0.001 -0.012** -0.011 -0.001 -0.014*** -0.013 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.004* -0.005 
CEO Descendant 0.007 -0.003 -0.010 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 0.003 0.000 -0.003 
CEO-Chair -0.009 0.009 0.018 -0.004 0.008 0.012 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.005 
CEO-Group 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.014 0.003 -0.011 0.006 0.001 -0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.005 
BIG 4 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.006 -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.006 -0.006 0.000 -0.009 -0.005 0.004 -0.005* 0.000 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
             
             
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
(This table is continued on the next page) !
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Table 5.17: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel C: An Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder (Model 5.3) and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Managers’ 
Accounting Discretion with Additional Variables (Cont’) 
 Model 5.3 
 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
             
Firm Size -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.003** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.003** -0.003*** 0.000 
Firm Age -0.010 -0.008 0.002 -0.012 -0.009* 0.003 -0.006** 0.000 0.006* -0.006** 0.000 0.006** 
Firm Growth 0.001 0.008 0.007 -0.004 0.012 0.016 0.001 0.007** 0.006 0.003 0.005** 0.002 
Leverage 0.038 0.051*** 0.013 0.024 0.054*** 0.030 -0.002 0.007 0.009 -0.009 0.007** 0.016*** 
!CFO 0.281*** 0.377*** 0.096* 0.308*** 0.356*** 0.048 0.011 0.025** 0.014 0.008 0.004 -0.004 
ROAt -0.051 -0.055* -0.004 -0.062 -0.052 0.010 0.003 -0.013 -0.016 0.004 0.011 0.007 
Constant 0.069 0.106**  0.112 0.107**  0.140*** 0.124***  0.106*** 0.094***  
             
No. of Obs. 754 2,036  730 1,997  839.000 2001.000  838.000 2001.000  
Adj. R-squared 0.203 0.274  0.206 0.250  0.048 0.094  0.048 0.065  
F-test 3.629 8.015  4.081 6.870  2.495 5.759  2.037 3.457  
p_value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.003 0.000  
             
 
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. !
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Table 5.17: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel D: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholder (Model 5.4) and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion with Additional Variables 
 Model 5.4 
 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
             
D_Family 0.019 0.007 -0.012 0.017 0.008 -0.009 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.001 -0.001 
D_Government 0.006 -0.009 -0.015 0.014 -0.008 -0.022 -0.003 0.010* 0.013 0.002 0.002 0.000 
D_Foreign 0.008 0.004 -0.004 0.012 0.003 -0.009 0.008 0.006 -0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.002 
D_Domestic 0.062 -0.015 -0.077** 0.058* -0.017 -0.075** 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.005 
D_Bank 0.000 -0.032** -0.032 0.000 -0.034** -0.034 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.003 0.003 
D_Non-Bank Fin. Insti.  -0.002 0.043 0.045 -0.007 0.032 0.039 -0.003 0.044* 0.047* -0.001 0.026 0.027 
Share Difference 0.000 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
CV 0.029* 0.004 -0.025 0.019 0.006 -0.013 0.003 -0.004 -0.007 0.006 -0.002 -0.008 
Board Size 0.022 0.022* 0.000 0.013 0.022* 0.009 -0.012** -0.004 0.008 -0.008** -0.005 0.003 
Board Independence -0.003 0.023 0.026 0.004 0.025 0.021 -0.009 0.004 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Board Experience -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.007* -0.007 0.004 -0.006* -0.010 
CEO Founder -0.004 -0.012** -0.008 -0.003 -0.014*** -0.011 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
CEO Descendant 0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 
CEO-Chair -0.008 0.009 0.017 -0.004 0.008 0.012 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.004 
CEO-Group 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.004 -0.005 0.007 0.002 -0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.005 
BIG 4 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.009 -0.006 0.003 -0.011 -0.005 0.006 -0.005* 0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
             
             
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
(This table is continued on the next page) !
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Table 5.17: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel D: An Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Types of Shareholder (Model 5.4) and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Managers’ Accounting Discretion with Additional Variables (Cont’) 
 Model 5.4 
 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
             
Firm Size -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.003** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001 
Firm Age -0.010 -0.008 0.002 -0.011 -0.008 0.003 -0.005* 0.000 0.005 -0.005** 0.000 0.005* 
Firm Growth 0.003 0.007 0.004 -0.003 0.012 0.015 0.001 0.007** 0.006 0.003 0.004** 0.001 
Leverage 0.034 0.050*** 0.016 0.020 0.052*** 0.032 -0.003 0.007 0.010 -0.011* 0.008** 0.019*** 
!CFO 0.287*** 0.377*** 0.090 0.313*** 0.356*** 0.043 0.011 0.024** 0.013 0.008 0.003 -0.005 
ROAt -0.044 -0.056* -0.012 -0.056 -0.054 0.002 0.004 -0.016 -0.020 0.004 0.009 0.005 
Constant 0.064 0.109**  0.101 0.107**  0.120*** 0.121***  0.093*** 0.089***  
             
No. of Obs. 754 2,036  730 1,997  839 2,001  838 2,001  
Adj. R-squared 0.201 0.275  0.203 0.251  0.037 0.094  0.043 0.062  
F-test 3.783 8.378  3.998 7.411  2.324 5.870  1.991 3.541  
p_value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000  0.004 0.000  
             
 
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. !
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Table 5.17: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel E: An Impact of Ownership by all Directors (Model 5.5) on Managers’ Accounting Discretion with Additional Variables 
 Model 5.5- All Directors 
 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
             
Manager Own -0.011 0.007 0.018 -0.019 0.009 0.028 0.004 -0.010** -0.014 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 
Share Difference 0.021 -0.006 -0.027* 0.017 -0.007 -0.024 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 
CV 0.022 0.003 -0.019 0.013 0.005 -0.008 0.004 -0.002 -0.006 0.008* 0.000 -0.008 
Board Size 0.022 0.020* -0.002 0.013 0.020* 0.007 -0.012** -0.002 0.010 -0.008** -0.004 0.004 
Board Independence 0.000 0.023 0.023 0.005 0.024 0.019 -0.008 0.007 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Board Experience -0.008 -0.005 0.003 -0.007 -0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.007* -0.005 0.003 -0.006* -0.009 
CEO Founder 0.000 -0.013** -0.013 0.001 -0.014*** -0.015 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.004* -0.005 
CEO Descendant 0.005 -0.003 -0.008 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 
CEO-Chair -0.010 0.010* 0.020 -0.005 0.008 0.013 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.003 
CEO-Group 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.012 0.003 -0.009 0.006 0.001 -0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.005 
BIG 4 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.005 -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.008 -0.007* 0.001 -0.010 -0.006 0.004 -0.006* 0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
Firm Size -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.007*** -0.003 -0.002* -0.005*** -0.003* -0.002* -0.003*** -0.001 
Firm Age -0.010 -0.008 0.002 -0.012 -0.009* 0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.004* 0.000 0.004* 
Firm Growth 0.003 0.008 0.005 -0.003 0.012 0.015 0.001 0.008** 0.007 0.002 0.005** 0.003 
Leverage 0.037 0.050*** 0.013 0.023 0.053*** 0.030 -0.004 0.007 0.011 -0.011* 0.008** 0.019*** 
!CFO 0.289*** 0.377*** 0.088 0.316*** 0.356*** 0.040 0.009 0.023** 0.014 0.007 0.003 -0.004 
ROAt -0.047 -0.055* -0.008 -0.060 -0.053 0.007 0.007 -0.014 -0.021 0.006 0.010 0.004 
Constant 0.072 0.111**  0.111* 0.109**  0.112*** 0.116***  0.092*** 0.087***  
             
No. of Obs. 754 2,036  730 1,997  839 2,001  838 2,001  
Adj. R-squared 0.201 0.273  0.205 0.250  0.038 0.089  0.044 0.060  
F-test 4.203 9.627  4.656 8.380  2.399 6.190  2.247 3.878  
p_value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000  0.002 0.000  
             
 
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. !
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Table 5.17: Sensitivity Test – Additional Control Variables – before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
Panel F: An Impact of Ownership by Executive Directors (Model 5.5) on Managers’ Accounting Discretion with Additional Variables 
 Model 5.5- Executive Directors 
 DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
             
Manager Own -0.0001 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 -0.001 0.006 -0.020*** -0.026*** 0.007 -0.011*** -0.018** 
Share Difference 0.017 -0.005 -0.022 0.010 -0.005 -0.015 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
CV 0.022 0.003 -0.019 0.011 0.004 -0.007 0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.007* 0.000 -0.007 
Board Size 0.023 0.020* -0.003 0.013 0.020 0.007 -0.012** -0.001 0.011 -0.008** -0.004 0.004 
Board Independence 0.002 0.022 0.020 0.009 0.024 0.015 -0.008 0.007 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Board Experience -0.009 -0.004 0.005 -0.009 -0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.008** -0.007 0.003 -0.006* -0.009 
CEO Founder -0.001 -0.013** -0.012 -0.001 -0.014*** -0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
CEO Descendant 0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 0.003 0.000 -0.003 
CEO-Chair -0.010 0.010* 0.020 -0.005 0.009 0.014 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003 
CEO-Group 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.011 0.004 -0.007 0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.005 -0.001 -0.006 
BIG 4 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.006 -0.004 -0.010 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
Audit Partner Tenure -0.009 -0.007* 0.002 -0.010 -0.006 0.004 -0.005* 0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
Firm Size -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.002* -0.005*** -0.003* -0.002* -0.003*** -0.001 
Firm Age -0.010 -0.008 0.002 -0.010 -0.009* 0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.004 -0.004* 0.000 0.004 
Firm Growth 0.003 0.008 0.005 -0.003 0.012 0.015 0.001 0.008** 0.007 0.003 0.005** 0.002 
Leverage 0.036 0.050*** 0.014 0.021 0.053*** 0.032 -0.004 0.007 0.011 -0.011* 0.008** 0.019*** 
!CFO 0.288*** 0.377*** 0.089 0.313*** 0.356*** 0.043 0.009 0.023** 0.014 0.006 0.002 -0.004 
ROAt -0.045 -0.053 -0.008 -0.057 -0.051 0.006 0.006 -0.016 -0.022 0.006 0.009 0.003 
Constant 0.063 0.117***  0.095 0.117***  0.116*** 0.108***  0.089*** 0.083***  
             
No. of Obs. 754 2,036  730 1,997  839 2,001  838 2,001  
Adj. R-squared 0.201 0.273  0.204 0.249  0.038 0.092  0.045 0.062  
F-test 4.225 9.656  4.756 8.394  2.526 6.524  2.319 4.115  
p_value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000  
             
 
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. !
!! "**!
5.6.2 Test for Specification Errors 
5.6.2.1 Multicollinearity  
The method of OLS assumes that there is no perfect linear relationship between 
independent variables (Gujarati, 1995). As discussed in Section 5.5.1, the results from 
the Pearson and Spearman correlations suggest that there may be imperfect 
multicollinearity among the independent variables used in the regression models.  
In order to test whether the multicollinearity problem is severe in this study, Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) and tolerance (1/VIF) were tested for all independent variables 
(including year and industry dummies) in all discretionary accruals and discretionary 
(sales) revenues models4. According to Table 5.18, Panel A, the VIFs in all models 
range between 1 and 4, with mean VIFs between 1 and 3, indicating that the regression 
models do not seriously suffer from multicollinearity.5  
5.6.2.2 Endogeneity Test  
The literature suggests that accounting discretion, ownership and characteristics of the 
board of directors (board size, board independence and board experience) might be 
endogenous or simultaneous, as determined by unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity 
(for examples, see Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Hazarika et al., 2012). The design of this 
study allows for different periods of accounting discretion and corporate governance 
structure but may not solve all endogeneity problems. Therefore, the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman Test6 was performed in order to address possible endogeneity using a null 
hypothesis that variables of ownership and boards of directors are exogenous.  
The results from Table 5.18, Panel B, show that the null hypothesis for all discretionary 
accruals models cannot be rejected, indicating that variables of ownership and boards of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The VIF tests for adjusted discretionary accruals are not presented here because the results are all similar 
to those obtained from the original discretionary accruals models. 
5 There is no rule of thumb for the exact threshold of VIF, but existing research typically suggests that the 
VIF value should be below 10 in order to indicate no serious multicollinearity (O’Brien, 2007). 
6 The Dubin-Wu-Hausman Test (DWH) for endogeneity was performed using the Stata package 
(command -ivendog-).  
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directors are jointly exogenous in these samples. However, the null hypothesis of 
exogenous variables is rejected for the conditional discretionary revenue models (DR2). 
This evidence suggests the presence of the endogeneity problem, which may make the 
OLS method less efficient.  
The existing literature suggests the use of instrumental variables and then the application 
of simultaneous regressions such as the Two-Stage Least Squares in order to remedy this 
problem (for examples, see Cho, 1998; Cui and Mark, 2002; Hazarika et al., 2012; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). Therefore, Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) was 
performed with instrument variables for the conditional revenues-based model (DR2) in 
which the endogeneity problem appears. Although Larcker and Rusticus (2010) suggest 
that it is important to choose instrument variables based on grounded economic theory, it 
is difficult to find suitable variables from the limited data available. Therefore, lagged 
variables for all ownership and board of director variables were used as instrument 
variables, as they have been used in previous research (for examples, see Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010).  
Because the data on ownership was only available for 1994 onwards, the sample in this 
test consisted of firm-year observations from 1995 to 2007. In the first stage, all 
endogenous variables (all ownership and board of director variables) were regressed 
separately with all exogenous variables in the system. The simultaneous equation7 in 
stage two required at least one instrument variable8 for all possible endogenous 
variables. The system of equations is as follows: 
 ENDO = ƒ(CEO Founder, CEO Son/Daughter, CEO-Chair, CEO-Group, 
  BIG4, Auditor Tenure, Firm Size, Firm Age, Firm Growth, Leverage, 
  Industry dummy, Year dummy, I_OWN, I_BOARD) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The numbers of instrument variables must be at least equal to the numbers of possible endogenous 
variables, in order to allow the models to be properly identified. 
8 Ideally, instrument variables should have no correlation with endogenous variables but be exogenous in 
the structural equation (Cornett et al., 2009). 
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Where ENDO is a set of possible endogenous variables (ownership concentration, 
ownership concentration by shareholder types, managerial ownership, Share Difference, 
CV, Board Size, Board independence, Board Experience), I_OWN is a set of lagged 
ownership variables and I_BOARD is a set of lagged board of director variables.  
Table 5.19 presents the results of the 2SLS for discretionary revenues, most of which are 
consistent with the previous results of OLS, shown in Section 5.5.3. However, it appears 
that the significant results for domestic company ownership become insignificant. 
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Table 5.18 Test for Model Specification Errors – Full sample 
Panel A: Variance Inflation Factors for Independent Variables 
       
 Model 5.1 
DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 Explanatory 
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
             
Concentrated Own 2.39 0.418 2.39 0.418 2.37 0.422 2.37 0.422 2.39 0.418 2.39 0.418 
Share Difference 2.34 0.427 2.34 0.427 2.30 0.435 2.30 0.435 2.34 0.427 2.34 0.427 
CV 1.37 0.731 1.37 0.729 1.36 0.735 1.36 0.735 1.37 0.729 1.37 0.729 
Board Size 2.06 0.485 2.06 0.485 2.02 0.494 2.02 0.494 2.06 0.485 2.06 0.485 
Board Independence 3.22 0.311 3.20 0.313 3.50 0.286 3.50 0.286 3.20 0.313 3.20 0.313 
Board Experience 1.40 0.715 1.40 0.714 1.38 0.725 1.38 0.725 1.40 0.714 1.40 0.714 
CEO Founder 1.48 0.676 1.48 0.674 1.50 0.665 1.50 0.665 1.48 0.674 1.48 0.674 
CEO Descendant 1.52 0.659 1.50 0.665 1.59 0.627 1.59 0.627 1.50 0.665 1.50 0.665 
CEO-Chair 1.47 0.680 1.47 0.679 1.50 0.665 1.50 0.665 1.47 0.679 1.47 0.679 
CEO-Group 1.46 0.684 1.45 0.688 1.55 0.646 1.55 0.646 1.45 0.688 1.45 0.688 
BIG 4 1.14 0.880 1.14 0.875 1.14 0.879 1.14 0.879 1.14 0.875 1.14 0.875 
Audit Partner Tenure 1.18 0.845 1.19 0.842 1.17 0.857 1.17 0.857 1.19 0.842 1.19 0.842 
Firm Size 1.63 0.612 1.64 0.608 1.60 0.624 1.60 0.624 1.64 0.608 1.64 0.608 
Firm Age 1.25 0.798 1.25 0.800 1.26 0.796 1.26 0.796 1.25 0.800 1.25 0.800 
Firm Growth 1.18 0.848 1.19 0.842 1.18 0.851 1.18 0.851 1.19 0.842 1.19 0.842 
Leverage 1.26 0.795 1.24 0.806 1.27 0.785 1.27 0.785 1.24 0.806 1.24 0.806 
Mean VIF 2.28  2.26  2.01  2.01  2.26  2.26  
             
 Model 5.3 
DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 Explanatory 
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
             
Family Own 2.70 0.371 2.72 0.367 2.68 0.373 2.69 0.372 2.72 0.367 2.72 0.367 
Government own 1.47 0.678 1.49 0.673 1.42 0.704 1.42 0.704 1.49 0.673 1.49 0.673 
Foreign Own 1.71 0.583 1.72 0.580 1.68 0.594 1.68 0.594 1.72 0.580 1.72 0.580 
Domestic Own 1.21 0.826 1.20 0.830 1.21 0.824 1.21 0.824 1.20 0.830 1.20 0.830 
Bank Own 1.16 0.865 1.14 0.877 1.12 0.889 1.12 0.890 1.14 0.877 1.14 0.877 
Non-Bank Fin. Insti. 
Own 1.13 0.887 1.13 0.883 1.17 0.856 1.17 0.855 1.13 0.883 1.13 0.883 
Share Difference 1.62 0.617 1.63 0.614 1.61 0.619 1.61 0.619 1.63 0.614 1.63 0.614 
CV 1.43 0.699 1.43 0.698 1.41 0.710 1.41 0.710 1.43 0.698 1.43 0.698 
Board Size 2.11 0.474 2.11 0.474 2.06 0.486 2.06 0.486 2.11 0.474 2.11 0.474 
Board Independence 3.23 0.309 3.21 0.311 3.51 0.285 3.51 0.285 3.21 0.311 3.21 0.311 
Board Experience 1.47 0.682 1.47 0.678 1.44 0.694 1.44 0.694 1.47 0.678 1.47 0.678 
CEO Founder 1.53 0.652 1.54 0.651 1.56 0.642 1.56 0.642 1.54 0.651 1.54 0.651 
CEO Descendant 1.55 0.647 1.53 0.653 1.62 0.617 1.62 0.617 1.53 0.653 1.53 0.653 
CEO-Chair 1.48 0.677 1.48 0.675 1.51 0.662 1.51 0.662 1.48 0.675 1.48 0.675 
CEO-Group 1.49 0.669 1.49 0.672 1.58 0.632 1.58 0.632 1.49 0.672 1.49 0.672 
BIG 4 1.22 0.822 1.22 0.818 1.22 0.818 1.22 0.818 1.22 0.818 1.22 0.818 
Audit Partner Tenure 1.19 0.841 1.19 0.838 1.17 0.854 1.17 0.853 1.19 0.838 1.19 0.838 
Firm Size 1.72 0.580 1.73 0.577 1.70 0.589 1.70 0.588 1.73 0.577 1.73 0.577 
Firm Age 1.29 0.775 1.29 0.778 1.29 0.774 1.29 0.774 1.29 0.778 1.29 0.778 
Firm Growth 1.18 0.847 1.19 0.841 1.18 0.849 1.18 0.849 1.19 0.841 1.19 0.841 
Leverage 1.28 0.780 1.26 0.791 1.30 0.767 1.30 0.768 1.26 0.791 1.26 0.791 
Mean VIF 2.18  2.16  1.94  1.94  2.16  2.16  
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.18 Test for Model Specification Errors – Full sample (Cont’) 
Panel A: Variance Inflation Factors for Independent Variables (Cont’) 
  
 Model 5.5 – All Directors 
DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 Explanatory 
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
             
Manager Own 1.59 0.628 1.59 0.628 1.52 0.657 1.52 0.657 1.59 0.628 1.59 0.628 
Share Difference 1.29 0.778 1.29 0.775 1.25 0.801 1.25 0.801 1.29 0.775 1.29 0.775 
CV 1.35 0.739 1.35 0.739 1.35 0.741 1.35 0.741 1.35 0.739 1.35 0.739 
Board Size 2.06 0.485 2.06 0.485 2.02 0.496 2.02 0.496 2.06 0.485 2.06 0.485 
Board Independence 3.23 0.310 3.21 0.312 3.51 0.285 3.51 0.285 3.21 0.312 3.21 0.312 
Board Experience 1.40 0.714 1.40 0.713 1.38 0.725 1.38 0.725 1.40 0.713 1.40 0.713 
CEO Founder 1.54 0.651 1.54 0.651 1.56 0.639 1.56 0.639 1.54 0.651 1.54 0.651 
CEO Descendant 1.55 0.647 1.53 0.654 1.62 0.618 1.62 0.618 1.53 0.654 1.53 0.654 
CEO-Chair 1.47 0.679 1.48 0.677 1.51 0.663 1.51 0.663 1.48 0.677 1.48 0.677 
CEO-Group 1.48 0.676 1.47 0.680 1.56 0.640 1.56 0.640 1.47 0.680 1.47 0.680 
BIG 4 1.15 0.869 1.15 0.866 1.15 0.868 1.15 0.868 1.15 0.866 1.15 0.866 
Audit Partner Tenure 1.18 0.844 1.19 0.842 1.17 0.857 1.17 0.857 1.19 0.842 1.19 0.842 
Firm Size 1.66 0.601 1.67 0.598 1.62 0.616 1.63 0.615 1.67 0.598 1.67 0.598 
Firm Age 1.27 0.790 1.26 0.792 1.26 0.791 1.26 0.791 1.26 0.792 1.26 0.792 
Firm Growth 1.18 0.848 1.19 0.842 1.17 0.851 1.17 0.851 1.19 0.842 1.19 0.842 
Leverage 1.26 0.794 1.24 0.805 1.28 0.784 1.28 0.784 1.24 0.805 1.24 0.805 
Mean VIF 2.24  2.22  1.97  1.97  2.22  2.22  
  
 Model 5.5 – Executive Directors 
DA1 DA2 DR1 DR2 DA2_DR1 DA2_DR2 Explanatory 
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
             
Manager Own 1.12 0.891 1.12 0.894 1.11 0.898 1.11 0.898 1.12 0.894 1.12 0.894 
Share Difference 1.15 0.873 1.15 0.868 1.14 0.880 1.14 0.880 1.15 0.868 1.15 0.868 
CV 1.36 0.737 1.36 0.737 1.35 0.739 1.35 0.739 1.36 0.737 1.36 0.737 
Board Size 2.06 0.486 2.06 0.486 2.01 0.497 2.01 0.497 2.06 0.486 2.06 0.486 
Board Independence 3.21 0.311 3.19 0.313 3.50 0.286 3.50 0.286 3.19 0.313 3.19 0.313 
Board Experience 1.40 0.714 1.40 0.713 1.38 0.725 1.38 0.725 1.40 0.713 1.40 0.713 
CEO Founder 1.55 0.645 1.55 0.645 1.58 0.633 1.58 0.633 1.55 0.645 1.55 0.645 
CEO Descendant 1.55 0.644 1.54 0.649 1.63 0.614 1.63 0.614 1.54 0.649 1.54 0.649 
CEO-Chair 1.48 0.678 1.48 0.677 1.51 0.663 1.51 0.663 1.48 0.677 1.48 0.677 
CEO-Group 1.46 0.686 1.45 0.689 1.54 0.648 1.54 0.648 1.45 0.689 1.45 0.689 
BIG 4 1.13 0.881 1.14 0.877 1.13 0.881 1.13 0.881 1.14 0.877 1.14 0.877 
Audit Partner Tenure 1.19 0.843 1.19 0.841 1.17 0.856 1.17 0.855 1.19 0.841 1.19 0.841 
Firm Size 1.63 0.612 1.64 0.608 1.60 0.625 1.60 0.624 1.64 0.608 1.64 0.608 
Firm Age 1.26 0.797 1.25 0.799 1.26 0.795 1.26 0.795 1.25 0.799 1.25 0.799 
Firm Growth 1.18 0.849 1.19 0.843 1.17 0.851 1.17 0.852 1.19 0.843 1.19 0.843 
Leverage 1.26 0.794 1.24 0.805 1.28 0.784 1.28 0.784 1.24 0.805 1.24 0.805 
Mean VIF 2.25  2.23  1.98  1.98  2.23  2.23  
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 5.18 Test for Model Specification Errors – Full sample (Cont’) 
Panel B: Durbin-Wu-Hasman Test for Endogeneity 
 
 H0: Residuals of All Ownership and Board Structure Variables are Exogenous 
 Model 5.5 
 Model 5.1 Model 5.3 All Directors Executive Directors 
 Chi-sq p_value Chi-sq p_value Chi-sq p_value Chi-sq p_value 
         
DA1 4.665 0.588 8.511 0.667 4.958 0.549 4.798 0.570 
DA2 4.633 0.592 11.192 0.427 4.726 0.579 4.325 0.633 
DR1 8.555 0.200 15.595 0.157 7.692 0.262 7.544 0.274 
DR2 1.674 0.947 20.236 0.042 3.554 0.737 3.228 0.780 
DA2_DR1 4.266 0.641 11.099 0.435 4.369 0.627 3.952 0.683 
DA2_DR2 4.165 0.654 10.999 0.443 4.193 0.651 3.921 0.687 
         !
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Table 5.19: Two-Stage least Square with Instrument Variables (2SLS) for Discretionary Revenues – 
Full Sample 
 DR2 
Model 5.5 
Model 5.1 Model 5.3 All Directors Executive Directors Explanatory 
Variables Coff. t Coff. t Coff. t Coff. t 
         
Concentrated 
Own -0.006 (-1.18)       
Family Own   -0.017*** (-3.63)     
Government Own   0.0005 (0.04)     
Foreign Own   0.003 (0.44)     
Domestic Own   -0.004 (-0.36)     
Bank Own   -0.026 (-0.88)     
Non-Bank Fin. 
Insti. Own   -0.039* (-1.68)     
Manager_Own     -0.005* (-1.73) 0.002 (0.54) 
Share Difference 0.004 (1.05) 0.006** (2.20) 0.002 (0.81) 0.001 (0.26) 
CV 0.000 (0.12) -0.001 (-0.35) 0.001 (0.20) 0.001 (0.22) 
Board Size -0.013*** (-3.16) -0.013*** (-3.10) -0.014*** (-3.20) -0.013*** (-3.12) 
Board 
Independence -0.012 (-1.43) -0.011 (-1.31) -0.013 (-1.54) -0.012 (-1.43) 
Board Experience -0.004 (-1.45) -0.002 (-0.74) -0.004 (-1.44) -0.004 (-1.49) 
CEO Founder -0.004** (-2.11) -0.003 (-1.57) -0.003* (-1.68) -0.004** (-2.16) 
CEO Descendant -0.001 (-0.38) 0.000 (0.14) 0.000 (-0.17) -0.001 (-0.51) 
CEO-Chair 0.001 (0.59) 0.002 (0.76) 0.001 (0.70) 0.001 (0.62) 
CEO-Group 0.000 (-0.02) 0.001 (0.60) 0.000 (0.13) 0.000 (-0.08) 
BIG 4 -0.002* (-1.78) -0.003*** (-2.71) -0.003** (-2.12) -0.002* (-1.86) 
Audit Partner 
Tenure -0.001 (-0.71) -0.001 (-0.55) -0.001 (-0.71) -0.001 (-0.69) 
Firm Size -0.002*** (-4.17) -0.003*** (-4.69) -0.002*** (-4.28) -0.002*** (-4.12) 
Firm Age -0.002** (-2.00) -0.003*** (-2.58) -0.002** (-2.13) -0.002** (-1.98) 
Firm Growth 0.003 (1.54) 0.003 (1.31) 0.003 (1.54) 0.003 (1.61) 
Leverage 0.003 (1.25) 0.005* (1.92) 0.003 (1.36) 0.003 (1.24) 
Constant 0.116*** (8.53) 0.126*** (8.66) 0.119*** (8.43) 0.113*** (8.47) 
         
No. of Obs. 3,277  3,356  3,277  3,277  
Adj. R-squared 0.077  0.079  0.08  0.077  
F-test 7.119  6.644  7.09  7.127  
p_value 0.000  0.000  0.00  0.000  
         
         
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. !
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5.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
The latitude of accounting standards allows managers to report accounting information 
that better reflects a firm’s position and performance. However, the conflict of interests 
that cannot be solved among contract parties in firms with dispersed or concentrated 
ownership may motivate managers or dominant shareholders to take this opportunity to 
exercise accounting discretion for their own interests (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
This chapter has investigated (1) whether ownership and other corporate governance 
mechanisms have influenced accounting discretion in the Thai capital market and (2) 
whether this potential impact differed significantly between the periods before and after 
the Thai corporate governance reforms. This study focuses on the main corporate 
governance mechanisms in the Thai capital market: ownership concentration, boards of 
directors, CEO characteristics and external auditors. Depending on the contractual and 
agency frameworks, these mechanisms have either enhanced or limited the use of 
managers’ accounting discretion. 
Although the existing literature suggests many approaches to the measurement of 
accounting discretion, none of them can measure the magnitude of accounting discretion 
without errors (Dechow et al. 1995; McNichols, 2000; Young, 1999). Therefore, this 
study has used (unsigned) discretionary accruals and (unsigned) discretionary revenues 
calculated from the Jones model, modified Jones model and revenues-based approaches 
suggested by Stubben (2010). This study has also attempted to investigate the possibility 
of improving the validity of discretionary accruals by integrating both sets of 
approaches. However, the adjusted discretionary accruals have not significantly differed 
from the discretionary accruals calculated by the original models.  
Regarding the first and the second questions, the overall evidence suggests that 
ownership structure has had some influence on managers’ accounting discretion, 
especially before the corporate governance reforms. Although the results seem to have 
been inconsistent among various measurements of accounting discretion, most of them 
support the proposition of an alignment effect, suggesting that higher levels of 
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ownership motivate blockholders to monitor financial reporting and thereby inhibit 
managers’ opportunistic use of accounting discretion. Nevertheless, the alignment of 
interests seems to depend on the types of shareholder, their ability to govern managers’ 
discretion on different accounts (accruals and revenues component of accruals) and the 
periods of study. 
Different types of shareholder are motivated by their block ownership to limit 
accounting discretion over different accounts. It appears that most of them can better 
limit discretionary revenues than discretionary accruals. Possible explanations could be 
the fact that revenues account is less complicated and is normally scrutinised by 
regulators. 
In particular, family block ownership, it appears that increasing levels of family 
ownership are associated with smaller magnitudes of discretionary revenues. 
Additionally, firms with dominant family shareholders appear to have engaged less in 
the misuse of discretionary revenues than firms without them did. This may imply that 
dominant family shareholders have influence over financial reporting and may be self-
constrained by their block of shareholders to facilitate opportunistic accounting 
discretion over revenues. Additionally, better business knowledge and long-term 
relationships among family members may also contribute to their ability to inhibit 
opportunistic accounting discretion over revenues (for examples, see Ali et al., 2007; 
Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999). Nevertheless, the findings suggest that family 
ownership played a role in limiting the use of discretionary revenues, but only after the 
reforms. 
The findings also reveal that domestic company, bank and non-bank financial 
institutional investor block ownership is associated with smaller magnitudes of 
discretionary revenues. This may imply that they had knowledge and sufficient 
resources to monitor and limit the use of accounting discretion over revenues (for 
example, see Bushee, 1998) and supports the argument of Brickley et al. (1988), that 
financial institutions are more independent from the firms in which they invest; 
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therefore, they are likely to contribute to a firm’s accounting policy. Nevertheless, block 
ownership appeared to motivate these shareholders to limit a use of discretionary 
revenues was only significant before the reforms. The expectation of a better corporate 
governance system may reduce the motivation of these shareholders to participate in the 
monitoring over financial reporting. 
Regarding discretionary accruals, this study has found that increasing levels of 
government and foreign company block ownership were associated with smaller 
magnitudes of discretionary accruals, which implies that firms might have been better 
monitored or required by government and foreign investors to produce high quality 
reports of the accruals component of earnings (for examples, see Aggarwal et al. 2005; 
Ding et al. 2007; Jeon and Ryoo, 2013; Wang and Yung, 2011). Nevertheless, the role of 
foreign company investors block ownership in limiting managers’ accounting discretion 
over accruals seems to have only existed before the reforms. Again, the reform may 
reduce the motivation of foreign company blockholders to participate in the monitoring 
over financial reporting. 
However, the evidence suggests that the presence of a foreign company as the dominant 
shareholder enhanced the use of accounting discretion over revenues and may imply that 
high levels of share ownership increase the ability of foreign companies to influence 
accounting methods and policies for opportunistic purposes, such as to boost sales in the 
parent company (Boardman et al., 1997). In addition, the findings reveal that banks may 
have been motivated to facilitate the use of managers’ accounting discretion over 
accruals, but only before the reforms. The close relationship between bank and firms 
may motivate the bank to facilitate in a use of accounting discretions over accruals 
before the reform. However, the evidence suggests that banks that acted as a dominant 
shareholders seemed to be constrained by their block of shares to limit the use of 
accounting discretion over accruals after the reforms. The restricted regulation by the 
bank regulator after the reform may force banks as owners to provide better monitoring 
over financial reporting. 
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Regarding managerial ownership, the evidence supports the expectation of an alignment 
effect, suggesting that levels of managerial ownership (all directors and executive 
directors) helped to align managers’ interests with those of firms. Although there is 
evidence that increasing levels of executive director ownership may have enhanced the 
use of accounting discretion over revenues prior to the reforms, they helped to limit it 
after the reforms. This may partly imply the success of the corporate governance reforms 
that emphasised the responsibility and accountability of directors after the reforms. 
Regarding board structure, while bigger boards tend to have consistently enhanced the 
use of accounting discretion over accruals, they tend to have limited the use of 
accounting discretion over revenues. This evidence reveals some conflict of interests 
between boards of directors and firms, but also suggests that the boards may have had 
different incentives and abilities in respect to curbing managers’ accounting discretion; 
they tended to be concerned with revenues rather than accruals accounts because 
revenues accounts are less complicated and normally spotted by regulators and the 
public. In addition, board independence is likely to have enhanced the use of accounting 
discretion over accruals. This evidence is inconsistent with the findings of other studies, 
which predict that board independence may limit the use of accounting discretion (for 
examples, see Davidson et al., 2005; Jaggi et al., 2009; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 
2000). Again, the evidence questions whether independent directors in Thai listed firms 
were actually “independent”. 
Regarding CEO characteristics, CEO founders and their descendants appear to have 
limited the use of discretionary accruals, suggesting the dominance of an alignment of 
interests. Since most Thai listed firms with CEO founders are family firms, this evidence 
consistently suggests that family attributes may inhibit the engagement of CEO founders 
and their descendants in accounting discretion (Dechow et al., 1996).  
Regarding auditor reputation and expertise, BIG4 firms appear to have only limited the 
use of discretion on revenues. Experience (five years or more) of auditor partners has 
been found to enhance their ability to limit the use of accounting discretion over accruals 
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and the revenues component of accruals. Since listed firms are required to rotate their 
auditors every five years, the evidence suggests that this rule might reduce the benefits 
of auditor experience in respect to the quality of financial reporting. 
Overall, the findings of this chapter have revealed that ownership concentration tended 
to motivate largest shareholders to provide better monitoring or to inhibit managers’ 
accounting discretion. Additionally, most dominant shareholders, and their types, did not 
have significant impacts on accounting discretion. Therefore, the positive impact of 
ownership concentration (by shareholder types) and the presence of dominant 
shareholders (by their types) on firm performance presented in Chapter 4 at least are not 
mainly influenced by managers’ accounting discretion. 
The findings may provide evidence of the success of the reforms in respect to reducing 
the role of dominant shareholders in firms with concentrated ownership, which was 
claimed to weaken the corporate governance system before the financial crisis (World 
Bank, 1998). However, this claim is also challenged by this chapter’s findings, which 
suggest that the concentration of ownership in the hands of most types of shareholder, 
especially families, limited, rather than enhanced, the misuse of managers’ accounting 
discretion. The evidence also suggests some improvements in the alignment of interests 
derived from increasing levels of shares owned by executive directors after the reforms 
and may point to their success in terms of improving an awareness of directors’ 
responsibility and accountability.  
The role of other corporate governance mechanisms (CEO characteristics and audit 
quality) on limiting managers’ accounting discretion became significant after the 
reforms. However, their impacts on accounting discretion were not statistically different 
after the reforms, implying that the reforms did not significantly improve their efficiency 
in limiting managers’ opportunistic accounting discretion. 
This study has some limitations. Firstly, it aims to understand the impact of various 
corporate governance mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion in general but 
does not attempt to investigate the specific motivations for managers’ accounting 
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discretion. Recent research suggests that managers may engage in accounting discretion 
to convey private information that better reflects firms’ financial status (for examples, 
see Bowen et al., 2008; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Subramanyam, 1996; Tucker and 
Zarowin, 2006; Warfield et al. 1995). Therefore, it might be too early to conclude that 
the use of accounting discretion has been for opportunistic purposes. Hence it will be 
interesting for future research to explore the consequences of managers’ accounting 
discretion and whether it is an example of efficiency or opportunism. 
Secondly, although many approaches to the measurement of managers’ accounting 
discretion are suggested by the existing literature, no perfect measurement is 
forthcoming. This study uses more than one approach, including the most powerful 
approaches suggested by the literature, to estimate managers’ accounting discretion, but 
it is possible that the estimated discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues have 
still suffered from measurement errors, which may have reduced the validity of the 
reported results.  
In this study, the use of different measurements has led to some inconsistent findings 
regarding the power of significance between and within accruals and revenues-based 
approaches. Regardless of possible measurement errors, these inconsistencies may be 
driven by the different incentives and abilities of the largest shareholders or dominant 
shareholders and boards of directors to detect accounting discretion over different 
accounts. Therefore, this study considers that its findings are sufficient convey an 
understanding of the impact of ownership structure and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ accounting discretion in the context of emerging markets 
such as Thailand.  
It seems fair to conclude that ownership concentration has helped to solve the conflict of 
interests in terms of managers’ accounting discretion in Thai listed companies. The 
findings also confirm that different approaches to the measurement of accounting 
discretion may lead to different results among researchers. Therefore, this study 
encourages future research related to managers’ accounting discretion to apply multiple 
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approaches in order to obtain more understanding on the nature of this activity. The 
recent accruals-based approach of Dechow et al. (2012), taking into account a reversal 
factor, may provide fruitful evidence for this area of research. 
In conclusion, the evidence from this chapter sheds light on the role of various 
ownership structures, especially families, and other corporate governance mechanisms in 
inhibiting the use of accounting discretion in the Thai capital market. However, it casts 
doubt on the role of boards of directors, which might not be as efficient as they were 
intended to be. The next chapter will explore whether investors can correctly perceive 
the impact of these governance mechanisms on corporate performance. 
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Chapter 6: How do Investors Perceive the Impact of 
Ownership Structure and Other Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms on Firm Performance? 
6.1 Introduction: Motivations and Research Questions 
The findings from Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that ownership structure and other corporate 
governance mechanisms have significant impacts on firm performance and managers’ 
accounting discretion. Ownership concentration and the presence of dominant 
shareholders by most of shareholders’ types contribute to high firm performance and 
low accounting discretion (discretionary accruals and revenues). In addition, firms with 
CEO founders and long-audit tenures are associated with low accounting discretion. 
Nevertheless, the findings reveal that the board of directors in terms of board size and 
independence tends to be an inefficient mechanism either to enhance corporate 
performance or to limit the use of managers’ accounting discretion and that this impact 
was unaffected by the reforms.  
So far, the evidence has challenged the claim that ownership concentration and the 
presence of dominant shareholders are poor governance structures, but this negative 
perception may lead investors to a discount of a firm’s value without considering its 
actual performance. On the other hand, the high-profile corporate governance reforms, 
which aimed to regain investors’ confidence in the Thai capital market, may have helped 
to reduce this negative view, even though they might not have made significant changes 
to performance. 
Although some research has attempted to investigate market reactions to individual 
governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors (DeFond et al., 2005; Nguyen 
and Nielsen, 2010; Lin et al., 2003; Singhvi et al., 2013) and external auditors (Teoh and 
Wong, 1993), there is a lack of relevant research that directly examines investors’ 
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perceptions of ownership structure and takes potential impact of the reforms into 
account. Therefore, this chapter aims to investigate whether investors can correctly 
perceive the impact of ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms 
on firm performance and whether the corporate governance reforms improve the 
accuracy of their perceptions of these impacts. 
In particular, the research questions addressed in this chapter are as follows: 
Q6.1: Whether investors correctly perceive the impact of ownership structure on 
firm performance and therefore correctly estimate these impacts. 
Q6.2: Whether investors correctly perceive the impact of other corporate 
governance mechanisms (board of directors, CEO characteristics and audit reputation 
and expertise) on firm performance and therefore correctly estimate these impacts. 
Q6.3: Whether the corporate governance reform has helped investors to more 
realistically perceive the impact of ownership and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance. 
Based on the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), investors should efficiently use the 
available information about ownership structure and other corporate governance 
mechanisms to correctly estimate their impact on firm performance. However, the 
existing literature provides some evidence suggesting that investors might misperceive 
their actual impact. 
Sloan (1996) first employed the Mishkin Test (1983) (MT) to test the naïve hypothesis 
against the EMH in the context of accounting research. He reveals that investors fixated 
on earnings and failed to distinguish the ability of cash flows and the accruals 
components of earnings to predict future earnings.  
Later, Kraft et al. (2007) argued that the MT test applied by Sloan (1996) and in 
subsequent research may suffer from the omitted variable problems. As a result, it may 
incorrectly lead to the conclusion that the market is inefficient because of earnings and 
earnings components if the omitted variables were not rationally priced. They also 
suggest that the Ordinary Least Square method (OLS) can be applied in order to provide 
the same results as the MT does. Therefore, this study applies the OLS suggested by 
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Kraft et al. (2007), which provides a simple but practical method by which to answer the 
research questions.  
This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance and accounting research 
literature in several ways.  
Firstly, this study directly examines investors’ perceptions of ownership structure and 
other corporate governance mechanisms in more general cases. This chapter’s findings 
improve our understanding how efficiently investors use the non-accounting information 
such as ownership and other corporate governance information that is available to the 
public. This is one of the most important indicators of the success of the Thai corporate 
governance reforms, which were aimed at promoting transparency of financial reporting 
and disclosure. 
Additionally, the evidence could confirm whether the positive impact of ownership 
structure on market performance found earlier in Chapter 4 have been influenced by 
investors’ perception of these structures. The more understanding on the views of 
investors on these structures could also help policy makers to develop more efficient 
ways to inform investors about the role of ownership structure and other corporate 
governance mechanisms in their invested firms. An accurate view of these structures 
could also help investors to efficiently make their investment decisions in turn 
increasing the efficiency of the Thai capital market. 
Secondly, this study indirectly responds to a call by Kraft et al. (2007) to improve the 
MT used in accounting research. In order to avoid misspecification in the MT, this study 
takes into account a more complete set of variables and includes non-financial 
information, such as ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms 
that may affect future firm performance. The results could provide guidance for future 
research on the mispricing of earnings to improve the MT for example by adding the 
control variables, other than accounting numbers, that may affect future firm 
performance.  
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Finally, the results from this study should enhance current understanding of the 
efficiency of the Thai capital market and the knowledge of investors of the effectiveness 
of corporate governance reforms. They could also provide guidance for policy makers 
and market regulators who develop corporate governance policies and practices. 
Reforms should not merely respond to international pressure but should be efficient and 
practical for firms and the Thai capital market. 
This chapter will be organised as follows: Section 6.2 begins with a brief overview of 
the theoretical framework of the market efficiency hypothesis and alterative hypotheses 
in accounting research. The relevant literature and hypothesis development are discussed 
in Chapter 6.3. Research Design is presented in Section 6.4. Sampling and Data 
collection is described in Section 6.5 and the descriptive statistics analysis and empirical 
evidence is discussed in Section 6.6. Sensitivity Analysis is provided in Section 6.7 and 
the last section provides a chapter summary and conclusions and highlights topics for 
future research. 
6.2 Theoretical Framework 
6.2.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) plays a major role in the economics and finance 
literature. Ideally, the capital market1 is called “efficient” if asset prices at any time 
“fully reflect” all available information (Fama, 1970). Jensen (1978: 96) simply defines 
an efficient market as follows: 
 “A market is efficient with respect to information set θ, if it is impossible 
to make economic profits2 by trading on the basis of information set θt.” 
(Footnote is added) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The major role of the capital market is to allocate “ownership of economy’s capital stock”; therefore, the 
price of security can be a signal for resource allocation (Fama, 1970: 383). The capital market includes 
stock, bond and credit trade markets (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), but this study focuses exclusively on 
the stock market.  
2 Economic Profit is the profit after subtracting the market rate of the return on capital (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986: 17). It also includes all net costs such as transactions costs and costs to obtain 
information. 
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The underlying assumption of the EMH is that assets (stock) are priced and adjusted 
rapidly to an equilibrium in response to a set of information in the capital market (Ball, 
1972). To make the theory testable, an expected price of asset i at time t+1 given θt, 
E(Pi,t+1| θt) is  
E(Pi,t+1| φt) = Pi,t[1+E(ri,t+1| φt)] 
Where,  
φt = Set of information available at time t 
Pi,t = Price of asset i at time t 
E(ri,t+1| φt)] = The market’s expected rate of return on asset i (or other assets 
   with the same risk) at time t, given θt 
 
The EMH predicts that, on average, no one can earn abnormal returns3 from trading on 
the given set of information. Hence, on average, economic profits or abnormal returns 
should be zero.  
Nevertheless, the degree of market efficiency depends on the speed at which the asset’s 
prices achieve equilibrium after the release of a relevant set of information (Ball, 1972). 
Therefore, market efficiency is usually categorised into three different types: as follows: 
1) Weak Form of the EMH: The information set (θ) contains only historical 
information, such as historical stock price/volume, which is readily available 
to many market participants at low costs. Therefore, no systematic abnormal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986: 18), an abnormal rate of return (vi,t+1) is defined as the 
difference between the realised rate of return (ri,t+1) and the market’s expected rate of return for asset i, 
given θt ((E(ri,t+1|θt)). That is, 
 
vi,t+1 ≡ ri,t+1 - E(ri,t+1|θt). 
 
The average abnormal rate of return across many periods (T) is expected to be zero when the same set of 
information is used. That is, 
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returns should be observed when investors trade stocks using this set of 
information. 
2) Semi-Strong Form of the EMH: The information set (θ) contains all 
publicly available information at time t, such as announcements of annual 
earnings, which is readily available to many market participants at low costs. 
Therefore, no systematic abnormal returns should be observed when 
investors trade stocks using this set of information. 
3) Strong Form of the EMH: The information set (θ) contains all information 
at time t, which is readily available to many market participants at low costs. 
Therefore, no systematic abnormal returns should be observed when 
investors trade stocks using this set of information. 
6.2.2 The Alternative Hypotheses vs. The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Accounting research has long been interested in the extent to which accounting numbers 
such as earnings convey useful information to the capital market (Ball, 1972; Jensen, 
1978; Watts and Zimmerman, 1968). Prior to the EMH, accounting research during 
1960s, that examined the relationship between accounting earnings and stock prices, 
mostly relied on the mechanistic hypothesis (MH). The MH assumes that accounting 
reports are the only source of information on a corporation. Therefore, stock prices are 
determined solely on the reported accounting earnings (for examples, see Ball, 1972; 
Hand, 1990; Watts and Zimmerman, 1968). In addition, the MH assumes that market 
participants, such as investors, interpret reported earnings without concern for a firm’s 
accounting policies and procedures. These investors are “unsophisticated” because they 
are unable to properly extract information, such as the probability distribution of future 
cash flows, from a firm’s financial reports (Hand, 1990; Watts and Zimmerman, 1968). 
Because accounting standards allow managers to exercise discretion over accounting 
policies and procedures, managers can mislead the capital market by choosing 
accounting procedures that manipulate shareholder perceptions to serve their own 
interests by, for example, overvaluing a firm’s stock prices. As a result, the capital 
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market cannot discriminate between efficient and inefficient corporations (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1968) and the MH predicts that the capital market can be systematically 
misled by reported earnings, leading to the mispricing of stocks. 
Another hypothesis used in the accounting literature is the functional fixation hypothesis 
(FFH). Unlike the MH, the FFH assumes that there are two types of investors: 
sophisticated investors who can properly extract the information contained in financial 
reports and unsophisticated investors who cannot (Hand, 1990). However, it is difficult 
that information extracted from a few sophisticated investors is transferred to 
unsophisticated investors. Therefore, many investors are unsophisticated, leading to the 
mispricing of stocks. 
These two hypotheses contradict the notion of the EMH. Under the EMH, the capital 
market is competitive in the sense that market participants, such as investors and 
security analysts, use not only accounting reports but also other information to evaluate 
firm value (Watts and Zimmerman, 1968); they are assumed to be sophisticated. 
Therefore, in contrast to the MH and FFH, the capital market under the EMH cannot be 
systematically misled by reported earnings. 
6.3 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
6.3.1 How do Investors Perceive the Impact of Ownership Structure on 
Firm Performance? 
6.3.1.1 Ownership Concentration and the Presence of Dominant 
Shareholders 
As discussed in previous chapters, ownership structure is a root cause of the agency 
problem in firms with dispersed or concentrated ownership. In the context of 
concentrated ownership, a conflict of interest usually occurs between dominant 
shareholders and minority shareholders. Holderness (2003) suggests that shareholders 
with blocks of shares are motivated to participate in a firm’s monitoring and policies 
because their wealth could be substantially affected by firm performance. This, in turn, 
benefits other shareholders. However, if the large shareholders’ interests are not aligned 
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to those of other shareholders, they might influence a company’s policies for private 
benefit at the expense of other shareholders. 
So far, there is only limited literature available on the question of whether investors 
correctly perceive the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. 
Drawing on literature on the announcement effect of private equity placement, this study 
can gain some insights into investors’ perception about the impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance.  
For example, Wruck (1989) investigated market reactions to private equity sales in the 
US. She argued that private equity and public equity sales send different signals about a 
firm value to the capital market. She found that, on average, the announcement of 
private equity sales was followed by positive abnormal returns, which opposed to 
negative abnormal returns found in studies of the announcement effect of public equity 
sales. This may be because a change in ownership concentration affects the markets’ 
assessment of a firm’s value4. For example, investors may view private equity sales as a 
solution to appropriate share distributions of the firm that reduce the voting power of the 
existing blockholders. In contrast, investors may view public equity shares as a dilution 
of the existing blockholders’ voting power by many small shareholders, which could 
reduce the benefits that firms may gain from the existing blockholders. 
In the context of an initial public offering (IPO), researchers (such as Chen and Strang, 
2004; Darmadi and Gunawan, 2013) suggest that ownership structure (ownership 
retention by insiders) could be used by the IPO firms to signal high quality to potential 
investors. According to signalling theory, investors may perceive that the high retention 
by initial shareholders is a signal of firms with good performance because initial 
shareholders might not want to transfer wealth (such as high future cash flows) to 
outside investors. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Another possible explanation is that private and public equity sales convey the opposite signal of firm 
value to the market. Wruck (1989) suggests that the market may view public equity sales as a negative 
signal for firm overvaluation. The market may also consider that private equity sales will mitigate this 
problem because it provides an opportunity for buyers and managers to directly negotiate the true firm 
value.	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In contrast, Chen and Strang (2004) argue that the initial controlling owners may 
intentionally retain blocks of shares for private benefits of control. If investors have a 
negative perception of the stock retention, they will value stock lower, leading to lower 
IPO returns5. Chen and Strang (2004) found evidence of a negative relationship between 
IPO returns and level of ownership by the largest single shareholder in China. They also 
report that IPO returns were low in firms in which the State was the largest shareholder. 
However, the returns were high in firms with other domestic shareholders as the largest 
shareholders. Their evidence implies a negative investor perception of ownership 
concentration that may be linked to an expectation that block ownership of shares will 
facilitate large shareholders (such as the State) to enjoy private benefits of control. 
Nevertheless, the high returns in firms with other largest domestic shareholders could 
imply that that investors may expect for better corporate governance in these firms. 
However, other researchers have been unable to find significant relationships between 
ownership concentration and IPO returns in countries such as Indonesia (Darmadi and 
Gunawan, 2013) and Thailand (Venkatesh and Neupane, 2004). 
Accounting research provides some clues that investor perceptions of ownership 
concentration may affect their demand for high quality financial reporting, thereby 
influencing how they price stocks. Fan and Wong (2002) suggest that investors may 
have negative perceptions that high ownership concentration leads managers or 
dominant shareholders to become entrenched. As a result, investors will not trust the 
quality of accounting information (such as accounting earnings) reported by firms with 
concentrated ownership and the loss of the credibility of reported earnings may lower 
earnings informativeness and lead to a decline in stock prices. Therefore, investors may 
require a higher quality of reported earnings in order to compensate for poor ownership 
structure, and their perception of an entrenchment effect may also motivate managers or 
dominant shareholders to report high quality earnings to, for example, protect against a 
decline in stock price (Wang, 2006).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  IPO returns normally refer to the difference between the public offering stock price and the closing stock 
price on its first trading date.	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On the other hand, investor perceptions of the alignment effect may decrease their 
motivation to monitor firms and lower their demand for high quality reported earnings 
(Wang, 2006). This may also reduce the motivation for managers or dominant 
shareholders to report high quality earnings.  
Overall, the limited evidence from the existing literature provides some clues that 
investors’ perception of ownership concentration might affect how they price stocks. For 
example, if investors have overly positive perceptions of ownership concentration, they 
might expect efficient monitoring by blockholders or dominant shareholders, which 
leads them to overestimate (underestimate) the positive (negative) impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. On the other hand, if they have overly negative 
perceptions of ownership concentration, their fear of exploitation might lead them to, 
underestimate (overestimate) the positive (negative) impact of blockholders. 
In Thailand, the evidence from the previous chapters suggests that firms gain benefits 
from their large shareholders/ dominant shareholders. However, the claims by the 
international organisations and the press about the poor corporate governance system 
and the bad news about e.g. exploitation by large shareholders/dominant shareholders 
might create a negative perception of these structures. Therefore, this study proposes the 
hypotheses based on investor misperception of ownership concentration and a dominant 
shareholder as follows: 
Ha1: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of ownership concentration 
on firm performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
Ha2: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of the presence of a dominant 
shareholder on firm performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly.  
6.3.1.2 Ownership Concentration by Shareholder Types and the Presence 
of Dominant Shareholders by their Types 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, different types of shareholder have different 
incentives to participate in firms’ monitoring processes or influence management. 
Investors may therefore have different perceptions of the impact of different types of 
shareholder ownership on firm performance. 
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6.3.1.2.1 Family 
A family’s ties to its business (through loyalty, trust and concern for reputation), and the 
lesser influence of agency problems, as outlined in the existing literature (such as 
Bertrand et al., 2008; Fama and Jensen, 1983: James, 1999), may lead investors to have 
a positive perception when family shareholders own or control firms.  
On the other hand, investors may have negative perceptions of family firms because of 
concerns that family ownership facilitates the expropriation of corporate assets and 
decreases the efficiency of business succession plans (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; James, 
1999; Mehrotra et al., 2013; Mishra et al. 2001). 
In Thailand, families who own major businesses are normally well known and investors 
may believe that the family will not exploit corporate assets because it might lose its 
reputation and status in society. An overly positive perception may lead investors to 
overestimate (underestimate) the positive (negative) impact of family block ownership 
or the presence of dominant family shareholders on firm performance.  
In contrast, investors may be overly concerned about the expropriation of corporate 
assets because of the bad press that family block ownership continues to receive. They 
might also question the competency of the founding family’s descendants. The overly 
negative perception might lead them to underestimate (overestimate) the positive 
(negative) impact of these structures on firm performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor misperception of family 
block ownership/a dominant family shareholder as follows: 
 Ha3: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of family block ownership on 
firm performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
Ha4: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of the presence of a dominant 
family shareholder on firm performance and therefore estimate it 
incorrectly. 
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6.3.1.2.2 Government 
Investors may have negative perceptions of government shareholders if they believe 
government officials pursue private interests by holding high proportions of shares 
(Chen and Strang, 2004). In Thailand, unstable politics and fear of government 
corruption may create an overly negative perception of firms owned or controlled by 
government, leading investors to underestimate (overestimate) the positive (negative) 
impact of government block ownership and the presence of dominant government 
shareholders on firm performance. 
On the other hand, investors may think that firms with high government ownership will 
receive financial support from government that will enhance firm performance and 
protect against bankruptcy (Capobianco and Christiansen, 2011; Chen, Firth and Xu, 
2009; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Le and Buck, 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In 
this case, an overly positive perception may lead investors to overestimate 
(underestimate) the positive (negative) impact of government block ownership and the 
presence of dominant government shareholders on firm performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor misperception of 
government block ownership/a dominant government shareholder as follows: 
Ha5: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of government block 
ownership on firm performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
Ha6: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of the presence of a dominant 
government shareholder on firm performance and therefore estimate it 
incorrectly. 
6.3.1.2.3 Foreign Company Investors 
Prior literature suggests that foreign companies are motivated by their substantial 
ownership to provide efficient monitoring to the firms they invest in (for example, see 
Tomassen, 2004). Chen et al. (2012) suggest that the performance of foreign-owned 
companies improves over time with greater experience and knowledge of the foreign 
market. These companies often gain higher profitability from growth as they 
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substantially invest in intangible assets such as technology or advertising (Lu and 
Beamish, 2004). These reasons could lead market participants to be exceedingly 
optimistic the future performance of foreign-owned firms (Duru and Reeb, 2002). 
Therefore, the overly positive perceptions could lead investors to overestimate 
(underestimate) the positive (negative) impact of foreign block ownership or the 
presence of dominant foreign shareholders on firm performance. 
However, investor perceptions of foreign-owned firms may be negative if they believe 
that monitoring by foreign companies will be more difficult because of geographical and 
cultural differences (Boardman et al., 1997; Lin and Shiu, 2003; Wiwattanakantang, 
1999). Investors may also expect some risk that a parent company will expropriate 
corporate resources in subsidiary companies (Chen et al, 2012). Therefore, the overly 
negative perceptions may lead investors to underestimate (overestimate) the positive 
(negative) impact of foreign block ownership or the presence of dominant foreign 
shareholders on firm performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor misperception of 
foreign company block ownership/a dominant foreign company shareholder as follows: 
Ha7: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of foreign block company 
ownership on firm performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
Ha8: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of the presence of a dominant 
foreign company shareholder on firm performance and therefore estimate 
it incorrectly. 
6.3.1.2.4 Bank and Non-Bank Financial Institutional Investors 
In respect to bank and non-bank financial institutional investors, investors may expect 
more efficient monitoring by these shareholders because these investors are specialists in 
business  (e.g, see Brickley et al., 1988; Chen et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2007). 
Therefore, investors may see bank and non-bank institutional investor ownership as a 
good sign for future firm performance. An overly positive perception may lead investors 
to overestimate (underestimate) the positive (negative) impact of bank and non-bank 
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financial institutional investors block ownership or the presence of these shareholders as 
dominant shareholders on firm performance. 
However, investors may perceive that some institutional investors such as banks may 
lack motivation to participate in firms’ monitoring because these investors may want to 
avoid conflicts with their clients (e.g. see Cornett et al., 2007). In addition, investors 
may expect some conflicts of interests between equity investors and banks as lenders. 
Therefore, an overly negative perception may lead them to underestimate (overestimate) 
the positive (negative) impact of block ownership by bank and non-bank financial 
institutional investors or their presence as dominant shareholders on firm performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor misperception of bank 
block ownership/a dominant bank shareholder as follows: 
Ha9: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of bank block ownership on 
firm performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
Ha10: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of the presence of dominant 
bank shareholders on firm performance and therefore estimate it 
incorrectly. 
In addition, this study separately proposes the hypotheses based on investor 
misperception of non-bank financial institution block ownership/a dominant non-bank 
financial institution shareholder as follows: 
Ha11: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of non-bank financial 
institution block ownership on firm performance and therefore estimate it 
incorrectly. 
Ha12: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of the presence of a 
dominant non-bank financial institution shareholder on firm performance 
and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
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6.3.2 How do Investors Perceive the Impact of Other Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms on Corporate Performance? 
6.3.2.1 Board of Directors 
From an agency theory perspective, a board of directors is a corporate governance 
mechanism that aims to reduce the agency problem in a corporation (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Hermalin and Weisback, 2003).  
This study is interested in why investors might not accurately perceive the impact of a 
board of directors in terms of its size, independence and experience on firm 
performance, which might lead them to underestimate or overestimate their impact on 
firm performance. 
6.3.2.1.1 Board Size 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, literature based on the agency theory perspective 
suggests that a larger board size may reduce board efficiency and it is easier for CEOs to 
control larger boards (Jensen, 1993). However, other research suggests that larger boards 
may be more efficient in terms of extracting critical resources (such as funding) from an 
external environment (for examples, see Dalton et al., 1999; Pfeffer, 1972; Proven, 
1980). 
Most research that links board size to investor perceptions has been done in the context 
of IPO firms. Certo (2003) argues that investors may use board structure as a piece of 
non-financial information in order to make decisions on investment. Certo et al. (2001) 
found that board size has a negative relationship with IPO returns,6 indicating that firms 
with larger boards tend to have lower IPO returns. In Indonesia, Darmadi and Gunawan 
(2013) also found a negative relationship, but with limited significance. 
This literature suggests that investors might overestimate large boards’ abilities to access 
and manage resources. This may lead investors to overestimate (underestimate) the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Certo et al. (2001) focused on the benefit to initial shareholders, who are likely to reduce IPO under- 
pricing as much possible, thereby lowering IPO returns. 
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positive (negative) impact of board size on firm performance. On the other hand, 
concerns about free riding in large boards might overly negatively affect investors’ 
perceptions, which may lead investors to underestimate (overestimate) the positive 
(negative) impact. Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor 
misperception of board size as follows: 
Ha13: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of board size on firm 
performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
6.3.2.1.2 The Independence and Experience of the Board of Directors 
Independent directors7 are thought to help minimise the conflict of interests within a 
board. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, independent directors are believed to supervise 
CEOs efficiently because they are less likely to collude with managers (e.g. see Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and Weisbach et al., 1998). 
The existing literature also provides some evidence that could be relevant to investor 
perceptions of the impact of board independence on firm performance. For example, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) report a positive stock-price reaction following the 
appointment of outside directors in the US. They interpret the findings as evidence that 
investors expect firms to benefit from monitoring by outside directors.  
Lin et al. (2003: 352) suggest that investor perceptions of changes in board structure (the 
appointment of new outside directors) depend on how they view “firm- and director- 
specific characteristics”. They found a positive stock price reaction only when outside 
directors had a strong incentive to monitor firms, and when the potential for agency 
problems was high (low managerial ownership). 
Nguyen et al. (2010) examined stock reactions to the sudden death of independent 
directors in US listed firms. They posit that stock price should decline after the sudden 
death if investors perceive that the independent directors provided good monitoring and 
advice to managers. The negative market reaction should remain even when a new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 “Independent directors” refers to directors who are not internal managers, such as current or former 
employees, and who have no business relationships with a firm. 
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director appointment is announced. This is because investors may expect some costs for 
replacement (such as search costs or learning curve of new directors). Their evidence 
indicates a decrease in stock price (negative abnormal returns) after the sudden death 
(even after controlling for directors’ ability or skill), which implies that investors have 
positive perceptions of the role of independent directors. 
Regarding director experience, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that firms may benefit 
from appointing outside directors who are experts; their skill and experience may either 
help to improve board performance in monitoring processes or reducing costs of finance 
or production (Field et al., 2012). 
The limited literature related to audit committee reform can also provide some clues 
about how investors view board experience. A study by DeFond et al. (2005) research 
the impact of the SOX (2002) provision that requires firms to disclose whether audit 
committees include members who have financial experience. They investigated market 
reactions surrounding the appointment of audit committee members with accounting 
experience, other financial experience and non-financial experience and found a positive 
and significant reaction only to the appointment of audit committees with accounting 
experience. The findings of Davidson et al. (2004) are similar. Singhvi et al. (2013) 
consistently found a negative market reaction to the departure of audit committee 
members who were accounting experts. Both these findings imply that investors believe 
that directors with relevant experience have an enhanced ability to monitor management. 
The literature suggests that investor perceptions of the impact of the independence and 
expertise of boards of directors on firm performance may be positive. Investors may 
therefore have an overly positive perception of independent directors because they 
expect efficient supervision and high levels of expertise from them. 
In Thailand, the government has created a great deal of publicity over its attempts to 
improve the efficiency of boards of directors in terms of their independence as part of 
the reforms. Therefore, investors may have an overly positive perception of independent 
directors as a good safeguard for their interests (potentially better than these directors 
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actually are). Since information on personal relationships between independent and 
executive directors is difficult to obtain, investors might find it difficult to correctly 
assess the impact of independent directors on firm performance and therefore 
overestimate (underestimate) their positive (negative) impact.  
On the other hand, investors may question whether directors are really independent and 
expert. In addition, some corporate scandals, which get a high degree of press exposure, 
might convince investors that independent directors are useless (to a much greater 
degree than is the case in reality). Therefore, the overly negative perception may lead 
investors to underestimate (overestimate) the positive (negative) impact of independent 
directors on firm performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor misperception of board 
independence and experience as follows: 
Ha14: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of board independence on 
firm performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly.  
Ha15: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of board experience on firm 
performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
6.3.2.2 CEO Characteristics 
Because CEOs have the most powerful position on a board of directors, they are likely 
to have a key influence on investors’ expectations for the success of a firm. For example, 
Fischer et al. (2009)8 argue that “the presence of a poorly (well) perceived CEO is 
perceived as a failure (success) of the board, where the degree of failure (success) is 
associated with how poorly (well) the CEO is perceived to be performing” (Fischer et 
al., 2009: 177) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 They suggest that the shareholders’ vote in uncontested director elections (such as those that are not 
related to proxy-fights or “vote-no campaigns”) reflects investor perceptions of board performance. They 
also found that the higher (lower) shareholder approval scores were associated with lower (higher) stock 
price reactions subsequent to an announcement of CEO turnover. 
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As in previous chapters, this chapter focuses the literature review on CEO duality and 
CEO founders/descendants. 
6.3.2.2.1 CEO Duality 
From an agency theory perspective, the combination of the CEO and chairman’s 
positions may facilitate their control over boards of directors and thereby reduce the 
efficiency of boards in monitoring managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993). 
However, according to the stewardship theory perspective, single leadership may bring 
benefits such as quicker decision-making processes in a changing business environment, 
CEO expertise and a clear role of leadership (for examples, see Boyd, 1995; Brickley et 
al., 1997). 
Limited evidence is available in the literature. Baliga et al. (1996) investigated the 
market reaction to a change in non-CEO duality to CEO duality in the US, predicting 
that if investors have a positive (negative) perception of CEO duality due, for example, 
to an expected benefit from consistent strategy (poor governance), the change to CEO 
duality would lead to positive (negative) market reactions. However, they report 
insignificant evidence of an announcement effect from this change, indicating that 
investors are indifferent about CEO duality. 
Based on relevant literature, investor perceptions of the impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance may be either positive or negative. An overly positive perception of CEO 
duality regarding CEO expertise and the clear role of leadership may lead investors to 
overestimate (underestimate) the positive (negative) impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance. However, corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom may have 
created an overly negative perception of the combined positions. As a result, investors 
may underestimate (overestimate) the positive (negative) impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor misperception of CEO 
duality as follows: 
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Ha16: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance and therefore price it incorrectly. 
The existing literature reports a significant increase in the number of companies in S&P 
500 that separated CEO and chairmen roles after the corporate scandals in the US (e.g. 
see Sampson-Akpuru, 2009). In Thailand, many listed companies also separate the two 
roles. However, CEOs can have very close relationships with chairmen (they may be 
father and son, for example). Therefore, investors may recognise this feature and may 
not believe that CEOs and chairmen are actually independent from each other, in turn 
underestimating (overestimating) the positive (negative) impact of the separation of 
CEO and their positions on firm performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor misperception of CEOs 
who come from the same (family) group as the chairmen as follows: 
Ha17: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of a CEO who comes from 
the same group as the chairman does on firm performance and therefore 
estimate it incorrectly.  
6.3.2.2.2 CEO Founders and CEO Descendants 
As discussed in Chapter 2, CEO founders may contribute to firms in terms of their skill 
and experience in business (Morck et al., 1988), their political and business connections 
(Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 2004) and their long-term objectives in running the 
business.  
However, a CEO founder may have a level of control over a board of directors that 
decreases its efficiency (Morck et al., 1988). Additionally, CEO founders may be 
motivated to transfer business to their descendants regardless of competence (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Bertrand et al., 2008; Mehrotra et al., 2013; Morck et al., 1988). 
While much of the existing research directly examines the effect of CEO founders on 
firm performance, there is a lack of evidence on the investor perceptions of this impact. 
In the context of Thailand, founders of family firms are normally famous people and 
have a good reputation in Thai society. Most of the founders of listed firms also have 
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good business connections with other business groups and the government 
(Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2006). Therefore, investors may have overly 
positive perceptions of CEO founders’ contribution to firm performance and therefore 
overestimate (underestimate) their positive (negative) impact on firm performance. 
Alternatively, investors may doubt the competency and integrity of CEO founders. An 
overly negative perception may lead them to underestimate (overestimate) the positive 
(negative) impact of CEO founders on firm performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor misperception of CEO 
founders as follows: 
Ha18: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of CEO founders on firm 
performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
Although most founders of Thai listed companies are still alive, some of them have 
stepped down as CEOs and passed the position to their descendants. Investors who 
believed in the founders’ competence may question the competence of their descendants. 
Previous research also addresses problem of business succession as a disincentive for 
firm to the hiring of outside professional CEOs (for example, see Mehrotra et al., 2013). 
An overly negative perception may lead investors to underestimate (overestimate) the 
positive (negative) impact of CEO descendents on firm performance. 
Alternatively, investors may believe in the competence of CEO descendants. In fact, 
most famous family members in Thailand are attractive to the public and their 
background (such as education or personal life) is often reported in the press. Investors 
may therefore have an overly positive perception of the competence of CEO descendants 
and consequently overestimate (underestimate) the positive (negative) impact of CEO 
descendants of on firm performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor misperception of CEOs 
descendants as follows: 
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Ha19: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of CEO descendants on firm 
performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly.  
6.3.2.3 Auditor Reputation and Expertise 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the credibility of external auditors may depend on their 
reputation and expertise and these characteristics may affect investors’ confidence in the 
quality of reported earnings, because they cannot directly observe audit quality 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Teoh and Wong, 1993).  
Nichols and Smith (1983) examined whether the market reacted positively when firms 
changed from non-Big 8 auditors to Big 8 auditors and negatively to changes in the 
opposite direction. They found a positive but not significant market reaction when firms 
moved from non-Big 8 to Big 8 auditors. 
Teoh and Wong (1993) suggest that investors respond strongly to a reported earnings 
surprise if they have a positive perception of audit quality (based on the expertise of the 
auditors, for example). They tested for the difference in “earnings response 
coefficients”9 (ERC) between firms audited by Big 8 and non-Big 8 firms and found that 
the former had larger ERCs than the latter, implying that investors have a positive 
perception of the credibility of auditors. 
Based on relevant literature, investor perceptions of the impact of auditor reputation and 
experience on firm performance may be either very positive or negative. In Thailand, 
BIG4 audit firms have merged with large Thai auditing firms because Thai law limits 
accounting professionals to Thai nationals. Investors may think that more experienced 
auditors increase audit quality and are a good indication for effective whistleblower 
procedures. An overly positive expectation may lead them to overestimate 
(underestimate) the positive (negative) impact of long auditor tenure on firm 
performance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 According to Teoh and Wong (1993), ERC is a measurement of how new earnings information is 
incorporated into the stock price. Commonly, ERC is “a slope coefficient in a regression of abnormal 
stock returns on a measure of earnings surprise” (Teoh and Wong, 1993, 347). 
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Nevertheless, the big corporate scandals, such as ENRON, have revealed collusion 
between auditors and managers, which may create an overly negative perception of 
BIG4 auditors and lead investors to underestimate (overestimate) their positive 
(negative) impact on firm performance. Additionally, investors may view long auditor 
tenures as a sign of reduced auditor independence and therefore underestimate the 
impact of long auditor tenure on firm performance. 
Therefore, this study proposes the hypotheses based on investor misperception of BIG4 
auditors and auditor-partner tenure as follows: 
Ha20: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of the presence of BIG4 
audit firm on firm performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
Ha21: Investors do not correctly perceive the impact of auditor-partner tenure on 
firm performance and therefore estimate it incorrectly. 
6.3.3 The Corporate Governance Reforms 
As discussed in the previous chapters, one objective of the corporate governance reforms 
is to regain investors’ confidence in the Thai capital market. The corporate governance 
reform, in particular accounting reforms, should have led to better disclosure and 
transparency, which in turn should help investors to use public accounting and non-
accounting information to predict future earnings. Therefore, the reforms should have 
improved the accuracy of investor perceptions of the impact of ownership structure and 
other governance mechanisms on firm performance, if they were successful. 
However, the findings from Chapters 4 and 5 do not strongly suggest that the impact of 
ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
has improved after the reforms. Therefore, it is not clear overall how effective they were. 
In particular, the findings do not strongly support the notion that ownership structure and 
other corporate governance mechanisms have helped to limit the use of (opportunistic) 
managers’ accounting discretion after the reforms. Nevertheless, they may have affected 
investor perceptions of corporate governance mechanisms, as the reforms have had a 
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high public profile and the expectation is that they should improve the effectiveness of 
corporate governance in Thailand.  
Therefore, two further hypotheses, regarding the corporate governance reforms, are 
proposed as follows. 
Ha22: Investors can better perceive the impact of ownership concentration on 
firm performance after the reforms; consequently, they more correctly 
estimate the impact. 
Ha23: Investors can better perceive the impact of the presence of a dominant 
shareholder on firm performance after the reforms; consequently, they 
more correctly estimate the impact. 
Ha24: Investors can better perceive the impact of family block ownership on firm 
performance after the reforms; consequently, they more correctly 
estimate the impact. 
Ha25: Investors can better perceive the impact of government block ownership on 
firm performance after the reforms; consequently, they more correctly 
estimate the impact. 
Ha26: Investors can better perceive the impact of foreign company block 
ownership on firm performance after the reforms; consequently, they 
more correctly estimate the impact. 
Ha27: Investors can better perceive the impact of bank block ownership on firm 
performance after the reforms; consequently, they more correctly 
estimate the impact. 
Ha28: Investors can better perceive the impact of non-bank financial institution 
block ownership on firm performance after the reforms; consequently, 
they more correctly estimate the impact. 
Ha29: Investors can better perceive the impact of the presence of a dominant 
family shareholder on firm performance after the reforms; consequently, 
they more correctly estimate the impact. 
Ha30: Investors can better perceive the impact of the presence of a dominant 
government shareholder on firm performance after the reforms; 
consequently, they more correctly estimate the impact. 
Ha31: Investors can better perceive the impact of the presence of a dominant 
foreign company shareholder on firm performance after the reforms; 
consequently, they more correctly estimate the impact. 
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Ha32: Investors can better perceive the impact of the presence of a dominant non-
bank financial institution shareholder on firm performance after the 
reforms; consequently, they more correctly estimate the impact. 
Ha33: Investors can better perceive the impact of board size on firm performance 
after the reforms; consequently, they more correctly estimate the impact. 
Ha34: Investors can better perceive the impact of board independence on firm 
performance after the reforms; consequently, they more correctly 
estimate the impact. 
Ha35: Investors can better perceive the impact of board experience on firm 
performance after the reforms; consequently, they more correctly 
estimate the impact. 
Ha36: Investors can better perceive the impact of the presence of the presence of 
CEO duality firm on firm performance after the reforms; consequently, 
they more correctly estimate the impact. 
Ha37: Investors can better perceive the impact of the presence of a CEO and 
chairman who come from the same group on firm performance after the 
reforms; consequently, they more correctly estimate the impact. 
Ha38: Investors can better perceive the impact of the presence of CEO founder on 
firm performance after the reforms; consequently, they more correctly 
estimate the impact. 
Ha39: Investors can better perceive the impact of the presence of CEO descendant 
on firm performance after the reforms; consequently, they more correctly 
estimate the impact. 
Ha40: Investors can better perceive the impact of the presence of a BIG4 audit 
firm on firm performance after the reforms; consequently, they more 
correctly estimate the impact. 
Ha41: Investors can better perceive the impact of auditor-partner tenure on firm 
performance after the reforms; consequently, they more correctly 
estimate the impact. 
6.4 Research Design 
6.4.1 The Mishkin Test (1983) in Accounting Research 
The Mishkin Test (MT) is a joint estimation of forecasting and pricing equations that 
uses a non-linear least square procedure to test for market efficiency in macroeconomic 
terms. The MT relies on the rational expectation hypothesis, which suggests that the 
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market’s subjective expectation of any variable should be equal to the objective 
expectation for that variable, conditional on all past information (Mishkin, 1983).  
The MT was first introduced into accounting research by Sloan (1996) in order to test 
how the market prices accounting numbers (such as earnings and earnings components). 
He suggests that “[a] meaningful test of whether stock prices fully reflect available 
information requires the specification of an alternative ‘naïve’ expectation model, 
against which to test the null of market efficiency” (Sloan, 1996: 291). He then employs 
the methodology developed by Mishkin (1983) to jointly test the two hypotheses. 
In accounting research, the variable of interest is earnings (and earnings components). 
Therefore, the rational expectation hypothesis suggests that the expectation of earnings 
assessed by the market should be equal to the true earnings, conditional on all past 
information such as past earnings. That is,  
   Em(Earningst+1|φt) = E(Earningst+1|φt)    (A) 
Where,  
φt = the set of the information available at time t 
Em(Earningst+1|φt) = the subjective expectation of earnings for period t+1 accessed by the market 
E(Earningst+1|φt) = the objective expectation of earnings conditional on φt 
 
Under the EMH, which focuses on holding period stock returns (for instance), the 
specification in equation A implies that 
   E(Returnt+1) = Returnt+1 - Em(Returnt+1| φt) = 0  (B) 
Where,  
Returnt+1 = the stock return in period t+1 
Em(Returnt+1|φt) = the subjective expectation of the stock return in period t+1 (Rt+1), conditional on all 
past information available at time t 
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The market efficient condition in equations A and B implies that Rt+1 - Em(Rt+1| φt) 
should be uncorrelated with past information. Hence, abnormal return10 is expected to be 
zero. Therefore, a model based on the market efficient condition from equation (A) and 
(B) is 
   Returnt+1 = β(Earningst+1 – E(Earningst+1|φt)) + εt+1   (C) 
Where εt+1 is an error term and E(εt+1|φt) = 0. Under the efficient market conditions, 
Returnt+1 should be only correlated with unexpected earnings but should not be 
correlated with any past information. 
Based on the EMH, the MT applied in Sloan (1996) consists of two equations: a 
forecasting equation and a pricing equation. These are shown below: 
Forecasting Equation: Earningst+1 = α0 + α1Earningst + νt+1     (D.1) 
Pricing Equation: Returnt+1 = β(Earningst+1 - α0 - α1*Earningst) + εt+1   (D.2) 
Past earnings (Earningst) is used to predict future earnings (Earningst+1) in the 
forecasting equation (D.1). The coefficient of Earningst (α1) is a weight placed on past 
earnings in order to predict future earnings (earnings persistence). Under the EMH, the 
market’s subjective expectation of earnings, conditional on past earnings in equation D.1 
should be equal to the objective expectation of earnings obtained from equation D.2. 
Therefore, this implies that α1, the weight placed on past earnings in the forecast 
equation, should not be different from α1*, the weight placed on past earnings in 
equation (D.2). Hence α1 = α1*. 
To test whether α1 = α1*, the two equations are jointly estimated using a non-linear least 
square procedure. In addition, α0 in the two equations are assumed to be the same. If α1 
is equal to α1*, then the sum of squared residuals from the estimation constraining α1 = 
α1
* (SSRc) will not be different from the sum of squared residuals from the estimation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Under the EMH, there should be no profit opportunities in the capital market on a given day’s stock 
price. As a result, market participants are not expected to earn more than a normal return on their 
investment. 
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that allows α1 differ from α1* (SSRu). Therefore, the test statistic for a small sample, as 
suggested by Mishkin (1983; pp. 19 - 20), is a likelihood ratio test, which is 
asymptotically distributed Chi-square, q (χ2 (q)): 
 
2 × n × ln(SSRc/SSRu) 
 
Where,  
q = the number of constraints imposed by rational pricing 
n = the number of observations in each equations 
SSRc = the sum of squared residuals from the constrained system 
SSRu = the sum of squared residuals from the unconstrained system 
  
This procedure allows researchers to examine how well the capital market’s participants 
use past earnings to predict future earnings, which is reflected in the stock price. After 
decomposing earnings into accruals and cash flows, Sloan (1996) applies the MT to test 
whether investors can perceive the different properties of the accruals and cash flow 
components of current earnings in order to predict future earnings. He hypothesises that 
investors are fixated on earnings and fail to distinguish persistence within the accruals 
and cash flow components of current earnings. The forecast equation and pricing 
equations are as follows: 
Forecasting Equation: Earningst+1 = γ0 + γ1Cash Flowst + γ2Accrualst + νt+1  (E.1) 
Pricing Equation: Returnt+1 = β(Earningst+1 - γ0 - γ1*Cash Flowst - γ2*Accrualst) + εt+1 
           (E.2) 
The EMH implies that γ1 and γ2, the weight placed on past cash flows and the accruals 
component of earnings in the forecast equation (E.1), should not be different from γ1* 
and γ2*, the weight placed on past cash flows and the accruals component of earnings in 
the pricing equation (E.2). Hence γ1 = γ1*and γ2 = γ2*. 
After Sloan (1996), the MT has been used widely in accounting research to test the 
rational pricing of accounting numbers (for examples, see Chan et al., 2009; Hanlon, 
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2005; Pincus, 2007; Xie, 2001). However, Kraft et al. (2007) argue that much of the 
previous research in accounting misunderstands the use of the MT.  
Firstly, Kraft et al. (2007) argue that Mishkin (1983) intended to test for market 
rationality; therefore, the test should be applied in economic research on time-series 
data. However, accounting research normally applies this methodology using pooled 
data across time and firms. Therefore, the estimations in the forecasting and pricing 
equations may suffer from cross-sectional correlations in error terms, a 
heteroskedasticity problem from size and industry effects.  
Secondly, they argue that previous accounting research normally excludes variables 
other than past earnings, such as size, book to market ratio and lagged earnings, that 
could influence components of future earnings in the forecasting equation. If these 
variables are not rationally priced, the omitted variables lead to a misspecification of the 
statistical test of coefficients in the forecast and pricing equations. Hence if other 
variables that predict earnings are omitted from both the forecasting and the pricing 
equations, one can conclude whether the market is efficient but not whether accounting 
numbers are the source of the inefficiency.  
In order to minimise the problem of omitted variables, a set of potential variables11 (Zt) 
that might influence future earnings should be included in both the forecasting equation 
and the pricing equation as follows: 
Forecasting Equation: Earningst+1 = γ0 + γ1Cash Flowst + γ2Accrualst + γ3Zt + νt+1   (F.1) 
Pricing Equation: Returnt+1 = β(Earningst+1 - γ0 - γ1*Cash Flowst - γ2*Accrualst  
       - γ3*Zt) + εt+1        (F.2) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 According to Kraft et al. (2007), variables that are suggested in the existing literature for the prediction 
of future earnings and returns include the ratio of book to market value of equity (Fama and French, 
1992), industry effect (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999) and past returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). 
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6.4.2 The Ordinary Least Square Method (OLS) 
Kraft et al. (2007) formally prove that the parameters and test statistics that are estimated 
from the MT, as discussed in Section 6.4.1, are asymptotically equivalent to those 
estimated using the OLS regression as follows: 
   Returnt+1 = φ0 + φ1Cash Flows + φ2Accruals + µt   (G) 
Using the system of equations (D.1) and (D.2) in the MT previously discussed: 
Forecasting Equation: Earningst+1 = γ0 + γ1Cash Flowst + γ2Accrualst + νt+1  (D.1) 
Pricing Equation: Returnt+1 = β(Earningst+1 - γ0 - γ1*Cash Flowst - γ2*Accrualst) + 
εt+1             (D.2) 
Substituting the Earningst+1 from the forecasting equation (D.1) into the pricing equation 
(D.2) results in the following equation: 
   Returnt+1 = β(γ0 + γ1Cash Flowst + γ2Accrualst + νt+1  
        - γ0 - γ1*Cash Flowst - γ2*Accrualst) + εt+1    (H) 
Rearranging equation H gives 
   Returnt+1 = β(γ0 - γ0) + β(γ1 - γ1*) Cash Flowst  
          + β(γ2 - γ2*)Accrualst + βνt+1 + εt+1    (I) 
This can be written as 
   Returnt+1 = φ0 + φ1Cash Flowst + φ2Accrualst + φ3νt+1 + µt  (J) 
Where φi = β(γi – γi*) 
Kraft et al. (2007) assert that the parameters estimated in equation J are asymptotically 
equivalent to the system of equations D.1 and D.2 except for νt+1. The νt+1 is an error 
term from the forecasting equation and is assumed to be uncorrelated with Cash Flowst 
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and Accrualst. Kraft et al. (2007) suggest that when the sample is large12, the absence of 
νt+1 in equation M does not bias the coefficients of Cash Flows and Accruals. Because β 
is constant, a test whether the coefficients of Cash Flows and Accruals are statistically 
different from zero, using the OLS, is equivalent to a test whether γ1 = γ1* and γ2 = γ2* in 
the MT. 
Kraft et al. (2007) also assert that the OLS method has some advantages over the MT. 
Firstly, the OLS method is easier and more convenient to implement than the MT is and, 
secondly, while the MT is used in macroeconomics and applied to time-series data, the 
OLS method is more appropriate for cross-sectional data. Thirdly, it allows researchers 
to easily add other explanatory variables and other control variables, for example, in 
order to correct for econometric problems such as heteroskedasticity. Finally, while 
Earningst+1 is used in the pricing equation under the MT, they are not required under the 
OLS method. The requirement for Earningst+1 could cause selection bias because it 
requires researchers to restrict the sample to cases that have information on future 
earnings available at time t (Kraft et al., 2006; 2007). Therefore, Kraft et al. suggest that 
researchers could consider the use of the OLS method instead of the MT to test for the 
mispricing of earnings. 
6.4.3 The Test Procedures 
According to Kraft et al. (2007), the existing literature suggests that investors may use 
other information to predict future earnings. Based on the arguments discussed in section 
6.3, this study suggests that investors incorporate non-accounting information13 in 
particular on ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms, in their 
prediction of firm’s future earnings and stock returns. The accuracy of their predictions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
.12 No absolute number is identified in the existing literature as constituting a large sample, but accounting 
research normally uses a sample of more than 10,000 firm-year observations, such as 14,106 firms-years 
(Hanlon, 2005), 111,838 firm-years (Kraft et al., 2009), 43,988 firm-years (Pincus et al., 2007), and 
24,209 firm-years (Sloan, 1996). 
13 This information is publicly available because listed companies are required to disclose it in annual 
reports or annual registration statements.  	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is subject to their perceptions of the impact of these variables on firm performance. 
Hence if investors have a correct perception of the impact of ownership structure and 
other corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance, they will not overestimate 
or underestimate the price of relevance variables. However, investor perceptions might 
not be realistic, as they might wrongly believe that ownership and other corporate 
governance mechanisms do not matter, or that they matter more than they do in reality. 
For the purposes of this study, the OLS method, as suggested by Kraft et al. (2007), is 
preferred over the MT because it is more suitable for the pooled cross-sectional it uses. 
It is also easier to apply an OLS approach in order to estimate and compare results 
between pre-reform and post-reform periods. 
Hence the extended models take the following forms: 
BHARt+1 = φ0 + φ1Concentrated Ownit + φ2Share Difference+ φ3CVit 
    + φ4Board Sizeit + φ5Board Independenceit + φ6Board Experienceit  
     + φ7CEO Founderit + φ8CEO Son/Daughterit + φ9CEO-Chairit  
      + φ10CEO-Groupit + φ11BIG4it + φ12Auditor Tenureit 
      + φ13Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ14 Other Control Variablesit 
    + φ15Industry dummy + φ16Year dummy + µt 
           (6.1) 
BHARt+1 = φ0 + φ1D_Dominantit + φ2Share Differenceit + φ3CVit 
    + φ4Board Sizeit + φ5Board Independenceit + φ6Board Experienceit  
     + φ7CEO Founderit + φ8CEO Son/Daughterit + φ9CEO-Chairit  
      + φ10CEO-Groupit + φ11BIG4it + φ12Auditor Tenureit 
      + φ13Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ14 Other Control Variablesit 
    + φ15Industry dummy + φ16Year dummy + µt 
           (6.2) 
BHARt+1 = φ0 + φ1Family Ownit + φ2Government Ownit + φ3Foreign Company Ownit 
     + φ4Domestic Company Ownit + φ5Bank Ownit  
     + φ6Non-bank Financial Institution Ownit+ φ7Share Differenceit  
     + φ8CVit+ φ4Board Sizeit + φ9Board Independenceit + φ10Board Experienceit 
       + φ11CEO Founderit + φ12CEO Son/Daughterit + φ13CEO-Chairit  
       + φ14CEO-Groupit + φ15BIG4it + φ16Auditor Tenureit 
       + φ17Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ18Other Control Variablesit 
     + φ19Industry dummy + φ20Year dummy + µt 
           (6.3) 
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BHARt+1 = φ0 + φ1D_Familyit + φ2D_Governmentit + φ3D_Foreign Companyit 
     + φ4D_Domestic Companyit + φ5D_Bankit  
     + φ6D_Non-bank Financial Institutionit+ φ7Share Differenceit 
     + φ8CVit+ φ4Board Sizeit + φ9Board Independenceit + φ10Board Experienceit 
       + φ11CEO Founderit + φ12CEO Son/Daughterit + φ13CEO-Chairit  
       + φ14CEO-Groupit + φ15BIG4it + φ16Auditor Tenureit 
       + φ17Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ18Other Control Variablesit 
     + φ19Industry dummy + φ20Year dummy + µt 
           (6.4) 
Where φi = β(γi – γi*) and BHARt+1 is one-year-ahead buy and hold abnormal stock 
returns. Earningsit (EBITit) is earnings before interests and taxes scaled by lagged total 
assets for each sample firm i at time t. In separated regression, Earningsit components are 
total accruals (TACit) and cash flows (CFit) components of earnings for each sample 
firm i at time t and are added as control variables. Other control variables include firm 
characteristics and other variables that could influence future earnings and future 
returns, as suggested in the literature. This study also added lagged variables of earnings 
and its components as other control variables (EBITit-1,TACit-1 and CFit-1) as suggested 
by Kraft et al., (2007). The details and measurements for these variables are discussed in 
the next section. 
As discussed in Section 6.4.2, the test whether the coefficients of ownership and other 
corporate governance variables are statistically different from zero, using the OLS, is 
equivalent to a test whether coefficients of these variables in forecasting and pricing 
equation are equal using the MT. Therefore, if the coefficients of ownership structure 
and/or other corporate governance variables (φi) are statistically different from zero, they 
indicate that investors cannot correctly perceive the actual influence of these 
mechanisms on firm performance. A significantly positive sign of φi indicates that 
investors underestimate (overestimate) the positive (negative) impact of these variables 
on firm performance (i.e. γi* < γi), and a significantly negative sign of φi indicates that 
investors overestimate (underestimate) their positive (negative) impact (i.e. γi* > γi). 
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6.4.3.1 Test for Equality between Coefficients before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms 
The specification models (Model 6.1 – 6.4) are separately estimated using sub-period 
samples, a pre-period (1994 – 1998) and post-period of the corporate governance reform 
(2000 – 2007). As in the previous chapters, the dummy variable approach as suggested 
by Gujarati (1970a, 1970b) is applied to test equality between sets of coefficients in the 
pre and post regressions. The single regressions are as following: 
BHARt+1 = φ0 + φ1Concentrated Ownit + φ2Share Difference+ φ3CVit 
    + φ4Board Sizeit + φ5Board Independenceit + φ6Board Experienceit  
     + φ7CEO Founderit + φ8CEO Son/Daughterit + φ9CEO-Chairit  
      + φ10CEO-Groupit + φ11BIG4it + φ12Auditor Tenureit 
      + φ13Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ14 Other Control Variablesit 
    + φ15Industry dummy +Post × [φ0 + φ1Concentrated Ownit  
    + φ2Share Difference+ φ3CVit+ φ4Board Sizeit + φ5Board Independenceit  
    + φ6Board Experienceit + φ7CEO Founderit + φ8CEO Son/Daughterit  
    + φ10CEO-Groupit + φ11BIG4it + φ12Auditor Tenureit 
      + φ13Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ14 Other Control Variablesit 
    + φ15Industry dummy] + µt       (6.5) 
BHARt+1 = φ0 + φ1D_Dominantit + φ2Share Differenceit + φ3CVit 
    + φ4Board Sizeit + φ5Board Independenceit + φ6Board Experienceit  
     + φ7CEO Founderit + φ8CEO Son/Daughterit + φ9CEO-Chairit  
      + φ10CEO-Groupit + φ11BIG4it + φ12Auditor Tenureit 
      + φ13Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ14 Other Control Variablesit 
    + φ15Industry dummy + Post × [φ0 + φ1D_Dominantit + φ2Share Differenceit  
    + φ3CVit+ φ4Board Sizeit + φ5Board Independenceit + φ6Board Experienceit 
     + φ7CEO Founderit + φ8CEO Son/Daughterit + φ9CEO-Chairit  
      + φ10CEO-Groupit + φ11BIG4it + φ12Auditor Tenureit 
      + φ13Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ14 Other Control Variablesit 
    + φ15Industry dummy] + µt       (6.6) 
 BHARt+1 = φ0 + φ1Family Ownit + φ2Government Ownit + φ3Foreign Company Ownit 
     + φ4Domestic Company Ownit + φ5Bank Ownit  
     + φ6Non-bank Financial Institution Ownit+ φ7Share Differenceit  
     + φ8CVit+ φ4Board Sizeit + φ9Board Independenceit + φ10Board Experienceit 
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       + φ11CEO Founderit + φ12CEO Son/Daughterit + φ13CEO-Chairit  
       + φ14CEO-Groupit + φ15BIG4it + φ16Auditor Tenureit 
       + φ17Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ18Other Control Variablesit 
     + φ19Industry dummy + Post × [φ0 + φ1Family Ownit + φ2Government Ownit  
     + φ3Foreign Company Ownit + φ4Domestic Company Ownit + φ5Bank Ownit 
     + φ6Non-bank Financial Institution Ownit+ φ7Share Differenceit  
     + φ8CVit+ φ4Board Sizeit + φ9Board Independenceit + φ10Board Experienceit 
       + φ11CEO Founderit + φ12CEO Son/Daughterit + φ13CEO-Chairit  
       + φ14CEO-Groupit + φ15BIG4it + φ16Auditor Tenureit 
       + φ17Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ18Other Control Variablesit 
     + φ19Industry dummy] + µt       (6.7) 
BHARt+1 = φ0 + φ1D_Familyit + φ2D_Governmentit + φ3D_Foreign Companyit 
     + φ4D_Domestic Companyit + φ5D_Bankit  
     + φ6D_Non-bank Financial Institutionit+ φ7Share Differenceit 
     + φ8CVit+ φ4Board Sizeit + φ9Board Independenceit + φ10Board Experienceit 
       + φ11CEO Founderit + φ12CEO Son/Daughterit + φ13CEO-Chairit  
       + φ14CEO-Groupit + φ15BIG4it + φ16Auditor Tenureit 
       + φ17Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ18Other Control Variablesit 
     + φ19Industry dummy + Post × [φ0 + φ1D_Familyit + φ2D_Governmentit  
     + φ3D_Foreign Companyit+ φ4D_Domestic Companyit + φ5D_Bankit 
     + φ6D_Non-bank Financial Institutionit+ φ7Share Differenceit 
     + φ8CVit+ φ4Board Sizeit + φ9Board Independenceit + φ10Board Experienceit 
       + φ11CEO Founderit + φ12CEO Son/Daughterit + φ13CEO-Chairit  
       + φ14CEO-Groupit + φ15BIG4it + φ16Auditor Tenureit 
       + φ17Earningsit (or Earnings Componentsit) + φ18Other Control Variablesit 
     + φ19Industry dummy] + µt       (6.8) 
 
Where Post is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 for periods after the reform 
(2000 - 2007) and is equal to 0 for periods before the reform (1994 - 1998).  
The significantly positive sign of the coefficient of (Post × variable) indicates the 
negative incremental effect. In other words, investors may have more negative 
misperception of ownership and/or governance variable in the post-reform period than in 
the pre-reform period leading to a significant positive stock return in the following year. 
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In the context of the Thai capital market, this could imply that the reforms have some 
degrees of success in increasing investors’ confident over the Thai capital market.  
On the other hand, the significantly negative sign of coefficient of (Post × variable) 
indicates the positive incremental effect. In other words, investors may have more 
positive misperception of ownership and/or governance variable in the post-reform 
period than in the pre-reform period leading to a significant negative stock return in the 
following year. In the context of the Thai capital market, this could imply that the 
reforms might not play a successful role in increasing investors’ confident over the Thai 
capital market. 
The Wald test is also performed in order to test whether the coefficients of variables in 
the post-reform period (βPost = βPre + incremental effect) significantly differ from those 
in the pre-reform period (βPre). As in the previous chapters, the Wald tests are computed 
by using “test” command in Stata. The null hypothesis is that βpost = βPre, which is 
equivalent to βPost – βPre = 0. The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that βpost is 
significantly different from βPre. 
6.4.4 Variable Measurements 
6.4.4.1 Abnormal Stock Returns 
This study measures one-year-ahead abnormal stock returns (BHARt+1) as the difference 
between a firm’s 12-month buy-and-hold returns and the buy-and-hold returns of the 
SET market in the same period. Stock returns include dividends and their measurement 
begins four months after a firms’ previous fiscal year ended (31 December). For 
example, a measurement of the one-year-ahead returns for the fiscal year 2007 
(BHARt+1) is measured from 1 May 2007 to 30 April 2008. 
In fact, the SECT requires listed companies to submit an annual financial report within 
three months of their fiscal year ending. Therefore, the four-month period used in this 
study ensures that information on financial reports is publicly available. This period also 
is consistent with previous studies such as Kraft et al. (2007) and Sloan (1996). 
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As previously discussed, one-year-ahead abnormal stock returns should not be 
systematically observed under the EMH. Hence observed abnormal stock returns imply 
that the capital market is not efficient because market participants can use past 
information on stock prices to earn abnormal stock returns.  
6.4.4.2 Variables of Ownership Structure and Other Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms 
As in Chapters 4 and 5, ownership concentration was measured by the percentage of 
shares owned by the largest shareholders. Given the different behavioural incentives of 
different types of shareholders, this study differentiated ownership concentration by 
shareholder types, which were family, government, foreign company, domestic 
company, bank and non-bank financial institutional investors. As discussed in previous 
chapters, it is unlikely that shareholders within a group cooperate in their control efforts 
with each other. Therefore, ownership concentration by shareholder type was measured 
by the percentages of shares held by the largest shareholder in each category.  
As in previous chapters, this study identified shareholders as a dominant shareholder if 
they own shares at least 25% and are the largest shareholders of the firm. 
This study also includes a ratio of the share difference between the largest shareholder 
and the second largest shareholder (Share Difference) as control variables. A lower ratio 
indicates a smaller gap between the proportion of shares owned by the largest 
shareholder and that owned by the second largest shareholder and reflects an increase in 
the power of the second largest shareholder to control the largest shareholder.  
If investors have positive perceptions of the impact of the largest shareholder on firm 
performance, they may believe that the largest shareholder, who has near absolute 
control (a high ratio of share difference), provides better monitoring because the largest 
shareholder do not have to spend time and effort to negotiate with other large 
shareholders about monitoring process. Hence they may not recognise the second largest 
shareholder as a corporate governance mechanism that effectively controls the largest 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Pagano and Röell, 1998). 
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However, if investors have negative perceptions of the impact of the largest shareholders 
on firm performance, they may see share difference as very (perhaps too) important. 
This study also includes a ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights (CV). As discussed 
in Chapters 2 and 4, lower cash flow rights, relative to control rights, indicate a high 
possibility that dominant shareholders can engage in exploitation at less cost to 
themselves (Fan and Wong 2002).  
In practice, investors might not be actually aware of the impact of share difference and 
CV issues because they may not access to this information. For example, working out 
share difference and in particular CV requires tracing ownership data. In particular, the 
CV ratio requires the tracing of complex pyramidal or cross-shareholding. Therefore, 
investors might ignore the impact of these variables on firm performance. 
The variables used for board structure, CEO characteristics and audit reputation and 
expertise were the same as those discussed in previous chapters. Definitions of these 
variables are provided again in Table 6.1. 
6.4.4.3 Earnings, Earnings Components and Lagged Variables 
In this chapter, the main variables of interest are ownership and other corporate 
governance variables, rather than accounting information variables. Therefore, earnings 
and earnings components and their lagged variables are treated just like other control 
variables.  
Broadly speaking, accounting research focuses on the role of accounting earnings and 
their components in predicting future earnings and suggests that investors can use 
current earnings and their components, such as cash flows and total accruals, to predict 
future earnings because they have the property of “persistence”14 (Schipper and Vincent, 
2003; Dechow et al., 2010). However, the existing literature suggests that cash flows 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Lipe (1990, cited in Schipper and Vincent, 2003: 99) defines earnings persistence as an autocorrelation 
of earnings that “captures the extent to which the current period innovation becomes a permanent part of 
the earnings series.” According to Kormendi and Lipe (1987: 326), earnings innovation is “the new 
information contained in current-period earnings.” 
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should have higher persistence than total accruals and should be better predictors of 
future earnings. However, investors may “fixate” on earnings and fail to distinguish this 
information until it actually impacts future earnings (for example, see Sloan, 1996). 
Therefore, this study includes current earnings (EBITt) as control variables. 
Additionally, accounting research suggests that investors may use components of 
earnings in order to predict future earnings and returns. Therefore, this study also 
decomposes earnings into current cash flows (CFt) and total accruals (TACt) 
components of earnings and uses them as control variables in the separated regression. 
According to the EMH, investors should correctly perceive the ability of cash flows and 
accruals to predict future earnings and will not overestimate or underestimate the ability 
of earnings, accruals and the cash flow components of earnings to predict future 
earnings. 
This study also includes one-year lagged values of earnings (EBITt-1), cash flows (CFt-1) 
and the accruals (TACt-1) components of earnings, as suggested by Kraft et al. (2007), 
because investors may use current performance as well as past performance to predict 
future firm performance. 
6.4.4.4 Other Control Variables 
The existing literature suggests that firm characteristics, such as firm size, book-to-
market ratio, leverage, sales growth and past returns, may influence cross-sectional 
variation in average stock returns, and Kraft et al. (2007: 1089) argue that these 
variables should be included in the MT’s forecasting equation in order to minimise the 
problem of omitted variables. Therefore, this study includes them as other control 
variables. 
6.4.4.4.1 Firm Size and Book-to-Market Value of Equity 
Regarding firm size, the existing research suggests that there is a relationship between 
firm size and stock returns. In the US stock markets, Banz (1981) found that smaller 
firms measured by market value of equity (ME) were associated with higher risk 
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adjusted returns than larger firms were. Fama and French (1992) report evidence that 
confirms this, showing a negative relationship between firm size and average stock 
returns. 
Regarding the book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), a high (low) ratio indicates that a firm has 
a high (low) book value of equity relative to market value of equity. Hence firms with a 
high (low) BE/ME tend to have lower (higher) growth. 
Fama and French (1992) found that BE/ME were positively associated with average 
stock returns. Chan et al. (1991) also confirm that BE/ME was one of the most powerful 
factors that had a positive effect on stock returns in Japan.  
Fama and French (1993) provide evidence suggesting that both firm size (ME) and 
book-to-market ratio (BE/ME) are common risk factors that can explain cross-sectional 
variation in stock returns. They argue that smaller firms and/or firms with a high BE/ME 
tend to have lower firm performance (such as ROA) and may suffer for longer during an 
economic depression than larger firms do. Hence investors may require higher returns in 
order to compensate for higher fundamental risk in smaller firms and high BE/ME firms 
(Daniel and Titman, 1997). 
However, Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that this return pattern may not be fully driven 
by risk factors but by investor perceptions. For example, investors may overreact to 
stocks that had good (bad) performance in the past and, in turn, overbuy (oversell) them, 
so the stock becomes overpriced (underpriced). They also found that investors tend to 
rely too much on past earnings growth when predicting future returns. 
This study emulates others in the existing literature by including firm size and the ratio 
of book-to-market value of equity as control variables. No attempt is made to distinguish 
whether these factors are driven by firm characteristics or risk factors. Firm size is a 
natural log of market capitalisation and the ratio of book-to-market value of equity 
(BE/ME) is the book value of common equity divided by the market value of common 
equity. 
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6.4.4.4.2 Leverage, Sales Growth, Firm Age and Past Abnormal Stock 
Return 
Since widely published research suggests that the following variables impact on stock 
returns, this study expects them to also influence investors’ perceptions of future returns. 
Regarding leverage, Bhandari (1988) found that leverage was positively associated with 
stock returns, even after controlling for firm size and risk (Beta). He suggests that firms 
with high ratios of leverage tend to have high risk and therefore inveators required 
higher returns as risk compensation. This study therefore controls for leverage, which is 
measured by the ratio of debt to book value of equity. 
Regarding sales growth, investors may over expect long-run future sales and growth of 
earnings in stock that have had high sales and earnings growth in the past (in the short 
term), which in turn leads to a higher price of stock (Lakonishok et al., 1994; Skinner 
and Sloan 2002). The overoptimistic expectations are then recognised over time, 
subsequently leading to lower stock returns (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Jegadeesh and 
Livnat (2006) suggest that investors may use sales growth as incremental information to 
predict future earnings because sales are less subject to managers’ accounting discretion. 
Therefore, this study adds sales growth as another control variable in order to control for 
past growth. Sales growth is calculated as an average of annual change in sales over 3 
years, prior to the current year. 
A small number of studies suggest that firm age may influence stock returns. For 
example, Clark (2002) found a significant positive relationship between firm age at IPO 
and after-IPO abnormal returns. Therefore, this study adds firm age as another control 
variable and measures it by natural log of the number of years since a firm was 
established. 
Finally, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found that investors tended to use past stock price 
(3 to 12 months) to predict future returns. Hence stock returns tended to have short-term 
persistence in the sense that stock that has performed well in the past tends to perform 
well in the near future. They also show that investors gained abnormal returns from 
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buying past winner and selling past loser stocks. Therefore, this study adds a lagged 
variable of one-year-ahead buy-and-hold abnormal returns15 (BHARt) as another control 
variable because it may have some influence on the prediction of future earnings and 
returns. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For example, the BHARt of the fiscal year 2007 was calculated from 1 May 2006 to 30 April 2007. 	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Table 6.1: Summary of All Dependent and Explanatory Variables used in Chapter 6 
Dependent Variables: Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
Variables Description 
BHARt+1 12-month buy and hold abnormal returns at time t+1 
Explanatory Variables: Ownership Variables and Control Mechanisms 
Variables Description 
Concentrated Own Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder  
Family Own Percentage of shares owned by family who is the largest shareholder in family 
shareholder’s category 
Government Own Percentage of shares owned by government who is the largest shareholder in 
government shareholder’s category 
Foreign Company Own Percentage of shares owned by foreign company who is the largest 
shareholder in foreign company shareholder’s category 
Domestic Company 
Own 
Percentage of shares owned by domestic company who is the largest 
shareholder in domestic company shareholder’s category 
Bank Own Percentage of shares owned by bank who is the largest shareholder in bank 
shareholder’s category 
Non-Bank Financial 
institutions Own 
Percentage of shares owned by non-bank financial institutions who is the 
largest shareholder in non-bank financial institutions shareholder’s category  
(excluded insurance companies) 
D_Dominant Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a dominant shareholder 
who is the largest shareholder and own equal or more than 25% of voting 
shares, otherwise equal to zero 
D_Family Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a dominant shareholder 
who is the family largest shareholder and own equal or more than 25% of 
voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
D_Government Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a dominant shareholder 
who is the government largest shareholder and own equal or more than 25% 
of voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
D_Foreign Investors Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a dominant shareholder 
who is the foreign company largest shareholder and own equal or more than 
25% of voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
D_Domestic Company Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a dominant shareholder 
who is the domestic company largest shareholder and own equal or more than 
25% of voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
D_Bank Own Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a dominant shareholder 
who is the bank largest shareholder and own equal or more than 25% of 
voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.1: Summary of All Dependent and Explanatory Variables used in Chapter 6 (Cont’) 
Explanatory Variables: Ownership Variables 
Variables Description 
  Explanatory Variables: Ownership Variables and Control Mechanisms (Cont’) 
D_Non-Bank Financial 
institutions 
Dummy variable equal to one if firm has a presence of a dominant shareholder 
who is the non-bank financial institutions largest shareholder and own equal or 
more than 25% of voting shares, otherwise equal to zero 
Ratio of Share 
Difference 
Shares difference between the largest and the second largest shareholders 
divided by shares owned by the largest shareholder 
CV Ratio of cash-flow rights to voting rights 
Board Structure  
Board Size Natural log of number of directors in the board 
Board Independence Number of Independent directors divided by total number of directors in the 
board 
Board Experience Number of directors who are directors of other companies divided by total 
number of directors in the board 
CEO Characteristics 
CEO Founder Dummy variable, which equal to one if CEO is also a founder of the firm, 
otherwise as zero 
CEO Son/Daughter Dummy variable, which equal to one if CEO is founder’s descendants, 
otherwise as zero 
CEO-Chair Dummy variable, which equal to one if CEO serves as the chairman, otherwise 
as zero 
CEO-Group Dummy variable, which equal to one if CEO and chairman come from the 
same family, otherwise as zero 
Auditor Reputation and Expertise 
BIG4 Dummy variable equal to one if firm is audited by Big 4 firms, otherwise equal 
to zero 
Audit Partner Tenure Dummy variable equal to one if the same audit partner audits the firm at least 5 
years or more. 
Control Variables: Earnings, Earnings Components and Lagged Variables 
EBITt+1 Earnings before interests and taxes at time t+1, scaled by lagged total assets 
EBITt Earnings before interests and taxes at time t, scaled by lagged total assets 
TACt Total Accruals at time t = [∆current assets – ∆cash] less [∆current liabilities] 
less Depreciation and amortisation, scaled by lagged total assets (Jones, 1991) 
CFt EBITt – TACt 
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.1: Summary of All Dependent and Explanatory Variables used in Chapter 6 (Cont’) 
Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Variables Description 
Control Variables: Earnings, Earnings Components and Lagged Variables 
EBITt-1 Earnings before interests and taxes at time t-1, scaled by lagged total assets 
TACt-1 Total accruals at time t-1 
CFt-1 CF at time t-1 
Control Variables: Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size Natural log of market capitalisation at the year ended 31 December 
Firm Age Natural log of number of year since established 
Sales Growth An average of annual change in sales, average over three years, or available years, prior 
to the current year 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets (at the year ended 31 December) 
Book-to-Market 
ratio 
A ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the year ended 31 December 
BHARt 12-month buy and hold abnormal returns at time t 
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6.5 Sampling and Data Collection	  
Consistent with previous chapters, this chapter uses a sample of non-financial firms that 
were listed in the SET between 1994 and 2007. In addition, the sample was divided into 
the periods before and after the corporate governance reforms. The year 1999 was a cut-
off year in order to reduce any effects of the transition period and firms in the 
rehabilitation sector were excluded, as in the previous chapters. The cases that contained 
missing data in the sample were also excluded from observations, which resulted in an 
unbalanced sample size for each model.  
In order to avoid selection bias, this study applies no other criteria for data selection. As 
a result, the sample sizes for each regression vary, subject to data availability. 
Information about stock price, ownership structure and accounting data were obtained 
mostly from the SETSMART database. Procedures for collecting ownership and other 
corporate governance data are discussed in the previous chapters. All variables were 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles and definitions of all variables are summarised 
in Table 6.1.  
6.6 Results 
6.6.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis – Full Sample 
The sample contained 3,513 firm-year observations in regressions (A), which are 
included earnings as one of control variables. However, the sample size was reduced to 
2,882 firm-year observations in regressions (B), which are included cash flows and total 
accruals components of earnings as control variables. This is because data for total 
accruals calculation is missing. Table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics based on the 
earnings components sample. 
On average, one-year-ahead buy-hold abnormal returns (BHARt+1) are 7.70% of lagged 
total assets suggesting that investors may have received an average gain above the 
market from their shares. This could imply that the Thai capital market might not be 
efficient. 
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Regarding ownership structure, the largest shareholders held an average of 41.95% of 
the shares and the largest family shareholders owned about 35.42%, which suggests that 
most of them were also dominant shareholders. On average, the largest shareholders in 
each other shareholders’ types owned shares between 1% and 10%. 
The ratio of share difference between the largest and the second largest shareholders is 
about 0.637. The ratio indicates a large difference in the proportion of shares owned by 
the second largest shareholder and the largest shareholder. The ratio of cash flow to 
control rights of owners is about 0.848, indicating a small gap between the two rights. 
The Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix is presented in Panels A and B in Table 
6.3. The two correlation matrixes suggest that there are some significant correlations 
between variables such as ownership variables by types of shareholder. This suggests 
that there might be an imperfect multicollinearity problem. This study therefore includes 
the VIF test in the sensitivity tests. 
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample during 1994 to 2007	  
	   No.  Mean Median SD Maximum Minimum 
 Firm Characteristics (Million Baht) 
Total Current Assets 3,513 3,100 953 10,300 316,000 6.61 
Total Current Liabilities 3,513 2,811 784 9,657 245,000 0.47 
Total Assets 3,513 9,265 2327 32,600 892,000 64.43 
Total Liabilities 3,513 5,519 1128 20,100 494,000 0.47 
BV of Shareholders’ Equity 3,513 3,526 1069 12,200 361,000 -23,600 
Market Capitalisation 3,513 7,267 1025 35,300 1,060,000 2.16 
Total Sales Revenues 3,513 7,136 1747 41,700 1,500,000 -646 
Depreciation 3,031 439 92 1,616 28,500 -4.51 
       
One-Year-Ahead Buy and Hold Abnormal Return 
BHARt+1 3,513 0.077 -0.031 0.639 2.848 -1.309 
       
Ownership Structure, Other Corporate Governance and Control Variables 
Ownership Variables 
 Ownership Concentration by the Largest Shareholders 
Concentrated Own  3,513 41.95% 41.40% 18.08% 83.80% 7.50% 
       
Ownership Concentration by the Largest Shareholders within each Type 
 Family 3,513 35.42% 35.80% 21.70% 83.30% 0.00% 
 Government 3,513 1.32% 0.00% 6.74% 47.90% 0.00% 
 Foreign company  3,513 9.98% 3.80% 14.69% 66.80% 0.00% 
 Domestic company 3,513 2.17% 0.00% 7.30% 51.60% 0.00% 
 Bank 3,513 1.03% 0.00% 2.44% 12.20% 0.00% 
 Non-Bank Financial Institutions 3,513 2.42% 1.20% 3.47% 19.80% 0.00% 
       
Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
       Control Mechanisms       
Ratio of Share Difference 3,513 0.637 0.726 0.281 0.982 0.010 
Ratio of Cash Flow Rights to Voting 
Rights (CV) 3,513 0.848 1.000 0.248 1.000 0.085 
       
       
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample during 1994 to 2007 (Cont’)	  
	   No.  Mean Median SD Maximum Minimum 
	         
Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms (Cont’) 
       Board Structure       
Number of Total Directors 3,513 12.336 12 3.903 32 1 
Number of Independent Directors 3,513 5.079 6 2.484 18 0 
Number of Directors who are 
appointed in Multiple Companies 3,513 5.045 4 3.805 26 0 
Board Size 3,513 2.467 2.485 0.298 3.219 1.792 
Board independence 3,513 0.433 0.429 0.218 1.000 0.080 
Board Experience 3,513 0.392 0.375 0.242 0.933 0.000 
       
External Auditor       
Auditor-Partner Tenure 3,513 6.383 6 3.843 18 1 
       
Control Variables 
       Earnings, Earnings Components and Lagged Variables (Scaled by Lag Total Assets) 
EBITt+1 3,508 0.076 0.080 0.108 0.345 -0.399 
EBITt 3,513 0.085 0.086 0.101 0.356 -0.290 
CFt 2,882 0.127 0.131 0.177 0.630 -0.629 
TACt 2,882 -0.042 -0.047 0.156 0.603 -0.531 
EBITt-1 3,513 0.094 0.091 0.101 0.413 -0.233 
CFt-1 2,882 0.128 0.132 0.186 0.658 -0.653 
TACt-1 2,882 -0.037 -0.044 0.165 0.656 -0.506 
       
Other Control Variables 
Number of Year Since Established 3,513 24 21 15 131 2 
Firm Age (ln Age) 3,513 3.035 3.045 0.525 4.466 1.609 
Leverage 3,513 0.498 0.499 0.245 1.322 0.040 
Sales Growth 3,513 0.175 0.104 0.370 2.778 -0.408 
Firm Size (ln MV) 3,513 14.001 13.840 1.650 18.507 10.587 
Book to Market Ratio 3,513 1.282 0.984 1.428 7.858 -6.193 
BHARt 3,513 0.050 -0.059 0.649 2.888 -1.397 
       
       
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
          All variables definitions are provided in Table 6.1 
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Table 6.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables used in this study. The total sample includes 3,513 firm-year observations of non-financial listed companies 
in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is shown in Panel B. Asterisk 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 1% level. 
  Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 BHARt+1 1.000            
2 Concentrated Own 0.010 1.000           
3 Family Own 0.012 0.708* 1.000          
4 Government Own 0.015 0.013 -0.241* 1.000         
5 Foreign Com. Own -0.001 0.022 -0.452* -0.039 1.000        
6 Domestic Com. Own -0.017 -0.038 -0.284* 0.001 -0.004 1.000       
7 Bank Own 0.012 -0.117* -0.154* 0.039 -0.069* 0.108* 1.000      
8 Non- Bank Fin. Own  0.020 -0.142* -0.151* -0.038 -0.041 0.076* 0.028 1.000     
9 Ratio of Share Difference -0.013 0.734* 0.542* -0.013 -0.175* -0.058* -0.085* -0.120* 1.000    
10 CV -0.012 -0.123* -0.181* 0.037 0.110* -0.069* -0.107* 0.088* -0.088* 1.000   
11 Board Size 0.010 -0.124* -0.102* 0.166* 0.031 0.058* 0.132* -0.044* -0.142* -0.296* 1.000  
12 Board Independence -0.072* 0.087* 0.011 -0.002 0.057* -0.042 -0.057* -0.149* 0.055* 0.167* -0.319* 1.000 
13 Board Experience 0.015 0.092* 0.093* 0.131* -0.041 0.005 0.171* -0.080* 0.102* -0.321* 0.213* -0.090* 
14 CEO Founder 0.005 -0.073* 0.074* -0.104* -0.161* -0.071* -0.105* -0.022 -0.016 0.174* -0.129* 0.083* 
15 CEO Descendant 0.001 0.1753* 0.253* -0.067* -0.091* -0.082* -0.016 -0.031 0.156* -0.033 0.081* 0.018 
16 CEO-Chair -0.008 0.012 0.131* -0.075* -0.126* -0.087* -0.087* -0.023 0.059* 0.091* -0.101* 0.091* 
17 CEO-Group -0.003 0.192* 0.248* -0.075* -0.085* -0.032 -0.009 -0.078* 0.168* 0.047* -0.019 0.046* 
18 BIG 4 -0.040 -0.064* -0.178* -0.018 0.281* 0.076* 0.033 -0.056* -0.094* 0.094* -0.002 0.057* 
19 Audit Partner Tenure 0.059* 0.030 0.031 0.021 -0.050* -0.035 0.034 0.030 0.034 -0.042 -0.013 -0.155* 
20 EBITt -0.021 0.099* 0.039 0.073* 0.063* -0.024 -0.049* -0.056* 0.081* -0.011 -0.072* -0.006 
21 EBITt-1 -0.050* 0.088* 0.048* 0.054* 0.039 -0.023 -0.067* -0.039 0.080* 0.009 -0.107* -0.033 
22 Firm Size -0.162* 0.006 -0.112* 0.254* 0.143* 0.011 -0.037 -0.167* 0.047* -0.029 0.186* 0.081* 
23 Firm Age -0.008 0.072* 0.025 -0.121* 0.134* 0.027 0.012 -0.107* 0.023 -0.015 0.086* 0.147* 
24 Sales Growth -0.067* -0.057* -0.076* 0.097* -0.012 -0.017 -0.004 -0.012 0.007 0.009 -0.029 -0.046* 
25 Leverage 0.022 -0.017 0.024 0.014 -0.085* -0.003 0.043 0.063* 0.023 0.015 -0.011 -0.118* 
26 Book-to-Market Ratio 0.155* -0.014 0.016 -0.047* -0.051* -0.008 -0.008 0.080* -0.009 -0.044* 0.012 -0.099* 
27 BHARt -0.061* 0.010 0.004 0.023 0.012 -0.020 0.016 0.011 -0.015 -0.001 0.031 0.020 
              
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables used in this study. The total sample includes 3,513 firm-year observations of non-financial listed companies 
in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is shown in Panel B. Asterisk 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 1% level. 
  Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
 Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13 Board Experience 1.000            
14 CEO Founder -0.163* 1.000           
15 CEO Descendant 0.043 -0.214* 1.000          
16 CEO-Chair -0.043 0.474* 0.065* 1.000         
17 CEO-Group -0.027 -0.103* 0.509* -0.174* 1.000        
18 BIG 4 0.108* -0.042 -0.041 -0.067* -0.059* 1.000       
19 Audit Partner Tenure -0.011 -0.049* -0.037 -0.029 0.006 -0.081* 1.000      
20 EBITt 0.016 -0.014 -0.009 -0.021 0.030 0.017 0.102* 1.000     
21 EBITt-1 -0.013 0.012 -0.028 0.004 0.022 0.026 0.089* 0.629* 1.000    
22 Firm Size 0.296* -0.132* 0.044* -0.048* -0.014 0.207* -0.082* 0.344* 0.307* 1.000   
23 Firm Age 0.094* -0.078* 0.043 -0.020 0.083* 0.046* -0.021 0.019 -0.021 -0.086* 1.000  
24 Sales Growth 0.074* -0.002 -0.025 -0.030 -0.027 0.071* -0.026 0.160* 0.156* 0.262* -0.244* 1.000 
25 Leverage 0.089* 0.065* 0.014 0.034 0.033 0.003 -0.046* -0.319* -0.275* -0.083* -0.164* 0.044* 
26 Book-to-Market Ratio -0.051* 0.036 -0.002 0.011 -0.032 -0.069* 0.058* -0.152* -0.156* -0.395* 0.057* -0.099* 
27 BHARt 0.001 0.010 0.013 0.005 0.017 -0.051* 0.038 0.123* -0.046* -0.024 0.001 -0.032 
              
  25 26 27          
25 Leverage 1.000            
26 Book-to-Market Ratio -0.192* 1.000           
27 BHARt -0.017 0.036 1.000          
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Table 6.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables used in this study. The total sample includes 3,513 firm-year observations of non-financial listed companies 
in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is shown in Panel B. Asterisk 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 1% level. 
  Panel B: Spearman Correlation Matrix 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 BHARt+1 1.000            
2 Concentrated Own 0.027 1.000           
3 Family Own 0.013 0.704* 1.000          
4 Government Own 0.024 -0.030 -0.175* 1.000         
5 Foreign Com. Own 0.018 -0.186* -0.415* 0.033 1.000        
6 Domestic Com. Own -0.005 -0.191* -0.267* 0.034 0.019 1.000       
7 Bank Own 0.004 -0.146* -0.166* 0.097* -0.018 0.157* 1.000      
8 Non- Bank Fin. Own  -0.013 -0.204* -0.161* -0.026 -0.031 0.064* 0.058* 1.000     
9 Ratio of Share Difference 0.006 0.789* 0.587* -0.002 -0.296* -0.167* -0.108* -0.098* 1.000    
10 CV -0.037 -0.181* -0.272* 0.034 0.119* -0.005 -0.063* 0.065* -0.145* 1.000   
11 Board Size 0.039 -0.124* -0.113* 0.175* 0.114* 0.089* 0.149* -0.063* -0.152* -0.258* 1.000  
12 Board Independence -0.064* 0.067* -0.001 -0.004 0.003 -0.083* -0.072* -0.219* 0.046* 0.156* -0.292* 1.000 
13 Board Experience 0.036 0.080* 0.077* 0.184* 0.069* 0.033 0.169* -0.085* 0.085* -0.317* 0.227* -0.093* 
14 CEO Founder 0.003 -0.082* 0.069* -0.092* -0.120* -0.043 -0.112* 0.034 -0.019 0.144* -0.124* 0.084* 
15 CEO Descendant -0.013 0.188* 0.261* -0.037 -0.048* -0.090* -0.012 -0.025 0.156* -0.087* 0.078* 0.023 
16 CEO-Chair -0.007 0.007 0.129* -0.016 -0.073* -0.069* -0.084* 0.033 0.057* 0.057* -0.101* 0.084* 
17 CEO-Group -0.026 0.202* 0.252* -0.080* -0.038 -0.056* -0.037 -0.076* 0.185* -0.010 -0.029 0.048* 
18 BIG 4 -0.029 -0.073* -0.183* 0.032 0.284* 0.067* 0.062* -0.038 -0.101* 0.083* -0.005 0.074* 
19 Audit Partner Tenure 0.071* 0.031 0.032 -0.023 -0.064* -0.045* -0.025 0.079* 0.041 -0.024 0.001 -0.167* 
20 EBITt 0.041 0.079* 0.020 0.049* 0.113* -0.082* -0.061* -0.034 0.066* 0.022 -0.060* -0.001 
21 EBITt-1 -0.002 0.073* 0.032 0.030 0.100* -0.080* -0.079* 0.000 0.071* 0.042 -0.090* -0.033 
22 Firm Size -0.132* -0.005 -0.108* 0.249* 0.280* 0.013 0.028 -0.168* 0.037 -0.025 0.170* 0.095* 
23 Firm Age 0.027 0.071* 0.029 -0.033 0.083* -0.019 -0.012 -0.165* 0.023 -0.036 0.112* 0.147* 
24 Sales Growth -0.072* -0.048* -0.062* 0.056* 0.031 -0.001 -0.022 0.004 0.015 0.019 -0.054* -0.042 
25 Leverage -0.067* -0.019 0.022 0.004 -0.053* 0.090* 0.080* 0.099* 0.031 -0.042 -0.017 -0.138* 
26 Book-to-Market Ratio 0.160* -0.018 0.018 -0.114* -0.091* -0.024 0.034 0.070* -0.015 -0.030 0.028 -0.061* 
27 BHARt -0.024 0.027 0.006 0.029 0.028 -0.018 0.030 -0.017 -0.004 -0.022 0.069* 0.023 
              
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
The table shows correlation matrixes of all variables used in this study. The total sample includes 3,513 firm-year observations of non-financial listed companies 
in the SET during 1994 - 2007. Pearson Correlation Coefficient is shown in Table A and Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is shown in Panel B. Asterisk 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 1% level. 
  Panel B: Spearman Correlation Matrix (Cont’) 
 Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13 Board Experience 1.000            
14 CEO Founder -0.170* 1.000           
15 CEO Descendant 0.050* -0.214* 1.000          
16 CEO-Chair -0.049* 0.474* 0.065* 1.000         
17 CEO-Group -0.029 -0.103* 0.509* -0.174* 1.000        
18 BIG 4 0.120* -0.042 -0.041 -0.067* -0.059* 1.000       
19 Audit Partner Tenure -0.017 -0.049* -0.037 -0.029 0.006 -0.081* 1.000      
20 EBITt 0.018 -0.006 -0.021 -0.004 0.010 0.029 0.098* 1.000     
21 EBITt-1 -0.007 0.008 -0.034 0.007 0.007 0.037 0.086* 0.656* 1.000    
22 Firm Size 0.302* -0.122* 0.051* -0.032 -0.004 0.216* -0.095* 0.342* 0.315* 1.000   
23 Firm Age 0.079* -0.082* 0.044* -0.026 0.079* 0.030 -0.040 -0.011 -0.036 -0.086* 1.000  
24 Sales Growth 0.080* -0.004 -0.017 -0.030 -0.014 0.071* -0.039 0.310* 0.275* 0.334* -0.211* 1.000 
25 Leverage 0.090* 0.064* 0.015 0.031 0.027 0.014 -0.045* -0.287* -0.256* -0.059* -0.185* 0.097* 
26 Book-to-Market Ratio -0.109* 0.057* 0.002 0.015 -0.005 -0.105* 0.063* -0.316* -0.290* -0.555* 0.118* -0.259* 
27 BHARt 0.027 0.005 0.002 0.004 -0.009 -0.046* 0.056* 0.200* 0.016 -0.005 0.025 0.014 
              
  25 26 27          
25 Leverage 1.000            
26 Book-to-Market Ratio -0.177* 1.000           
27 BHARt -0.078* 0.032 1.000          
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6.6.2 Univariate Analysis 
6.6.2.1 Abnormal Stock Returns in Firms with and without Dominant 
Shareholders 
Table 6.4, Panel A presents the mean comparison of buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
between firms with and without dominant shareholders. It shows that average one-year-
ahead buy-and-hold abnormal returns between firms with and without dominant 
shareholders were 8.0% and 6.5%, respectively, in which are not significantly different. 
In addition, Table 6.4, Panels B, focuses on firms with dominant shareholders and 
presents the mean comparison of buy-and-hold abnormal returns between firms with a 
particular type of dominant shareholder and firms with all other types of dominant 
shareholders. It also shows that on average firms with most types of dominant 
shareholder gained abnormal returns, with exception of those with domestic company or 
bank dominant shareholders, which had negative abnormal returns. However, there is no 
evidence that firm with any particular types of dominant shareholders gained 
significantly more or less abnormal returns than the others types did. 
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Table 6.4: Univariate Analysis – A Mean Comparison of Abnormal Return - Full Sample 
Panel A: A Mean Comparison of One-Year Ahead Unsigned Abnormal Return (BHARt+1) between 
Firms with and without Dominant Shareholders - Full Sample 
 BHARt+1 
Types of 
Shareholders 
Firm without 
Dominant 
Shareholders (1) 
< 25% 
Firm with 
Dominant 
Shareholders (2) 
>= 25% 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
Dominant 
Shareholders 684 0.065 2,829 0.080 0.015 0.54 0.589 1.10 0.270 
                    
Panel B: A Mean Comparison of One-Year Ahead Unsigned Abnormal Return (BHARt+1) Among 
Different Types of Dominant Shareholders - Full Sample 
 BHARt+1 
Types of  
Dominant 
Shareholders 
Firm with Other 
Types of 
Dominant 
Shareholders 
Firm with this 
Type of 
Dominant 
Shareholders 
Mean 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t-test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank- 
sum Test 
 No. Mean No. Mean  t p z p 
Family 607 0.086 2,222 0.078 -0.008 -0.26 0.795 -1.31 0.191 
Government  2,745 0.078 84 0.149 0.071 1.01 0.314 1.28 0.200 
Foreign Company  2,409 0.077 420 0.093 0.016 0.46 0.643 1.31 0.190 
Domestic Company  2,760 0.082 69 -0.031 -0.114 -1.46 0.144 -0.81 0.420 
Bank  2,811 0.080 18 -0.003 -0.083 -0.55 0.582 -0.40 0.684 
Non-Bank Financial 
Institution  2,813 0.079 16 0.164 0.085 0.53 0.594 0.13 0.889 
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6.6.2.2 Before and After the Corporate Governance Reforms 
When the sample is divided into the periods before and after the corporate governance 
reforms, the pre-reform and post-reform sub-samples contain 1,211 and 2,067 firm-year 
observations16. Table 6.5 shows that, on average, the sampled firms were larger in terms 
of market capitalisation, book value of equity and sales but had lower current liabilities 
after the reforms. In addition, one-year-ahead abnormal returns significantly decreased 
after the reforms. This suggests that the capital market might be more efficient after the 
reform. 
Regarding ownership, while the percentage of shares owned by the largest family 
shareholders (36.10% to 34.91%) or the largest non-bank financial institutional investors 
(3.24% to 1.85%) significantly reduced after the reforms, the largest foreign company 
shareholders significantly increased their share ownership (8.39% to 10.86%). 
The ratio of the difference in holdings between the largest and the second largest 
shareholders significantly reduced after the reforms (0.65 to 0.63), implying that the 
second largest shareholders had more ability to control the largest shareholders. 
However, no significant changes of the ratio of cash flow to control rights were found 
after the reform. 
Regarding board structure and auditor experience, the number of directors significantly 
increased after the reforms, mainly due to an increase in the number of independent 
directors in order to the meet the requirement for audit committees after the reforms. 
Auditor tenure was significantly shorter after the reforms. This suggests that, on the 
whole, firms may have changed their auditors more frequently after the reforms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 When cash flows and accruals components of earnings were added as control variables instead of 
earnings, the sample size of pre-reform and post-reform were reduced to 664 and 2,063 firm-year 
observations, respectively. 
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Table 6.5: Mean Comparison of Variables before and after the Thai Corporate Governance Reforms 
 Obs. Mean t-test 
Wilcoxon  
Rank-Sum Test 
Firms’ Characteristics (Million Baht) Pre-CG Post-CG Pre-CG  (1) Post-CG (2) 
Diff. 
(2)-(1) t p z p 
          
Total Current Assets  1,211 2,067 2,411 3,596 1,185 3.09 0.002 2.81 0.005 
Total Current Liabilities  1,211 2,067 2,676 2,832 156 0.46 0.649 -4.62 0.000 
Total Assets 1,211 2,067 7,282 10,495 3,213 2.68 0.007 1.93 0.054 
Total Liabilities 1,211 2,067 4,933 5,812 879 1.20 0.229 -3.44 0.001 
BV of Shareholders’ Equity 1,211 2,067 2,181 4,426 2,245 4.97 0.000 8.34 0.000 
Market Capitalisation 1,211 2,067 4,483 9,173 4,690 3.57 0.000 8.34 0.000 
Total Sales Revenues 1,211 2,067 3,453 9,617 6,164 3.96 0.000 9.02 0.000 
          Buy and Hold Abnormal Return          
BHARt+1 1,211 2,067 0.158 0.017 -0.141 -6.07 0.000 -5.01 0.000 
          
Ownership Variables          
Concentrated Own 1,211 2,067 41.52% 42.20% 0.68% 1.05 0.295 0.75 0.451 
Family Own 1,211 2,067 36.10% 34.91% -1.19% -1.51 0.131 -1.80 0.072 
Government Own 1,211 2,067 1.05% 1.48% 0.43% 1.78 0.076 2.27 0.023 
Foreign Company Own 1,211 2,067 8.39% 10.86% 2.47% 4.66 0.000 2.55 0.000 
Domestic Company Own 1,211 2,067 2.33% 2.10% -0.23% -0.90 0.370 -4.20 0.000 
Bank Own 1,211 2,067 0.99% 1.02% 0.33% 0.41 0.679 -0.47 0.640 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions Own 1,211 2,067 3.24% 1.85% 1.39% -11.51 0.000 -17.09 0.000 
Ratio of Share Difference 1,211 2,067 0.653 0.630 -0.023 -2.22 0.026 -2.64 0.008 
CV 1,211 2,067 0.846 0.849 0.003 0.303 0.761 1.38 0.165 
          
Board Composition and CEO 
Characteristics Variables          
Board Size 1,211 2,067 2.411 2.489 .078 7.35 0.000 7.14 0.000 
Board Independence 1,211 2,067 0.219 0.555 0.336 61.89 0.000 44.22 0.000 
Board Experience 1,211 2,067 0.408 0.383 -0.025 -2.82 0.005 -2.24 0.025 
          
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.5: Mean and Median Comparison of Variables before and after the Thai Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
 Obs. Mean t-test 
Wilcoxon  
Rank-Sum Test 
 Pre-CG Post-CG Pre-CG  (1) Post-CG (2) 
Diff.  
(2)-(1) t p z p 
          Board Composition and CEO 
Characteristics Variables (Cont’)          
No. of All Directors 1,211 2,067 11.742 12.532 0.790 5.71 0.000 7.14 0.000 
No. of Independent Directors 1,211 2,067 2.350 6.573 4.223 78.62 0.000 46.94 0.000 
No. of Directors who are Appointed in 
Multiple Companies 
1,211 2,067 5.015 4.991 -0.024 -0.18 0.861 0.31 0.756 
          
Audit Reputation and Expertise          
Audit Partner Tenure (Years) 1,211 2,067 7.274 5.779 -1.495 -10.98 0.000 -12.64 0.000 
          
Earnings and Earnings Components 
(Scaled by Lag Total Assets)          
EBITt+1 1,208 2,065 0.070 0.081 0.012 3.03 0.002 2.68 0.007 
EBITt 1,211 2,067 0.091 0.086 -0.006 -1.60 0.111 -1.98 0.048 
CFt 664 2,063 0.173 0.118 -0.055 -7.20 0.000 -7.50 0.000 
TACt 664 2,063 -0.079 -0.033 0.046 6.83 0.000 6.56 0.000 
EBITt-1 1,211 2,067 0.108 0.086 -0.021 -5.89 0.000 -5.95 0.000 
CFt-1 664 2,063 0.167 0.112 -0.054 -6.59 0.000 -7.67 0.000 
TACt-1 664 2,063 -0.063 -0.026 0.037 4.98 0.000 6.14 0.000 
          Other Control Variables          
Number of Years since Established 1,211 2,067 21.080 26.100 5.020 9.16 0.000 14.77 0.000 
Firm Age 1,211 2,067 2.861 3.141 0.280 15.16 0.000 14.76 0.000 
Firm Size 1,211 2,067 13.730 14.209 0.478 8.13 0.000 8.34 0.000 
Sales Growth 1,211 2,067 0.220 0.165 -0.055 -4.04 0.000 -5.42 0.000 
Leverage 1,211 2,067 0.565 0.451 -0.115 -13.50 0.000 -13.14 0.000 
Book-to-Market Value Ratio 1,211 2,067 1.442 1.189 -0.253 -4.93 0.000 -0.53 0.593 
BHARt 1,211 2,067 -0.014 0.019 0.033 1.50 0.135 2.43 0.015 
          
Note: All variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percentiles 
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6.6.3 Multivariate Analysis 
6.6.3.1 Do Investors Correctly Perceive the Impact of Ownership 
Concentration and the Presence of Dominant Shareholders on Firm 
Performance? 
This section investigates whether investors correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration (Ha1) and the impact of the presence of dominant shareholders on firm 
performance (Ha2). Models 6.1 and 6.2 were estimated separately using the OLS. 
As discussed in previous sections, under the EMH, the market’s subjective expectation 
of any variable should be equal to the objective expectation for that variable, conditional 
on all past information (Mishkin, 1983). Therefore, if the market is efficient, there 
should be no systematic abnormal returns.  
In other words, if the coefficients of ownership and other corporate governance variables 
are statistically different from zero, this suggests that the market is not fully efficient and 
that investors misperceive the impact of these variables on firm performance. In 
particular, a significant positive sign of a coefficient indicates that investors 
underestimate (overestimate) the positive (negative) impact of these variables on firm 
performance at the current year (t), the misperception would lead to the significant 
positive return at the following year (t+1). On the other hand, a significant negative sign 
of a coefficient indicates that investors overestimate (underestimate) of the positive 
(negative) impact of these variables on firm performance. This leads would lead to the 
significant negative return at the following year. 
Table 6.6 reports the two sets of regression results for each hypothesis (Ha1 and Ha2). 
Regarding Model 6.1, the results show that the coefficient of Concentrated Own in 
earnings sample is positively but not significantly related to the one-year-ahead buy-and-
hold abnormal returns when either earnings, Regression (A), or earnings components, 
Regression (B), were included in the regressions as control variables.  
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Regarding Model 6.2, the results consistently show that the coefficient of D_Dominant 
is positively related to the one-year-ahead buy-and-hold abnormal returns at the 10% 
level of significance when either earnings or earnings components were included as the 
control variables. 
The insignificant sign of the coefficients in Model 6.1 suggests that investors correctly 
perceived the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. In contrast, the 
significantly positive signs of the coefficients in Model 6.2 support the hypothesis Ha2 
and suggest that investors misperceived the influence of the presence of dominant 
shareholders on firm performance. The results suggest that investors underestimate the 
impact of the presence of dominant shareholders on firm performance (i.e. γi* < γi). 
Evidence from Chapter 4 suggests that firms with dominant shareholders performed 
better than firms without dominant shareholders did, but only in terms of market 
performance. In this chapter, evidence of the underestimation of the impact of the 
presence of dominant shareholders on firm performance therefore indicates negative 
investor perceptions of firms with dominant shareholders. The claim by the World Bank 
that the dominant shareholders partly led Thailand to the financial crisis may have 
influenced investors’ beliefs about the presence of dominant shareholders. For example, 
they may have expected them to exploit corporate assets for private benefit. Their overly 
negative perception led them to underestimate the positive impact less as than is actually 
the case. 
The results from Models 6.1 and 6.2, Table 6.6 report significant negative signs of the 
coefficients of the ratio of the share difference between the largest and second largest 
shareholders. The evidence suggests that investors misperceived the role of the second 
largest shareholders as a corporate governance mechanism to control the largest 
shareholders. This might be because it is too complicated for many investors to extract 
ownership information and to calculate the ratio of share difference, so they may not 
have been aware of the benefit from this governance structure.  
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It is worth noting that these results must be interpreted with care because they are based 
on an assumption that the estimated regressions are correctly specified and any omitted 
variables are correctly estimated. 
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Table 6.6: Investors’ Perception on the Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of 
Dominant Shareholders and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Firm Performance 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration, the presence of dominant shareholder and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. 
Dependent variable is BHARt+1, which is a one-year ahead 12-month buy and hold abnormal stock return. All variables 
definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. Regression (A) included 
earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged 
cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Model 6.1 – Ownership Concentration 
Model 6.2 - Dominant Shareholders 
(Dummy) 
 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 
 Regression (A) Regression (B) Regression (A) Regression (B) 
Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
         
Concentrated 
Own 0.114 (1.44) 0.087 (1.00)     
D_Dominant     0.050* (1.68) 0.056* (1.74) 
Share Difference -0.094* (-1.79) -0.082 (-1.42) -0.077* (-1.75) -0.080* (-1.68) 
CV 0.030 (0.68) 0.025 (0.53) 0.029 (0.66) 0.025 (0.53) 
Board Size 0.010 (0.20) -0.006 (-0.10) 0.004 (0.09) -0.012 (-0.22) 
Board 
Independence -0.002 (-0.02) -0.040 (-0.40) -0.004 (-0.04) -0.040 (-0.42) 
Board Experience 0.139*** (2.80) 0.189*** (3.45) 0.141*** (2.83) 0.191*** (3.48) 
CEO-Founder -0.003 (-0.12) 0.003 (0.10) -0.006 (-0.22) 0.002 (0.05) 
CEO Descendant 0.032 (0.81) 0.027 (0.65) 0.029 (0.75) 0.025 (0.59) 
CEO-Chair -0.033 (-1.02) -0.022 (-0.60) -0.032 (-0.98) -0.021 (-0.59) 
CEO-Group -0.024 (-0.65) -0.044 (-1.11) -0.022 (-0.59) -0.042 (-1.08) 
BIG 4 -0.006 (-0.30) -0.004 (-0.15) -0.006 (-0.27) -0.003 (-0.13) 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 
0.029 (1.35) 0.022 (0.97) 0.028 (1.32) 0.022 (0.93) 
EBITt 0.461*** (3.05)   0.457*** (3.02)   
CFt   0.350** (2.14)   0.346** (2.12) 
TACt   0.277 (1.54)   0.277 (1.53) 
EBITt-1 -0.130 (-0.98)   -0.139 (-1.04)   
CFt-1   -0.104 (-0.74)   -0.119 (-0.84) 
TACt-1   -0.032 (-0.21)   -0.043 (-0.28) 
BHARt -0.089*** (-4.77) -0.096*** (-4.57) -0.089*** (-4.76) -0.096*** (-4.57) 
Firm Size -0.042*** (-4.96) -0.043*** (-4.59) -0.043*** (-5.04) -0.044*** (-4.67) 
Firm Age -0.010 (-0.50) -0.019 (-0.79) -0.010 (-0.47) -0.019 (-0.77) 
Sales Growth -0.016 (-0.62) -0.013 (-0.43) -0.015 (-0.57) -0.010 (-0.33) 
Leverage 0.100* (1.81) 0.091 (1.49) 0.096* (1.76) 0.087 (1.44) 
Book-to-Market 0.049*** (5.07) 0.051*** (4.48) 0.049*** (5.04) 0.051*** (4.50) 
Constant 0.314* (1.85) 0.446** (2.27) 0.335** (2.00) 0.464** (2.39) 
         No. of Obs. 3,513  2,882  3,513  2,882  
Adj. R-squared 0.172  0.150  0.173  0.150  
F-test 18.723  12.522  18.812  12.679  
p_value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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6.6.3.2 Do Investors Correctly Perceive the Impact of Ownership 
Concentration by Shareholder Types and the Presence of Dominant 
Shareholders by their Types on Firm Performance? 
This section examines whether investors correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration by different shareholder types on firm performance and whether they 
correctly perceive the impact of the presence of dominant shareholders by their types on 
firm performance (Ha3 – Ha12). Models 6.3 and 6.4 were estimated separately using the 
OLS. Table 6.7 reports the two sets of regression results for each hypothesis (Ha3 – 
Ha12). 
Regarding Models 6.3 and 6.4, the results show that the coefficients of Government 
Own and D_Government are positively related to one-year-ahead buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns at the 1% level of significance. 
The significantly positive sign of the coefficients support the hypotheses Ha5 and Ha6 and 
suggest that investors failed to correctly perceive the impact of government block 
ownership as well as the presence of dominant government shareholders on firm 
performance. In particular, they tended to overly underestimate these impacts (i.e. γi* < 
γi).  
Based on the findings of Chapter 4, there is no evidence that these structures were 
harmful to firm performance. Nevertheless, the findings from this chapter may imply 
that investors are likely to have a negative perception of the influence of government 
block ownership and the present of government as the dominant shareholders on firm 
performance. As suggested by the existing literature, investors may view ownership 
retention by the government as a sign of private benefit of control and expropriation (for 
example, see Chen and Strang, 2004). In fact, political intervention and the instability of 
the political environment are acute in Thailand. A survey by Freeman (2000) suggests 
that “political interference” is one of the major weaknesses of the Thai business 
environment from the point of view of investors. Hence the overly negative perception 
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of the government could lead investors to underestimate performance of government 
owned/controlled firms less than it actually performed. 
The results of Models 6.317 and 6.4 from Table 6.7 also show that the coefficients of 
Foreign Own and D_Foreign are significantly positive at the 5% level of significance. 
The evidence supports the hypotheses Ha7 and Ha8 and reveals that investors also failed 
to correctly perceive the influence of foreign company block ownership as well as the 
presence of dominant foreign company shareholders on firm performance. Therefore, 
they tended to underestimate these impacts (i.e. γi* < γi) due to a negative perception. 
Although there is no evidence from Chapter 4 that these structures were harmful to firm 
performance, the evidence from this chapter suggests that investors tended to have a 
negative perception of foreign block ownership and foreign companies as dominant 
shareholders. Investors might question the efficiency of monitoring provided by these 
shareholders due to long distances or cultural differences, for instance. This may lead 
investors to underestimate their positive impact of foreign companies block ownership 
on firm performance. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that it would be helpful for research to classify ownership 
concentration by shareholder types. While different shareholders have different 
incentives to hold shares and participate in the monitoring of firms, investors also have 
different perceptions of the different types of major owners. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The coefficient of Foreign Own is significant only when earnings were included as control variables. 
However, the significance disappeared when earnings components were included as control variables 
instead of earnings. 
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Table 6.7: Investors’ Perception on the Impact of Ownership Concentration by Shareholder Types, 
the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Shareholder Types and Other Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms on Firm Performance 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of 
ownership concentration by shareholder types, the presence of dominant shareholder by their types and other 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. Dependent variable is BHARt+1, which is a one-year ahead 
12-month buy and hold abnormal stock return. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year 
Dummy are included for all models. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as 
control variables. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and 
lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 
10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
Model 6.3 –Ownership Concentration 
by Shareholders’ Types 
Model 6.4 – Dominant Shareholders 
by Shareholders’ Types (Dummies) 
 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 
Regression (A) Regression (B) Regression (A) Regression (B) Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
         
Family 0.014 (0.20) 0.018 (0.23) 0.022 (0.67) 0.031 (0.89) 
Government 0.543*** (2.59) 0.607*** (2.59) 0.245*** (2.84) 0.278*** (2.94) 
Foreign Com. 0.201** (2.35) 0.117 (1.30) 0.100*** (2.64) 0.083** (2.05) 
Domestic Com. -0.098 (-0.76) -0.061 (-0.44) -0.054 (-0.94) -0.010 (-0.16) 
Bank 0.055 (0.12) -0.193 (-0.39) -0.043 (-0.38) -0.048 (-0.43) 
Non-Bank Fin. -0.297 (-0.84) -0.448 (-1.12) 0.152 (0.74) 0.159 (0.68) 
Share Difference -0.039 (-0.90) -0.046 (-1.00) -0.053 (-1.18) -0.059 (-1.23) 
CV -0.001 (-0.02) -0.001 (-0.01) -0.012 (-0.27) -0.010 (-0.19) 
Board Size -0.011 (-0.23) -0.034 (-0.61) -0.010 (-0.21) -0.032 (-0.59) 
Board 
Independence -0.018 (-0.19) -0.060 (-0.62) -0.024 (-0.26) -0.066 (-0.68) 
Board 
Experience 
0.134*** (2.64) 0.184*** (3.24) 0.135*** (2.70) 0.183*** (3.33) 
CEO-Founder 0.010 (0.34) 0.010 (0.32) 0.007 (0.25) 0.012 (0.40) 
CEO Descendant 0.041 (1.05) 0.035 (0.83) 0.037 (0.93) 0.032 (0.77) 
CEO-Chair -0.031 (-0.95) -0.021 (-0.58) -0.025 (-0.77) -0.015 (-0.42) 
CEO-Group -0.015 (-0.41) -0.036 (-0.91) -0.008 (-0.22) -0.029 (-0.73) 
BIG 4 -0.014 (-0.62) -0.005 (-0.20) -0.009 (-0.42) -0.004 (-0.15) 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 
0.027 (1.28) 0.020 (0.87) 0.027 (1.27) 0.021 (0.88) 
EBITt 0.455*** (3.02)   0.448*** (2.98)   
CFt   0.341** (2.10)   0.333** (2.04) 
TACt   0.272 (1.51)   0.259 (1.44) 
EBITt-1 -0.134 (-1.02)   -0.146 (-1.10)   
CFt-1   -0.106 (-0.75)   -0.119 (-0.84) 
TACt-1   -0.034 (-0.22)   -0.050 (-0.33) 
BHARt -0.091*** (-4.91) -0.098*** (-4.70) -0.091*** (-4.90) -0.097*** (-4.69) 
         
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.7: Investors’ Perception on the Impact of Ownership Concentration by Shareholder Types, 
the Presence of Dominant Shareholders by Shareholder Types and Other Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms on Firm Performance (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of 
ownership concentration by shareholder types, the presence of dominant shareholder by their types and other 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. Dependent variable is BHARt+1, which is a one-year ahead 
12-month buy and hold abnormal stock return. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year 
Dummy are included for all models. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as 
control variables. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and 
lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 
10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
Model 6.3 –Ownership Concentration 
by Shareholders’ Types 
Model 6.4 – Dominant Shareholders 
by Shareholders’ Types (Dummies) 
 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 
Regression (A) Regression (B) Regression (A) Regression (B) Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
         Firm Size -0.049*** (-5.63) -0.049*** (-5.18) -0.048*** (-5.49) -0.048*** (-5.06) 
Firm Age -0.012 (-0.55) -0.017 (-0.66) -0.011 (-0.51) -0.016 (-0.65) 
Sales Growth -0.016 (-0.63) -0.012 (-0.42) -0.015 (-0.58) -0.011 (-0.38) 
Leverage 0.097* (1.77) 0.087 (1.43) 0.088 (1.61) 0.074 (1.23) 
Book-to-Market 0.048*** (4.93) 0.050*** (4.35) 0.047*** (4.82) 0.049*** (4.26) 
Constant 0.489*** (2.76) 0.626*** (3.09) 0.481*** (2.79) 0.602*** (3.02) 
         No. of Obs. 3,513  2,882  3,513  2,882  
Adj. R-squared 0.175  0.152  0.175  0.152  
F-test 16.972  11.504  16.805  11.407  
p_value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
         
 
6.6.3.3 Do Investors Correctly Perceive the Impact of Other Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms on Firm Performance? 
This section examines whether investors correctly perceive the impact of board structure 
(Ha13 to Ha15), CEO characteristics (Ha16 to Ha19), and auditor reputation and expertise 
(Ha20 to Ha21) on firm performance. 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show that the signs of the coefficients of Board experience are 
significant and positive for all models. The findings support the hypothesis Ha15 and 
imply that investors could not correctly perceive the influence of board experience on 
firm performance and tended to underestimate (overestimate) the positive (negative) 
impact of board experience on firm performance (i.e. γi* < γi). 
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Based on the findings from Chapter 4, there was no significant impact of board 
experience on firm performance. Therefore, the misperception of the impact found in 
this chapter may have been caused by a negative perception of board experience, 
measured by the number of directorships held in multiple companies. Investors may 
believe that these directors are too busy to give their time and resources to the efficient 
supervision of managers rather than that firms benefit from their experience. Ferris et al. 
(2003) empirically investigated whether directors of multiple companies were less 
efficient due to the demands of institutional investors and shareholding activists. They 
found no evidence that these directors neglected their board responsibilities or put their 
firms at greater risk from security fraud. 
Nevertheless, the evidence is inconsistent with other literature on, for example, short-
term announcement effects, which shows investors as having a more positive reaction to 
firms when they hire new directors with experience. It is possible that the proxy for 
board experience used in this study is more general in its definition of “expert” and fails 
to capture specific expertise (such as accounting expertise). Hence it will be interesting 
for future research to identify more specific forms of board experience. 
6.6.3.4 Other Control Variables 
This section further examines whether other control variables have any effects on 
investor predictions of future earnings and returns. The OLS regression results are 
consistent for all models (Model 6.1 to 6.4). 
Regarding earnings and earnings components, the results from Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show 
that the signs of the coefficient of EBITt are significant and positive, suggesting that 
investors underestimated the ability of current earnings when predicting future earnings. 
Particularly, they tended to underestimate the ability of the cash flow component of 
earnings to predict future earnings. This finding is consistent with those of Pincus et al. 
(2007) and partly consistent with those of Sloan, who found that investors tended to 
underestimate the ability of cash flows. However, this study has not found evidence of 
the overestimating of the ability of the accruals component of earnings.  
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The evidence also supports Kraft et al. (2007), who argue that the accruals anomaly18 
disappears when other variables that are related to future earnings and returns are taken 
into account (the MT). However, it is not fully consistent with subsequent research in 
accrual anomalies such as that of Konstantinidi et al. (2012) and Kraft et al. (2007), 
which report that investors correctly perceived the ability of both current cash flows and 
accruals to predict future earnings. 
Regarding other control variables, the evidence from Models 6.3 and 6.4, in Table 6.7, 
shows that, while firm size is significantly and negatively related to one-year-ahead 
abnormal returns, book-to-market ratio is significantly and positively related to them. 
The evidence is consistent with previous studies such as those of Banz (1981) and Fama 
and French (1992), who found that smaller firms seemed to have higher abnormal 
returns. It is also consistent with some previous studies that found a positive relationship 
between the ratio of book-to-market value of equity and abnormal returns (for example, 
see Fama and French, 1992), implying that investors may require higher returns from 
smaller firms and firms with high BE/ME ratios in order to compensate for high risks.  
Nevertheless, the evidence from this study, in Section 6.7.2, reveals that the perception 
of investors may be a factor that drives these relationships; investors seem to over expect 
the performance of larger firms and therefore overestimate the stock returns of large 
firms. On the other hand, investors seem to under expect the performance of firms with a 
high BE/ME ratio, which suggests lower growth, and therefore underestimate the stock 
returns of firms with high BE/ME ratio. 
Regarding leverage, the evidence shows that it is significantly and positively related to 
one-year-ahead abnormal returns, which is consistent with previous studies such as that 
of Bhandari (1988) and suggests that investors view firms with high leverage as having 
higher risk and tend to underestimate the value of high leverage firms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 An “accruals anomaly” refers to a situation in which investors tend to overestimate the ability of the 
accruals component of earnings and underestimate the ability of the cash flow component of earnings to 
predict future earnings (Sloan, 1996). 
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Finally, the evidence shows that previous buy-and-hold abnormal returns are 
significantly and negatively related to one-year-ahead abnormal returns, suggesting that 
investors use past information on abnormal returns to predict future performance and 
returns. They may therefore have an overly positive perception of stock that has 
performed well and, in turn, they overestimate the value of stock (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993; Lakonishok et al., 1994). 
6.6.4 The Corporate Governance Reforms  
This section examines whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
structure and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in pre-
reform and post-reform periods. The samples were divided into pre-reform (1994 to 
1998) and post-reform (2000 – 2007) sub-samples. The regression results estimated 
from Model 6.1 and Model 6.2 are reported in Table 6.8 to 6.9. 
Additionally, it further investigates whether investors were more able to perceive the 
impact of ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance after the reforms (Ha22 to Ha41). The tests for equality of coefficients in pre-
reform and post-reform periods are also performed using the dummy variables approach 
discussed in Section 6.4.3.1. Only the incremental effects and the Wald test (F-statistic) 
from Model 6.5 to 6.8 are reported. 
6.6.4.1 Are Investors More Able to Perceive the Impact of Ownership 
Concentration and the Presence of Dominant Shareholders on Firm 
Performance? 
Panels A and B in Table 6.8 report the OLS regression results estimated from Models 
6.1 and 6.2 before and after the reforms.  
Regarding Model 6.1, the results from Panel A show that the sign of the coefficient of 
Concentrated Own in Regression (A) is significantly positive only before the reforms, 
suggesting that investors tended to misperceive the impact of ownership concentration 
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on firm performance, but only before the reforms. Hence they tended to significantly 
underestimate the impact before the reforms.  
The equality test (Ha22) reveals that the incremental effects in the post-reform period are 
negative but not significant. The Wald test suggests that investors tended to 
underestimate the impacts in both periods but no significant misperception incurred in 
the post-reform period. The evidence suggests that generally investors could better 
perceive the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance after the reforms. 
Therefore, they more correctly estimate the impact after the reforms.  
Regarding Model 6.2, the result from Panel B shows that the sign of the coefficient of 
D_Dominant in Regression (B) is significant and positive, but only before the reform, 
suggesting that investors only misperceived the impact of the presence of dominant 
shareholders on firm performance before the reforms. No evidence of the significant 
mispricing of this impact is found after the reforms.  
The equality test (Ha23) reveals that the incremental effects in the post-reform period are 
negative but not significant. The Wald test suggests that investors tended to 
underestimate the impacts in both periods but no significant misperception incurred in 
the post-reform period. Consistent to Hypothesis Ha23, the evidence suggests that 
generally investors could better perceive the impact of the presence of a dominant 
shareholder on firm performance after the reforms. Therefore, they more correctly 
estimate the impact after the reforms. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that the reforms are likely to have helped to improve the 
ability of investors to predict future earnings and returns and that, alongside the 
accounting standard reforms, they encouraged firms to provide better transparency and 
disclosure on their structures, which in turn may have reduced the degree of investor 
misperceptions of the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. In 
addition, improvements in corporate governance may have increased investors’ 
confidence in general, regardless of ownership structures; they tended not to have 
extreme views on the impact of these structures after the reforms. 
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Table 6.8: Investors’ Perception on the Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant 
Shareholder and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Firm Performance before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration, the presence of dominant shareholder and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
before and after the corporate governance reforms. Dependent variable is BHARt+1, which is a one-year ahead 12-month 
buy and hold abnormal stock return. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are 
included for all models. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 
Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged total accruals (TACit-
1) as control variables. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in 
pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the 
single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Panel A: Model 6.1 – Ownership Concentration 
 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 
 Regression (A) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.5) Regression (B) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.5) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
         Concentrated 
Own 0.324* 0.109 -0.215 1.21 0.268 0.113 -0.155 0.39 
Share 
Difference -0.102 -0.105 -0.003 0.00 -0.085 -0.107 -0.022 0.02 
CV 0.064 0.062 -0.002 0.00 0.090 0.058 -0.032 0.07 
Board Size 0.188*** 0.108 -0.080 0.62 0.200** 0.104 -0.096 0.79 
Board 
Independence 0.639*** 0.063 -0.576** 5.31** 0.880*** 0.061 -0.819*** 6.80*** 
Board 
Experience 0.020 0.275*** 0.255** 4.91** 0.132 0.274*** 0.142 1.11 
CEO-Founder -0.032 0.003 0.035 0.30 -0.046 0.005 0.051 0.42 
CEO 
Descendant 0.041 0.001 -0.040 0.16 0.144 0.001 -0.143 1.17 
CEO-Chair 0.057 -0.041 -0.098 1.56 0.134 -0.040 -0.174* 2.81* 
CEO-Group 0.041 -0.050 -0.091 0.95 -0.023 -0.049 -0.026 0.06 
BIG 4 0.024 -0.002 -0.026 0.27 0.068 -0.001 -0.069 1.40 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 0.081** 0.006 -0.075 2.26 0.107** 0.007 -0.100* 2.76* 
EBITt 1.228*** 0.247 -0.981*** 7.63***     
CFt     1.210*** 0.230 -0.980*** 6.13*** 
TACt     1.237*** 0.185 -1.052*** 6.15*** 
EBITt-1 -1.066*** -0.026 1.040*** 10.19***     
CFt-1     -0.887** -0.076 0.811** 4.15** 
TACt-1     -0.992*** 0.037 1.029*** 7.17*** 
BHARt -0.270*** -0.043* 0.227*** 30.13*** -0.339*** -0.042* 0.297*** 38.14*** 
p_value 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   
         
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.8: Investors’ Perception on the Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant 
Shareholder and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Firm Performance before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration, the presence of dominant shareholder and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
before and after the corporate governance reforms. Dependent variable is BHARt+1, which is a one-year ahead 12-month 
buy and hold abnormal stock return. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are 
included for all models. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 
Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged total accruals (TACit-
1) as control variables. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in 
pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the 
single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Panel A: Model 6.1 – Ownership Concentration 
 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 
 Regression (A) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.5) Regression (B) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.5) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
         Firm Size -0.042*** -0.047*** -0.005 0.06 -0.043** -0.045*** -0.002 0.01 
Firm Age -0.003 -0.036 -0.033 0.49 -0.038 -0.037 0.001 0.00 
Sales Growth -0.119*** -0.061 0.058 0.99 -0.169*** -0.061 0.108 2.17 
Leverage -0.211** 0.214*** 0.425*** 10.77*** -0.306** 0.208*** 0.514*** 10.53 
Book-to-Market 0.035*** 0.108*** 0.073*** 8.02*** 0.031** 0.107*** 0.076*** 8.15 
Constant 0.040 0.134   0.031 0.134   
         No. of Obs. 1,211 2,067   664 2,063   
Adj. R-squared 0.106 0.055   0.144 0.054   
F-test 6.838 4.597   5.591 4.252   
p_value 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   
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Table 6.8: Investors’ Perception on the Impact of Ownership Concentration, the Presence of Dominant 
Shareholder and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Firm Performance before and after the 
Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration, the presence of dominant shareholder and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance before 
and after the corporate governance reforms. Dependent variable is BHARt+1, which is a one-year ahead 12-month buy and 
hold abnormal stock return. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all 
models. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. Regression (B) included 
cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. A 
single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. 
This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × variable) from the single regressions and the 
Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) 
or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Panel B: Model 6.2 – The Presence of Dominant Shareholder 
 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 
 Regression (A) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.6) Regression (B) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.6) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
         D_Dominant 0.079 0.053 -0.026 0.11 0.161* 0.055 -0.106 1.36 
Share Difference -0.017 -0.089 -0.072 0.46 -0.092 -0.091 0.001 0.00 
CV 0.065 0.059 -0.006 0.00 0.094 0.055 -0.039 0.11 
Board Size 0.171** 0.102 -0.069 0.47 0.176** 0.098 -0.078 0.52 
Board 
Independence 
0.600*** 0.066 -0.534** 4.49** 0.840*** 0.064 -0.776** 5.96** 
Board Experience 0.037 0.272*** 0.235** 4.19** 0.163 0.271*** 0.108 0.63 
CEO-Founder -0.039 0.001 0.040 0.39 -0.058 0.003 0.061 0.61 
CEO Descendant 0.029 0.000 -0.029 0.08 0.126 0.000 -0.126 0.89 
CEO-Chair 0.061 -0.041 -0.102 1.69 0.146 -0.040 -0.186* 3.18* 
CEO-Group 0.058 -0.050 -0.108 1.34 -0.014 -0.049 -0.035 0.10 
BIG 4 0.026 -0.002 -0.028 0.31 0.072 0.000 -0.072 1.54 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 0.079* 0.005 -0.074 2.18 0.093* 0.006 -0.087 2.11 
EBITt 1.222*** 0.245 -0.977*** 7.55***     
CFt     1.209*** 0.226 -0.983*** 6.25*** 
TACt     1.215*** 0.185 -1.030** 5.96** 
EBITt-1 -1.079*** -0.039 1.040*** 10.08***     
CFt-1     -0.937** -0.087 0.850** 4.48** 
TACt-1     -1.040*** 0.029 1.069*** 7.63*** 
BHARt -0.268*** -0.043* 0.225*** 29.61*** -0.339*** -0.042* 0.297*** 38.82*** 
Firm Size -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.006 0.07 -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.001 0.00 
Firm Age -0.002 -0.035 -0.033 0.48 -0.036 -0.035 0.001 0.00 
Sales Growth -0.122*** -0.059 0.063 1.15 -0.163*** -0.060 0.103 2.06 
Leverage -0.211** 0.210*** 0.421*** 10.63*** -0.321** 0.205*** 0.526*** 11.12*** 
Book-to-Market 0.035*** 0.108*** 0.073*** 7.98*** 0.033** 0.107*** 0.074*** 7.87*** 
Constant 0.104 0.153   0.114 0.153   
         No. of Obs. 1,211 2,067   664 2,063   
Adj. R-squared 0.104 0.055   0.148 0.055   
F-test 6.643 4.677   5.694 4.312   
p_value 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   
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6.6.4.2 Do Investors Better Perceive the Impact of Ownership 
Concentration by Shareholder Type and the Presence of Dominant 
Shareholder by their Types on Firm Performance? 
Panels A and B in Table 6.9 report the OLS regression results estimated from Models 
6.3 and 6.4 before and after the reforms.  
The results from Panel A show that the signs of the coefficients of Government Own and 
D_Government in Regressions (A) and (B) are significantly positive in Models 6.3 and 
6.4, but only after the reforms. No significant sign is found before the reforms for all 
models. The evidence suggests that investors tend to better perceived the impact of 
government block ownership and the presence of dominant government shareholders on 
performance before the reforms. 
Nevertheless, the equality test (Ha25 and Ha30) reveals that the incremental effects in the 
post-reform period are positive but not significant. The Wald test suggests that investors 
tended to underestimate the impacts in both periods but no significant misperception 
incurred in the post-reform period. Although the equality test19 did not provide strong 
evidence of the significant negative perception of government incurred in the post-
reform period, the significant positive sign of the coefficients of Government Own and 
D_Government in post-reform period imply that investors tended to misperceive these 
impacts after the reforms, leading to the underestimating of the impacts after the 
reforms. 
According to Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2006), Thailand has had an 
unstable democracy and Thai politics have been governed by military and bureaucratic 
elites since 1932. During 1990s, the country was governed by four elected governments; 
each government was formed by coalitions between political parties and normally ended 
because of the departure of key coalition partners. A major change in Thai politics began 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 By performing the Mishkin test in Section 6.7.2, the results also confirm that investors have more 
significant negative perception on government block ownership/the presence of a dominant government 
shareholder after the reforms. 
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with the enactment of the new constitution in 1997. The political reform included such 
measures as the adoption of a party list system and the requirement for prime ministers 
to be elected. Each government has served a four-year term. 
The first election under the new constitution was on 6 January 2001 and the leader of the 
winning party became the prime minister. This was the first civilian government that ran 
for a full, four-year term, and it was re-elected in 2005. The prime minister at that time 
owned big businesses in Thailand. Although Thai politics seemed to be stable (in terms 
of the frequency of changes in government), investors may have felt less confident about 
firms that were majority owned by government during that period. For example, they 
may have feared that the government would take some private benefits and transfer them 
to the prime minister’s businesses. 
As mentioned above, it is possible that the unstable politics and political intervention as 
well as a lack of confidence in government transparency, especially during the reforms, 
created negative investor perceptions of government-owned firms. Additionally, the 
evidence from this study suggests that the corporate governance reforms did not 
significantly help to mitigate investors’ negative perceptions of the impact of 
government block ownership on firm performance.  
Regarding foreign company ownership, Panels A and B report significantly positive 
signs of Foreign Own in Regressions (A) and (B) only before the reforms in Models 6.3 
and 6.4. However, these significant positive signs disappear in all models after the 
reforms.  
The equality test (Ha26) reveals that the incremental effects of foreign company block 
ownership in the post-reform period are significantly negative. The Wald test also 
suggests that the degrees of the misperception in pre-reform and post-reform periods are 
significantly different. Hence investors tended to have more positive perception of 
foreign block ownership after the reforms and this perception significantly reduce their 
negative perception of this structure before the reforms. Nevertheless, the equality test 
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(Ha30) does not provide strong evidence of significant misperception of the presence of a 
dominant foreign company shareholder in the post-reform period. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that investors misperceived the impact of concentrated 
ownership by foreign investors and the presence of dominant foreign shareholders on 
firm performance, but only before the reforms. Therefore, they tended to underestimate 
the impacts of these structures on firm performance before the reforms.  
Before the reforms, many foreign companies were faced with restrictions (such as 
limited ownership, limited types of businesses) under the Foreign Business Law (1972). 
These may have affected the investor perceptions and confidence in firms with foreign 
company block ownership. Since the crisis, the law became less restricted and many 
campaigns were launched by the government (such as corporate tax exemptions) in 
order to promote the Thai economy. These may have reduced the overly negative 
investor perceptions of foreign block ownership after the reforms and improved 
investors’ ability to predict the impact of this structure on firm performance. 
Regarding non-bank financial institutional investor ownership, the results from Models 
6.3 report significantly negative signs for Non-Bank Financial institution Own, but only 
before the reforms. However, no significant sign is found in Model 6.4. 
The equality test (Ha28) reveals that the incremental effects in the post-reform period are 
positive but not significant. The Wald test suggests that investors tended to overestimate 
the impacts in both periods but no significant misperception incurred in the post-reform 
period. Hence it could imply that investors seem to have more negative perception of 
non-bank financial institution ownership in post-reform period in turn reducing the 
extremely positive perception in the pre-reform period. 
The evidence suggests that, before the reforms, investors misperceived the impact of 
non-bank financial institutional investors block ownership. Therefore, they tended to 
overestimate the impact of this structure on firm performance before the reforms. Since 
the Thai economy was booming before the financial crisis, investors may have had a 
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positive view of this type of shareholder’s ability to provide good monitoring in order to 
enhance firm performance (for examples, see Brickley et al., 1988; Chen et al., 2005; 
Cornett et al., 2007) and therefore they overestimated the impact of this structure.  
However, many financial institutions were closed after the crisis and this indicated some 
weaknesses in the financial system. Coupled with the reforms, this may have led to more 
accurate investor perceptions of the impact of non-bank financial institutional investors 
block ownership on firm performance. 
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Table 6.9: Investors’ Perception on the Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the 
Presence of Dominant Shareholder by their Types and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Firm 
Performance before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration by types of shareholder, the presence of dominant shareholder by their types and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance before and after the corporate governance reforms. Dependent variable is BHARt+1, which 
is a one-year ahead 12-month buy and hold abnormal stock return. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry 
and Year Dummy are included for all models. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as 
control variables. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged total 
accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of 
coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × 
variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Panel A: Model 6.3 – Ownership Concentration by Shareholders’ Types 
 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 
 Regression (A) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.7) Regression (B) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
         
Family Own 0.050 0.069 0.019 0.01 0.107 0.075 -0.032 0.02 
Government Own 0.534 0.560** 0.026 0.00 0.656 0.559** -0.097 0.04 
Foreign Com. Own 0.655*** 0.083 -0.572*** 6.45*** 0.552** 0.083 -0.469* 3.56* 
Domestic Com. Own -0.165 0.036 0.201 0.43 -0.373 0.048 0.421 1.25 
Bank Own 0.720 -0.472 -1.192 1.20 1.758 -0.475 -2.233 2.53 
Non-Bank Fin. Own -1.213** -0.235 0.978 1.47 -1.247* -0.238 1.009 1.22 
Share Difference 0.044 -0.076 -0.120 1.20 0.009 -0.079 -0.088 0.47 
CV 0.045 0.047 0.002 0.00 0.064 0.045 -0.019 0.02 
Board Size 0.166** 0.080 -0.086 0.71 0.145* 0.076 -0.069 0.39 
Board Independence 0.576*** 0.041 -0.535** 4.61** 0.854*** 0.040 -0.814*** 6.69*** 
Board Experience 0.026 0.267*** 0.241** 4.33** 0.119 0.266*** 0.147 1.12 
CEO-Founder 0.009 0.008 -0.001 0.00 -0.022 0.010 0.032 0.15 
CEO Descendant 0.059 0.008 -0.051 0.26 0.168 0.007 -0.161 1.33 
CEO-Chair 0.055 -0.043 -0.098 1.57 0.141 -0.042 -0.183* 3.12* 
CEO-Group 0.048 -0.047 -0.095 1.01 -0.009 -0.047 -0.038 0.12 
BIG 4 -0.006 0.001 0.007 0.02 0.052 0.003 -0.049 0.66 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.087** 0.009 -0.078 2.41 0.094* 0.010 -0.084 1.95 
EBITt 1.133*** 0.248 -0.885*** 6.39***     
CFt     1.119*** 0.225 -0.894** 5.20** 
TACt     1.163*** 0.190 -0.973** 5.32** 
EBITt-1 -1.086*** -0.035 1.051*** 10.55***     
CFt-1     -0.952*** -0.084 0.868** 4.75** 
TACt-1     -1.027*** 0.030 1.057*** 7.51*** 
BHARt -0.273*** -0.044* 0.229*** 30.76*** -0.344*** -0.043* 0.301*** 38.17*** 
         
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.9: Investors’ Perception on the Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the 
Presence of Dominant Shareholder by their Types and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Firm 
Performance before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration by types of shareholder, the presence of dominant shareholder by their types and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance before and after the corporate governance reforms. Dependent variable is BHARt+1, which 
is a one-year ahead 12-month buy and hold abnormal stock return. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry 
and Year Dummy are included for all models. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as 
control variables. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged total 
accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality of 
coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × 
variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Panel A: Model 6.3 – Ownership Concentration by Shareholders’ Types (Cont’) 
 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 
 Regression (A) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.7) Regression (B) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
         
Firm Size -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.001 0.00 -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.002 0.01 
Firm Age -0.033 -0.028 0.005 0.01 -0.055 -0.028 0.027 0.21 
Sales Growth -0.122*** -0.061 0.061 1.13 -0.186*** -0.061 0.125* 2.97* 
Leverage -0.208** 0.214*** 0.422*** 10.46*** -0.298** 0.208*** 0.506*** 10.10*** 
Book-to-Market 0.034*** 0.106*** 0.072*** 7.60*** 0.033** 0.105*** 0.072*** 7.10*** 
Constant 0.344 0.272   0.315 0.268   
         No. of Obs. 1,211 2,067   664 2,063   
Adj. R-squared 0.117 0.055   0.151 0.055   
F-test 6.590 3.871   4.974 3.637   
p_value 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   
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Table 6.9: Investors’ Perception on the Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the 
Presence of Dominant Shareholder by their Types and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Firm Performance before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration by types of shareholder, the presence of dominant shareholder by their types and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance before and after the corporate governance reforms. Dependent variable is BHARt+1, which 
is a one-year ahead 12-month buy and hold abnormal stock return. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry 
and Year Dummy are included for all models. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as 
control variables. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged 
total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality 
of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × 
variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 Panel B: Model 6.4 – The Presence of Dominant Shareholder by Shareholders’ Types 
 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 
 Regression (A) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.8) Regression (B) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.8) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
         
D_Family 0.028 0.041 0.013 0.02 0.120 0.044 -0.076 0.57 
D_Government 0.184 0.293** 0.109 0.37 0.224 0.292** 0.068 0.13 
D_Foreign 0.218*** 0.060 -0.158 2.71 0.217** 0.060 -0.157 2.18 
D_Domestic -0.164 -0.014 0.150 0.99 -0.011 -0.008 0.003 0.00 
D_Bank - -0.122 - - - -0.122 - - 
D_Non-Bank Fin. 0.063 0.230 0.167 0.14 0.351 0.236 -0.115 0.06 
Share Difference 0.039 -0.079 -0.118 1.14 -0.046 -0.082 -0.036 0.07 
CV 0.012 0.035 0.023 0.04 0.051 0.032 -0.019 0.02 
Board Size 0.175** 0.074 -0.101 0.98 0.177** 0.070 -0.107 0.94 
Board 
Independence 0.599*** 0.032 -0.567** 5.09** 0.856*** 0.031 -0.825*** 6.68*** 
Board Experience 0.034 0.260*** 0.226** 3.88** 0.151 0.259*** 0.108 0.63 
CEO-Founder -0.014 0.010 0.024 0.14 -0.046 0.012 0.058 0.54 
CEO Descendant 0.034 0.006 -0.028 0.08 0.131 0.006 -0.125 0.87 
CEO-Chair 0.064 -0.039 -0.103 1.71 0.151 -0.039 -0.190* 3.27 
CEO-Group 0.074 -0.039 -0.113 1.48 0.004 -0.039 -0.043 0.15 
BIG 4 0.016 0.001 -0.015 0.09 0.074 0.003 -0.071 1.42 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 0.080* 0.006 -0.074 2.19 0.098* 0.007 -0.091 2.25 
EBITt 1.184*** 0.238 -0.946*** 7.26***     
CFt     1.181*** 0.218 -0.963** 5.92** 
TACt     1.179*** 0.172 -1.007** 5.64** 
EBITt-1 -1.121*** -0.045 1.076*** 11.27***     
CFt-1     -0.942** -0.096 0.846** 4.45** 
TACt-1     -1.046*** 0.011 1.057*** 7.49*** 
BHARt -0.272*** -0.045* 0.227*** 30.39*** -0.343*** -0.044* 0.299*** 39.22*** 
         
(This table is continued on the next page) 
 
	  	  	  
Chapter 6	  
471	  
 
Table 6.9: Investors’ Perception on the Impact of Ownership Concentration by Types of Shareholder, the 
Presence of Dominant Shareholder by their Types and Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Firm Performance before and after the Corporate Governance Reforms (Cont’) 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration by types of shareholder, the presence of dominant shareholder by their types and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance before and after the corporate governance reforms. Dependent variable is BHARt+1, which 
is a one-year ahead 12-month buy and hold abnormal stock return. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry 
and Year Dummy are included for all models. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as 
control variables. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged 
total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. A single regression using dummy variable approach is applied to test the equality 
of coefficients in pre and post-reform periods. This table shows only an incremental effect from post-reform period (Post × 
variable) from the single regressions and the Wald test is performed to test the null hypothesis that βPre = βPost. Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at 1% (***) 5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Model 6.4 – The Presence of Dominant Shareholder by Shareholders’ Types 
(Cont’) 
 BHARt+1 BHARt+1 
 Regression (A) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.8) Regression (B) 
Equality Test 
(Model 6.8) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
Pre-
Reform 
Post-
Reform 
Inct. 
Effect 
Wald 
Test (F) 
         
Firm Size -0.046*** -0.052*** -0.006 0.10 -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.004 0.04 
Firm Age -0.021 -0.025 -0.004 0.00 -0.040 -0.025 0.015 0.07 
Sales Growth -0.115*** -0.064* 0.051 0.77 -0.159*** -0.064 0.095 1.72 
Leverage -0.207* 0.195** 0.402*** 9.55*** -0.309** 0.188** 0.497*** 9.86*** 
Book-to-Market 0.033** 0.104*** 0.071*** 7.51*** 0.033** 0.103*** 0.070*** 7.07*** 
Constant 0.236 0.305   0.146 0.301   
         No. of Obs. 1,211 2,067   664 2,063   
Adj. R-squared 0.109 0.056   0.145 0.056   
F-test 6.380 3.811   5.051 3.574   
p_value 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   
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6.6.4.3 Do Investors Better Perceive the Impact of Other Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms on Firm Performance? 
Panels A and B in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 report the OLS regression results estimated from 
Models 6.1 and 6.4 before and after the reforms. 
The results show significantly positive signs for Board Size coefficients for both models, 
but only before the reforms, suggesting that investors misperceived the impact of board 
size on firm performance before the reforms and therefore tended to underestimate the 
impact of board size. However, this misperception largely disappeared after the reforms. 
The equality test (Ha33) reveals that the incremental effects in the post-reform period are 
negative but not significant. The Wald test suggests that investors tended to 
underestimate the impacts in both periods but no significant misperception incurred in 
the post-reform period. Hence it could imply that investors seem to have more positive 
perception of bigger board size in post-reform period in turn reducing the extremely 
negative perception in the pre-reform period. 
The literature suggests that bigger boards are less efficient than smaller boards (Jensen, 
1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). According to the findings of Chapter 
4, board size was significantly and negatively related to accounting performance (ROA) 
before and after the reforms and to market performance (simplified Tobin’s q) only 
before the reforms. 
Incorporated into the findings of this chapter, this evidence indicates that investors 
tended to have an overly negative perception of board size, leading them to expect a 
more negative effect of larger boards on firm performance than was actually the case 
before the reforms. After the reforms, the responsibility and accountability of directors 
has been particularly emphasised by regulators, and directors’ training programmes have 
been launched in an effort to increase directors’ awareness of their roles and 
responsibilities in respect to firms and shareholders. These factors may have increased 
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investors’ confidence in the quality of boards and helped them to correctly perceive the 
impact of board size on firm performance after the reforms. 
In respect to board independence, the results from all models report significantly 
positive signs of the coefficients of Board independence only before the reforms, 
indicating that investors tended to incorrectly perceive the impact of board independence 
on firm performance and therefore underestimate the impact of board independence on 
firm performance before the reform. However, the misperception disappeared after the 
reforms. 
The equality test (Ha34) reveals that the incremental effects in the post-reform period are 
significantly negative. The Wald test also suggests that the degrees of the misperception 
in pre-reform and post-reform periods are significantly different. Hence investors tended 
to have more positive perception of board independence after the reform and this 
perception significantly reduce their negative perception of this structure before the 
reform. 
The evidence from Chapter 4 reports a significantly positive association between board 
independence and accounting performance, but only before the reforms. Therefore, the 
findings from this chapter suggest that investors tended to have a negative perception of 
board independence or they underestimate the impact of board independence before the 
reforms. In fact, the role of board independence was not well known in Thailand prior to 
the crisis and the subsequent reforms. Investors may have had little knowledge of how 
independent directors could help to improve firm performance or may have doubted 
whether independent directors were actually independent. These negative perceptions 
may have led them to incorrectly perceive the true impact of board independence on 
firm performance before the reforms. This finding also is inconsistent with evidence 
from the literature that suggests that investors are likely to have positive perceptions of 
board independence (for examples, see Lin et al., 2003; Nguyen et al., 2010; Rosenstein 
and Wyatt, 1990).  
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After the reforms, listed companies were required to have audit committees comprised 
of at least three independent directors. Although the Chapter 4 did not find a significant 
relationship between board independence and firm performance (accounting and market 
performance) after the reforms, investors may have had a better understanding of it and 
therefore correctly perceived the impact. 
Regarding board experience, the results from all models report significantly positive 
signs for the coefficients of Board experience, but only after the reforms, suggesting that 
investors tended to incorrectly perceive the impact of board experience after the reforms 
and underestimated the impact of board experience on firm performance. 
The equality test (Ha35) reveals that the incremental effects in the post-reform period are 
significantly positive. The Wald test also suggests that the degrees of the misperception 
in pre-reform and post-reform periods are significantly different. Hence investors tended 
to have more negative perception of board experience after the reforms. 
The evidence suggests that investors may have viewed directors who hold multiple 
directorships as being less efficient rather than more experienced, especially after the 
reforms (Ferris et al., 2003). In addition, the average number of directors in each board 
significantly increased after the reforms, partly due to the requirement for audit 
committees. Investors may have had the perception that these directors made less effort 
(in terms of time and resources) to efficiently monitor firms than those who held one 
directorship did. This negative perception of the impact of board experience on firm 
performance led them to underestimate the impact after the reforms. 
Regarding auditor-partner tenure, the results from all models report significantly positive 
signs for the coefficients of Audit Partner Tenure, but only before the reforms, 
suggesting that investors tended to incorrectly perceive the impact of auditor-partner 
tenure after the reforms and to underestimate the impact of auditor experience on 
performance. 
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The equality test (Ha41) reveals that the incremental effects in the post-reform period are 
negative but not significant. The Wald test suggests that investors tended to 
underestimate the impacts in both periods but no significant misperception incurred in 
the post-reform period. Hence it could imply that investors seem to have more positive 
perception of long auditor-partner tenure in post-reform period in turn reducing the 
extremely negative perception in the pre-reform period. 
The evidence also suggests that investors’ conviction that long auditor-partner tenures 
reduce auditor independence and audit quality resulted in a negative perception of their 
impact on firm performance before the reforms. The corporate governance reforms and 
the reform of accounting and auditing standards in line with international frameworks 
may have reduced negative investor perceptions and led to a correct perception of the 
impact of audit partner tenure on firm performance. 
6.6.4.4 Other Control Variables 
This section further examines whether other control variables had any effect on investor 
perceptions before and after the reforms. The OLS regression results are consistent for 
all models (Model 6.1 to 6.4). 
The results from Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show that investors tended to underestimate the 
ability of current earnings to predict future earnings before the reforms. In addition, they 
tended to underestimate the ability of the accruals and cash flow components of earnings 
to predict future earnings before the reforms. This may imply that underestimating 
before the reforms was due to both the accruals and the cash flow components of 
earnings. The evidence is inconsistent with Sloan (1996) and other research from the US 
that reports that investors are likely to underestimate the ability of cash flows but 
overestimate the ability of accruals components of earnings to predict future earnings. 
Nevertheless, this evidence is partly consistent with the findings of Pincus et al. (2007), 
who found that investors tended to underestimate the ability of cash flow components of 
earnings to predict future earnings in Thailand. 
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However, the evidence from the earnings components sample suggests that investors 
tended to overestimate one-year lagged earnings, cash flow and the accruals components 
of earnings before the reforms. This may imply that they had overoptimistic expectations 
from past firm performance but, when firm performance was announced and did not 
meet their expectations, they tended to underestimate the price of current earnings and 
earnings components. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Kraft et al. (2007) 
and suggests that the exclusion of other variables may influence the prediction of future 
earnings and returns and lead to problems (omitted variables) in forecast and pricing 
regressions that are based on the Mishkin test. 
The misperception of past earnings and earnings components largely disappeared after 
the reforms, which suggests that investors then correctly perceived the ability of these 
accounting numbers to predict future earnings and returns. This may imply that the 
corporate governance and accounting standards reforms improved the quality of 
accounting information to some extent and thereby helped investors to use the 
information to predict future earnings and returns. The evidence in this study also 
suggests that the accruals anomaly found in other research may have been due to the 
period of study. 
Regarding other control variables, the evidence from Tables 6.8 and 6.9 shows that, 
while firm size was significantly and negatively related to the one-year-ahead abnormal 
returns, the book-to-market ratio was significantly and positively related to them, before 
and after the reforms. This evidence is consistent with the findings of previous research 
in countries such as the US and Japan. Although investor perceptions could be an 
alternative explanation to risk factors, as suggested by Fama and French (1993), the 
relationship between firm size and the ratio of book-to-market or abnormal returns 
seems to have been consistent over time, regardless of the reforms. 
Sales growth was significantly and negatively related to one-year-ahead abnormal 
returns, but only before the reforms. This may have been caused by an overoptimistic 
expectation of investors about future sales growth based on past performance, leading 
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them to overestimate the value of companies with high sales growth (Skinner and Sloan, 
2002). Nevertheless, investors may have been able to extract better information from 
financial reports after the reforms, which allowed them to correctly perceive the impact 
of sales growth on firm performance. 
Leverage was significantly and negatively related to one-year-ahead abnormal returns 
before the reforms but significantly and positively related to them after the reforms. In 
Thailand, many banks have close relationships with businesses (Limpaphayom and 
Polwitoon, 2004) and investors may have viewed high leverage before the reforms as an 
indication that firms had more access to funding from banks for investment. However, 
high leverage in listed firms was one of the reasons for the financial crisis. Therefore, 
investors may have believed that firms with high leverage had higher risks, leading to 
negative investor perceptions of high leverage after the reforms. 
Finally, previous buy-and-hold abnormal returns were significantly and negatively 
related to one-year-ahead abnormal returns both before and after the reforms and in both 
samples, confirming the notion that investors had overoptimistic expectations of stock 
that performed well and overpriced it over time (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; 
Lakonishok et al., 1994; Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Nevertheless, the degree of the 
misperception of past abnormal returns was significantly reduced after the reforms, 
suggesting that investors then had more ability to use this information to predict future 
earnings and return. 
6.6.4.5 Summary of the Impact of the Corporate Governance Reform on 
Investor Perceptions 
The findings reported in Section 6.6.4 suggest that, on average, investors tended to 
incorrectly perceive the impact of some ownership structures (such as foreign company 
and non-bank financial institutional investors’ ownership) and other corporate 
governance mechanisms (such as board size, board independence and auditor 
experience) on firm performance before the reforms. Nevertheless, the investors’ 
misperceptions of these impacts largely disappeared after the reforms. 
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Overall, the evidence suggests that the reforms helped the ability of investors to 
accurately estimate the impact of most ownership structures and other corporate 
governance factors on firm performance. This suggests that the capital market and listed 
companies have become much more transparent, making it easier for investors to 
develop realistic expectations after the reforms. The evidence also indicates that the 
publicity around the corporate governance reforms has helped to educate investors about 
the effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of corporate governance mechanisms. For 
example, investors’ knowledge about the role of independent directors seems to have 
improved since the reforms. Although board independence did not significantly 
contribute to firm performance in reality, as shown in Chapter 4, the reforms have 
helped to reduce the investors’ negative perceptions of board independence.  
The evidence also suggests, however, that investors had more negative perceptions of 
government owned and controlled firms and of board experience only after the reforms. 
This may indicate that they responded to public criticism of the government (such as 
reports of unstable politics or political interference) in Thailand and that the reforms 
failed to improve investor confidence in these firms.  
In addition, the government’s focus on the promotion of certain corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as the requirement for audit committees to have at least three 
independent directors, may have led to some negative impressions. Investors may have 
become overly aware of the issue of directors’ independence, and this belief might have 
given them an unduly negative impression of effectiveness of directors who were 
appointed by many companies (in terms of time, effort and independence). Therefore, 
they may have overlooked benefits that firms could receive from these directors (e.g. 
experience). 
In conclusion, the reforms have partly achieved the aim of improved investor confidence 
in the Thai capital market. The government’s promotion of the corporate governance 
reforms has improved investors’ understanding of the important role of good corporate 
governance. The reforms have also helped to improve transparency and the ability of 
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investors to access public information, leading to greater accuracy in their perception of 
most corporate governance structures. Hence the evidence suggests that the objective of 
the Thai corporate governance reforms to improve market and firm transparency has 
been achieved to a considerable extent.  
6.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
6.7.1 Test for Specification Errors 
6.7.1.1 Multicollinearity Testing 
The results from the Pearson and Spearman correlations shown in Table 6.3, Section 
6.6.1, suggest that there is the imperfect multicollinearity among the independent 
variables. High levels of the multicollinearity problem would violate the assumptions of 
the OLS method, in which there are no perfect linear relationships among independent 
variables. Therefore, the VIF test was performed for all independent variables (including 
year and industry dummies) in all models. 
The results of the VIF tests for the full sample20 are presented in Table 6.10, Panels A.1 
and B.1, and show that the VIFs in all specification models are less than 10, with mean 
VIFs of about 2. Therefore, the multicollinearity problem is not severe in any of the 
specification models used in this chapter. 
6.7.1.2 Endogeneity Testing 
The existing literature highlights the endogeneity problem in studies of firm 
performance, ownership structure and other governance mechanisms. Therefore, the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test was used to identify possible endogeneity problems in all 
models with exception of Models 6.2 and 6.4, which use dummy variables to identify the 
presence of dominant shareholders. The null hypothesis that was tested states that the 
ownership and board of director variables are both exogenous. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The VIF test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test were also performed for the samples from before and after 
the reforms. The unreported results show no serious problems with multicollinearity or endogeneity in 
either of the sub-samples. 
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The results for the full sample21, shown in Panels A.2 and B.2 in Table 6.10, show that 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any of the models and suggest that all the 
ownership and board of directors variables are jointly exogenous in these samples. 
Therefore, the results from the main regressions are consistent. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Footnote 18. 
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Table 6.10 Test for Model Specification Errors – Full Sample 
Panel A.1: Variance Inflation Factors for Independent Variables for Model 6.1 and 6.2 
 
Model 6.1 – Ownership 
Concentration  
Model 6.2 – Dominant Shareholder 
(Dummy) 
 Regression (A) Regression (B)  Regression (A) Regression (B) 
Explanatory 
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF  VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
          Concentrated Own 
(D_Dominant) 2.37 0.422 2.38 0.420  1.45 0.690 1.45 0.690 
Share Difference 2.29 0.437 2.30 0.434  1.47 0.680 1.48 0.676 
CV 1.36 0.733 1.37 0.732  1.36 0.735 1.36 0.737 
Board Size 2.09 0.479 2.15 0.465  2.08 0.481 2.15 0.465 
Board Independence 3.53 0.284 3.24 0.308  3.53 0.283 3.24 0.309 
Board Experience 1.40 0.713 1.42 0.705  1.40 0.714 1.42 0.705 
CEO-Founder 1.52 0.656 1.51 0.661  1.52 0.658 1.50 0.665 
CEO Descendant 1.61 0.620 1.53 0.655  1.62 0.618 1.53 0.654 
CEO-Chair 1.50 0.665 1.48 0.674  1.50 0.665 1.48 0.674 
CEO-Group 1.57 0.637 1.47 0.680  1.56 0.639 1.47 0.682 
BIG 4 1.15 0.873 1.16 0.859  1.15 0.873 1.16 0.860 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 
1.17 0.851 1.19 0.837  1.17 0.851 1.19 0.838 
EBITt 2.06 0.486    2.06 0.486   
CFt   6.38 0.157    6.38 0.157 
TACt   5.64 0.177    5.64 0.177 
EBITt-1 1.93 0.517    1.94 0.516   
CFt-1   6.54 0.153    6.57 0.152 
TACt-1   5.82 0.172    5.84 0.171 
BHARt 1.30 0.770 1.26 0.794  1.30 0.770 1.26 0.794 
Firm Size 2.11 0.475 2.10 0.476  2.11 0.473 2.10 0.476 
Firm Age 1.31 0.763 1.28 0.778  1.31 0.763 1.28 0.778 
Sales Growth 1.22 0.817 1.23 0.814  1.23 0.816 1.23 0.811 
Leverage 1.54 0.651 1.55 0.645  1.54 0.650 1.55 0.644 
Book-to-Market 1.46 0.687 1.47 0.680  1.45 0.688 1.47 0.680 
          Mean VIF 2.10  2.72   2.05  2.67  
            
Panel A.2: Durbin-Wu-Hasman Test for Endogeneity 
 H0: Residual of All Ownership Variables and board OD directors are Jointly 
Exogenous  Durbin-Wu-Hasman 
 Model 6.1 
 Regression (A)  Regression (B) 
    
Chi-sq 5.075  4.598 
P-value 0.534  0.596 
    
Note: 
1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
2. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 
    Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and  
    lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. 
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Table 6.10 Test for Model Specification Errors – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel B.1: Variance Inflation Factors for Independent Variables for Model 6.3 and 6.4 
 
Model 6.3 – Ownership 
Concentration by Shareholders’ 
Types  
Model 6.4 – Dominant Shareholder 
by Shareholders’ Types (Dummies) 
 Regression (A) Regression (B)  Regression (A) Regression (B) 
Explanatory 
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF  VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
          Family 2.76 0.363 2.74 0.364  2.44 0.410 2.48 0.403 
Government 1.63 0.612 1.63 0.614  1.51 0.664 1.50 0.666 
Foreign Com. 1.71 0.583 1.72 0.581  1.72 0.580 1.75 0.571 
Domestic Com. 1.22 0.821 1.19 0.838  1.17 0.856 1.17 0.858 
Bank 1.16 0.858 1.17 0.854  1.06 0.947 1.07 0.938 
Non-Bank Fin. 1.15 0.867 1.14 0.881  1.05 0.956 1.06 0.947 
Share Difference 1.59 0.627 1.60 0.625  1.52 0.656 1.54 0.649 
CV 1.44 0.697 1.44 0.692  1.46 0.687 1.47 0.682 
Board Size 2.13 0.470 2.23 0.449  2.11 0.475 2.19 0.456 
Board Independence 3.54 0.282 3.26 0.307  3.55 0.282 3.27 0.306 
Board Experience 1.48 0.674 1.49 0.669  1.42 0.704 1.44 0.695 
CEO-Founder 1.58 0.632 1.56 0.639  1.56 0.642 1.53 0.652 
CEO Descendant 1.64 0.610 1.55 0.644  1.63 0.612 1.55 0.646 
CEO-Chair 1.51 0.662 1.49 0.671  1.52 0.658 1.50 0.666 
CEO-Group 1.61 0.622 1.50 0.665  1.59 0.629 1.50 0.667 
BIG 4 1.22 0.817 1.24 0.804  1.20 0.831 1.22 0.822 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 
1.18 0.845 1.20 0.832  1.18 0.845 1.21 0.830 
EBITt 2.06 0.485    2.06 0.485   
CFt   6.40 0.156    6.39 0.157 
TACt   5.66 0.177    5.65 0.177 
EBITt-1 1.93 0.517    1.94 0.516   
CFt-1   6.56 0.153    6.58 0.152 
TACt-1   5.83 0.171    5.84 0.171 
BHARt 1.30 0.769 1.26 0.793  1.30 0.769 1.26 0.793 
Firm Size 2.22 0.451 2.21 0.453  2.18 0.459 2.16 0.462 
Firm Age 1.36 0.737 1.33 0.754  1.34 0.744 1.31 0.761 
Sales Growth 1.23 0.816 1.23 0.814  1.23 0.814 1.23 0.810 
Leverage 1.55 0.647 1.56 0.641  1.56 0.642 1.57 0.637 
Book-to-Market 1.47 0.682 1.48 0.674  1.46 0.683 1.48 0.675 
          Mean VIF 2.04  2.60   2.01  2.57  
Note: 
1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
2. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 
    Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and  
    lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. 
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Table 6.10 Test for Model Specification Errors – Full Sample (Cont’) 
Panel B.2: Durbin-Wu-Hasman Test for Endogeneity 
 H0: Residual of All Ownership Variables and board OD directors are Jointly 
Exogenous  Durbin-Wu-Hasman 
 Model 6.3 
 Regression (A)  Regression (B) 
    Chi-sq 8.049  6.585 
P-value 0.709  0.832 
    
Note: 
1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
2. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 
    Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and 
    lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. 
 
6.7.2 OLS Method (OLS) vs. the Mishkin Test (MT) 
Kraft et al. (2007) suggest that the OLS estimations from Models 6.1 to 6.4 should be 
asymptotically equivalent to the estimations obtained from the forecasting and pricing 
equations under the MT, with exception of νt+1 in equation M. Hence, when the sample 
size is large, φi should be equal to β(γi – γi*). 
As discussed in Section 6.4.1, the MT requires two equations for each model: a 
forecasting equation and a pricing equation. As an alternative test, Models 6.1 to 6.4 
were re-estimated by the MT for all the samples. This study also restricts the samples to 
make them equal in order to compare the results between the two methods. The general 
forms of the two equations for each model are shown below. 
Forecasting Equation: 
Earningst+1 = γ0 + γk1 Ownership Variablesit + γk2Board Structure  
  + γk3CEO Characteristics + γk4 Auditor Reputation and Experience 
  + γk5Earnings (or Earnings components) + γk6 Other Control Variablesit 
  + γk7 Industry dummies + γk8 Year dummies + µt  (6.5) 
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Pricing Equation: 
BHARt+1  = β(Earningst+1 - γ*0 - γ*k1 Ownership Structureit - γ*k2Board Structure  
  + γk*3CEO Characteristics + γ*k4 Auditor Reputation and Expertise 
  + γ*k5 Earnings (or Earnings components) + γ*k6 Other Control Variablesit 
  + γk7 Industry dummies + γk8 Year dummies) + εt+1  (6.6) 
Under the EMH, the estimation of γ*k should not differ from γk. In other words, the EMH 
imposes a constraint that γ*k = γk, which is equivalent to testing whether βγ*k = βγk.  
The results from the MT for each model are shown in Tables 6.11 and 6.12. Overall, the 
results from the two methods are generally consistent. However, the coefficients 
estimated from the OLS are not exactly equivalent1 to those estimated from the MT 
approaches, β(γk - γ*k), in the smaller samples (such as those smaller than 40,000). In 
addition, the results from the MT are consistent with the main results reported in Section 
6.6.3. 
Overall, the evidence from Table 6.11 (Panels A.1, A.2 and B.1, B.2) suggests that there 
is no strong evidence of investors’ misperception of the impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance according to MT.  
When different types of shareholder are considered, the results (see Table 6.11) are 
consistent between the two approaches, confirming that investors negatively 
misperceived the impact of government block ownership and the presence of dominant 
government shareholders on firm performance (Panels C.1, C.2, D.1 and D.2). The 
results from the MT also confirm that investors misperceived the impact of foreign 
companies block ownership and the presence of dominant foreign shareholders on firm 
performance (Panel D.1 and D.2). Nevertheless, when cash flows and the accruals 
components of earnings were included as control variables, instead of earnings, no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The difference could be caused by the omission of νt+1 from equation J (Section 6.4.2). Kraft et al. 
(2007) suggest that this could indicate a slight increase in the standard error in the MT. The samples used 
in this study are much smaller than those used in accounting research and may therefore suffer if this error 
is ignored. However, it does not significantly affect most of the main results. 
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evidence of investors’ misperception of foreign companies as block owners or dominant 
shareholders was found. 
Regarding other corporate governance variables, the evidence that suggests that 
investors tended to incorrectly perceive the impact of the ratio of share differences 
disappears under the MT. Nevertheless, it is confirmed that investors misperceived the 
impact of board experience on firm performance. In addition, the estimation from the 
MT, suggests that investors also negatively misperceived the impact of auditor expertise 
(auditor partner tenure) on firm performance. 
Regarding the pre-reform and post-reform samples, the evidence is mostly consistent 
between the two methods, as shown in Table 6.12. 
In conclusion, this study suggests that the use of two equations (forecasting and pricing 
equations) in the MT could provide some advantages over the use of the OLS. Under the 
MT, researchers can also see the impact of the variables of interests on the prediction of 
firm performance (negative or positive). For example, under the MT, this study found 
that larger boards seem to have been less efficient than smaller boards before the 
reforms (forecasting equation). Additionally, investors seem to have realised this but 
their overly negative perceptions caused them to overestimate their negative impact 
(pricing equation). Therefore, although the OLS method is easier to implement, as 
suggested by Kraft et al. (2007), it could be helpful to apply the MT as well, in order to 
interpret the direction of investor perceptions more clearly. This study encourages future 
research to use both approaches, depending on the relevant research interests. 
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Table 6.11 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test 
Panel A.1: OLS Model 6.1: Investors’ Perception and the Impact of Ownership Concentration on 
Firm Performance – Regression (A) 
 OLS Mishkin Test  
 
Forecasting 
Equation  (1) 
Pricing  
Equation (2) Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Diff. 
Coef.  
(1) – (2) 
φOLS =  
β(γi - γ*i) 
         
Concentrated 
Own 0.112 (1.41) 0.016 (1.44) -0.029 (-1.04) 0.045 0.128 
Share Difference -0.094* (-1.78) -0.0005 (-0.07) 0.030 (1.60) -0.030 -0.085 
CV 0.033 (0.75) -0.005 (-0.75) -0.032** (-2.22) 0.027* 0.077 
Board Size 0.009 (0.18) -0.006 (-0.78) -0.028* (-1.94) 0.022 0.062 
Board 
Independence -0.001 (-0.02) -0.015 (-1.13) 0.008 (0.36) -0.023 -0.065 
Board 
Experience 0.140*** (2.81) 0.007 
 
(1.03) -0.056*** (-3.14) 0.063*** 0.179 
CEO-Founder -0.003 (-0.10) 0.003 (0.78) 0.003 (0.31) 0.000 0.000 
CEO Descendant 0.033 (0.83) 0.003 (0.66) -0.004 (-0.32) 0.007 0.020 
CEO-Chair -0.033 (-1.02) -0.004 (-0.78) 0.004 (0.32) -0.008 -0.023 
CEO-Group -0.024 (-0.65) -0.001 (-0.28) 0.004 (0.34) -0.005 -0.014 
BIG 4 -0.007 (-0.30) -0.001 (-0.27) 0.003 (0.46) -0.004 -0.011 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 0.029 (1.38) 0.011*** (3.76) -0.005 (-0.73) 0.016** 0.045 
EBITt 0.465*** (3.06) 0.502*** (15.89) 0.284*** (5.11) 0.218*** 0.619 
EBITt-1 -0.129 (-0.97) 0.173*** (6.13) 0.248*** (5.08) -0.075 -0.213 
BHARt -0.090*** (-4.79) 0.019*** (6.02) 0.049*** (7.74) -0.030*** -0.085 
Firm Size -0.042*** (-4.95) 0.003** (2.08) 0.023*** (7.34) -0.020*** -0.057 
Firm Age -0.009 (-0.43) 0.000 (0.10) 0.017** (2.33) -0.017** -0.048 
Sales Growth -0.015 (-0.60) -0.011** (-2.37) 0.016* (1.67) -0.027*** -0.077 
Leverage 0.104* (1.89) -0.012 (-1.59) -0.053*** (-2.92) 0.041** 0.116 
Book-to-Market 0.050*** (5.07) -0.004** (-2.14) -0.022*** (-5.71) 0.018*** 0.051 
Constant 0.305* (1.80) 0.033 (1.24) -0.182*** (-3.15) 0.215*** 0.611 
Beta (Mishkin)     2.840*** (16.96)   
         
No. of Obs. 3,508    3,508    
F-Test (OLS)/LR 
Test (Mishkin) 18.75    345.66    
p value 0.000    0.000    
Adj. R-Square 0.173        
         
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables 
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Table 6.11 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test (Cont’) 
Panel A.2: OLS Model 6.1: Investors’ Perception and the Impact of Ownership Concentration on Firm 
Performance – Regression (B) 
 OLS Mishkin Test  
 
Forecasting 
Equation (1) 
Pricing  
Equation (2) Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Diff. 
Coef.  
(1) – (2) 
φOLS =  
β(γi - γ*i) 
         Concentrated 
Own 0.085 (0.98) 0.016 (1.38) -0.015 (-0.47) 0.031 0.084 
Share Difference -0.082 (-1.43) -0.001 (-0.15) 0.023 (1.08) -0.024 -0.065 
CV 0.028 (0.59) -0.004 (-0.66) -0.034** (-2.09) 0.030* 0.081 
Board Size -0.006 (-0.10) 0.000 (0.04) -0.018 (-1.08) 0.018 0.049 
Board 
Independence -0.037 (-0.38) -0.013 (-0.89) 0.020 (0.78) -0.033 -0.089 
Board Experience 0.190*** (3.47) 0.006 (0.84) -0.083*** (-3.94) 0.089*** 0.240 
CEO-Founder 0.004 (0.11) 0.002 (0.40) 0.001 (0.05) 0.001 0.003 
CEO Descendant 0.028 (0.67) -0.002 (-0.32) -0.005 (-0.32) 0.003 0.008 
CEO-Chair -0.022 (-0.60) 0.007 (1.39) 0.010 (0.74) -0.003 -0.008 
CEO-Group -0.043 (-1.11) -0.001 (-0.22) 0.014 (0.96) -0.015 -0.040 
BIG 4 -0.004 (-0.15) 0.000 (0.09) 0.003 (0.40) -0.003 -0.008 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 0.023 (0.98) 0.009*** (2.80) -0.005 (-0.66) 0.014 0.038 
CFt 0.349** (2.13) 0.465*** (12.44) 0.295*** (4.68) 0.170*** 0.459 
TACt 0.277 (1.53) 0.454*** (11.16) 0.273*** (3.94) 0.181*** 0.489 
CFt-1 -0.100 (-0.70) 0.201*** (6.06) 0.254*** (4.50) -0.053 -0.143 
TACt-1 -0.027 (-0.18) 0.190*** (5.48) 0.239*** (4.10) -0.049 -0.132 
BHARt -0.096*** (-4.57) 0.019*** (5.68) 0.049*** (6.61) -0.030*** -0.081 
Firm Size -0.043*** (-4.60) 0.002* (1.83) 0.022*** (6.43) -0.020*** -0.054 
Firm Age -0.017 (-0.72) -0.001 (-0.43) 0.020** (2.25) -0.021** -0.057 
Sales Growth -0.012 (-0.41) -0.006 (-1.03) 0.018 (1.64) -0.024** -0.065 
Leverage 0.096 (1.58) -0.020** (-2.42) -0.071*** (-3.37) 0.051** 0.138 
Book-to-Market 0.052*** (4.49) -0.004* (-1.87) -0.027*** (-5.80) 0.023*** 0.062 
Constant 0.435** (2.22) 0.023 (0.77) -0.194*** (-2.75) 0.217*** 0.586 
Beta (Mishkin)     2.699*** (14.11)   
         
No. of Obs. 2,879    2,879    
F-Test (OLS)/LR 
Test (Mishkin) 12.54    257.22    
p value 0.000    0.000    
Adj. R-Square 0.150        
         
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged  
    total  accruals (TACit-1) as control variables 
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Table 6.11 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test (Cont’) 
Panel B.1: OLS Model 6.2: Investors’ Perception and the Impact of The Presence of Dominant 
Shareholder on Firm Performance – Regression (A) 
 OLS Mishkin Test  
 
Forecasting  
Equation (1) 
Pricing Equation 
(2) Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Diff. 
Coef.  
(1) – (2) 
φOLS =  
β(γi - γ*i) 
         
D_Dominant 0.049 (1.64) 0.004 (0.88) -0.010 (-0.94) 0.014 0.040 
Share 
Difference -0.077* (-1.73) 0.004 (0.73) 0.024 (1.55) -0.020 -0.057 
CV 0.032 (0.73) -0.005 (-0.81) -0.032** (-2.18) 0.027* 0.077 
Board Size 0.003 (0.07) -0.007 (-0.85) -0.027* (-1.89) 0.020 0.057 
Board 
Independence -0.003 (-0.04) -0.015 (-1.11) 0.008 (0.34) -0.023 -0.065 
Board 
Experience 0.142*** (2.85) 0.007 (1.07) -0.056*** (-3.15) 0.063*** 0.179 
CEO-Founder -0.006 (-0.21) 0.003 (0.70) 0.004 (0.38) -0.001 -0.003 
CEO 
Descendant 0.031 (0.78) 0.003 (0.65) -0.004 (-0.29) 0.007 0.020 
CEO-Chair -0.032 (-0.98) -0.004 (-0.76) 0.004 (0.30) -0.008 -0.023 
CEO-Group -0.022 (-0.59) -0.001 (-0.21) 0.004 (0.30) -0.005 -0.014 
BIG 4 -0.006 (-0.28) -0.001 (-0.24) 0.003 (0.44) -0.004 -0.011 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 0.029 (1.34) 0.011*** (3.73) -0.005 (-0.70) 0.016** 0.045 
EBITt 0.461*** (3.04) 0.502*** (15.89) 0.284*** (5.13) 0.218*** 0.619 
EBITt-1 -0.138 (-1.04) 0.173*** (6.12) 0.249*** (5.09) -0.076 -0.216 
BHARt -0.089*** (-4.78) 0.019*** (6.03) 0.048*** (7.71) -0.029*** -0.082 
Firm Size -0.043*** (-5.03) 0.002** (2.00) 0.023*** (7.41) -0.021*** -0.060 
Firm Age -0.008 (-0.40) 0.000 (0.12) 0.017** (2.30) -0.017** -0.047 
Sales Growth -0.014 (-0.55) -0.011** (-2.38) 0.016* (1.66) -0.027*** -0.077 
Leverage 0.101* (1.84) -0.013* (-1.65) -0.052*** (-2.87) 0.039** 0.111 
Book-to-Market 0.049*** (5.04) -0.004** (-2.16) -0.022*** (-5.69) 0.018*** 0.051 
Constant 0.326* (1.95) 0.036 (1.38) -0.187*** (-3.28) 0.223*** 0.634 
Beta (Mishkin)     2.841*** (16.98)   
         
No. of Obs. 3,508    3,508    
F-Test (OLS)/ 
LRTest 
(Mishkin) 18.84    345.11    
p value 0.000    0.000    
Adj. R-Square 0.173        
         
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 
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Table 6.11 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test (Cont’) 
Panel B.2: OLS Model 6.2: Investors’ Perception and the Impact of the Presence of Dominant 
Shareholder on Firm Performance – Regression (B) 
 OLS Mishkin Test  
 
Forecasting 
Equation (1) 
Pricing  
Equation (2) Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Diff. 
Coef.  
(1) – (2) 
φOLS =  
β(γi - γ*i) 
         
D_Dominant 0.055* (1.69) 0.003 (0.65) -0.014 (-1.19) 0.017 0.046 
Share Difference -0.080* (-1.69) 0.004 (0.70) 0.026 (1.48) -0.022 -0.059 
CV 0.028 (0.59) -0.005 (-0.75) -0.035** (-2.13) 0.030* 0.081 
Board Size -0.012 (-0.22) 0.000 (-0.03) -0.017 (-1.01) 0.017 0.045 
Board 
Independence -0.038 (-0.39) -0.012 (-0.85) 0.020 (0.81) -0.032 -0.086 
Board Experience 0.191*** (3.49) 0.006 (0.88) -0.083*** (-3.94) 0.089*** 0.240 
CEO-Founder 0.002 (0.06) 0.001 (0.32) 0.001 (0.07) 0.000 0.000 
CEO Descendant 0.026 (0.62) -0.002 (-0.30) -0.004 (-0.27) 0.002 0.005 
CEO-Chair -0.021 (-0.58) 0.007 (1.39) 0.010 (0.72) -0.003 -0.008 
CEO-Group -0.042 (-1.08) -0.001 (-0.17) 0.014 (0.95) -0.015 -0.040 
BIG 4 -0.003 (-0.13) 0.000 (0.13) 0.003 (0.40) -0.003 -0.008 
Audit Partner 
Tenure 0.022 (0.93) 0.008*** (2.76) -0.005 (-0.62) 0.013 0.035 
CFt 0.345** (2.11) 0.466*** (12.45) 0.296*** (4.71) 0.170*** 0.459 
TACt 0.277 (1.53) 0.454*** (11.17) 0.274*** (3.96) 0.180*** 0.486 
CFt-1 -0.114 (-0.80) 0.201*** (6.06) 0.257*** (4.55) -0.056 -0.151 
TACt-1 -0.038 (-0.25) 0.190*** (5.48) 0.243*** (4.15) -0.053 -0.143 
BHARt -0.096*** (-4.57) 0.019*** (5.68) 0.049*** (6.59) -0.030*** -0.081 
Firm Size -0.044*** (-4.67) 0.002* (1.77) 0.022*** (6.46) -0.020*** -0.054 
Firm Age -0.017 (-0.70) -0.001 (-0.43) 0.019** (2.24) -0.020** -0.054 
Sales Growth -0.010 (-0.32) -0.006 (-1.03) 0.017 (1.57) -0.023** -0.062 
Leverage 0.093 (1.52) -0.021** (-2.48) -0.069*** (-3.32) 0.048** 0.130 
Book-to-Market 0.052*** (4.50) -0.004* (-1.88) -0.027*** (-5.82) 0.023*** 0.062 
Constant 0.453** (2.33) 0.026 (0.91) -0.197*** (-2.82) 0.223*** 0.602 
Beta (Mishkin)     2.699*** (14.11)   
         
No. of Obs. 2,879    2,879    
F-Test (OLS)/LR 
Test (Mishkin) 12.69    258.88    
p value 0.000    0.000    
Adj. R-Square 0.151        
         
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged  
    total  accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. 
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Table 6.11 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test (Cont’) 
Panel C.1: OLS Model 6.3: Investors’ Perception and the Impact of Ownership Concentration by 
Shareholders’ Types on Firm Performance – Regression (A) 
 OLS Mishkin Test  
 
Forecasting  
Equation (1) 
Pricing  
Equation (2) Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Diff. 
Coef.  
(1) – (2) 
φOLS =  
β(γi - γ*i) 
         
Family Own 0.013 (0.18) 0.014 (1.37) -0.006 (-0.23) 0.020 0.057 
Government Own 0.540** (2.57) 0.053** (2.39) -0.118* (-1.84) 0.171*** 0.484 
Foreign Com. Own 0.199** (2.33) 0.037*** (2.97) -0.036 (-1.24) 0.073** 0.207 
Domestic Com.Own -0.093 (-0.72) 0.019 (0.87) 0.036 (0.84) -0.017 -0.048 
Bank Own 0.056 (0.12) 0.118* (1.90) 0.125 (0.78) -0.007 -0.020 
Non-Bank Fin. Own -0.334 (-0.94) -0.023 (-0.55) 0.083 (0.68) -0.106 -0.300 
Share Difference -0.040 (-0.91) 0.005 (0.75) 0.019 (1.26) -0.014 -0.040 
CV 0.003 (0.07) -0.007 (-0.98) -0.025* (-1.68) 0.018 0.051 
Board Size -0.013 (-0.26) -0.009 (-1.16) -0.023 (-1.58) 0.014 0.040 
Board Independence -0.018 (-0.20) -0.017 (-1.26) 0.012 (0.53) -0.029 -0.082 
Board Experience 0.136*** (2.66) 0.005 (0.73) -0.057*** (-3.13) 0.062*** 0.175 
CEO-Founder 0.010 (0.35) 0.006 (1.30) 0.001 (0.12) 0.005 0.014 
CEO Descendant 0.043 (1.08) 0.005 (1.02) -0.007 (-0.51) 0.012 0.034 
CEO-Chair -0.031 (-0.95) -0.003 (-0.66) 0.004 (0.31) -0.007 -0.020 
CEO-Group -0.016 (-0.42) -0.001 (-0.23) 0.003 (0.21) -0.004 -0.011 
BIG 4 -0.014 (-0.64) -0.003 (-0.83) 0.004 (0.48) -0.007 -0.020 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.028 (1.31) 0.011*** (3.76) -0.005 (-0.68) 0.016** 0.045 
EBITt 0.459*** (3.05) 0.499*** (15.89) 0.284*** (5.12) 0.215*** 0.608 
EBITt-1 -0.134 (-1.01) 0.173*** (6.15) 0.249*** (5.07) -0.076 -0.215 
BHARt-1 -0.092*** (-4.93) 0.019*** (6.03) 0.049*** (7.80) -0.030*** -0.085 
Firm Size -0.049*** (-5.64) 0.002 (1.61) 0.025*** (7.61) -0.023*** -0.065 
Firm Age -0.011 (-0.49) 0.000 (0.00) 0.016** (2.21) -0.016** -0.045 
Sales Growth -0.016 (-0.61) -0.011** (-2.34) 0.016* (1.74) -0.027*** -0.076 
Leverage 0.102* (1.85) -0.012 (-1.60) -0.052*** (-2.86) 0.040** 0.113 
Book-to-Market 0.048*** (4.94) -0.004** (-2.12) -0.021*** (-5.56) 0.017*** 0.048 
Constant 0.483*** (2.73) 0.046* (1.67) -0.229*** (-3.71) 0.275*** 0.778 
Beta (Mishkin)     2.830*** (16.91)   
         
No. of Obs. 3,508    3,508    
F-Test (OLS) /LR 
Test (Mishkin) 17.01    363.55    
p value 0.000    0.000    
Adj. R-Square 0.175        
         
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 
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Table 6.11 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test (Cont’) 
Panel C.2: OLS Model 6.3: Investors’ Perception and the Impact of Ownership Concentration by 
Shareholders’ Types on Firm Performance – Regression (B) 
 OLS Mishkin Test  
 
Forecasting 
Equation (1) 
Pricing  
Equation (2) Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Diff. 
Coef.  
(1) – (2) 
φOLS =  
β(γi - γ*i) 
         Family Own 0.018 (0.23) 0.013 (1.21) -0.006 (-0.21) 0.019 0.051 
Government Own 0.605*** (2.58) 0.043* (1.76) -0.153** (-2.02) 0.196*** 0.527 
Foreign Com. Own 0.114 (1.26) 0.026* (1.94) -0.015 (-0.47) 0.041 0.110 
Domestic Com. Own -0.057 (-0.41) 0.023 (1.03) 0.036 (0.72) -0.013 -0.035 
Bank Own -0.191 (-0.38) 0.058 (0.93) 0.135 (0.72) -0.077 -0.207 
Non-Bank Fin. Own -0.468 (-1.17) -0.054 (-1.21) 0.081 (0.55) -0.135 -0.363 
Share Difference -0.048 (-1.03) 0.003 (0.51) 0.020 (1.19) -0.017 -0.046 
CV 0.003 (0.06) -0.005 (-0.74) -0.028 (-1.62) 0.023 0.062 
Board Size -0.034 (-0.61) -0.003 (-0.33) -0.011 (-0.64) 0.008 0.022 
Board Independence -0.057 (-0.59) -0.014 (-1.01) 0.025 (0.98) -0.039* -0.105 
Board Experience 0.184*** (3.25) 0.005 (0.69) -0.082*** (-3.78) 0.087*** 0.234 
CEO-Founder 0.010 (0.33) 0.003 (0.65) -0.001 (-0.08) 0.004 0.011 
CEO Descendant 0.036 (0.85) -0.0001 (-0.03) -0.007 (-0.46) 0.007 0.019 
CEO-Chair -0.021 (-0.58) 0.007 (1.43) 0.010 (0.74) -0.003 -0.008 
CEO-Group -0.037 (-0.92) -0.001 (-0.21) 0.012 (0.85) -0.013 -0.035 
BIG 4 -0.005 (-0.20) -0.001 (-0.25) 0.002 (0.23) -0.003 -0.008 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.020 (0.88) 0.008*** (2.76) -0.005 (-0.60) 0.013 0.035 
CFt 0.340** (2.09) 0.464*** (12.46) 0.297*** (4.72) 0.167*** 0.449 
TACt 0.272 (1.51) 0.454*** (11.20) 0.273*** (3.94) 0.181*** 0.487 
CFt-1 -0.102 (-0.71) 0.201*** (6.07) 0.255*** (4.48) -0.054 -0.145 
TACt-1 -0.029 (-0.19) 0.191*** (5.50) 0.240*** (4.07) -0.049 -0.132 
BHARt-1 -0.098*** (-4.70) 0.019*** (5.70) 0.050*** (6.68) -0.031*** -0.083 
Firm Size -0.049*** (-5.18) 0.002 (1.40) 0.024*** (6.61) -0.022*** -0.059 
Firm Age -0.015 (-0.59) -0.002 (-0.50) 0.017* (1.93) -0.019** -0.051 
Sales Growth -0.012 (-0.40) -0.006 (-1.07) 0.019* (1.72) -0.025** -0.067 
Leverage 0.092 (1.51) -0.020** (-2.39) -0.070*** (-3.33) 0.050** 0.135 
Book-to-Market 0.050*** (4.36) -0.004* (-1.84) -0.027*** (-5.69) 0.023*** 0.062 
Constant 0.616*** (3.04) 0.037 (1.22) -0.239*** (-3.22) 0.276*** 0.743 
Beta (Mishkin)     2.691*** (14.08)   
         No. of Obs. 2,879    2,879    
F-Test (OLS) 
/LRTest (Mishkin) 11.52    271.46    
p value 0.000    0.000    
Adj. R-Square 0.152        
         Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged  
    total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. 
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Table 6.11 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test (Cont’) 
Panel D.1: OLS Model 6.2: Investors’ Perception and the Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholder 
by Shareholders’ Types on Firm Performance – Regression (A) 
 OLS Mishkin Test  
 
Forecasting 
Equation (1) 
Pricing  
Equation (2) Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Diff. 
Coef.  
(1) – (2) 
φOLS =  
β(γi - γ*i) 
         
D_Family 0.021 (0.64) 0.001 (0.24) -0.005 (-0.43) 0.006 0.017 
D_Government 0.244*** (2.82) 0.018** (1.97) -0.055* (-1.94) 0.073*** 0.207 
D_Foreign 0.098** (2.57) 0.009* (1.66) -0.020 (-1.50) 0.029** 0.082 
D_Domestic -0.054 (-0.93) -0.001 (-0.06) 0.026 (1.42) -0.027 -0.076 
D_Bank -0.044 (-0.39) -0.004 (-0.33) 0.041 (0.95) -0.045 -0.127 
D_Non-Bank Fin. 0.152 (0.74) -0.002 (-0.16) -0.040 (-0.60) 0.038 0.108 
Share Difference -0.053 (-1.17) 0.006 (1.04) 0.019 (1.24) -0.013 -0.037 
CV -0.009 (-0.19) -0.009 (-1.27) -0.022 (-1.46) 0.013 0.037 
Board Size -0.012 (-0.24) -0.008 (-1.01) -0.023 (-1.63) 0.015 0.042 
Board Independence -0.023 (-0.26) -0.016 (-1.17) 0.010 (0.45) -0.026 -0.074 
Board Experience 0.136*** (2.72) 0.007 (1.08) -0.055*** (-3.05) 0.062*** 0.175 
CEO-Founder 0.007 (0.26) 0.004 (0.97) 0.001 (0.06) 0.003 0.008 
CEO Descendant 0.038 (0.96) 0.004 (0.88) -0.006 (-0.46) 0.010 0.028 
CEO-Chair -0.025 (-0.77) -0.003 (-0.60) 0.002 (0.20) -0.005 -0.014 
CEO-Group -0.009 (-0.23) 0.0001 (0.03) 0.001 (0.04) -0.001 -0.003 
BIG 4 -0.009 (-0.43) -0.001 (-0.41) 0.003 (0.40) -0.004 -0.011 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.028 (1.30) 0.011*** (3.62) -0.005 (-0.67) 0.016** 0.045 
EBITt 0.452*** (3.00) 0.501*** (15.88) 0.286*** (5.15) 0.215*** 0.608 
EBITt-1 -0.145 (-1.09) 0.173*** (6.13) 0.251*** (5.11) -0.078 -0.221 
BHARt-1 -0.091*** (-4.92) 0.018*** (5.98) 0.049*** (7.77) -0.031*** -0.088 
Firm Size -0.048*** (-5.47) 0.002 (1.62) 0.024*** (7.50) -0.022*** -0.062 
Firm Age -0.009 (-0.44) 0.000 (0.09) 0.016** (2.15) -0.016** -0.045 
Sales Growth -0.014 (-0.56) -0.011** (-2.39) 0.016* (1.72) -0.027*** -0.076 
Leverage 0.092* (1.69) -0.013* (-1.72) -0.049*** (-2.70) 0.036* 0.102 
Book-to-Market 0.047*** (4.82) -0.004** (-2.26) -0.021*** (-5.52) 0.017*** 0.048 
Constant 0.472*** (2.73) 0.049* (1.80) -0.223*** (-3.67) 0.272*** 0.770 
Beta (Mishkin)     2.830*** (16.91)   
         
No. of Obs. 3,508    3,508    
F-Test (OLS) 
/LRTest (Mishkin) 16.82    363.16    
p value 0.000    0.000    
Adj. R-Square 0.175        
         
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 
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Table 6.11 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test (Cont’) 
Panel D.2: OLS Model 6.2: Investors’ Perception and the Impact of the Presence of Dominant Shareholder 
by Shareholders’ Types on Firm Performance – Regression (B) 
 OLS Mishkin Test  
 
Forecasting 
Equation (1) 
Pricing  
Equation (2) Explanatory 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
Diff. 
Coef.  
(1) – (2) 
φOLS =  
β(γi - γ*i) 
         D_Family 0.030 (0.85) 0.0005 (0.11) -0.010 (-0.82) 0.010 0.028 
D_Government 0.276*** (2.93) 0.015 (1.50) -0.072** (-2.19) 0.087*** 0.234 
D_Foreign 0.080** (1.97) 0.008 (1.27) -0.017 (-1.11) 0.025 0.067 
D_Domestic -0.009 (-0.15) 0.001 (0.05) 0.009 (0.41) -0.008 -0.022 
D_Bank -0.048 (-0.43) -0.002 (-0.13) 0.035 (0.78) -0.037 -0.100 
D_Non-Bank Fin. 0.159 (0.68) -0.001 (-0.06) -0.063 (-0.78) 0.062 0.167 
Share Difference -0.060 (-1.25) 0.006 (0.96) 0.023 (1.33) -0.017 -0.046 
CV -0.006 (-0.12) -0.008 (-1.14) -0.027 (-1.56) 0.019 0.051 
Board Size -0.032 (-0.59) -0.002 (-0.22) -0.011 (-0.68) 0.009 0.024 
Board Independence -0.064 (-0.65) -0.013 (-0.94) 0.024 (0.95) -0.037 -0.100 
Board Experience 0.184*** (3.34) 0.006 (0.90) -0.081*** (-3.81) 0.087*** 0.234 
CEO-Founder 0.013 (0.41) 0.002 (0.54) -0.002 (-0.19) 0.004 0.011 
CEO Descendant 0.033 (0.79) -0.0004 (-0.09) -0.007 (-0.45) 0.007 0.018 
CEO-Chair -0.016 (-0.43) 0.007 (1.53) 0.009 (0.66) -0.002 -0.005 
CEO-Group -0.029 (-0.74) 0.0003 (0.05) 0.011 (0.74) -0.011 -0.029 
BIG 4 -0.003 (-0.14) -0.0001 (-0.02) 0.002 (0.23) -0.002 -0.006 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.021 (0.89) 0.008*** (2.64) -0.005 (-0.61) 0.013 0.035 
CFt 0.332** (2.04) 0.465*** (12.43) 0.299*** (4.75) 0.166*** 0.447 
TACt 0.259 (1.43) 0.454*** (11.15) 0.277*** (3.99) 0.177*** 0.476 
CFt-1 -0.115 (-0.81) 0.201*** (6.07) 0.260*** (4.57) -0.059 -0.159 
TACt-1 -0.046 (-0.30) 0.190*** (5.48) 0.246*** (4.17) -0.056 -0.151 
BHARt-1 -0.097*** (-4.69) 0.019*** (5.66) 0.050*** (6.64) -0.031*** -0.083 
Firm Size -0.048*** (-5.05) 0.002 (1.47) 0.024*** (6.55) -0.022*** -0.059 
Firm Age -0.014 (-0.56) -0.001 (-0.43) 0.017* (1.93) -0.018** -0.048 
Sales Growth -0.011 (-0.36) -0.006 (-1.08) 0.019* (1.70) -0.025** -0.067 
Leverage 0.079 (1.31) -0.021** (-2.52) -0.066*** (-3.16) 0.045** 0.121 
Book-to-Market 0.049*** (4.27) -0.004** (-1.97) -0.026*** (-5.67) 0.022*** 0.059 
Constant 0.590*** (2.96) 0.039 (1.28) -0.231*** (-3.12) 0.270*** 0.727 
Beta (Mishkin)     2.691*** (14.05)   
         No. of Obs. 2,879    2,879    
F-Test (OLS) / 
LR Test (Mishkin) 11.41    271.94    
p value 0.000    0.000    
Adj. R-Square 0.152        
         Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged  
    total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. 
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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Before and After the Corporate Governance Reforms 
Panel A.1: OLS Model 6.1 – Investors’ Perception and the Ownership Concentration – Regression (A) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS =  
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS =  
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
Concentrated Own 0.317* 0.004 -0.185** 0.189** 0.348 0.108 0.026** -0.017 0.043 0.089 
Share Difference -0.098 0.013 0.079 -0.066 -0.122 -0.106 -0.009 0.041 -0.050 -0.103 
CV 0.065 0.003 -0.036 0.039 0.072 0.065 -0.010 -0.055** 0.045 0.093 
Board Size 0.189*** -0.018* -0.134*** 0.116*** 0.214 0.107 -0.006 -0.056* 0.050 0.103 
Board Independence 0.641*** 0.006 -0.372*** 0.378*** 0.697 0.064 -0.021 -0.040 0.019 0.039 
Board Experience 0.018 0.004 -0.005 0.009 0.017 0.276*** 0.010 -0.131*** 0.141*** 0.290 
CEO-Founder -0.034 -0.005 0.002 -0.007 -0.013 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.002 
CEO Descendant 0.040 0.008 -0.022 0.030 0.055 0.002 0.001 0.008 -0.007 -0.014 
CEO-Chair 0.056 -0.010 -0.022 0.012 0.022 -0.041 0.001 0.017 -0.016 -0.033 
CEO-Group 0.041 -0.007 -0.032 0.025 0.046 -0.050 0.001 0.018 -0.017 -0.035 
BIG 4 0.025 -0.001 -0.013 0.012 0.022 -0.003 0.003 0.013 -0.010 -0.021 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.083** 0.011** -0.039* 0.050** 0.092 0.006 0.014*** 0.016 -0.002 -0.004 
EBITt 1.225*** 0.463*** -0.306* 0.769*** 1.417 0.249 0.473*** 0.358*** 0.115 0.237 
EBITt-1 -1.060*** 0.170*** 0.693*** -0.523*** -0.964 -0.024 0.211*** 0.231*** -0.020 -0.041 
BHARt -0.270*** 0.017*** 0.156*** -0.139*** -0.256 -0.043* 0.021*** 0.040*** -0.019 -0.039 
           
(This table is continued on the next page) 	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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform 
Panel A.1: OLS Model 6.1 – Investors’ Perception and the Ownership Concentration – Regression (A) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
Firm Size -0.042*** 0.003 0.030*** -0.027*** -0.050 -0.047*** 0.003* 0.024*** -0.021*** -0.043 
Firm Age -0.003 0.005 0.024 -0.019 -0.035 -0.034 0.001 0.018 -0.017 -0.035 
Sales Growth -0.119*** -0.004 0.052** -0.056** -0.103 -0.059 -0.012* 0.009 -0.021 -0.043 
Leverage -0.206** 0.000 0.119** -0.119** -0.219 0.219*** -0.007 -0.109*** 0.102*** 0.210 
Book-to-Market 0.035*** -0.004* -0.020*** 0.016** 0.029 0.108*** -0.005* -0.056*** 0.051*** 0.105 
Constant 0.033 0.004 -0.062 0.066 0.122 0.122 0.012 -0.034 0.046 0.095 
Beta (Mishkin)   1.843***     2.059***   
           
No. of Obs. 1,208  1,208   2,065  2,065   
LR Test (MT) or  
F-Test (OLS) 6.816  233.62   4.562  133.31   
p_value 0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   
Adj. R-Square 0.106     0.054     
           
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 	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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel A.2: OLS Model 6.1 – Investors’ Perception and the Ownership Concentration - Regression (B) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
Concentrated Own 0.255 0.005 -0.179 0.184 0.299 0.112 0.024* -0.021 0.045 0.095 
Share Difference -0.080 0.018 0.061 -0.043 -0.070 -0.108 -0.008 0.043 -0.051 -0.107 
CV 0.090 -0.005 -0.064 0.059 0.096 0.061 -0.009 -0.051* 0.042 0.088 
Board Size 0.201** -0.006 -0.141** 0.135 0.219** 0.103 -0.005 -0.053* 0.048 0.101 
Board Independence 0.886*** 0.031 -0.543** 0.574 0.932** 0.062 -0.025 -0.042 0.017 0.036 
Board Experience 0.131 -0.002 -0.088 0.086 0.140 0.275*** 0.009 -0.128*** 0.137*** 0.288 
CEO-Founder -0.048 -0.018 -0.006 -0.012 -0.019 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.004 
CEO Descendant 0.144 0.002 -0.081 0.083 0.135 0.002 0.000 0.007 -0.007 -0.015 
CEO-Chair 0.134 0.020* -0.046 0.066 0.107 -0.040 0.002 0.017 -0.015 -0.032 
CEO-Group -0.023 -0.015 -0.005 -0.010 -0.016 -0.049 0.002 0.019 -0.017 -0.036 
BIG 4 0.069 0.002 -0.032 0.034 0.055 -0.001 0.003 0.012 -0.009 -0.019 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.108** 0.004 -0.067** 0.071 0.115** 0.007 0.014*** 0.016 -0.002 -0.004 
CFt 1.199*** 0.383*** -0.476 0.859 1.394*** 0.231 0.450*** 0.350*** 0.100 0.210 
TACt 1.222*** 0.365*** -0.508 0.873 1.417*** 0.189 0.422*** 0.345*** 0.077 0.162 
CFt-1 -0.877** 0.216*** 0.653** -0.437 -0.709 -0.073 0.221*** 0.260*** -0.039 -0.082 
TACt-1 -0.982*** 0.205*** 0.738*** -0.533 -0.865* 0.041 0.225*** 0.214** 0.011 0.023 
BHARt -0.339*** 0.014** 0.215*** -0.201 -0.326*** -0.042* 0.022*** 0.040*** -0.018 -0.038 
           
 (This table is continued on the next page) 	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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel A.2: OLS Model 6.1 – Investors’ Perception and the Ownership Concentration - Regression (B) (Cont’) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS  
= β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
Firm Size -0.044** 0.001 0.030** -0.029 -0.047** -0.045*** 0.002 0.022*** -0.020*** -0.042 
Firm Age -0.038 0.006 0.062** -0.056 -0.091* -0.034 0.000 0.017 -0.017 -0.035 
Sales Growth -0.170*** 0.008 0.099** -0.091 -0.148** -0.060 -0.009 0.012 -0.021 -0.044 
Leverage -0.300** -0.006 0.202** -0.208 -0.338** 0.214*** -0.011 -0.106*** 0.095*** 0.200 
Book-to-Market 0.033** -0.005* -0.019** 0.014 0.023 0.106*** -0.006** -0.055*** 0.049*** 0.103 
Constant 0.030 0.021 -0.065 0.086 0.140 0.122 0.020 -0.024 0.044 0.092 
Beta (Mishkin)   1.623***     2.102***   
           
No. of Obs. 663  663   2,061  2,061   
LR Test (MT) or  
F-Test (OLS) 5.599  202.20   4.215  134.28   
p_value 0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   
Adj. R-Square 0.145     0.054     
           
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. 	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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel B.1: OLS Model 6.2 – Investors’ Perception and the Presence of Dominant Shareholder - Regression (A) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
D_Dominant 0.076 -0.002 -0.029 0.027 0.050 0.052 0.006 -0.014 0.020 0.041 
Share Difference -0.014 0.017 0.018 -0.001 -0.002 -0.089 -0.001 0.042 -0.043 -0.088 
CV 0.066 0.002 -0.035 0.037 0.068 0.062 -0.011 -0.055** 0.044 0.091 
Board Size 0.172** -0.018* -0.124*** 0.106*** 0.196 0.101 -0.006 -0.055* 0.049 0.101 
Board Independence 0.603*** 0.006 -0.352** 0.358*** 0.662 0.067 -0.019 -0.039 0.020 0.041 
Board Experience 0.035 0.004 -0.013 0.017 0.031 0.273*** 0.009 -0.130*** 0.139*** 0.286 
CEO-Founder -0.040 -0.005 0.004 -0.009 -0.017 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 
CEO Descendant 0.028 0.008 -0.017 0.025 0.046 0.002 0.001 0.008 -0.007 -0.014 
CEO-Chair 0.061 -0.010 -0.022 0.012 0.022 -0.041 0.001 0.017 -0.016 -0.033 
CEO-Group 0.057 -0.007 -0.042 0.035 0.065 -0.049 0.001 0.018 -0.017 -0.035 
BIG 4 0.027 -0.002 -0.014 0.012 0.022 -0.002 0.003 0.013 -0.010 -0.021 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.081* 0.012** -0.039* 0.051*** 0.094 0.005 0.013*** 0.016 -0.003 -0.006 
EBITt 1.220*** 0.464*** -0.308* 0.772*** 1.427 0.247 0.474*** 0.360*** 0.114 0.235 
EBITt-1 -1.074*** 0.170*** 0.698*** -0.528*** -0.976 -0.036 0.211*** 0.235*** -0.024 -0.049 
BHARt -0.268*** 0.017*** 0.154*** -0.137*** -0.253 -0.043* 0.021*** 0.040*** -0.019 -0.039 
           
(This table is continued on the next page) 	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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel B.1: OLS Model 6.2 – Investors’ Perception and the Presence of Dominant Shareholder - Regression (A) (Cont’) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
Firm Size -0.042*** 0.003 0.030*** -0.027*** -0.050 -0.048*** 0.002 0.024*** -0.022*** -0.045 
Firm Age -0.003 0.005 0.024 -0.019 -0.035 -0.032 0.001 0.017 -0.016 -0.033 
Sales Growth -0.122*** -0.004 0.054** -0.058*** -0.107 -0.058 -0.012* 0.009 -0.021 -0.043 
Leverage -0.206** -0.0003 0.118** -0.118*** -0.219 0.216*** -0.008 -0.107*** 0.099*** 0.204 
Book-to-Market 0.036*** -0.004* -0.020*** 0.016*** 0.030 0.108*** -0.005* -0.056*** 0.051*** 0.105 
Constant 0.096 0.005 -0.104 0.109 0.202 0.141 0.017 -0.036 0.053 0.109 
Beta (Mishkin)   1.849***     2.058***   
           
No. of Obs. 1,208  1,208   2,065  2,065   
LR Test (MT) or  
F-Test (OLS) 6.621  229.17   4.634  133.79   
p_value 0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   
Adj. R-Square 0.104     0.055     
           
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 	  
	  	  
Chapter 6	  
500	  
	  
Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel B.2: OLS Model 6.2 – Investors’ Perception and the Presence of Dominant Shareholder - Regression (B) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
D_Dominant 0.157* -0.003 -0.066 0.063 0.103 0.054 0.004 -0.017 0.021 0.044 
Share Difference -0.089 0.023 0.031 -0.008 -0.013 -0.092 0.001 0.043 -0.042 -0.088 
CV 0.094 -0.006 -0.059 0.053 0.087 0.058 -0.010 -0.051* 0.041 0.086 
Board Size 0.177** -0.006 -0.127** 0.121 0.198 0.097 -0.005 -0.051 0.046 0.097 
Board Independence 0.846*** 0.032 -0.520** 0.552** 0.904 0.065 -0.024 -0.042 0.018 0.038 
Board Experience 0.161 -0.002 -0.103 0.101 0.165 0.272*** 0.009 -0.126*** 0.135*** 0.284 
CEO-Founder -0.060 -0.018 -0.002 -0.016 -0.026 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.002 
CEO Descendant 0.126 0.002 -0.071 0.073 0.120 0.002 0.000 0.007 -0.007 -0.014 
CEO-Chair 0.146 0.020* -0.050 0.070 0.115 -0.040 0.002 0.017 -0.015 -0.032 
CEO-Group -0.015 -0.014 -0.011 -0.003 -0.005 -0.049 0.002 0.019 -0.017 -0.036 
BIG 4 0.073 0.002 -0.034 0.036 0.059 -0.001 0.003 0.012 -0.009 -0.019 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.094* 0.004 -0.061* 0.065** 0.106 0.006 0.014*** 0.016 -0.002 -0.004 
CFt 1.200*** 0.383*** -0.472 0.855*** 1.400 0.227 0.452*** 0.352*** 0.100 0.210 
TACt 1.203*** 0.366*** -0.493 0.859*** 1.406 0.190 0.423*** 0.346*** 0.077 0.162 
CFt-1 -0.926** 0.217*** 0.672** -0.455 -0.745 -0.084 0.222*** 0.265*** -0.043 -0.090 
TACt-1 -1.030*** 0.205*** 0.757*** -0.552** -0.904 0.032 0.226*** 0.218** 0.008 0.017 
BHARt -0.339*** 0.014** 0.213*** -0.199*** -0.326 -0.042* 0.022*** 0.039*** -0.017 -0.036 
           
(This table is continued on the next page) 	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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel B.2: OLS Model 6.2 – Investors’ Perception and the Presence of Dominant Shareholder - Regression (B) (Cont’) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
Firm Size -0.046*** 0.001 0.031*** -0.030*** -0.049 -0.046*** 0.002 0.022*** -0.020*** -0.042 
Firm Age -0.037 0.005 0.062** -0.057** -0.093 -0.033 0.000 0.016 -0.016 -0.033 
Sales Growth -0.164*** 0.008 0.094** -0.086** -0.141 -0.058 -0.010 0.012 -0.022 -0.046 
Leverage -0.315** -0.005 0.207** -0.212** -0.347 0.210*** -0.011 -0.105*** 0.094*** 0.198 
Book-to-Market 0.034** -0.005* -0.020** 0.015 0.025 0.106*** -0.006** -0.055*** 0.049*** 0.103 
Constant 0.110 0.023 -0.122 0.145 0.237 0.141 0.026 -0.026 0.052 0.109 
Beta (Mishkin)   1.637***     2.103***   
           
No. of Obs. 663  663   2,061  2,061   
LR Test (MT) or  
F-Test (OLS) 5.700  203.810   4.269  134.760   
p_value 0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   
Adj. R-Square 0.148     0.054     
           
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. 	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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel C.1: OLS Model 6.3 – Investors’ Perception and the Ownership Concentration by Shareholders’ Types - Regression (A) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
Family Own 0.041 0.003 -0.034 0.037 0.065 0.069 0.017 -0.011 0.028 0.057 
Government Own 0.521 0.064 -0.067 0.131 0.232 0.559** 0.038 -0.255** 0.293*** 0.602 
Foreign Own 0.651*** 0.079*** -0.259** 0.338*** 0.598 0.080 0.028** 0.005 0.023 0.047 
Domestic Own -0.168 -0.021 0.064 -0.085 -0.150 0.042 0.046* 0.013 0.033 0.068 
Bank Own 0.717 0.261** 0.020 0.241 0.427 -0.468 0.034 0.220 -0.186 -0.382 
Non-Bank Fin. Own. -1.258** -0.003 0.672* -0.675* -1.195 -0.259 -0.083 -0.042 -0.041 -0.084 
Share Difference 0.047 0.021* 0.004 0.017 0.030 -0.078 -0.001 0.041 -0.042 -0.086 
CV 0.048 0.000 -0.038 0.038 0.067 0.051 -0.010 -0.047* 0.037 0.076 
Board Size 0.163** -0.018* -0.125*** 0.107** 0.189 0.079 -0.009 -0.039 0.030 0.062 
Board Independence 0.569** 0.004 -0.351** 0.355*** 0.628 0.043 -0.022 -0.026 0.004 0.008 
Board Experience 0.027 0.000 -0.019 0.019 0.034 0.268*** 0.009 -0.127*** 0.136*** 0.279 
CEO-Founder 0.008 0.001 -0.010 0.011 0.019 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.008 
CEO Descendant 0.059 0.012 -0.030 0.042 0.074 0.009 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
CEO-Chair 0.055 -0.009 -0.018 0.009 0.016 -0.043 0.001 0.017 -0.016 -0.033 
CEO-Group 0.048 -0.007 -0.036 0.029 0.051 -0.047 0.0005 0.016 -0.016 -0.032 
BIG 4 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.002 0.007 -0.005 -0.010 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.089** 0.013** -0.045** 0.058*** 0.103 0.009 0.014*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.002 
EBITt 1.142*** 0.452*** -0.318* 0.770*** 1.363 0.249 0.474*** 0.362*** 0.112 0.230 
EBITt-1 -1.088*** 0.172*** 0.727*** -0.555*** -0.982 -0.033 0.210*** 0.239*** -0.029 -0.060 
BHARt -0.275*** 0.016*** 0.163*** -0.147*** -0.260 -0.045* 0.021*** 0.041*** -0.020* -0.041 
           
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel C.1: OLS Model 6.3 – Investors’ Perception and the Ownership Concentration by Shareholders’ Types - Regression (A) (Cont’) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
Firm Size -0.052*** 0.003 0.035*** -0.032*** -0.057 -0.052*** 0.002 0.026*** -0.024*** -0.049 
Firm Age -0.034 0.002 0.041** -0.039* -0.069 -0.025 0.001 0.011 -0.010 -0.021 
Sales Growth -0.123*** -0.004 0.059** -0.063** -0.112 -0.059 -0.012* 0.011 -0.023 -0.047 
Leverage -0.204* 0.001 0.116* -0.115* -0.204 0.220*** -0.006 -0.108*** 0.102*** 0.209 
Book-to-Market 0.035*** -0.004* -0.020** 0.016*** 0.028 0.106*** -0.005* -0.054*** 0.049*** 0.101 
Constant 0.350 0.012 -0.217 0.229 0.405 0.259 0.026 -0.103 0.129 0.265 
Beta (Mishkin)   1.770***     2.053***   
           
No. of Obs. 1,208  1208   2,065  2,065   
LR Test (MT) or  
F-Test (OLS) 6.555  261.52   3.844  141.92   
p_value 0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   
Adj. R-Square 0.117     0.055     
           
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 	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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel C.2: OLS Model 6.3 – Investors’ Perception and the Ownership Concentration by Shareholders’ Types - Regression (B) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
Family Own 0.096 0.008 -0.064 0.072 0.111 0.075 0.015 -0.017 0.032 0.067 
Government Own 0.646 0.105 -0.034 0.139 0.214 0.558** 0.030 -0.262** 0.292*** 0.613 
Foreign Own 0.547** 0.097*** -0.211 0.308* 0.474 0.080 0.024* 0.001 0.023 0.048 
Domestic Own -0.380 -0.065 0.107 -0.172 -0.265 0.054 0.044* 0.007 0.037 0.078 
Bank Own 1.750 0.257 -0.278 0.535 0.823 -0.471 0.040 0.225 -0.185 -0.388 
Non-Bank Fin. Own. -1.256* 0.005 0.839* -0.834* -1.284 -0.264 -0.091* -0.050 -0.041 -0.086 
Share Difference 0.013 0.026 0.003 0.023 0.035 -0.080 0.000 0.041 -0.041 -0.087 
CV 0.063 -0.011 -0.063 0.052 0.080 0.049 -0.008 -0.043 0.035 0.073 
Board Size 0.146* -0.012 -0.123** 0.111* 0.171 0.075 -0.008 -0.035 0.027 0.057 
Board Independence 0.860*** 0.036 -0.556** 0.592*** 0.911 0.041 -0.026* -0.028 0.002 0.004 
Board Experience 0.117 -0.006 -0.102 0.096 0.148 0.267*** 0.009 -0.123*** 0.132*** 0.277 
CEO-Founder -0.024 -0.012 -0.010 -0.002 -0.003 0.010 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.008 
CEO Descendant 0.167 0.008 -0.081 0.089 0.137 0.009 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
CEO-Chair 0.141 0.022* -0.043 0.065 0.100 -0.042 0.002 0.018 -0.016 -0.034 
CEO-Group -0.009 -0.012 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.047 0.002 0.017 -0.015 -0.031 
BIG 4 0.054 -0.001 -0.027 0.026 0.040 0.003 0.002 0.007 -0.005 -0.010 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.096* 0.004 -0.070* 0.074** 0.114 0.010 0.014*** 0.015 -0.001 -0.002 
CFt 1.108*** 0.366*** -0.510 0.876*** 1.348 0.226 0.451*** 0.355*** 0.096 0.201 
TACt 1.147*** 0.348*** -0.557 0.905*** 1.393 0.194 0.424*** 0.344*** 0.080 0.168 
CFt-1 -0.941*** 0.213*** 0.703** -0.490 -0.754 -0.081 0.221*** 0.269*** -0.048 -0.101 
           
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel C.2: OLS Model 6.3 – Investors’ Perception and the Ownership Concentration by Shareholders’ Types - Regression (B) (Cont’) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
TACt-1 -1.017*** 0.204*** 0.778*** -0.574* -0.883 0.034 0.226*** 0.221** 0.005 0.010 
BHARt -0.345*** 0.013** 0.227*** -0.214*** -0.329 -0.044* 0.022*** 0.041*** -0.019* -0.040 
Firm Size -0.048*** 0.001 0.034*** -0.033*** -0.051 -0.050*** 0.002 0.024*** -0.022*** -0.046 
Firm Age -0.056 0.004 0.076** -0.072** -0.111 -0.025 0.000 0.010 -0.010 -0.021 
Sales Growth -0.187*** 0.007 0.111** -0.104** -0.160 -0.060 -0.009 0.014 -0.023 -0.048 
Leverage -0.291** -0.002 0.195* -0.197* -0.303 0.214*** -0.010 -0.106*** 0.096*** 0.201 
Book-to-Market 0.035** -0.005* -0.022** 0.017 0.026 0.105*** -0.006** -0.054*** 0.048*** 0.101 
Constant 0.314 0.030 -0.221 0.251 0.386 0.255 0.033 -0.092 0.125 0.262 
Beta (Mishkin)   1.539***     2.098***   
           
No. of Obs. 663  663   2,061  2,061   
LR Test (MT) or  
F-Test (OLS) 4.982  220.01   3.609  143.01   
p_value 0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   
Adj. R-Square 0.152     0.055     
           
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. 	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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel D.1: OLS Model 6.4 – Investors’ Perception and the Presence of Dominant Shareholder by Shareholders’ Types - Regression (A) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
D_Family 0.026 -0.009 -0.014 0.005 0.009 0.040 0.004 -0.010 0.014 0.029 
D_Government 0.181 0.017 -0.025 0.042 0.076 0.292** 0.017 -0.126** 0.143*** 0.293 
D_Foreign 0.216*** 0.014 -0.084* 0.098** 0.177 0.057 0.011 -0.010 0.021 0.043 
D_Domestic -0.166 -0.024 0.068 -0.092 -0.167 -0.012 0.011 0.020 -0.009 -0.018 
D_Bank 0.000 - - - - -0.122 -0.002 0.041 -0.043 -0.088 
D_Non-Bank Fin. 0.062 0.022 0.034 -0.012 -0.022 0.230 -0.011 -0.129 0.118 0.242 
Share Difference 0.042 0.024** 0.000 0.024 0.043 -0.080 0.000 0.041 -0.041 -0.084 
CV 0.013 -0.005 -0.022 0.017 0.031 0.039 -0.013* -0.044 0.031 0.064 
Board Size 0.175** -0.018* -0.129*** 0.111*** 0.201 0.073 -0.009 -0.037 0.028 0.057 
Board Independence 0.600*** 0.008 -0.356** 0.364*** 0.659 0.034 -0.022 -0.020 -0.002 -0.004 
Board Experience 0.032 0.003 -0.015 0.018 0.033 0.261*** 0.010 -0.124*** 0.134*** 0.275 
CEO-Founder -0.015 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.010 
CEO Descendant 0.034 0.010 -0.019 0.029 0.052 0.007 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
CEO-Chair 0.063 -0.009 -0.022 0.013 0.024 -0.040 0.002 0.016 -0.014 -0.029 
CEO-Group 0.074 -0.005 -0.047 0.042 0.076 -0.040 0.002 0.015 -0.013 -0.027 
BIG 4 0.017 -0.002 -0.010 0.008 0.014 0.001 0.002 0.009 -0.007 -0.014 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.082** 0.012** -0.041* 0.053** 0.096 0.006 0.013*** 0.016 -0.003 -0.006 
EBITt 1.183*** 0.459*** -0.313* 0.772*** 1.397 0.239 0.474*** 0.364*** 0.110 0.226 
EBITt-1 -1.116*** 0.166*** 0.722*** -0.556*** -1.006 -0.042 0.212*** 0.244*** -0.032 -0.066 
BHARt -0.273*** 0.016*** 0.159*** -0.143*** -0.259 -0.045* 0.021*** 0.041*** -0.020* -0.041 
           
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel D.1: OLS Model 6.4 – Investors’ Perception and the Presence of Dominant Shareholder by Shareholders’ Types - Regression (A) (Cont’) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
Firm Size -0.046*** 0.003 0.031*** -0.028*** -0.051 -0.052*** 0.002 0.026*** -0.024*** -0.049 
Firm Age -0.022 0.003 0.032* -0.029 -0.052 -0.022 0.002 0.011 -0.009 -0.018 
Sales Growth -0.116*** -0.003 0.054** -0.057** -0.103 -0.063 -0.012* 0.013 -0.025 -0.051 
Leverage -0.202* 0.001 0.117** -0.116** -0.210 0.200*** -0.008 -0.101*** 0.093*** 0.191 
Book-to-Market 0.034** -0.004* -0.020** 0.016** 0.029 0.104*** -0.005** -0.054*** 0.049*** 0.100 
Constant 0.229 0.023 -0.140 0.163 0.295 0.292 0.031 -0.121 0.152 0.312 
Beta (Mishkin)   1.810***     2.051***   
           
No. of Obs. 1,208  1,208   2,065  2,065   
LR Test (MT) or  
F-Test (OLS) 6.346  242.69   3.774  144.52   
p_value 0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   
Adj. R-Square 0.109     0.056     
           
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (A) included earnings (EBITit) and lagged earnings (EBITt-1) as control variables. 	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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel D.2: OLS Model 6.4 – Investors’ Perception and the Presence of Dominant Shareholder by Shareholders’ Types - Regression (B) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
D_Family 0.115 -0.014 -0.059 0.045 0.073 0.043 0.002 -0.013 0.015 0.031 
D_Government 0.220 0.014 -0.043 0.057 0.092 0.291** 0.013 -0.128** 0.141*** 0.296 
D_Foreign 0.213** 0.013 -0.086 0.099 0.160 0.057 0.008 -0.013 0.021 0.044 
D_Domestic -0.016 -0.077** -0.093 0.016 0.026 -0.007 0.010 0.016 -0.006 -0.013 
D_Bank - - - - - -0.122 -0.005 0.038 -0.043 -0.090 
D_Non-Bank Fin. 0.349 0.034 -0.078 0.112 0.181 0.235 -0.011 -0.129 0.118 0.247 
Share Difference -0.042 0.036** 0.023 0.013 0.021 -0.083 0.002 0.043 -0.041 -0.086 
CV 0.050 -0.019 -0.056 0.037 0.060 0.036 -0.012 -0.040 0.028 0.059 
Board Size 0.179** -0.006 -0.130** 0.124** 0.200 0.069 -0.007 -0.033 0.026 0.054 
Board Independence 0.863*** 0.034 -0.530** 0.564** 0.911 0.033 -0.026 -0.023 -0.003 -0.006 
Board Experience 0.148 -0.006 -0.105 0.099 0.160 0.260*** 0.009 -0.120*** 0.129*** 0.270 
CEO-Founder -0.048 -0.014 -0.003 -0.011 -0.018 0.013 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.012 
CEO Descendant 0.131 0.003 -0.074 0.077 0.124 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 
CEO-Chair 0.150 0.021* -0.052 0.073 0.118 -0.039 0.003 0.017 -0.014 -0.029 
CEO-Group 0.004 -0.009 -0.012 0.003 0.005 -0.039 0.003 0.015 -0.012 -0.025 
BIG 4 0.075 0.003 -0.032 0.035 0.057 0.003 0.003 0.008 -0.005 -0.010 
Audit Partner Tenure 0.100* 0.005 -0.064* 0.069** 0.111 0.007 0.014*** 0.016 -0.002 -0.004 
CFt 1.171*** 0.376*** -0.479 0.855*** 1.381 0.219 0.451*** 0.356*** 0.095 0.199 
TACt 1.166*** 0.357*** -0.501 0.858*** 1.386 0.176 0.424*** 0.349*** 0.075 0.157 
CFt-1 -0.931** 0.214*** 0.682** -0.468 -0.756 -0.093 0.222*** 0.275*** -0.053 -0.111 
           
(This table is continued on the next page) 
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Table 6.12 Comparison between OLS and Mishkin Test  - Pre and Post the Corporate Governance Reform (Cont’) 
Panel D.2: OLS Model 6.4 – Investors’ Perception and the Presence of Dominant Shareholder by Shareholders’ Types - Regression (B) (Cont’) 
 Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
 OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  OLS Mishkin Test (MT)  
Explanatory Variables BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef.  
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) BHARt+1 
Forecasting 
Equation  
(1) 
EBITt+1 
Pricing 
Equation 
(2) 
BHARt+1 
Coef. 
Diff. 
(1) – (2) 
φOLS = 
β(γi - γ*i) 
           
TACt-1 -1.036*** 0.202*** 0.767*** -0.565** -0.912 0.015 0.227*** 0.228** -0.001 -0.002 
BHARt -0.343*** 0.013** 0.216*** -0.203*** -0.328 -0.044* 0.022*** 0.041*** -0.019* -0.040 
Firm Size -0.046*** 0.001 0.031** -0.030** -0.048 -0.050*** 0.002 0.025*** -0.023*** -0.048 
Firm Age -0.041 0.005 0.066** -0.061** -0.099 -0.022 0.001 0.010 -0.009 -0.019 
Sales Growth -0.160*** 0.009 0.095** -0.086* -0.139 -0.063 -0.010 0.016 -0.026 -0.054 
Leverage -0.303** -0.002 0.206** -0.208** -0.336 0.193** -0.011 -0.098*** 0.087** 0.182 
Book-to-Market 0.034** -0.005* -0.020** 0.015 0.024 0.103*** -0.006** -0.053*** 0.047*** 0.099 
Constant 0.142 0.032 -0.127 0.159 0.257 0.287 0.039 -0.110 0.149 0.312 
Beta (Mishkin)   1.615***     2.096***   
           
No. of Obs. 663  663   2,061  2,061   
LR Test (MT) or  
F-Test (OLS) 5.057  207.68   3.537  145.53   
p_value 0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   
Adj. R-Square 0.145     0.056     
           
Note: 
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
2. All variables definitions are shown in Table 6.1. Industry and Year Dummy are included for all models. 
3. Regression (B) included cash flows (CFit), lagged cash flows (CFit-1) Total accruals (TACit) and lagged total accruals (TACit-1) as control variables. 	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6.8 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
 While previous research tended to be limited to investigating whether investors can 
correctly use financial variables to predict firm performance, this research has aimed to 
also consider (1) whether they can correctly perceive the impact of ownership structure 
and other corporate governance characteristics on firm performance and (2) whether 
corporate governance reforms might affect the accuracy of investor perceptions of the 
impacts. 
In order to test whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
structure and corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance, this study has 
applied the OLS method suggested by Kraft et al. (2007). This study has also applied the 
Mishkin Test (1983), which includes the same set of variables, as an alternative 
methodology. The study has noted that one advantage of the MT over the OLS approach 
is that it provides clearer information on the direction of investors’ misperceptions, 
which cannot be seen under the OLS. Therefore, subject to the requirements of future 
research, this study has recommended the application of both methodologies. 
Regarding the first and third questions on investor perceptions of the impact of 
ownership structure on firm performance for all periods and sub-periods, the findings 
have suggested that investors tended to correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration and the presence of dominant shareholders on firm performance in the 
periods that were studied. However, the findings on the sub-periods have revealed that 
investors may have had an overly negative perception of ownership concentration before 
the reform, although the results are not consistent when the MT is applied. 
Regarding different types of shareholder, the evidence has revealed that investors tend to 
have a negative perception of both types of shareholder (government and foreign 
companies), which leads them to underestimate the impact of their ownership on firm 
performance. In addition, investors seem to underestimate the impact of the presence of 
these shareholder types on firm performance when they are the dominant shareholders. 
Nevertheless, evidence from the sub-periods has suggested that the misperception of the 
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impact of government and foreign company investors block ownership on firm 
performance existed in different periods.  
The evidence has revealed that the investors’ negative perception of government block 
ownership and the presence of dominant government shareholders appears only after the 
reforms, and may be caused by the unstable political situation and less confidence in 
government transparency in Thailand, especially after the reforms. Investors therefore 
overlook the true benefit that these structures contribute to firms. 
The evidence has also suggested that investors tend to misperceive the impact of foreign 
company investors block ownership and the existence of dominant foreign shareholders 
on firm performance, but only before the reforms. The negative perception may have 
arisen from the restricted Foreign Company Law (1972), which allowed foreign 
companies to do business in Thailand with some restrictions such as limited share 
ownership. In addition, investors may feel uncomfortable with a monitoring process in 
firms that are mainly owned by foreigners because of a lack of knowledge about these 
companies compared their knowledge of domestic companies, which are normally run 
by well-known families. 
The second and third questions focus on investor perceptions of the impact of other 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance for all periods and sub-periods. 
Regarding boards of directors, the evidence has suggested that investors tend to 
misperceive the impact of board experience on firm performance and that investors 
might take the view that directors with multiple directorships may be too busy rather that 
they have more experience when it comes to monitoring managers. Nevertheless, the 
evidence from the sub-periods has shown that this misperception appeared only after the 
reforms.  
The sub-period findings have also suggested that investors tend to have negative 
perceptions of board size and board independence, but only before the reforms. These 
may be due to a lack of knowledge about the contribution of independent directors to 
firms and a negative perception of larger boards, which may suffer from problems such 
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as the free-rider problem or poor communication between board members. Although the 
evidence from previous chapters does not strongly support the notion that firms benefit 
from having larger boards and more independent directors, it seems that investor 
perceptions of these mechanisms have improved after the reforms. As a result, they tend 
to have correctly perceived the impact of these mechanisms on firm performance after 
the reforms. Hence the reforms that focused on improving the quality of boards of 
directors (in terms of independence, for example) seem to have been successful in 
improving investors’ confidence, even if these mechanisms have not significantly 
improved firm performance in practice. 
This study attempted to add potential variables, which were addressed, to influence to 
future earnings and returns. There is evidence of the misperception of both accounting 
and non-accounting information, which may imply that many investors still have some 
limitations on their ability to correctly predict future earnings and returns. This study 
suggests that ownership structure and other corporate governance mechanisms have 
some influence on the prediction of future earnings and returns. Therefore, future 
research that applies the MT could consider adding these variables in order to reduce the 
problem of omitted variables in the MT. 
This study has some limitations. Firstly, the OLS method, which applied from Kraft et 
al., (2007) and the MT are based on the assumption that all omitted variables were 
rationally priced by investors. Therefore, findings need to be interpreted with caution. 
Secondly, the sample used in this study is smaller than those used in accounting research 
in countries such as the US and therefore the OLS approach and the MT have not 
provided results that are exactly equivalent to those of Kraft et al. (2007). Nevertheless, 
the results from the two methods have been shown to be consistent within this study. It 
will be interesting for future research to repeat the tests with larger samples. 
Thirdly, many factors might affect investor perceptions of ownership structure and other 
corporate governance mechanisms that have not been captured by the methodologies 
used in this study. However, this study aims to understand investor perceptions in 
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general; therefore, no attempt has been made to identify the actual sources of 
misperception. It will be interesting for future research to use other methods, such as 
surveys, to examine investor perceptions of these variables directly. 
Finally, the evidence from this chapter has suggested that the corporate governance 
reforms have succeeded, to some extent, in improving investors’ confidence and ability 
to use public available information. The Thai capital market has also become more 
transparent and more efficient after the reforms. This study proposes that a key to the 
success of corporate governance reform is its efficiency in conveying its role to 
investors. Nevertheless, policy makers and market regulators may need to promote 
awareness of the responsibility and accountability of boards of directors on a continuous 
basis and to closely monitor the efficiency of boards in practice. 
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Chapter 7: Concluding Remarks 
 
7.1 Introduction 
It has been almost a century since Berle and Mean (1932) attracted academic interest to 
the potential problems of the separation of ownership and control. Their argument has 
been challenged by the existence of firms with concentrated ownership around the world 
as well as in Thailand. 
The high concentration of ownership in most listed firms in the Thai capital market 
distinguishes them from those in developed economies such as the US and the UK, 
which tend to have more dispersed ownership. Following the financial crisis, corporate 
governance has been reformed, but on the basis of recommendations developed for 
dispersed ownership models. Therefore, the three empirical studies in this thesis aim to 
provide more complete evidence of the impact of ownership structure1 and other 
corporate governance mechanisms on three areas: firm performance, managers’ 
accounting discretion and investor perceptions of the impact of governance mechanisms 
on firm performance. All the studies have also taken into considered the impact of the 
corporate governance reform. 
7.2 Summary and Implications of the Study 
In response to the contradictory views of the World Bank and previous research in 
Thailand, the first empirical study, in Chapter 4, examines the impact of ownership 
structure on firm performance before and after the reforms. 
The findings reveal that listed companies had high concentrations of ownership, even 
after the reforms. This may imply that most dominant/block shareholders, especially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The study has focused on concentration of ownership by six shareholders types (family, government, 
foreign company investors, domestic company investors, bank and non-bank financial institutional 
investors), the presence of a dominant shareholder, by its types and managerial ownership. Other 
corporate governance mechanisms include board structure, CEO characteristics and auditor reputation and 
expertise. 
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families, are likely to hold shares for long-term objectives, such as to control firms, and 
that the motivation of large and dominant shareholders to contribute to firms depends on 
their type and their level of ownership.  
In contradiction to the World Bank’s claim, this study has not found any evidence that 
high concentration of ownership and the existence of dominant shareholders, especially 
dominant family shareholders, have been detrimental to the performance of listed firms, 
except in the case of bank ownership. In particular, family block owners, tended to 
contribute to both accounting and market performance before and after the reforms, 
though this contribution did not significantly improve following the reforms. The 
evidence may imply that family shareholders restrain themselves from exploiting other 
shareholders. Their block shareholding may also motivate them to provide either better 
monitoring or efficient control in order to retain their family’s reputation in society or to 
transfer business to their heirs. 
High levels of shareholding motivated government shareholders to participate in the 
monitoring of firms, but only before the reforms, and this may imply that the weak 
governance system motivated them to play an active role in monitoring. The expectation 
of a better system after the reforms, therefore, could have reduced the motivation of 
government to be active in monitoring. 
Additionally, high foreign company ownership motivated foreign companies to provide 
good monitoring, but only after the reforms. The Government’s campaign for foreign 
investment may have allowed foreign companies to hold more shares in firms after the 
reforms, substantially increasing their incentive and ability to provide good monitoring.  
However, there is evidence of exploitation by bank blockholders, in terms of market 
performance, before the reforms. Since most listed firms, especially family-owned firms, 
have very close relationships with banks, this might have reduced the motivation of the 
banks to monitor them and created negative investor perceptions of bank ownership. 
After the crisis, the BOT increased its monitoring over banks, possibly motivating them 
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to provide better monitoring as owners. As a result, the negative impact of bank 
ownership on firm performance disappeared after the reforms. 
A significant positive impact of managerial ownership on firm performance is found 
when managerial ownership is defined based on the shares owned by all directors. No 
significant relationship is found when only the ownership of executive directors is 
included. The evidence suggests that levels of shares helped to increase the motivation 
of non-executive directors to supervise managers. However, it did not help to align the 
interests of executive directors with those of shareholders in the context of Thailand. 
There is also evidence of the inefficiency of larger boards before and after the reforms, 
indicating some problems such as inefficient communication among the board members 
or a free rider problem. Board independence is associated with high accounting 
performance, but only before the reforms. This may imply that the requirement to 
introduce audit committees after the reforms merely increased size of boards but did not 
improve their quality in terms of their independence. 
The findings also show lower accounting performance in firms with CEO founders 
before the reforms and with CEO descendants after the reforms. The evidence suggests 
that CEO founders might have exercised their control in the way that did not contribute 
to firms before the reforms. The lower performance of firms with CEO descendants after 
the reforms may imply a lack of competency among founder’s descendants.  
However, firms with CEO founders and those with CEO descendants appear to have had 
superior market performance before the reforms. Since the corporate governance 
mechanisms were claimed to be weak, these structure may have been viewed as 
substitute governance by investors. 
Additionally, firms with CEO duality performed more poorly than those in which the 
two positions were separated did, but only after the reforms. Since the reforms especially 
emphasised the accountability of managers, they may have motivated CEO-chairmen to 
avoid market disciplines. In contrast, firms in which the CEO and chairman came from 
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the same group (father and son) did perform better in terms of accounting performance 
than those without this structure did, in both sub-periods. Efficient communication and 
family ties, such as trust or love among family members, may increase the ability of 
chairmen to monitor CEOs. Nevertheless, this structure might not have been favoured by 
investors, which would explain its negative impact on market performance before the 
reforms. 
Chapter 5 investigates the impact of ownership structure and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on managers’ opportunistic accounting discretion, as measured by 
discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues. The evidence suggests that the ability 
of blockholders to govern opportunistic discretions is subject to their type, the type of 
accounts (such as accruals or revenues) and the periods studied. 
In particular, most types of shareholders (such as families, domestic companies, bank 
and non-bank financial institutions) have both incentive and ability to limit the use of 
accounting discretion over revenues. In fact, revenues accounts are less complex than 
accruals accounts are; they are substantial and often scrutinised by regulators and the 
public. Therefore, most shareholders have more ability and incentive to limit the use of 
discretion over revenues rather than over accruals.  
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that ownership by domestic companies, bank and 
non-bank financial institutions was associated with lower discretionary revenues, but 
only before the reforms, and that the reforms, which were expected to strengthen 
corporate governance, may have actually reduced the incentive of these blockholders to 
participate in the monitoring of financial reporting. In contrast, families appear to have 
limited the use of accounting discretion after the reforms. 
Foreign company block ownership appears to have increased the incentive and ability of 
foreign company shareholders, as the largest shareholders, to limit discretionary accruals 
before the reform, suggesting that foreign company investors may be more familiar with 
accruals accounting and, in turn, more able to limit accounting discretion over accruals. 
However, firms with dominant foreign company shareholders appear to have used 
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discretionary revenues more than other firms did, suggesting that, when foreign 
companies gain efficient control, they are motivated to influence managers to prepare 
financial reports for opportunistic purposes, such as to boost sales in parent companies. 
Managerial ownership appears to align the interests of all directors and executive 
directors, in turn reducing the use of accounting discretion over revenues. In respects to 
the periods before and after the reforms, there is evidence that higher levels of 
ownership by executive directors increased their motivation to use discretionary 
revenues before the reforms. However, higher levels of ownership appear to have 
limited discretionary revenues after the reforms, suggesting that the promotion 
accountability in the role of directors may have reduced their motivation to exercise 
accounting discretion. 
Regarding other governance mechanisms, large boards tended to facilitate the use of 
discretionary accruals. Since accruals accounts are more complex and need more time to 
be verified by boards than revenues accounts do, managers may have more opportunities 
to exercise accounting discretion over accruals. Larger boards may have free-rider 
problems and inefficient communication and therefore be unable to efficiently limit 
accounting discretions. In contrast, the evidence suggests that the larger boards tended to 
have the motivation and ability to limit discretionary revenues, possibly because 
revenues accounts are less complex and are normally spotted by regulators. 
The evidence also suggests that the reforms may have increased independent directors’ 
incentive to facilitate the use of accruals discretions in order to avoid punishment by 
regulators or retain their reputation. However, it also shows that board experience helped 
to limit revenues discretions after the reforms, suggesting that directors with multiple 
directorships have more ability to limit accounting discretion and are not too busy to 
neglect their responsibilities. 
Firms with CEO founders and CEO descendants tended to engage less in accounting 
discretion over accruals, especially after the reforms. Experience in business and better 
communication between family members and family reputation may have helped CEO 
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founders and their descendants to engage less in opportunistic accounting discretion, 
especially after the reforms. 
Additionally, firms that were audited by BIG4 auditors appear to have had lower 
discretionary revenues before the reforms. The evidence also suggests that the 
experience of auditors (five years or more) increased their ability to detect the use of 
discretionary accruals and revenues before the reforms, highlighting the role of external 
auditors and the importance of auditor-partner years’ experience in the detection of 
accounting discretion. 
Chapter 6 investigates whether investors can correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
structure and other corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. The 
evidence suggests that they tended to correctly perceive the impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. However, their misperception of some types of 
dominant shareholders, government and foreign companies in particular, led them to 
incorrectly estimate the impact of these shareholders on firm performance. 
The evidence further suggests that a negative perception of government ownership, 
possibly derived from factors such as unstable politics and the fear of exploitation by the 
government, after the reforms led investors to underestimate the performance of firms 
that were owned and controlled by the government. In addition, a lack of knowledge 
about foreign company owners before the reforms may have led investors to 
underestimate the performance of firms that were owned and controlled by foreign 
companies. 
Investors appear to have perceived the impact of board experience on firm performance 
incorrectly, and this might reflect that they had a negative perception of multiple 
directorships (for example, assuming that directors may be too busy) in turn overlooked 
the benefits of their experience after the reforms. Their negative perception of larger and 
more independent boards led investors to overestimate the negative impact of large 
boards on firm performance. However, the evidence suggests that the reforms helped to 
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improve this perception and, in turn, helped investors to perceive the impacts more 
accurately after the reforms. 
7.3 Implications of the Study 
Overall, the findings of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have several implications for policy makers 
and regulators for the development of appropriate governance regulations and policies.  
Firstly, the evidence of Chapter 4 suggests that levels of ownership can help to motivate 
many types of blockholders to participate in monitoring and that firms do benefit 
especially from having dominant family shareholders. In addition, they also help to 
motivate most types of blockholders to limit the use of managers’ accounting discretion 
over accruals and/or revenues (Chapter 5). The findings contradict the view that high 
concentrations of ownership, especially with the presence of dominant shareholders, 
causes harm to firms and suggests that these structures could be a substitute for other 
governance mechanisms which do not work well in the context of Thailand. However, 
the negative views/opinions about some types of shareholder (government and foreign 
companies) caused investors to misperceive the performance of firms owned or 
controlled by these shareholders (Chapter 6).  
In fact, the corporate governance reforms have been mostly adopted from international 
corporate governance frameworks that were developed in contexts of dispersed 
ownership. Therefore, it is important for policy makers to be aware of this difference 
when considering governance policies. For example, the recently amended SEA of 1992 
aims to provide room for minority shareholders to participate in companies’ important 
matters. In particular, it allows a shareholder or shareholders with at least 5% of voting 
rights to submit a written proposal to a board of directors for an agenda of the 
shareholders’ meeting. However, it could be difficult in practice for small shareholders 
to efficiently gather that number of shares in order to make a proposal, and it is difficult 
to win a vote in firms with highly concentrated ownership. It is also important for policy 
makers to ensure that possible costs incurred from enforcement policies do not exceed 
	  	  
Chapter 7	  
521	  
benefits that firms may receive from their blockholders/dominant shareholders (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). 
Secondly, board structures including size and independence turned out to be less 
important for monitoring managers than they were intended to be, both in terms of 
enhancing firm performance and in limiting the use of managers’ accounting discretion. 
The evidence suggests that the attempts of regulators to promote the role of independent 
directors have not been completely effective, at least during the period of the study. 
The high concentration of ownership in most listed firms may have limited the role of 
boards of directors in supervising management because the owners and directors were 
the same people or came from the same groups. Furthermore, firms may have been 
forced to comply with rules and regulations without caring much for quality of 
governance that they implemented. For example, the requirement for three independent 
directors on audit committees might have forced firms to appoint new independent 
directors just to comply with the rule but without caring about their quality in terms of 
independence. 
Therefore, policy makers and regulators could develop policies that emphasise 
“qualities” (such as independence) rather than “quantities” of directors on boards. For 
example, they could consider how “independence” should be defined and established. In 
fact, requirements on the “qualification” of directors have been included in the SEA 
(1992), however they need to be efficiently verified and regularly monitored by 
regulators in order to ensure that the qualifications are actually met. 
The evidence also suggests that ownership could be a factor that motivates non-
executive directors to supervise firms. Currently, independent directors2 are allowed to 
hold shares not in excess of 1%. Therefore, policy makers could consider whether the 
threshold is sufficient to motivate these directors to perform their duty. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Notification of the Securities and Exchange Commission No. TorChor. 28/2008: 8-9. 
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Thirdly, evidence from Chapter 5 suggests that the reforms have not made a significant 
contribution in terms of improving the impact of concentrated ownership on firm 
performance and limiting the use of managers’ accounting discretion. In fact, they seem 
to have created some more leeway for CEO-Chairmen to engage in opportunistic 
activities. A separation of the two positions would be one possible solution (Jensen, 
1993), although this must be considered very carefully because this might also create 
some costs to firms that would benefit from CEO duality.  
It is worth quoting Jensen (2005:8) in the “Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity”: 
 “I realize it is not fashionable to use such harsh language to describe what 
are almost universal practices. But when numbers are manipulated to tell 
the markets what they want to hear (or what managers want them to hear) 
rather than the true status of the firm – it is lying, and when real operating 
decisions that would maximize value are compromised to meet market 
expectations real long-term value is being destroyed.” 
Fourthly, evidence from Chapter 6 reveals that investor perceptions of boards of 
directors, in terms of their size and independence, improved after the reforms, even 
though the reforms might not have helped to improve firm performance significantly. 
The findings may indicate the success of the reforms in promoting the role of boards of 
directors, but they call for regulators to put more effort into making these governance 
structures work efficiently in practice and to aim beyond merely achieving recognition 
for a brand of “good” corporate governance systems. 
However, the evidence suggests that, after the reforms, investors had negative 
perceptions of directors who held multiple directorships; they tended to believe that 
these directors were too busy and to overlook the benefits that firms could receive from 
them. Therefore, it is important for policy makers and regulators to monitor how these 
directors work for each board. For example, regulators could regularly monitor 
indicators such as the frequency of directors’ attendance at board meetings and report 
this information to investors, helping to alter the perception of directors as being too 
busy. 
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Fifthly, the evidence suggests that long auditor-partner tenure may increase the ability of 
auditors to audit financial reporting, in turn reducing managers’ opportunistic accounting 
discretion. Therefore, the requirement for auditor rotation every five years may create 
costs for firms. 
Finally, this study proposes some recommendations to improve the efficiency of boards 
and management in the long run.  
Firstly, policy makers should pay more attention to improve director and management 
awareness of ethical and moral practices and to improve communication between boards 
of directors, mangers and other market participants.  
Secondly, because an accurate perception of corporate governance structures is 
important to the efficiency of the capital market, it is necessary for policy makers to 
ensure that news and publications convey correct information to investors.  
Thirdly, training on the ethical and moral dimensions of corporate governance structures 
and their benefits and costs should not be limited only to boards or managers but also 
provided to shareholders and investors in order to improve their understanding of how 
these structures work and their role as shareholders.  
As Jensen (2005) argues, high expectations of investors might force managers and 
boards of directors to make the problem worse by lying to the public. Social motivations 
such as “a fear of losing face” could be also minimised by efficient communication 
between market participants. This would be difficult and would take time in order to be 
successful. However, improving the ethics, morality and communication skills of market 
participants should offer a more sustainable solution in a world of uncertainty that 
cannot be entirely covered by laws and regulations. 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
This thesis has been subject to some limitations. Firstly, all three studies were 
investigated based on firms that were listed in the SET. Generalisation to other firms or 
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markets is not straightforward, even though Thailand is, in some respects, a typical 
emerging economy with typical corporate governance structures and problems.  
Secondly, the variables used in this study (such as discretionary accruals) may contain 
some errors from the models used to estimate them. For example, there has been an on-
going debate about the inefficiency of the existing accruals-based models to classify 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Nevertheless, this study implies that many 
models for comparison, including those based on discretionary revenues, as suggested 
by Stubben (2010), are more powerful than accruals-based models. 
Limited ownership data for limited companies may have caused some errors in the 
identification of ultimate shareholders and the estimation of the ratio of cash flow rights 
to control rights. However, this study has added domestic companies as another category 
in order to control for this. Additionally, while this study has attempted to identify 
relationships among family shareholders, it is possible that some have been missed due 
to undisclosed relationships. 
Thirdly, this study has assumed that the use of managers’ accounting discretion is 
opportunistic, while the existing literature proposes that it is possible that managers will 
use it to convey useful information to the public. 
Fourthly, although this study has used a fixed-effects model to control for unobserved 
firm heterogeneity, it is still possible that the model could have been compromised by 
omitted variables. Nevertheless, alternative methodologies such as OLS and random 
effects model have provided consistent results. The OLS and MT tests for investor 
perceptions of corporate governance structures may also have been compromised by 
omitted variables if any of them were not rationally priced by investors. This study has 
also been affected by the limited size of the samples, which caused the results from the 
OLS to contain some errors. Nevertheless, the results from both the OLS and MT have 
been consistent. 
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Finally, it is difficult to identify the sources of investor misperceptions correctly in the 
context of this study and therefore no attempt has been made to do so. This study has 
aimed to gain more understanding on whether investors can correctly perceive the 
impacts of reforms and whether the reforms have achieved their goals by improving 
investors’ ability to estimate the impact of corporate government structures in general. 
The results from this study must be therefore be interpreted with caution. 
7.5 Future Research 
The results of this study suggest several potential avenues for future research. Firstly, 
small and medium-sized enterprises have become popular as alternative investments, 
and future research could investigate the impact of ownership structure and other 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in the context of these 
businesses. It would also be interesting to investigate the impact of corporate governance 
on non-listed family firms. As the former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun 
comments, good corporate governance should be implemented in both listed and non-
listed companies (Panyarachun, 2013). 
Secondly, future research may use new, alternative accruals-based approaches such as 
that of Dechow et al. (2012) with reversal factors to improve the quality of the 
discretionary accruals variable. This study also recommends the use of discretionary 
revenues-based approaches (Stubben, 2010) as a comparative measurement. In addition, 
it will be interesting for future research to further investigate and distinguish whether 
managers exercise accounting discretion for opportunistic or beneficial purposes (for 
examples, see Bowen et al., 2008; Core et al., 1999).  
Thirdly, future research could employ both the OLS and the MT to investigate investor 
perceptions of governance structures in larger samples. In addition, future accounting 
research, on accruals anomalies in particular, could add governance variables as control 
variables in order to minimise the omitted variables problem, as highlighted by Kraft et 
al. (2007). 
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Fourthly, future research could investigate the sources of misperception in greater depth 
using qualitative analysis (such as surveys) as well as quantitative analysis. This would 
be important for the development of capital markets beyond Thailand.  
Finally yet importantly, further work should be done to gain more understanding on 
ownership structure and corporate governance in other parts of the world where the 
agency problem exists.  
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